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Chinese Digital Platform Companies’ Expansion in the Belt and Road Countries

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Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................... 1

A. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 2

B. Chinese Digital Platforms’ Expansion in the Belt and Road Countries ....... 3
   B1. State-firm relations in Chinese ICT firms’ overseas expansion in the Belt and Road countries ................................................................................................................................. 4
   B2. Host country context shaping Chinese ICT firms’ overseas investments and business operations ................................................................................................................................. 6

C. Methodology ...................................................................................................................................... 7

D. Chinese Digital Platforms’ Overseas Investment: Quantitative Evidence ... 9

E. Host Country Context Shaping Chinese Digital Platforms’ Expansion: The Case of Indonesia ................................................................................................................................................... 13
   E1. Drivers of Chinese platform investment in Indonesia ......................................................... 13
   E2. Impact of the Indonesian context on Chinese platforms’ expansion and local business strategies ............................................................................................................................................. 17

F. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................... 25

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................................................................. 28

REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................ 29

APPENDIX 1 LIST OF INTERVIEWEES .................................................................................................. 36
Chinese Digital Platform Companies’ Expansion in the Belt and Road Countries

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2023

Abstract

The emergence of digital platforms is shifting the digital economy toward a “platform economy”, and Chinese platform-based businesses like Alibaba, Tencent, JD are increasingly expanding in the Global South. Alongside this, the Chinese government has been promoting digital economy collaboration with other emerging markets through high-level engagement under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its digital economy component the “Digital Silk Road” (DSR). Despite significant market interest and policy attention, grounded empirical analysis of Chinese digital platforms’ expansion within Belt and Road Initiative countries is scarce. This study employs a mixed-method approach, drawing on both quantitative data of Chinese platform companies’ overseas foreign direct investment and qualitative data obtained from fieldwork interviews in Southeast Asia and from secondary sources that focuses on a case study of Chinese platforms in Indonesia.

It finds that Chinese digital platforms largely conducted their overseas expansion based on commercial interests, and BRI as Beijing’s high-level policy framework has had a limited direct impact on the expansion of the privately-owned Chinese platforms and their local business operations within host countries. The vagueness of BRI/DSR has also allowed platform companies investing in Indonesia to choose how to engage with Chinese BRI/DSR rhetoric depending on the local context. Furthermore, local contextual factors, including Indonesian policy, policy implementation, and labor market, have shaped the platforms’ business expansion. Firms have been pushed to adapt to local policy priorities and socioeconomic context, seek local partners and invest in local capacity building. The findings suggest a more complicated state-firm relationship in Chinese digital platforms’ expansion than that which is often perceived, and the importance of host country contexts in shaping Chinese digital platforms’ local business strategies.
A. Introduction

The digital economy is now equivalent to 15.5% of global GDP, growing two and a half times faster than global GDP over the past 15 years (World Bank, 2020). Chinese firms are key players in this growth: from 2005 to 2019, the scale of China’s digital economy value-added expanded from RMB 2.6 trillion to RMB 35.8 trillion (USD 0.41 trillion to USD 5.63 trillion) (CAICT, 2020). Chinese ICT (information and communications technology) firms have also embarked on ambitious global expansion: in 2020, the technology, media & entertainment, and telecommunications sector was the top sector by deal value for overseas mergers & acquisitions of Chinese firms (EY, 2021). Southeast Asian countries, some of the world’s fastest-growing digital markets, are among the major destinations of interest. For instance, Chinese venture capital firms quadrupled their investments in Southeast Asian startups in 2019 alone (Zinser, 2021).

Such market trends did not escape policymakers’ attention. The Chinese government promotes digital economy collaboration through high-level engagement under the banner of the “Digital Silk Road” (DSR), part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to promote connectivity with other emerging markets. Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi remarked in 2020 that the “Digital Silk Road is a priority area for BRI cooperation in the next stage” (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020). China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states designated the Year 2020 as the ASEAN-China Year of Digital Economy Cooperation (Xinhua, 2020). On the other hand, Beijing’s rhetoric of “win-win” digital economy collaboration with emerging economies has garnered suspicions. For instance, former US Attorney General William P. Barr criticized the DSR as “PRC’s plans to dominate the world’s digital infrastructure” (US Department of Justice, 2020).

Despite the significant market interest and policy attention, scholarly analysis of Chinese ICT companies’ and especially digital platform companies’ expansion in the Belt and Road countries is still limited (Shen, 2018; Shen, 2021; Keane & Wu, 2018; Vila Seoane, 2020; Su & Flew, 2021). In discussing China’s presence in the BRI countries and in the Global South more broadly, the predominant narratives focus on the interests and actions of the Chinese state (Rolland, 2015). Such state-centric perspectives, while important, can neglect the role of private firms and host country environments in shaping Chinese firms’ expansion and business operations. Therefore, scholars have called for more empirical inquiries to show the complex realities of Chinese overseas investments (Lai et al., 2020) and study firms’ expansion in the BRI countries “from the ground” (Oliveira et al., 2020). This paper contributes to this nascent area of inquiry and adopts a mixed-method approach, using both quantitative data on Chinese overseas investment, and qualitative data gathered from fieldwork interviews and secondary sources. It seeks to answer the following research questions: How do Chinese digital platforms engage with the BRI in their overseas investment in emerging markets? How do host country contexts influence the expansion of Chinese digital platforms within the BRI countries?
This study’s findings overall suggest a more complicated firm-state relationship in Chinese digital platform companies’ overseas expansion than what is often perceived, and the host country context, including policies, policy implementation, and the labor market as important factors shaping the firms’ business strategies. Chinese platform companies, as private-sector firms backed by transnational capital, largely conducted their overseas expansion based on commercial interests. BRI/DSR as Beijing’s high-level policy framework remained a vague slogan with limited direct incentives and impact on the firms’ expansion on the ground. Considering local sentiment towards the BRI, firms cautiously engaged with Chinese state rhetoric such as the DSR/BRI in local business operations. On the other hand, host country governments and market players are not passive actors in their engagement with Chinese platforms, but play vital roles in shaping the trajectory of Chinese platforms’ expansion. Platforms were pushed to align with host country government’s digital economy development aspirations, while also adapting to the realities of policy implementation, seeking local partners, and investing in local capacity building.

This paper is structured as follows. The next section situates the study’s contribution within two main bodies of scholarship, on state-firm relationships in Chinese ICT firms’ overseas expansion, and on the host country contexts in Chinese ICT firms’ overseas expansion. The third section outlines the research methods. The fourth section presents an overview of the scope and the country destinations of Chinese digital platform companies’ overseas investments. The fifth section focuses on Chinese platforms’ expansion in Indonesia, the country receiving the largest volume of platform investments among the BRI countries. Drawing on interview-based fieldwork data and secondary documents, the section analyzes Chinese platform companies’ engagement with the BRI/DSR in their expansion in Indonesia, and importantly, how Indonesia’s particular policy and market context shaped their expansion. The final section concludes the study and reflects on the importance of shifting away from a Beijing-centric lens to studying the firms’ interests and behaviors and the host country’s development context in understanding Chinese digital expansion in the Global South.

**B. Chinese Digital Platforms’ Expansion in the Belt and Road Countries**

Digital platforms play an increasingly central role in today’s digital economy, having transformed innovation, organizations, and socioeconomic relationships with important policy implications (OECD, 2019). In China, platform companies like Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, JD and ByteDance have played instrumental roles across different application domains in its digital economy. While existing research on digital platforms focuses on business models in the Global North, increasing interests arise in studying the expansion of platforms in developing country settings (Nicholson et al., 2021).

This study attempts to contribute a grounded, empirical analysis of Chinese digital platforms’ overseas expansion in emerging markets and their local business strategies in the Belt and
Road countries. Beijing launched the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 to promote “policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds” with developing economies in Asia, Europe, and Africa with the addition of Latin America and the Caribbean states in 2018 (PRC NDRC, 2015; Jenkins, 2021). The Digital Silk Road was conceived as the digital economy component. According to Shen (2018), the Chinese state aims to achieve five policy objectives through DSR: cutting industrial overcapacity in both the ICT sector and the broader economy, enabling Chinese firms’ global expansion, supporting the internationalization of the Chinese currency RMB, constructing a China-centered transnational network infrastructure, and promoting its vision of Internet-enabled inclusive globalization.

Existing literature about the political economy of Chinese ICT firms’ overseas expansion in the BRI countries largely focuses on traditional large-scale telecommunications infrastructures such as fiber-optic cable construction, network equipment, 5G, and satellite networks (Cheney, 2019; Brown & Burjanadze, 2020; Hemmings, 2020; Mochinaga, 2020; Blanchard & Hooijmaaiers, 2021; Erie & Streinz, 2021; van der Lugt, 2021; Aboul-Dahab, 2021). With a few exceptions (Shen, 2017; Logan et al., 2018; Hernandez, 2019; Keane & Yu, 2019; Vila Seoane, 2020; Su & Flew, 2021; Shen, 2021), digital platform companies are largely missing from the analysis. Yet a review of Chinese government documents and state media articles shows that investments promoted under the DSR/BRI banner cover wide-ranging areas in the digital economy beyond the telecommunications infrastructure. They include e-commerce, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, smart cities, the Internet of Things, financial technologies (fintech), social networking, blockchain, online entertainment, animation, online games, science and technology parks, technology transfer centers, innovation hubs, startup incubators, student scholarships and exchange programs (PRC NDRC, 2015; China-ASEAN Expo Secretariat, 2015; CAICT, 2016; PRC MOST, 2016; PRC MOST, 2017; Xinhua, 2017a; Xinhua, 2017b; Xinhua, 2017c; Xinhua, 2018; Xinhua, 2019). In other words, all kinds of investments and partnership projects involving Chinese ICT firms in the Belt and Road countries could fall under the BRI/DSR umbrella. Considering the important role that platforms play in today’s digital economy, the expansion of Chinese digital platforms into the BRI countries warrants further analysis.

**B1. State-firm relations in Chinese ICT firms’ overseas expansion in the Belt and Road countries**

Scholarship in international affairs about Chinese digital expansion in emerging markets has a predominant focus on the strategic interests of the Chinese state. Chinese scholarly works tend to portray an idealistic vision of ICT expansion as a beneficial and “win-win collaboration” for both China and the host countries (Woon, 2021). However, western policy-oriented literature tends to view Chinese digital expansion as a means for the Chinese state to project its power abroad amid growing US-China competition. For instance, scholars in several prominent western think tanks argue that the rising power of Chinese players could challenge the US-centric Internet and cyber-governance model and threaten its regional security interests (Hemmings, 2020; Mochinaga, 2020; IISS, 2021). Cheney (2019, pp. 1-2)
argues that the Chinese government perceives “technological advancement as the sphere in which it can most adequately challenge the United States’ global power without creating direct confrontation”, and through DSR Beijing could “maintain economic components of the (liberal) order that have facilitated its economic rise, while spreading a politically illiberal model of governance”. Thomas-Noone (2018) argues that China is in a growing struggle against the US over “who will lead in new technologies and set the rules for how they are used and built, as well as how and where they are deployed”, and developing countries accepting Chinese investment should avoid entering “another colonial period, this time in the digital age”.

Such analysis, through the lens of Chinese state interests in US-China great power rivalry, certainly shows important policy concerns. However, such state-centric analysis is primarily based on traditional telecommunications infrastructure projects instead of the digital platform companies. It also tends to utilize secondary policy documents instead of first-hand empirical data from emerging markets. Unlike state-owned telecommunications network operators like China Mobile, or state-financed telecommunications equipment providers like ZTE, platform companies like Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (BAT) are private firms, having amassed significant capital from the Chinese market, international stock exchanges and global investors.

Rejecting the view of the Chinese digital platform companies as mere extensions of the state, a small but growing body of literature in media and communications highlights their complex relationships with the state and international capital (Shen, 2017; Shen, 2021; Su & Flew, 2021; Keane & Wu, 2018; Keane & Yu, 2019). Platform companies certainly benefited from “China’s state-led digital capitalism” in their domestic market expansion (Hong, 2017, p. 145). Yet in domestic markets, there are “tensions and potential contradictions arising from the reliance of the Chinese state on the BAT to build digital infrastructure” (Su & Flew, 2021), as firms seek to minimize direct state regulation for their business models. Chinese firms may also engage in fierce battles with each other, instead of acting in concert under state demands as some would assume. An example is ByteDance’s lawsuit alleging that Tencent’s WeChat and QQ messaging apps ban their users from sharing content from Douyin, the Chinese version of short-form video app TikTok owned by ByteDance (He, 2021).

As this study will show, the tension between the platform companies’ profit-seeking logic and the state’s political interests also exists in overseas expansion. On the one hand, high-tech firms’ overseas merger and acquisition activities can exhibit a certain degree of rhetorical alignment with policies like the BRI (Oh & No, 2020). For instance, Alibaba has promoted its Electronic World Trade Platform by employing the BRI discourse of “inclusive globalization” benefiting developing countries and disenfranchised groups such as small enterprises, youth, and women (Du, 2017; Vila Seoane, 2020). However, firms also seek profits in overseas markets, and profit-seeking inevitably prioritizes tangible commercial interests and incentives and seeks to minimize any possible negative impacts on their business operations. Chinese tech companies, having relied on international capital to fund business expansion, are subject to the profit-driven interests of global investors and capital
markets (Shen, 2017; Shen, 2021; Jia & Winseck, 2018; Jia & Liang, 2021). For instance, as Shen (2021) pointed out, different units of domestic and international capital, and state agencies both inside and outside of China, have interacted with Alibaba’s developmental strategies and influenced the company’s global expansion.

Moreover, from the side of the Chinese government, contrary to popular perceptions, the BRI or its digital economy component the DSR is far from a top-down plan carefully orchestrated by Beijing and imposed effectively upon platform companies. In the ICT sector more broadly, studies have critically examined the implementation of the DSR, which “did not occur with the degree of coordination that Beijing has projected, and foreign observers have feared” (Greene & Triolo, 2020). Scholarship studying Chinese telecommunications firms’ expansion shows that they provide low-cost products and localized services that appeal to price-conscious vendors and consumers in emerging markets (Harwit, 2013; Wen, 2020; Namingit & Al Haddad, 2020), and firm-initiated expansion can be merely rebranded by Beijing as part of the DSR (Greene & Triolo, 2020). Studies on BRI implementation also show that various stakeholders within China, including local governments and firms, employ the BRI as a broad policy slogan that is open to interpretation, competition, and contestation (Jones & Zeng, 2019; Zeng, 2019). Thus, treating Chinese firms as a monolithic entity together with Beijing, and their overseas business expansion as a direct outcome of policies like the BRI would be an oversimplification, giving much credit to the Chinese state, while underestimating the role of commercial interests and other factors shaping Chinese firms’ expansion. As this study will show, for platform companies, the vagueness of the BRI as a high-level policy framework also allows the firms to choose whether and how to engage with the initiative rhetorically without jeopardizing their business interests in the host country.

B2. Host country context shaping Chinese ICT firms’ overseas investments and business operations

Moving beyond a singular focus on the interests of the Chinese state also allows exploration of the role of the host country in shaping Chinese digital platforms’ overseas expansion. While the scholarship on Chinese digital platform companies’ engagement with host country players is limited, a growing body of literature on Chinese firms’ overseas projects discusses how the host countries’ development agendas overlap with Chinese firms’ commercial interests. For instance, on Chinese firms’ overseas projects in areas such as e-commerce, 5G, broadband, cable networks, and smart city development, scholars highlight the host countries’ rationale for bringing in Chinese players, including fulfilling unmet infrastructure, financing, or technology needs (UNESCAP, 2017; Das, 2017; Paulo, 2018; Yean, 2018; Yean, 2020; He, 2019; Chen, 2020; Martinus, 2020a; Naughton, 2020; Aboul-Dahab, 2021; Zhu et al., 2021; He & Tritto, 2022).

Host country governments may also have other political calculations. For instance, the Pakistani government’s demand for data infrastructure, data sovereignty, economic development, and social order drove its proactive collaboration with Chinese tech firms (Erie & Streinz, 2021). Security concerns, such as preventing the interception of critical financial
and security information by Western intelligence agencies, also manifest in cable network projects like the proposed BRICS cable (Lee, 2016; Shen, 2018). Depending on host country policies, collaboration with Chinese players may not preclude the host country from seeking other partners. For instance, in Ethiopia, the government “has the agency to independently choose which technology to acquire and from where” and cooperates with both Chinese and European firms (van der Lugt, 2021, p. 339). Countries in Southeast Asia have sought diversified partners from multiple countries for smart city and 5G partnerships (Martinus, 2020b; Martinus, 2020c; Namingit & Al Haddad, 2020).

As with other types of Chinese firms’ overseas expansion, local context inevitably shape the progress of Chinese ICT firms’ expansion. Host country governments and politicians, firms and other stakeholders may have specific interests and leverage which they can apply to influence Chinese tech businesses. For instance, Chinese-invested smart city projects in Malaysia, such as the KL City Brain and the Forest City in Johor, have suffered delays due to Malaysia’s domestic political contentions (Naughton, 2020; He & Tritto, 2022). Baidu’s expansion into Vietnam was hampered by false local media reports about its business practices, playing on the Vietnamese users’ anger against China in the South China Sea dispute (Logan, 2015). New technologies and business practices brought by Chinese firms may also incur socioeconomic issues, prompting the host country government to respond with new regulations. For instance, Chinese capital’s influx into Indonesia’s fintech lending sector led to a rapid expansion of the industry, but also escalating socioeconomic risks such as privacy violation. In response, Indonesia imposed new regulations to curb risks and promote financial inclusion (Tritto et al., 2020).

Thus, treating host countries as a black box, or merely as pawns trapped under Beijing’s agenda, would likely lead to a misinterpretation of their roles in engaging Chinese players in ICT development. Since considerable differences exist between the political, economic, and social contexts of China and emerging markets that firms expand to, Chinese ICT expansion in the host country can also be highly contextualized. How the expansion would occur and how the host country players would engage Chinese players needs further scrutiny than what a simple “export of Chinese model” argument would assume. This study of Chinese digital platforms’ overseas expansion, therefore, contributes to grounded, empirical analysis highlighting the complexity of state-firm relations, and the context of the host country in shaping their expansion.

C. Methodology

This study adopts a mixed-method approach, drawing on both quantitative and qualitative data in studying Chinese digital platforms’ expansion in Belt and Road Initiative countries. To understand the scope of Chinese platforms’ overseas expansion and more specifically investments in the BRI countries, the study first conducted a quantitative analysis using data on Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). The official bilateral FDI data published by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce is incomplete, due to the missing information on the final destination: about 75% of Chinese OFDI goes to Hong Kong SAR or
tax havens (e.g., the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands), with destination unknown (Diao & Park, 2021). The study therefore used project-level investment data from the China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT) database of the American Enterprise Institute (available at http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/).

The CGIT database tracks published corporation reports and official documents for investment transactions with a capital amount of no less than USD 100 million, providing a more accurate description of the final destinations of investment. The drawback is that small investments, such as venture capital financing for early-stage startups that are typically less than USD 100 million, are excluded. Nevertheless, descriptive statistical analysis using this dataset can illustrate the trend of major investments by platform companies across time, and the geographical distribution of their final destination. In terms of which destination countries are the BRI countries, the analysis follows the Council of Foreign Relations data of 139 countries which were participants in the initiative as of March 2021 (available at https://www.cfr.org/blog/countries-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-whos-and-whos-out).

The original CGIT database includes “Technology” as a specific category, however many investments made by Chinese platform companies are categorized as “Other” or specific services (for instance, Alibaba’s investment in the Indonesian ride-hailing platform Gojek was categorized as “Transport”). Therefore, the author manually went through the entire database to re-identify and include all investments recorded in the database by digital platform companies (including Alibaba, Baidu, ByteDance, Didi Chuxing, JD.com, Jumei, Meituan Dianping, NetEase, Qihoo, Renren, Shanda, Tencent, Trip.com, YY). This also narrowed the time frame, from 2010 until the end of 2021, as the first recorded investment was Tencent’s investment in Digital Sky Technologies in 2010.

To further examine the platform companies’ local operations in the BRI-participating countries, the paper then employs a case study of Chinese digital platforms’ expansion in Indonesia. The qualitative case study complements the quantitative evidence as it enables a more in-depth understanding of the complex phenomena of Chinese digital platforms’ expansion and the processes while retaining “the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin, 2003), bringing in perspectives from various stakeholders within the host country and from platforms with both large and small investments. Indonesia was selected as a “critical case” or a “unique case” (Yin, 2003, 40–42), because it is the largest digital economy in Southeast Asia, and as the quantitative data shows, the largest developing country recipient among the BRI countries of OFDI from Chinese platform companies, making the case highly important.

The analysis draws on data from two main sources: 1) semi-structured interviews conducted either in person in Indonesia, Singapore, China or over the phone, Skype or Zoom in 2018-19 with key informants, to obtain both retrospective and real-time accounts of their experience with Chinese platforms’ expansion; 2) secondary documents about Chinese platforms’ expansion in Indonesia, including press releases, industry and news reports. Summary information of the 50 interviewees including their organizations, job titles and acronyms,
and a description of the interviews can be found in Appendix 1. Interviewees represented a range of government officials, Chinese and local businesses, industry associations, consulting firms, startup founders, venture capitalists, lawyers, NGOs, and university and think tank researchers. The selection of interviewees followed a mix of purposeful sampling (selecting interviewees based on their knowledge and work experience with Chinese firms) and snowball sampling (identifying additional interviewees from the networks of existing interviewees).

Interviews were semi-structured, generally divided into five parts: background information about the Indonesian digital market, the industry, and the interviewee’s organization; relationships with the Chinese players; perceptions of Chinese government policies like the BRI/DSR; Indonesian government policies and other socioeconomic context important for Chinese platform investments; and local business strategies. To enable triangulation across different interviews, a pattern thematic analysis was conducted by grouping interview data under themes initially derived from the earlier review of literature such as the drivers of Chinese platforms’ expansion, engagement with the BRI and other Chinese government initiatives, policy for foreign investment in the digital sectors, Chinese platforms’ relations with local players and regulators, and business practices. Data analysis was performed to compare the findings of the case against the initial statements and concepts outlined in the literature review and against the quantitative evidence, to develop further explanations as to how Chinese digital platforms engage with the BRI in their overseas expansion and how host country context impacts the platforms’ local operations.

D. Chinese Digital Platforms’ Overseas Investment: Quantitative Evidence

This section presents the results from the descriptive statistical analysis of major overseas investments made by Chinese digital platforms, including the trend across time before and after the BRI announcement, and the geographical distribution of the investments across both BRI-participating and non-participating countries. As the data shows, Chinese digital platforms have significantly expanded their global footprint since the first major investment in 2010. The volume of yearly overseas foreign direct investment (OFDI) began to increase significantly after the 2013 BRI announcement, and despite the decline in recent years, investment was consistently higher than the pre-2013 level (see Figure 1). The decline in investment since 2016 was likely due to several factors. The 2016 peak value was likely an anomaly, due to a one-time USD 8.6 billion deal involving Tencent acquiring the majority stake in Finnish mobile game company Supercell. The domestic market also experienced a downturn, as China’s real GDP growth fell to a 28-year low of 6.6% in 2018, creating pressure for Chinese tech firms to conserve cash flow (Kawakami, 2019). Growing scrutiny of Chinese high-tech investments in the US since the start of the Trump administration in 2017 also led to some troubled transactions, such as Alibaba’s failed attempt to acquire MoneyGram (Roumeliotis, 2018). Thus, for example, platforms’ major investments in the US plunged from USD 4220 million in 2016 to USD 250 million in 2017. Similar calls for screening Chinese
high-tech investments in the EU may have also deterred some investments (Kirkegaard, 2019).

![Chinese Digital Platform Companies' OFDI](image)

Figure 1 The Total Volume of Major Overseas Foreign Direct Investments (no less than USD 100 million) by Chinese Digital Platform Companies in 2010-2021

In terms of the geographic distribution of investment destinations, the data shows that Chinese platform companies’ investments in the BRI countries have grown compared to pre-BRI levels, but the growth paled in comparison to the much stronger growth in investments in the developed economies and large developing economies not participating in the BRI. As shown in Figure 2, total OFDI in the 139 BRI-participating countries increased after the 2013 BRI announcement, suggesting increased interest in investing in these countries. In comparison, however, OFDI in non-BRI countries grew much more significantly. Despite the decline since 2017, investment in non-BRI countries has been consistently higher than in BRI countries. A breakdown of the major investment destinations by country, including the top-20 destination countries by OFDI volume (shown in Figure 3), shows that Chinese platform companies’ investments have concentrated in major non-BRI countries, notably the advanced western economies like the US and various European countries, and non-participating developing economies like India and Brazil.
Figure 2 Chinese Digital Platform Companies’ Major Overseas Foreign Direct Investments in BRI vs. non-BRI countries in 2010-2021

Figure 3 Top-20 Destination Countries of Chinese Digital Platform Companies’ Major Overseas Foreign Direct Investments in 2010-2021

The case of India in particular challenges the notion that a country’s participation in the BRI can be the primary motivator for Chinese platform companies’ investments. The Indian government has refused to participate in the BRI since its inception, citing issues such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)’s infringement of its territorial sovereignty (Indian
Ministry of External Affairs, 2017). India also has a highly uncertain domestic policy environment targeting foreign tech firms, such as an “e-commerce policy that prohibits foreign firms from selling their own products on their platforms” (World Bank, 2021, p. 235). Nevertheless, India has held the top spot among developing country recipients of Chinese platform companies’ OFDI, as Figure 3 shows. Chinese companies are drawn by India’s vibrant ICT sector and its large population coming online as potential consumers: among India’s 30 unicorns (start-ups valued at over USD 1 billion) in 2020, 18 were Chinese-funded (CNBC, 2020). India’s attractiveness as an overseas expansion destination however declined following the India-China border clash in 2020. India banned scores of Chinese apps and the Indian public started boycotting Chinese tech products (McMorrow & Findlay, 2020). Reflecting this changed host country context, the CGIT data does not show any major investments (of more than USD 100 million) from Chinese platform companies in India since 2020.

Among emerging markets that do participate in the BRI, notable investment destinations for Chinese digital platform companies include Indonesia, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and Pakistan. Chinese state initiatives for promoting trade, investments and connectivity like the BRI/DSR certainly can play a role in facilitating the engagement between relevant players in China and the host countries. Yet host country factors, including market size and geographic proximity to China, have also been shown to be key factors in Chinese platforms’ business expansion (Jia et al., 2018; Tritto et al., 2020; Zhu et al., 2021). Like India, these emerging markets have a large population with growing spending power, creating strong market potential that draws Chinese firms (Tritto et al., 2020). Geographical proximity to China also makes them more desirable destinations for overseas expansion for companies new to international expansion, compared to populous countries further away in Africa or Latin America. For instance, some digital platforms employ the strategy of “following Chinese users abroad”, expanding to proximate countries and regions in Asia where Chinese tourists visit frequently, and where a large local Chinese diaspora with business and cultural ties to China also drives demand (Jia et al., 2018; Zhao, 2018).

National digital economy development policies can also help attract foreign tech firms to the country, not just the Chinese ones. For example, Thailand launched its Thailand 4.0 national strategy in 2016, devoting business-friendly industry regulations, tax incentives, and investment policies to attracting tech firms from Japan, China, the US, and elsewhere (Kohpaiboon, 2020). As the next section will show, in the case of Indonesia, the largest BRI-participating developing country recipient of Chinese digital platforms’ OFDI, commercial interests largely prevailed in firms’ expansion, and host country environments are influential in shaping their engagement with the BRI discourse, their expansion and localization strategies.
E. Host Country Context Shaping Chinese Digital Platforms’ Expansion: The Case of Indonesia

Indonesia is one of the fastest-growing overseas investment destinations for Chinese digital platforms. Major investments (above USD 100 million) by Chinese platform companies in Indonesia have primarily been into the country’s two tech unicorns, ride-hailing company Gojek and e-commerce company Tokopedia, now merged as GoTo (see Table 1). For instance, Alibaba Cloud’s promotional materials show that Tokopedia uses its “cloud infrastructure as a service, big data solutions, AI capabilities, and security features to provide more intelligence and better user experience to their end customers”. In addition, Chinese-invested platforms headquartered in Singapore, such as Tencent-invested gaming and e-commerce firm SEA (also the parent company of e-commerce platform Shopee), and Alibaba-invested e-commerce firm Lazada, are also active in Indonesia.

Table 1 Major Investments by Chinese Platform Companies in Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chinese Investor</th>
<th>Indonesian Investee</th>
<th>Quantity in USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Tencent</td>
<td>Gojek</td>
<td>$150m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>JD.com</td>
<td>Gojek</td>
<td>$100m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Alibaba</td>
<td>Tokopedia</td>
<td>$500m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Tencent, JD.com</td>
<td>Gojek</td>
<td>$340m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Primavera Capital, Tencent</td>
<td>GoTo (formed after the merger of Gojek and Tokopedia)</td>
<td>$100m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the top ten e-commerce platforms by monthly web visits in Indonesia in the third quarter of 2021, five were linked to Chinese platforms, including the top four, Tokopedia, Shopee, Bukalapak (backed by foreign investors including Ant Financial, Alibaba’s fintech affiliate) and Lazada, plus JD.com’s local subsidiary JD.ID ranking no. 9 (iPriceInsights, 2021). Among the three most widely used mobile payment platforms in Indonesia, Chinese platform companies hold minority shares in two (Gojek’s Tencent- and JD-backed payment platform GoPay, and Ant Financial-backed DANA).

The findings below analyze this investment, focusing on how Chinese platform companies engaged with the BRI/DSR initiative in Indonesia and how the host country’s contextual factors shaped their investments and local business operations.

E1. Drivers of Chinese platform investment in Indonesia

As will be seen below from the interview evidence, in Indonesia it has been commercial interests, rather than the Chinese government’s foreign policy initiatives such as the
BRI/DSR, that largely drive the influx of Chinese platforms and their investments. With a large market, a young population with growing spending power, and geographic proximity to China, Indonesia appeals to Chinese digital platforms looking to expand overseas. Indonesia has the largest digital economy in Southeast Asia, with gross merchandise value reaching USD 70 billion in 2021 and projected to reach USD 146 billion in 2025, at a 20% compound annual growth rate (Google et al., 2021). Around half of its population are under 30 years old, the prime market for tech products and services. In contrast, the Chinese market has undergone a slowdown since 2017 and the population profile is aging, making the growth potential of Indonesia even more attractive.

Interviewees highlighted the appeal of Indonesian market growth for Chinese platforms looking to expand overseas. For instance, a venture capitalist (VC) remarked that

“in recent years, it [Chinese investment] has gravitated towards technology, partly because Internet penetration in Southeast Asia is where China was in 2014, but Southeast Asia is growing twice as fast. So we see a lot of activity coming here to tap on the growth in Internet penetration, and also the demographic dividend of the growing middle class…. growth in some areas in China is slowing down, and this is particularly true for asset-light investors... it’s not [just] the Chinese coming, but also Korean and Japanese investors flocking to Southeast Asia.” (Interview 38)

Similarly, a JD.ID executive explained the decision to set up the local subsidiary,

“Indonesia is the biggest country in ASEAN, and that’s why this is our biggest investment outside China. Indonesia has one of the youngest populations in the world, growing middle class so we see a lot of potential here.” (Interview 28)

The Vic-Chairman of the Indonesian FinTech Lending Association, a self-regulatory organization set up by the Indonesian Financial Services Authority to regulate fintech lending platforms, concurred that “Chinese tech VCs follow what the market wants” (Interview 1).

The influx of Chinese tourists and businesses to Indonesia has also helped facilitate Chinese platforms’ expansion. For instance, research has shown that because Chinese tourists are accustomed to using e-wallets at home and prefer not to carry large amounts of cash, Chinese digital payment services, such as WeChat Pay, have expanded to popular destinations like Bali through partnering with local startups developing point of sales for local merchants to cater to their demand (Pranata, 2019). Chinese business people using platform services within China have also helped drive the local demand when their businesses expanded to Indonesia. As one interviewee observed, “for AliCloud, people that are using Ali in China would use it in Indonesia too, because they are very familiar with the management of the cloud, the dashboard and the support team.” (Interview 7)

Indonesia is home to a large ethnically Chinese population, constituting about two percent of its entire population (Fossati, 2019). Those with strong business interests have helped
facilitate partnerships with Chinese platforms. Despite deep-rooted anti-Chinese sentiments, the top listed Indonesian conglomerates with the highest market capitalization have all been founded by ethnic Chinese businessmen. The growing economic power of China has led to Chinese-Indonesian business moguls being more open to using their ethnic identity to promote business partnerships with Chinese firms (Liu & Zhou, 2019). Major conglomerates, including Sinar Mas Group, Salim Group, Lippo Group, and Astra Group, accounting for 17.5 percent of total market capitalization in Indonesia altogether, all have business lines in media, information and communications (Liu & Zhou, 2019). Some have partnered with Chinese platforms to enhance the conglomerates’ incumbent positions and tap into the digital market boom. For instance, Astra International established a joint venture with the Chinese fintech platform WeLab to launch an online lending firm for unsecured consumer loans (Freischlad, 2018). Lippo Group invested IDR 628 billion (USD 44.35 million) in Chinese internet giant Tencent through shares and equity-linked notes to promote the group’s digitalization (Reuters, 2018). However, the desire for partnership should not only be associated with Chinese Indonesian-owned businesses; it has also come from other Indonesian conglomerates. For instance, MNC Group, an Indonesian media conglomerate became the local partner for Tencent’s WeChat messaging service, because the company was interested in expanding into social media, and Tencent could provide the platform for promoting MNC’s media and user-generated content (Tapsell, 2017).

In comparison, the BRI and its digital component the DSR, have been perceived by interviewees as a vague policy framework, yielding very limited direct influence on the platforms’ expansion into Indonesia. Interviewees viewed BRI as a high-level policy primarily promoting large-scale government-funded infrastructure projects in sectors like mining and energy, or a vague policy discourse with largely symbolic value promoting exchanges between Indonesian firms and Chinese firms. Unlike Chinese state-owned telecommunications equipment providers like ZTE or mobile service providers like China Mobile, Chinese digital platform companies are predominantly private-sector firms, whose business decisions are dominated by profit-seeking interests. The BRI/DSR as a high-level framework provided few direct commercial incentives for them on the ground. For instance, as one interviewee remarked,

“most of those preferential policies...like the loans from the [Chinese] state, from CDB [China Development Bank], preferential bank loans, any kind of loans...most go to the state-owned companies, so many private companies or SMEs [small and medium enterprises] cannot access those benefits.” (Interview 13)

The vagueness of the BRI/DSR as a high-level initiative also allowed firms to choose to engage with the initiative in ways deemed suitable for their business interests, leading to different strategies when dealing with stakeholders in Indonesia. Some firms linked their expansion in Indonesia to the broader discourse of the BRI such as BRI’s espoused win-win collaboration for both China and Indonesia, while still recognizing that commercial interests instead of Chinese foreign policy were the primary driver of expansion for private-sector collaborations. For instance, a JD.ID executive remarked that
“I’m a big advocate of BRI. I think it’s a fantastic idea. But under that umbrella, it’s more about the people. BRI is more visionary, Chinese companies have invested in a lot of infrastructure projects through government to government agreements. But for us [JD], this is purely private sector driven...the BRI idea is pretty good in bridging China and Indonesia. I see more and more strategic partnership, but it’s more on the macro atmosphere that allows private sector to engage in.” (Interview 28)

For some firms, associating their expansion rhetorically with BRI seems to be part of a public relations strategy to promote their businesses to domestic regulators and players within China, instead of in Indonesia. As an example, a fintech platform operating in Hong Kong and mainland China expanded into Indonesia via a partnership with an Indonesian conglomerate. Its expansion was recognized with an award for innovation during the Belt and Road International Innovation Forum in Beijing, where the firm’s chief executive attended and shared their insights on the expansion. Yet when asked about BRI and its impact on the company’s expansion, the firm’s executive in charge of international markets in Indonesia was unfamiliar with the BRI or the award, concluding that there was “no incentive (from BRI) or government support” (Interview 7). The executive speculated that “this [BRI] is one of the China initiatives as well, right? Wherever we are, we want to do what we can to help the government. Like, in Indonesia, if we have the chance to meet with the OJK [Financial Services Authority], we also say the same thing - if you need anything, you want to see how China does business or technology, we are more than happy, you can come to visit us anytime...So I think the impact is not felt in Indonesia on this BRI thing, but it’s helpful for our colleagues in [mainland] China and Hong Kong ... So this is helpful attention. We welcome these recognitions.” (Interview 7)

In some cases, the local executives of Chinese-invested joint ventures showed hesitancy to associate their business expansion even rhetorically with the BRI. They cautioned that unintended negative consequences may occur when engaging local players critical of the BRI. For instance, one local executive of the subsidiary of a Chinese firm who preferred to be off the record remarked that

“One Belt One Road initiative is quite sensitive, especially in Southeast Asia. So for us, we don’t mention the One Belt, One Road initiative so much here, especially to Indonesian companies. Maybe we mentioned a lot to Chinese companies [at home] ...The world situation is changing a lot recently and hard to predict...for us, we don't have any expectations from [Chinese] government to give us support or whatever.” (Interview 29)

It should be noted that Indonesia’s history of anti-Chinese ethnic prejudices has long stirred negative sentiments toward Chinese presence, and anti-Chinese rhetoric is frequently employed by politicians in political campaigns (Freedman, 2003). Indonesia is a Muslim-majority society, and Chinese Indonesians, both as an ethnic and religious minority, display a
high level of cultural distance from the other Indonesians, despite having long played a key role in domestic and international business (Fossati, 2019). Survey research shows that cues to the ethnicity of Chinese investors substantially lower public support for foreign investment (Fossati, 2019). While there has been growing admiration among the public towards China’s economic power, criticisms about the economic consequences of Chinese investments, such as the influx of Chinese workers perceived as negatively impacting local employment, have also grown, along with socio-cultural concerns of growing Chinese influence (Damuri et al., 2019). Furthermore, opposition politicians employed anti-BRI messaging in the lead-up to the presidential election in 2019 (Priyandita, 2018), leading to a more hostile environment for Chinese firms to navigate at the time of the interviews. Such factors could be influential in some firms’ decisions to distance themselves from the BRI or any Chinese government incentives in Indonesia, in comparison to countries with a more friendly political or social environment. Nevertheless, this shows the importance of the host country context in shaping the Chinese platforms’ expansion and business strategies.

Interestingly, while Chinese foreign policy such as the BRI seemed to have a very limited direct effect on the Chinese platforms’ expansion, China’s domestic regulatory shift towards stringent regulations over its ICT industries played a role in pushing some firms’ expansion. For instance, the Chinese government clamped down on the fintech lending sector in 2015-18 to address growing financial and socioeconomic risks. Many Chinese platforms as a result shifted their business overseas, including to Indonesia (Tritto et al., 2020). As regulations tightened within China, coupled with intense competition for a saturating market, the option of expanding overseas grew more attractive for some Chinese platforms. As a consultant for the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board remarked,

“I think it all boils down to policies. In promoting investment Chinese government can push firms to go out without forcing them...you have two choices, you can just stay here [in China], but the cost of doing business is rising.” (Interview 32)

Since mid-2021, Beijing has initiated a new round of crackdowns on tech platforms in numerous sectors such as ride-hailing, cloud computing, online education, fintech, e-sports, e-commerce, social media, online home rentals, virtual reality, live streaming, and entertainment, for issues such as data security risks, market monopoly, financial risks, tax evasion, marketing deception, failure to protect workers’ rights, failure in content moderation, or perceived negative influence on minors (SupChina, 2021). It will be interesting to see whether this expedites the growing interests of Chinese platforms in expanding to emerging markets like Indonesia.

E2. Impact of the Indonesian context on Chinese platforms’ expansion and local business strategies

As will be seen below from the interview evidence and secondary sources, in the case of Indonesia, the host country’s context, including its policy environment for foreign investment in the digital economy, the gaps between the stated policies and the policy
implementation in practice, and its labor market and policy have further shaped Chinese platforms’ expansion and their localization business strategies.

**E2.1. The policy environment for foreign investment in the digital economy: preferential treatment with local partnership expectations**

The Indonesian government has vowed to make the digital economy a key engine of its economic growth, using the nation’s strength as the fourth most populous country in the world and the largest market in Southeast Asia (Jakarta Globe, 2020). In a speech to Parliament in 2019, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo remarked that “data is the new type of wealth for our nation, it is now more valuable than oil” (SCMP, 2019). The government is keen to support innovation and local tech firms. As an example, Nadiem Makarim, the co-founder of Gojek was appointed by Jokowi as the Education and Culture Minister in the current Jokowi administration.

Similar to other developing countries with large markets such as China (Huang & Sharif, 2015), to develop its national innovation capabilities, Indonesia must rely on foreign investment to bring much-needed technology and capital to the country. As a result, the policy environment actively promotes foreign direct investments in the digital economy (Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board, 2021). This promotion is actively supported by a variety of digital economy stakeholders as evidenced by some of the interviews undertaken for this study,

“The fact that we are very technology-dependent [on foreign technologies] makes it easier for everybody to come in, not just from China... China is in the position to provide that technology, the ecosystem. Indonesia’s demographic circumstance, it’s almost like a perfect combination.” (Interview 16: Indonesian digital/investment advisor)

“The foreign investment’s role is very, very influential for our country...because local investors are quite afraid to do early investment. Early investments are mostly taken by foreign investors...without the capital from the foreign investor, it is hard to achieve what we achieved.” (Interview 12: Indonesian digital economy researcher)

“Government doesn’t care who invested in technology. There’s no citizenship in money. Money can come from the US, come from China, we don’t worry about where the money is from.” (Interview 6: Indonesian digital start-up founder)

In order to attract foreign investments to the digital economy, the government provides additional incentives such as tax breaks. Under the Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 150/PMK.010/2018, the “Digital Economy Sector” has been included among a list of 18 “pioneer industries” for a tax holiday (exemption of tax) since 2018. Investments of IDR 100-500 billion (USD 7-35 million) are eligible for a 50% tax holiday for five years; IDR 500 billion-1 trillion (USD 35-70 million) qualify for a 100% tax holiday for five years; larger investments
can secure a 100% tax holiday for even longer periods depending on the size of the investment, with investments of IDR 30 trillion (USD 2 billion) or more qualifying for 100% exemption for 20 years. Once the tax holiday expires, an additional two-year tax holiday is provided with a 25% exemption for investments of IDR 100-500 billion (USD 7-35 million) and a 50% exemption for larger investments.

On the other hand, similar to other sectors in Indonesia, most foreign investments in the digital economy were still subject to foreign ownership restrictions, requiring Indonesian firms as local partners. This suggests that the government wanted local firms to retain some or majority control of business operations, while receiving the benefits of partnering with foreign firms to access capital, technology or other resources. The Indonesia “Negative Investment List” (effective until 2021 under Presidential Regulation No. 76 of 2007 and Presidential Regulation No. 44 of 2016), and now the “Priority List” (effective under Presidential Regulation No. 10 of 2021) provide sector- and industry-specific guidance on foreign ownership. As an example, web portals and digital platforms in the information and communications sector allowed for 100% foreign ownership for investments involving at least IDR 100 billion (USD 7 million), while investments smaller than IDR 100 billion were restricted to 49% foreign ownership under the 2016 Negative Investment List (HSF, 2021). For businesses such as e-commerce, 100% foreign ownership was allowed only if the retailer sold a specific list of goods and had entered into partnerships with local cooperatives and micro, small and medium enterprises (HSF, 2021). These restrictions appeared to have been scrapped under the “Priority List” since March 2021, but legal experts caution that the new investment policy is still at an early stage and that investments may be scrutinized on a case-by-case basis (HSF, 2021).

Regulators responsible for specific digital sectors have also imposed requirements of Indonesian shareholdership, regardless of the scale of investment. For instance, for fintech lending, under regulation POJK No. 77 effective since 2016, the regulating Financial Services Authority requires platforms to have at least 15% Indonesian ownership. This low level suggests that the government is eager for foreign investment to help propel the industry’s growth to promote the underbanked populations’ access to credit. For payment platforms, the regulating Bank Indonesia requires non-bank payment services to have at least 15% Indonesian ownership, but at least 51% of shares with voting rights must be owned by Indonesian individuals or entities (Reuters, 2021). Bank Indonesia requires non-bank payment infrastructure companies providing clearing and settlement services to be at least 80% Indonesian-owned, with at least 80% of the voting rights held by Indonesian investors (Reuters, 2021). This suggests that the government views these payment platforms to be crucial to financial security and should avoid significant influence of foreign platforms.

In addition, Indonesia’s data governance policy has been cited as an example of requiring data localization to promote investments in local industry development, such as investments in data centers and digital infrastructure (Foster & Azmeh, 2020). In 2012 Indonesia imposed Government Regulation No. 82 on the Management of Electronic Systems and Transactions to require websites and applications that provide public services (which was interpreted to
cover almost all websites and applications) to establish local data centers for storage. This requirement was rolled back in 2019 by Government Regulation No. 71 on Organisation of Electronic Systems and Transactions, allowing private firms to store commercial data abroad, suggesting that Indonesia has become more receptive to the platforms’ demand for cross-border data flows.

How have these policies shaped the Chinese platforms’ investments and expansion? As the quantitative data showed earlier, Indonesia is the largest recipient of Chinese platforms’ OFDI among all 139 BRI-participating countries. Interviewees also generally agreed that the policy environment for large-scale foreign investments in the digital economy was supportive, and combined with Indonesia’s market potential, drew many Chinese and other foreign platforms to Indonesia. The favorable investment policies for the digital economy even led to some pushbacks from other sectors. For instance, one local think tank researcher observed,

“most big VCs come from the US, Singapore, and Japan, for the Chinese, capital mostly comes from tech firms… the [investment] policy is quite supporting and wonderful, very open compared to the other sectors...Indonesian government is very supportive for the digital [sectors] even compared to other sectors, the other sectors have been complaining that the government has a special [treatment] for the digital economy, very open and they provide quite a lot of incentives and easy procedures for the foreign investor, that’s also become the problem for the other sectors because they feel that their sector does not get the same regulatory ease for foreign investment.” (Interview 3)

Interviewees also highlighted the importance of seeking local partners for Chinese players. This was often required by the regulations but could also be motivated by business considerations such as tapping into the local user base. In general, Chinese firms’ expansion can take several forms, including establishing or acquiring a local subsidiary in which the parent company holds a controlling interest, establishing a joint venture with one or more local firms (with more balanced interest arrangements and control over corporate affairs), or investing in local firms as a minority shareholder with limited voting rights (such as VC investments). Chinese firms seeking predominant control over their local business operations would often seek close to 100% ownership or at least a majority ownership stake (Interview 8), yet this might not be possible for certain sectors and smaller investments due to foreign ownership restrictions outlined above. As one lawyer explained,

“The key for an international investor is to have majority stake... the logic [for Indonesia’s foreign ownership restrictions] is, foreigners are only here for big projects, that Indonesians do not have the capital or the expertise.” (Interview 8)

The process of finding a good local partner could certainly take time and effort. As one interviewee remarked, “the problem is not that Chinese firms don’t want a local partner, but [sometimes] there is no local partner. But the law says you must have a local, even if it’s 5%.”
Chinese platforms often found local partners through mutual business contacts or employees with overseas experiences. For example, one joint venture executive explained how a Chinese platform XX approached its Indonesian partner,

“from a mutual friend...XX and ourselves, we do our research. Based on our research, we felt it might be a good match. Early on, what’s important, is that I wouldn’t say it’s easy, but it’s to be upfront with the Chinese companies, this is what we want, what do you guys think, then put it in writing in the JV [joint venture] agreement, and then set up the company. There are some cultural frictions, but that’s natural. In my experience, what bridges that was that in XX these top managers had some experiences overseas. They’ve gone to schools overseas like Northwestern, Babson, they’ve worked overseas, so those guys know the overseas market.” (Interview 24)

As noted earlier, Indonesia is home to a large ethnic Chinese population with strong business interests. This also allowed some platforms to enter Indonesia through partnerships with local ethnic Chinese businesses. As one interviewee remarked,

“Here there are many Chinese companies, Chinese people from the mainland, but also here, there are many Chinese Indonesians, so more natural and easier to use them, like ‘Laoxiang’ [fellow townspeople in Chinese], to help them...some of the successful companies, they only do business internally within [ethnic] Chinese business circles, they can survive here.” (Interview 13)

E2.2. Gaps between policy and implementation further shaping Chinese platforms’ local partnerships and business practices

As with most developing countries, in Indonesia, government policies were not always implemented as they were stated. Although the digital economy sectors enjoyed preferential treatment and less regulation compared to other sectors, the process of obtaining incentives and regulatory approvals for business expansion could still be cumbersome for Chinese platforms. While some (Interview 28; Interview 32) argued implementation was improving, interviewees generally concurred that regulations applicable to digital economy sectors remained scattered across different laws and different government agencies, and there were issues such as the lack of qualified personnel or expertise, bureaucratic red tape, and inter-agency infighting within the government. For instance, one interviewee compared Indonesia with nearby Singapore, another hub of Chinese tech investment, “you go to Singapore, everything just works so perfectly, and then we have the same technology here, it [gaining approval] just doesn’t seem to work” (Interview 9). Another interviewee highlighted the limited governing capacity at the Financial Services Authority, where a small team of “only about 8 to 10 people” were responsible for supervising all fintech platforms in Indonesia (Interview 11).

As many Chinese platform companies and investors were new to Indonesia, the gaps between the policies and their implementation prompted them to rely on local partners,
consultants, and lawyers for dealing with government agencies in business registration and expansion. For instance, one joint venture executive remarked,

“I see some Chinese investors probably have a cultural gap, especially on the regulation, they are not really prudent...if Chinese investors would like to invest in Indonesia, they need to have a strong partner that really understands the market and be vocal. We [Indonesian partner] need to be bold, you cannot have a local partner that would only say yes as long as your money is coming in...I always tell them [Chinese partner] good corporate governance and always everything by the law, let’s do this. If you are thinking of doing otherwise, maybe you are meeting up with the wrong person. I know regulations can sometimes be troublesome...once you read and you follow the guidelines you will believe you can make a good business.” (Interview 24)

One local law firm working with Chinese firms remarked,

“for lawyers, it’s a good business opportunity...sometimes one government agency issues this regulation and then the other [agency] issues [another one], and then they clash, so which one you should follow? And even the lawyers can only mention [to the Chinese firm], these two are contradicting, and how will it be enforced, we don’t really know, but then we could do this.” (Interview 25)

Another consultant working with Chinese firms and the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board also remarked that Chinese firms typically used local consulting services,

“The policy is constantly changing, the government does not have a good reputation of keeping to its words...whenever a new policy comes out, we ask which agencies will be taking part, then we ask all these agencies, and when they give us more or less the same answers, we can respond [to Chinese firms]...that’s why they [Chinese firms] typically use local agents like us because you cannot do it alone, but it is getting better.” (Interview 32)

The government’s uneven capacity to implement policies also resulted in some Chinese platforms, especially smaller players in sectors where the regulatory capacity was limited, to attempt to circumvent the regulations for investment. For instance, some Chinese fintech platforms simply ran their local operations without registration (Interview 2), leading to unfavorable perceptions of Chinese investments among some local competing businesses and consumer rights groups (Interview 2; Interview 30). Some used pseudo-Indonesian partners with potentially serious legal ramifications. As one local business association leader observed,

“the regulation says 85%, they are actually owned 100% by the Chinese, they’ll have a nominee, an Indonesian, who they’ll just identify through mostly their employees. They’ll say, ‘look, I’ll just use your name because you are Indonesian. You own 15%,
but actually it’s ours.’ That’s not an ideal model...customers come and complain, then we [industry association] pass the complaint down, we cannot call the Chinese national, usually the director is Indonesian because it is required, so we call the Indonesian, and they’ll say, ‘OK, I told these guys already but they are not listening.’ But you are the director, you have a judicial responsibility, the company is under you, if you are under violation, they are going after you, not the Chinese guy because he is not on the board.” (Interview 16)

As another example of the gap between the stated policies and their implementation shaping firm practices, interviewees reported different practices with respect to the requirement for firms to invest in local data centers for storage. Some firms reported strict compliance by storing all their data on local servers, or using cloud services with local servers in Indonesia like AliCloud (Interview 17; Interview 24). Yet some tried to circumvent the rule, as the enforcement was weak before it was rolled back in 2019. As one lawyer working with Chinese firms remarked,

“No one cares about the data center and all this...they [the government] are playing checkers, but everyone is playing chess...the data center requirement is antiquated really, because it doesn’t address the reality on the ground...how can they [the government] tell the difference between the mirroring or a data center?...[the firms] have a data center in Singapore, or in Hong Kong, which they built for hundreds of millions of dollars for the region, so it’s secure. Then the government says you must build your data center here in Indonesia. Why? You’ll just build something which is cheap, but not secure. So actually it will not fulfill the purpose...my friend said for the data center, he just once put a box with some Christmas lights on it, saying ‘that’s our server’, will they [the government] know?” (Interview 8)

E2.3. Talent shortage and pro-local labor policy prompting Chinese platforms to invest in local capacity building

Besides the investment policies and the realities of policy implementation prompting Chinese platforms to seek local partnerships and adapt to the local context, Indonesia’s labor market context also played a role in shaping the platforms’ localization. Indonesia has a severe human capital shortage, as 58% of the population have an education of junior high school or below (The Jakarta Post, 2020). In terms of tech talents, the country produces only 278 engineers per 1 million people each year, far behind regional peers such as Malaysia or Thailand (Nikkei, 2019). Indonesian regulations on employment prioritize the local workforce in foreign-invested tech firms operating in Indonesia, with the hope of building up the talent pool for indigenous innovation over the long term. For firms, hiring foreign workers from overseas could be a solution but one that was time-consuming and costly: a number of interviewees commented on the lengthy work permit process, the requirement for the foreign worker to learn Bahasa Indonesian and for the firm to show that no local workers can qualify for the job (e.g. Interview 10; Interview 29). There is an exemption to the Foreign Manpower Utilisation Plan approval (by the Ministry of Manpower) for Indonesian tech-
based startups, yet this exemption only lasts for three months, and the startups must apply for a work visa afterwards for any staff hired this way.

Importantly, Indonesia requires that each foreign worker must have a parallel Tenaga Kerja Pendamping (Indonesian companion employee) appointment for the transfer of technology and skills from the foreign worker, and provide training for the Indonesian companion employees, per the Ministry of Manpower Regulation No. 10 of 2018. The policy’s goal is that “this apprentice he [the foreign worker] must teach [so as] to replace him, and transfer his knowledge” (Interview 9). Foreign nationals also cannot serve in human resources positions, per the Ministry of Manpower regulations, on the basis that Indonesian nationals are more adept in dealing with local employees in a manner consistent with local cultural norms.

On the incentives side, the Jokowi administration unveiled tax incentives for training local workers. Under the Super Deductible Tax Scheme, companies can receive a reduction of taxable income as high as 200 percent of the cost of vocational education activities, such as working with local vocational and polytechnic schools to provide vocational training, industrial equipment, and apprenticeship activities, and deduction of up to 300 percent for the cost of R&D activities conducted within Indonesia (The Jakarta Post, 2019). Interviewees cautioned however that due to the talent shortage, Chinese platforms would likely still consider nearby countries with stronger talent pools such as Singapore or Malaysia as primary location choices for R&D activities in Southeast Asia (e.g. Interview 32; Interview 33; Interview 35).

As a result of the policies promoting the hiring of local workers, Chinese-invested platforms have devoted significant attention and resources to local workforce hiring and retention (at least rhetorically). Chinese firms, being relatively new players in the market, are still not as highly regarded among local tech workers as western businesses like Google (Interview 39; Interview 40). Thus, the competition for the limited pool of local talents is fierce, and talents have strong bargaining power. As one interviewee vividly described,

“everybody would complain the same thing. We hired this guy, six months later he’s gone. So we keep on paying expensive money to get people in...These local tech talents are like San Francisco 49ers. their grade is actually 4, but for us, the pay is 9...once we have our own Technology Center here, then the challenge would be, can we retain these talents.” (Interview 7)

Aligning with the government’s priority of local workforce development, businesses also highlight talent training and education activities as key parts of their localization and corporate social responsibility efforts. For instance, Alibaba Cloud Indonesia promotes its Digital Talent Empowerment Program providing workshops on cloud services to lecturers at Bina Nusantara University and Prasetya Mulya Business School, and training for local developers through partnering with start-up incubator BLOCK71 and IT providers Trinocate and Inovasi Informatika (The Jakarta Post, 2020). JD.ID runs its own management training
programs, sending selected local students to work in the JD.com headquarter in Beijing and then back to Indonesia; an initiative that had helped the company grow its local Indonesian workforce to about 3000 people by 2018 (Interview 28). Interviewees also highlighted initiatives such as developing training programs with their local partners, offering paid student internships to local schools, free open seminars, and business competitions with prizes (Interview 7; Interview 24; Interview 40). These are not just public relations exercises but business-oriented initiatives aiming to attract future employees in a challenging local labor market. As one joint venture executive explained,

“We go to the campus directly sometimes, what else can we do? Because all the best qualified are already hijacked the minute they leave the campus. We try to prepay them first before they graduate, in return we give them some knowledge. At the end of the day, when it’s so difficult, then we bring in our expertise, the Chinese team that are working in Jakarta....I've been dealing with IT talent for many years, it’s so difficult to find the right IT talent because 100% of our IT talents are not ready to work, what they have been taught in schools are completely different from the real world...but the good thing is that Indonesian IT students are super smart...they can adjust pretty quickly...once they have a good mentor.” (Interview 24)

Admittedly, the evidence of such efforts’ impacts on developing Indonesian talents’ capability for learning is still limited. A consensus among business leaders and venture capitalists is that the limited local talent pool hinders significant technology transfer (Interview 6; Interview 39). In addition, some Chinese firms opted to use tourist visas to bring in Chinese or other foreign workers for short-term assignments to circumvent the regulations, a controversial practice with potentially serious legal ramifications (Interview 10). Some poached employees from local firms, leading to acrimonious relationships (Interview 14). Nevertheless, the local talent shortage and the labor policies to promote local workforce participation have resulted in the Chinese platforms investing in local capacity building, building more local partnerships, and further localization of their business operations.

F. Conclusion

Existing literature on China’s digital expansion in the Global South has focused particularly on the role of the Chinese state and analysis of Chinese policy documents and/or on Chinese telecommunications infrastructure projects and firms. By contrast, this paper uses empirically-grounded quantitative and qualitative analysis to investigate a much-less-researched topic area of growing activity and interest: expansion of Chinese digital platforms into overseas emerging markets; focusing especially on Belt and Road countries. It highlights the nuanced relationship that platform company investments have with state policies like the BRI/DSR. It also highlights the importance of host country development aspirations, policies and their implementation in practice, and socioeconomic context in shaping platforms’ operations within the host countries.
Evidence presented in this study finds limited impact of the BRI as Beijing’s high-level policy framework, on Chinese platform companies’ overseas investments. Commercial interests, shaped by local market opportunities and host countries’ socioeconomic and policy environments, largely drive these private-sector companies’ decisions to expand. In some cases, China’s domestic regulatory crackdown and the resultant rising costs of doing business at home also pushed the expansion. In this regard, this study concurs with survey research of Chinese firms across different sectors showing the predominance of commercial interests, rather than the BRI driving the private firms’ decisions around overseas expansion (Li & Zeng, 2019). It also echoes scholarly calls for understanding Chinese platform companies and their global expansion not merely as an extension of the Chinese state, but as a dynamic process involving different units of domestic and international capital, and state agencies both in China and in the destination countries (Shen, 2021).

The case of Indonesia, the largest recipient of Chinese platform companies’ overseas investments among the BRI countries, allows this study to further contextualize the platform companies’ engagement with the initiative in a BRI-participating host country. The Chinese government has promoted the BRI as its overarching policy framework to promote investments, trade and connectivity between China and emerging markets, and the DSR as its digital economy component. This has played at least some role in directing Global South investments of Chinese state-owned and state-affiliated telecommunications companies (Vila Seoane, 2020). However, the evidence presented here from Indonesia at least suggests that, for platform companies, BRI/DSR has become a policy slogan with enough vagueness for companies to choose whether and how to engage with the initiative based on specific local circumstances. At home in China, the BRI/DSR may be used by platforms as a beneficial branding tool to liaise with regulators and other actors and to promote the firms’ internationalization efforts. In the expansion within the host country, the BRI/DSR’s impact appears more limited and dependent on the context of the host country. In the case of Indonesia, Chinese platform companies perceived the BRI/DSR as lacking sufficient and tangible commercial interests for private firms and SMEs, therefore they engaged cautiously with the BRI/DSR in their local operations. Indonesia’s history of anti-Chinese ethnic prejudices and its political environment has led to some platform companies distancing themselves from not just the policy but also any discourses of the BRI/DSR in their local operations and business partnerships.

Care must, of course, be taken in generalizing from the particular circumstances of Indonesia, even given its pre-eminent role as a platform investment location. Nonetheless, this study does concur with other research showing that the BRI is far from “a monolithic program designed in Beijing and imposed upon others”, but “a bundle of intertwined discourses, policies and projects that sometimes align but that are sometimes contradictory” (Oliveira et al., 2020). For scholars, this study also suggests rethinking the rather singular focus on the Chinese state – its policies and rhetoric and US-China great power rivalry – in the literature studying Chinese technological expansion. More attention needs to be devoted to studying the interests and the behaviors of the firms, and the circumstances and the perspectives of the affected host countries. The impact of Beijing’s BRI/DSR may thus
also not be as far-reaching as popular perceptions – both positive and negative – assume, with China’s digital expansion depending more on the preferences of Chinese firms and host country stakeholders.

Moving beyond a narrow focus on the interests and actions of the Chinese state, this study also centers on the context of the host country shaping Chinese platform companies’ overseas expansion. This focus on the host country echoes growing scholarship on host country agency in engaging Chinese actors to further local development agendas (Liu & Lim, 2019; Tritto, 2019; He & Tritto, 2022; Brautigam, 2020; Loughlin & Grimsditch, 2021), and on the importance of the host country’s policy and socioeconomic context in shaping the impacts of Chinese investments (Blanchard & Hooijmaaijers, 2021). In the case of Indonesia, the host country’s aspirations to develop its digital economy led to the use of favorable but also selective foreign investment policies and regulations attracting Chinese platform companies to bring much-needed capital, technology and services to help propel Indonesia’s growing digital economy, while also prompting the Chinese platforms to partner with local businesses.

The capacity of the government to implement the policies and streamline the regulatory environment for business registration and expansion was however constrained, leading to a gap between the policies and their implementation. This prompted Chinese firms to rely on local partners and consultants to engage the regulators, but also led to some firms exploiting the limited enforcement on the ground. The local labor market context characterized by talent shortage and labor policies prioritizing the local workforce in foreign-invested businesses also prompted the platforms to invest in local workforce development. The Indonesian government under the pro-business Jokowi administration is keen to develop the capacity of local firms and talents to learn from Chinese partners and build indigenous capability for innovation over the long term. While the impact of the Chinese platforms on the local innovation system is limited without substantial evidence of technology or knowledge transfer, and the host country’s governing capacity needs to be strengthened, the analysis shows that companies have been prompted to localize their business operations, seek local partners and talents, and adapt to local circumstances.

The response of Chinese platforms to Indonesian policy has often imposed higher costs: in identifying, evaluating and engaging local partners; in retaining the services of local legal and consultancy advisors; and in the recruitment and retention of both foreign and local workers. Where the platforms have sought ways around local policy – using sleeping partners to nominally meet ownership rules; evading local data ownership regulations; using tourist visas for foreign workers; or poaching staff from local competitors – this imposes additional risk and, potentially, further costs. In all cases, though, it is local policy and local context that has determined these behaviors.

For scholars and strategists, then, this study highlights the importance of understanding host country-specific policy, policy implementation, and labor market contexts shaping Chinese digital expansion in the Global South on the ground. The way in which local policy shapes...
behavior also suggests that opportunities exist for governments within emerging markets to foster development gains from the expansion of Chinese platform companies. Future research may seek to expand the focus beyond Indonesia to other BRI countries, and to add a comparative dimension that helps understand the developmental gains to be obtained from different host country policy instruments.

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### Appendix 1 List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview no.</th>
<th>Organization (anonymized when requested)</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Topics discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indonesia FinTech Lending Association</td>
<td>Vice Chairman</td>
<td>Chinese and other foreign investment; fintech development and regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>An Indonesian fintech firm</td>
<td>Founder</td>
<td>Relationship with Chinese players</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Indonesian Institute of Sciences</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>Chinese investment in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>An Indonesian think tank</td>
<td>Program Officers</td>
<td>Chinese investment in Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Indonesia FinTech Lending Association</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>Relationship with Chinese players</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>A Chinese-Indonesian joint venture firm</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>Local business strategies, relationship with BRI and Chinese authorities, Indonesian regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-10</td>
<td>An Indonesian law firm</td>
<td>Attorney; Associate Attorney; Associate</td>
<td>Chinese investment in Indonesia, Indonesian regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-12</td>
<td>Indonesian Institute of Sciences</td>
<td>Researcher; Research Assistant</td>
<td>Indonesia’s digital economy, e-commerce development, fintech</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>China Council for the Promotion of International Trade Indonesia</td>
<td>Official</td>
<td>Chinese investment in Indonesia, BRI, local response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-15</td>
<td>An Indonesian fintech firm</td>
<td>Co-founders</td>
<td>Relationship with Chinese players</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>Chinese investment in Indonesia, Indonesian policy on ICT development</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Indonesian subsidiary of a Chinese firm</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Local business strategies, relationship with BRI and Chinese authorities, Indonesian regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>PwC Indonesia</td>
<td>Senior Associate</td>
<td>Indonesia’s digital economy, mergers and acquisitions activities and regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>19-20</td>
<td>Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia</td>
<td>Senior Economist; Research Associate</td>
<td>Chinese investment in Indonesia, Indonesian policy on ICT development, e-commerce</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-22</td>
<td>UN Pulse Lab Jakarta</td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>ICT for sustainable development</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>An Indonesian research institute</td>
<td>Research Head</td>
<td>Indonesia’s digital economy</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>A Chinese-Indonesian joint venture firm</td>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Local business strategies; relationship with BRI and Chinese authorities; Indonesian regulation</td>
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<td>25-27</td>
<td>An Indonesian law firm</td>
<td>Partners</td>
<td>Chinese investment in Indonesia, Indonesian regulation</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>JD.ID</td>
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<td>Local business strategies, relationship with BRI and Chinese authorities,</td>
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<td>Role</td>
<td>Topic</td>
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<tr>
<td>30-31</td>
<td>Indonesian Consumer Protection Foundation</td>
<td>Directors</td>
<td>Chinese business in Indonesia, consumer complaints, Indonesian regulation</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Chinese investment in Indonesia, Indonesian ICT development policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33-34</td>
<td>Nanyang Technological University</td>
<td>Researchers</td>
<td>Chinese investment in Southeast Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>35-37</td>
<td>National University of Singapore</td>
<td>Researchers</td>
<td>Chinese investment in Southeast Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>A Singaporean venture capital firm</td>
<td>Founder</td>
<td>Digital economy in Southeast Asia, early-stage investment for startups, Chinese investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>An Indonesian venture capital firm</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>Indonesia’s digital economy, early-stage investment for startups, Indonesian policy for entrepreneurship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Gadjah Mada University</td>
<td>Program Officer</td>
<td>Early-stage investment for startups, university training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Nanyang Technological University</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>Technology policy in Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42-43</td>
<td>National University of Singapore</td>
<td>Researchers</td>
<td>China-Southeast Asia relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44-45</td>
<td>Nanyang Technological University</td>
<td>Researchers</td>
<td>Chinese investment in Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Monash University Malaysia</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>Chinese investment in Southeast Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47-48</td>
<td>ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute</td>
<td>Researchers</td>
<td>Digital economy in Southeast Asia, Chinese investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49-50</td>
<td>UNSW Sydney</td>
<td>Researchers</td>
<td>Digital economy in Southeast Asia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>