The Seizure and Allocation of Resource Rents Chile and Peru Compared

Jose Carlos Orihuela Columbia University

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Mining in Chile and Peru, 2007

	Share of Fiscal Revenue	Share of Exports	Mining Exports (US\$ millions)	GDP (US\$ millions)
Chile	26%	64%	40,000	165,000
Peru /1	23%	70%	20,000	107,000

1/: Includes hydrocarbons

Sources: Central Banks, Consejo Minero and SUNAT

Mining and Fiscal Revenue, 2007

	Mining Taxation	Contribution of	Mining Share of	CODELCO	CODELCO
	/2	Mining to Fiscal	Fiscal Revenue	Contribution to	Share of Fiscal
	(US\$ millions)	Revenue /3		Fiscal Revenue	Revenue
		(US\$ millions)		(US\$ millions)	
Chile	9,000	11,400	26%	8,000	18%
Peru /1	4,750	4,750	23%		

Notes:


1/ Includes hydrocarbons

2/ Includes CODELCO Sales Tax for Army Forces in Chile

3/ Includes CODELCO dividends

Sources: Central Banks, Consejo Minero and SUNAT

Why has the Chilean State...



	Contribution of	Market Value of	Market Value of
	Mining to Fiscal	Copper Funds	Total Treasury's
	Revenue	December 2007	Portfolio
	2007		December 2007
Chile	11,400	15,500	21,100
Peru	4,750		

- ... saved more...?
 _ (why Copper Funds?)
- ... and seized more?
 - (why Codelco?)

Allocating the Rent

The Chilean Copper Funds

- (1982-3: Banking crisis)
 - 1986: Copper Compensation Fund (FEIC)
- (1990: Concertación)
 - 1990-2000: Fiscal-conservatism in left-to-centre democracy
- (1999: A socialist President is about to be elected;
 1997-98 crisis: copper price back to early 1980s level)
 - 2000: Structural Surplus Fiscal Rule: Copper Price and Y
- (2005: Boom-cycle starts; royalties debate and law)
 - 2006: Fiscal Responsibility <u>Law</u>: FEES and FRP
 - 2007 Royalty: Innovation Fund for Competitiveness (FIC)

Saving the Resource Rent

	US\$ Millions
Seizure Mining Fiscal Revenues	11,300
Allocation Contribution to Countercydical Fund /1	10,500
Contribution to Pensions Fund	700
Contribution to Innovations Fund	50

/1: Does not include FEIC endowment

=> Virtually all Mining Fiscal Revenue was saved in 2007

Why?

- Hacienda technocratic & political autonomy
- New 'Santiago Consensus': Inflation targeting, <u>competitive E</u>, trade integration, fiscallysustainable welfare state
- Shared Neo-Keynesian macroeconomic view (counter-cyclical + "original sin")
- => Strong *Hacienda* within a strong state within a less contested political economy

The Peruvian Way

(1999: elections are about to come; 1997-98 crisis)

• 1999: Fiscal Prudency and Transparency Law

(2000-2006: Return to Democracy

- Executives without Congress majority; political parties as electoral machines
- 2001: Regionalization Law; regions ask for more resources
- Mining enjoying tax-breaks)
- 2000-2006: Fiscally-responsible behavior (primary surplus grew from -0.6 to 3.4% GDP); yet the Law is not 100% enforced

(Price increase, end of tax-breaks, Royalties Law)

- (2006: "Outsider" Humala close to win elections, had promised to review tax-stability contracts)
- 2006: "Voluntary Contribution" Law

Saving in the Good Years: Two Paths

Revenue Flows and Stabilization Funds

	Chile		Peru		
Year	Mining Fiscal Revenue	Countercyclical Fund	Mining Fiscal Revenue	Countercyclical Fund	
2000	1,017	673	660	100	
2001	697	621	341	182	
2002	616	277	287	312	
2003	898	75	502	295	
2004	4,102	208	802	302	
2005	6,307	967	1,448	314	
2006	11,126	2,564	3,053	336	
2007	11,339	13,100	4,247	485	
2008 (Oct)		18,660		1,700	

Current US\$ millions

As a Percentage of Fiscal Revenue


	Chile		Peru	
Year	Mining Fiscal	Countercyclical	Mining Fiscal	Countercyclical
	Revenue	Fund	Revenue	Fund
2000	6%	4%	9%	1%
2001	5%	4%	4%	2%
2002	4%	2%	4%	4%
2003	6%	0%	6%	3%
2004	19%	1%	8%	3%
2005	22%	3%	12%	3%
2006	29%	7%	20%	2%
2007	25%	29%	23%	3%


Why?

- Not needed? Short-term priorities?
- Lower Treasury strength to lead the polity; wait-andsee policy-making; day-to-day political contestation
- Lower technical capacities (no DIPRES, no Cochilco)
- Lower autonomy from private interests
- Policy debate still too ideological and polar, although *"heterodoxos"* run well the Central Bank in 2002-6: high reserves, inflation targeting, dedollarization
- => Not-as-strong Treasury within a weak state within a highly-contested political economy

Seizing the Rent


Historical Importance of Mining





- Chile
 - Copper (after nitrates)
 - 80% before new X and mining liberalization.
 - 2007: Codelco = 30%.Ym
- Peru
 - Multi-metallic; gold since mid-1990s
 - 40-70% of exports for most of the century

"The Wage of Chile"



Post-War Peruvian Pendulum

- Less and weaker state
 - Less ISI, less developmental state, less involvement in the mining industry
- 1939-1948: Taxes and interventionism
- 1948-1956: Right-wing coup: free-markets and clientelism
- 1956-1968: Progressive centre. Inflation; weak land reform; oil: *Pagina* 12
- 1968-1980: Left-wing coup: nationalization of mining (Cerro de Pasco and Marcona; deal reached with Southern)

The weight of history?

- Pinochet kept CODELCO state-owned (as well as ENAP and CORFO; utilities and infrastructure went private)
- Fujimori privatized CENTROMIN
 - The weight of state institutions?
 - The weight of the military? (10% sales tax?)

Research Agenda

- The non-privatization of CODELCO
- Evaluation of CODELCO and CENTROMIN
- Evolution of planning and budgetary functions in Chile and Peru