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CONGRUENT OBJECTIVES, COMPETING INTERESTS AND STRATEGIC COMPROMISE: CONCEPTS AND PROCESSES IN THE EVOLUTION OF ZIMBABWE'S CAMPFIRE PROGRAMME

by

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CONGRUENT OBJECTIVES, COMPETING INTERESTS

AND STRATEGIC COMPROMISE

Concept and Process in the Evolution of Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE Programme

Marshall W. Murphree

1. INTRODUCTION

The background papers for this conference¹ call for the presentation of the CAMPFIRE Programme as a case study of a "model" in community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) which has resulted in "emulation and proliferation". While it is true that CAMPFIRE (the acronym is derived from the Programme's full title: Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) has achieved a high regional and international profile and has contributed to the shape of CBNRM programmes in the Southern African region, there is good reason to be cautious about regarding it in its specifics as a "model" for the generality of CBNRM projects and programmes which have proliferated over the last decade. It is in fact atypical: it had a local, Zimbabwean origin and was not imported by international agencies; its initial conception was in a government agency and not by "NGOs" and their allies; it has never had the protected area conservation focus characterising Integrated Conservation-Development Projects (ICDPs);² and its implementation has had a high degree of heterogeneity.

These caveats having been made, CAMPFIRE does provide an instructive case study for this conference. Firstly, its conceptual design encompasses a broad spectrum of factors nested in the evolution of Zimbabwe's political economy, giving insights into inter-institutional linkages which are critical for such programmes. In this dimension it is a design which recognises the "intrinsic relatedness" of micro-level strategies with strategic macro-level options for sustainable development. (Moyo *et al*, 1991 : 130). Secondly, it has now been in existence for over a decade, giving the case study a time frame allowing for an analysis of process and evolution. Thirdly, it is unusually well documented and has been subject to professional analysis which goes well beyond advocacy or consultancy evaluation. An annotated bibliography on CAMPFIRE produced by the Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe (CASS) lists 310 items for the period 1985-1996.³ This list is not comprehensive, and does not of course include publications since June 1996.

Out of this wealth of experience, documentation and analysis this paper traces the evolution of CAMPFIRE from its conceptual roots (the "congruent objectives" of the title), the issues it has had to face ("competing interests") and its implementational history ("strategic compromise"). The principal themes are economic motivation under changing market and trade conditions, resource appropriation, and centre-periphery relationships in governance. This focus has meant that important dimensions such as the role of extension

and donor agencies are underplayed. The paper does not take up the role of indigenous knowledge systems (cf. Matowanyika *et al.* 1995) nor is it an essay in the anthropological hermeneutics of environmental history (cf. Moore, 1996). All of these are important but their treatment in this paper is minimal, to preserve the focus required. The replicability of the Programme is explored and it is concluded that CAMPFIRE cannot be regarded as a "blueprint model". It is also suggested however that certain generalisations can be drawn from CAMPFIRE's history which have wide salience.

2. **BACKGROUND BASICS**

For this paper to be comprehensible certain background factors have to be sketched. These include Zimbabwe's ecological and demographic profile, its politico-economic history, its tenure system, its structures of sub-national governance and its wildlife policy.

2.1 *Ecology, Politico-Economic History and Land Allocation*

Zimbabwe is predominantly wooded savannah, lying at altitudes between 300 - 2800 metres above sea level. Soil types vary, but the greatest ecological determinant of land use is rainfall, which has considerable correlation with altitude. Vincent and Thomas (1961) provided a classification of the Country's land surface comprised of five agro-ecological regions using rainfall, altitude and temperature criteria, with regions I-III being suitable for cropping and relatively intensive livestock production, and regions IV and V being generally unsuitable for dryland crop production and suited only to extensive livestock production. Table 1 provides detail of this classification. Figure 1 shows the profile of this mapping,⁴ with the most viable arable areas lying in an arc from the centre to the eastern borders of the Country. The overall area of potential arable land is estimated at 22 per cent (Republic of Zimbabwe, 1982) and falls largely within this arc.

Given this profile, it is not surprising that white settler agriculture appropriated to itself land largely falling within regions I - III. The only major exception to this was the creation of extensive cattle ranches in the south and west. This appropriation was part of a racially structured system of minority dominance with coercive, ideological, economic and political components.⁵ Appropriation was affected by the removal of resident peoples to "native reserves" (subsequently titled "tribal trust lands" and then "communal lands") and formalised by the granting of title deeds. By 1931 nearly 60 per cent of land was under private, commercial, white farm land with black farmers being confined to slightly more than 20 per cent of the land. Subsequent shifts in land allocation meant that by 1975 41 per cent of land was communal, 42 per cent was commercial and the balance (17 per cent) was state land. Land re-distribution since Independence in 1980 has reduced commercial land to 37 per cent (cf. Figure 2).

2.2 *Demography and Land Use*

The statistics of the section above do not provide the full picture of the growing pressure on land and resources in communal lands. The 1982 Census indicated that 56.7 per cent of the population lived in communal lands and 20.8 per cent on commercial farm land.⁶ However the location of communal lands is skewed towards areas less capable of intensive arable production, as can be seen from Figure 3. With an annual population growth estimated at 3.13 per cent per annum (Republic of Zimbabwe, C.S.O., 1992: 10) pressure on viable land by communal land farmers is obviously growing and has resulted in an extension of human settlement in areas of Region IV and V where arable agriculture is tenuous and erosion hazards high. (CASS, 1988, Derman, 1990) Use of viable arable land in the commercial sector is far lower (cf. Table 2) and the reallocation and more effective use of much of this land is a political, economic and ecological imperative.

2.3 *Land and Resource Rights, Local Governance*

The important fact to note, for the purposes of this paper, is that communal lands are in law unalienated, state land. This also applies to natural resources on the land. Communal land farmers are accorded usufruct rights to arable land and commonly used natural resources such as pasturage and wood products for firewood and building, but they individually or as groups have no ownership status over these in law. Commercially valuable species of flora and fauna are claimed by the state.

This tenure situation is a perpetuation of the expropriations of the colonial period, when long-established populations not only lost land but also secure rights to resources on the land they were left with. After Independence some modification to this situation occurred through amendments to the District Councils Act and the Rural District Councils Act of 1988. While individual communal land farmers (or groupings of them) did not acquire ownership through them, these changes did provide for the conferment of right over communal land and natural resources thereon to district councils. The specification of these rights varies, depending on the specifics of the warrant concerned. (cf. Wood, 1991) Thus under certain circumstances Rural District Councils (RDCs) may act to lease land and exploit natural resources on behalf of their communal land constituencies.

The sub-structures of RDCs as set up after Independence are as follows. At the lowest tier are the Village Development Committees (VIDCOs), putatively comprised of 100 households. The next tier is the Ward Development Committee (WADCO), comprised of six VIDCOs. Each WADCO elects a councillor to the RDC, which may also have councillors elected from commercial farm areas within the district. The size of each council will vary according to the district's population, but generally fall within the range of 12-28 councillors. For this paper it is important to note the following: a) The delineation of VIDCOs and WADCOs

was imposed and often did not follow traditionally established boundaries of territory and membership, (b) VIDCOs and WADCOs are essentially planning and administrative units. Per se they do not have legal rights to ownership or exploitation of land and resources and can only act in this capacity as delegated units of RDCs. c) RDCs often preside over areas which are highly heterogeneous in population densities and resource endowments.

2.4 *Wildlife Policy*

The history of wildlife policy in Zimbabwe until the 1950s is similar to that of other territories under British colonial rule (McKenzie, 1988). Government appropriated formal control over all wildlife and then, through a sequence of enactments, provided hunting rights to resident whites and visiting sport hunters. Blacks, through a combination of hunting and firearms restrictions, were almost totally excluded from any legal use of wildlife and for communal land farmers wildlife was a complete liability except for those who were willing to risk unsanctioned exploitation as "poachers"⁷ Even for the white owners of farms and ranches, wildlife was often seen as competition to crops and livestock and eliminated illegally. Parallel to this alienation of wildlife from farmers, the state also created "game reserves" which were to form the basis of the Parks and Wild Life Estate of today, covering 12.5 per cent of the Country's land surface. (cf. Figure 2).

In the early 1960s a radical shift in wildlife policy, away from protectionist philosophy to one of conservation through sustainable use, occurred. The essence of the new approach was that proprietorship and the ability to earn direct economic benefit from wildlife would provide a more effective incentive for wildlife conservation.⁸ A related hypothesis was that, in certain ecological contexts, wildlife ranching could economically outperform cattle ranching because of the ability of wild animals to utilise a greater variety of flora. Research on ranches in the Southeast Lowveld during the early 1960s concluded that comparative meat production was relatively equal, with somewhat lower values for game meat because of marketing constraints although game ranching was found more environmentally friendly.⁹ However with the introduction of the international safari industry in the mid-1960s wildlife values rose sharply, tipping the economic scales towards wildlife dramatically in these ecological contexts.

These developments cumulated in a formalisation of the policy shift through the promulgation of the 1975 Parks and Wild Life Act. The Preamble of this Act indicates inter alia the objective "to confer privileges on owners or occupiers of alienated land as custodians of wildlife, fish and plants" (Government of Zimbabwe, 1975). The Act designates these "owners or occupiers of alienated land" as "appropriate authorities" over wildlife, effectively making farms and ranches into proprietorial wildlife units, combining "ownership", management, cost and benefit. Certain conditions remained, allowing for the exemption of specially protected species and the ability of Government to impose restriction orders in cases of flagrant abuse. Since the inception of the Act wildlife

populations have increased on farms and ranches, their ecological health has improved and the wildlife industry in Zimbabwe has boomed.

Zimbabwean wildlife policy continues to accord a place to more conventional conservation approaches. The 1989 Policy for Wild Life states a commitment to "preserve examples of Zimbabwe's flora and fauna in their physical environments, to protect areas of scenic beauty and of special interest," and "to preserve populations of rare, endangered and endemic species." (p. 14) However for the purposes of this analysis the most important statement of this policy paper is the following:

"Outside the Parks and Wild Life Estate, government views wildlife as a resource capable of complementing domestic livestock and will favour neither one above the other in the development of the country. It will rather allow economic processes to determine the outcome of competition." (Government of Zimbabwe, 1989:7)

This is a bold and radical statement, placing wildlife outside of parks in the realm of economics and land use rather than in the realm of conservation per se. In effect, the statement is asserting what Aldo Leopold had said sixty years ago: "Game management is a form of agriculture". (Leopold, 1933: 395) This is one of the fundamental conceptual roots of CAMPFIRE, to which we will return in the next section.

3. THE CONCEPTUAL GENESIS

At Independence in 1980 the demonstrated effectiveness of the new policy was still confined to the commercial, freehold sector. Enacted during U.D.I. era, the 1975 Act conferred proprietorship (or "Appropriate Authority") over wildlife only to white farmers and ranchers. Small-scale black farmers, many of them living in the underdeveloped but wildlife-rich periphery of the Country, did not receive the privileges and benefits of the Act. It was clearly discriminatory and in 1982 Government amended the Act allowing the Minister to appoint a rural district council "to be the appropriate authority for such area of Communal Land as may be specified". (Section 95 (1)) The purpose of this amendment was to eliminate discrimination between farmers on private lands and communal land farmers and to extend the demonstrated economic and environmental benefits of the Act to communal land farmers. The amendment, given the political climate of the day, had no difficulty in passage through Parliament. While, as shall be argued, it failed to address important issues it was a step forward and constituted partial legal enablement for the Programme which was to develop subsequently. Even at this early stage, the stochastic nature of CAMPFIRE's evolution can be seen retrospectively.

It is, however, one thing to pass enabling legislation and another for its intent to be realised. The Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management (DNPWLM) were aware of inherent problems in transferring success from the private to the communal land sector and set themselves to the task of creating the conceptual framework and

implementational vehicle which could effect this transfer. In the interim, DNPWLM continued to implement a programme they had initiated in 1978, designated WINDFALL (Wildlife Industries New Development for All). The basic premise of WINDFALL was that human/wildlife conflicts would be reduced and attitudes to conservation improved in communal lands if the benefits of wildlife were returned to communities living with wild animals. This was to be done by making meat from culls in the adjacent national parks available to local inhabitants and by returning revenues from safari hunting to the relevant district councils.

WINDFALL largely failed to achieve its objectives. Little meat found its way back to local communities, and only a small proportion of the proceeds survived the circuitous routes of bureaucratic accountancy before returning to district councils, let alone to original communities. Even more fundamentally, WINDFALL failed to generate local participation in decision making and the sense of local proprietorship. The money that found its way back to source communities was seen as a government handout, conveying little sense of the relationship between the money and the management of wildlife resources.¹⁰

Participants at this conference will recognise that WINDFALL bore many of the features that characterise a plethora of CBNRM projects - oblique compensation, "resource sharing", convoluted bureaucracy, tenuous linkages between cost and benefit, and non-local control. For peasant farmers it meant a perpetuation of colonial alienation from the resource. This was succinctly put to me by one farmer in a WINDFALL area when discussing with me his frustration at not being allowed to cultivate good soils on the other side of a game fence next to his household. "Why are they protecting this land for wildlife?" I asked. His wry answer was pregnant with meaning. *Ngekuti mhuka dzinodiwa nge Council ne varungu* - "Because wild animals are loved (owned and used) by the Council and whites".

DNPWLM strategists were well aware that WINDFALL was not the vehicle for the replication of game ranching success in communal lands. They were also aware that the issues involved were more economic and institutional than ecological. They thus sought the advice of economists and social scientists in a dialogue which over time coalesced into a conceptual "think tank".

The discourse in this conceptualisation was essentially dialectical. Although the following sequence omits significant detail and does some violence to actual chronology it gives a reasonable summary of the dialectic involved.

3.1 *The Core Problems*

The first stage involved the identification of major impediments involved in the replication in communal lands of the essential institutional profile providing success - the tight proprietorial unit combining ownership, management, cost and benefit. These were identified as:

- a) The tenure situation of communal land farmers was less secure and they were more vulnerable to planning and regulation imposed from outside their communities.
- b) The appropriate proprietorship units analogous to farms and ranches were communities of collective interest; management is therefore more complex. How are they to be defined, and what management structures do they require?
- c) Legally these communities still did not have "appropriate authority." This had been granted to councils, which are large, heterogeneous administrative units rather than units of production. Wildlife production comes from their sub-units (vidcos or wards), or some of them. These are the units which parallel farms and ranches, but they did not have the same position in law regarding the proprietorship of wildlife. Thus a legal discrimination between private farmers or ranchers and communal land farmers persisted in regard to wildlife.

3.2 *An Institutional Approach*

An institutional formulation taking into account the game ranch experience and modifying it for the communal land context was then produced. Fundamental to this formulation was a tenurial assumption. It was postulated that neither the current status of state tenure nor the alternative of the individualisation of tenure would viably address the requirements involved for the transplant. State tenure could not provide the required institutional profile. Individualisation of communal land holdings, extended to common pool resources, would result in a fragmentation of management to levels where any possible benefits would be negated. The only viable alternative was a third tenurial category: a societally sanctioned communal common pool property regime legitimated by title or lease granted to it as a body corporate.¹¹ Such a communal property regime is one in which use rights to common pool resources "are controlled by an identifiable group and are not privately owned or managed by governments; there exists rules concerning who may use the resource, who is excluded from the resource and how the resource should be used" (Berkes and Farvar, 1988: 10).

This identification of a communal property regime with strong tenurial rights as the appropriate management unit in communal land contexts is the second fundamental conceptual root of CAMPFIRE, following on from the first mentioned above in section 2.4, that is the economically instrumentalist approach to wildlife resources. Informed by this perspective, the institutional formulation was shaped at an abstract level in terms of five "principles" for policy:

- a) *Effective management of natural resources is best achieved by giving it focused value for those who live with them.*

This principle encapsulates the propositions that people seek to manage the environment when the benefits of management are perceived to exceed

it's costs and that local peoples are the de facto managers of natural resources, whatever de jure assertions exist.

- b) *Differential inputs must result in different benefits.*

This principle relates to the question, "value for whom?" The answer is "those who have the resource and pay for its existence". Natural resources assets are distributed unevenly in any national context; equally the cost of sustaining and managing these assets is unevenly distributed. Policy must ensure therefore that benefit is directly related to input.

- c) *There must be a positive correlation between quality of management and the magnitude of benefit.*

The differential input requiring differential benefit involves not only the assets mentioned above, it also incorporates management cost, both quantitative and qualitative. A fundamental policy objective is to provide the motivation for good management, thus policy should ensure that good management 'pays'.

- d) *The unit of proprietorship should be the unit of production, management and benefit.*

Institutionally this is the only structure which can efficiently combine the principles mentioned earlier. Proprietorship (which answers the question "who decides?") cannot be separated from production, management and benefit and is a fundamental component in a communal resource regime. The management prerogatives and responsibilities implied in proprietorship need not conflict with any larger structures of management activity. Such structures are necessary because of the nature of natural resources, but should be primarily co-ordinative and regulatory.

- e) *The unit of proprietorship should be as small as practicable, within ecological and socio-political constraints.*

From a social dynamics perspective scale is an important consideration: large-scale structures tend to be ineffective, increasing the potential for inefficiency, corruption and the evasion of responsibility. Conversely, a communal resource management regime is enhanced if it is small enough (in membership size) for all members to be in occasional face-to-face contact, enforce conformity to rules through peer pressure and has a long-standing collectively identity.¹²

It will be noted that the first three principles above are, in effect, a reformulation of the economically instrumentalist approach of DNPWLM. They deal with incentives, and ways to institutionally capture them. The last two principles flow from the advocacy of communal property regimes, locate them in larger context and deal with governance.

3.3 *From Policy to Programme*

Although the five principles above address the three problems initially identified, they did not provide detail on some of the critical issues which had to be addressed if policy was to be translated into programme. They are a statement of optimal conditions, not a strategy of implementation. Of particular and immediate importance were the following questions:

- a) How could tenurially strong communal property regimes be created under state tenure in communal lands?
- b) What were the "communities of collective interest"?
- c) How could "appropriate authority" be accorded to management entities which had no status in law?

At this stage the process of conceptual dialectic could not ignore the imperatives of urgency. Expansion of cultivation into areas of marginal arable viability (cf. section 2.2) was proceeding at a rapid pace, foreclosing options for wildlife production activities of greater economic benefit to the populations concerned. Expectations for the rapid introduction of a new programme were high. Ideal conceptions of the future would have to accommodate to the realities of the present.

The result was strategic compromise, embodied in DNPWLM's programme document Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), published in revised version in April 1986.¹³ At this point I examine the document only in respect to the three strategic questions posed above.

In respect to the issue of the creation of tenurially strong communal property regimes under state tenure (question a) the document notes that "the land tenure system may need to be modified to give group ownership of defined tracts of land to resident communities." (p. 14) However, as an immediate implementational measure, the document proposes the formation by communities of "Natural Resource Co-operatives with territorial rights over defined tracts of land called Communal Resource Areas within the Communal Lands." (p.17) These co-operatives would be formed under the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act, giving their membership stronger tenurial rights than those provided under the Communal Lands Act.

In respect to the second question, the identification of communities, the document proposes a strategy of self-definition through a process of dialogue and negotiation. (pp. 33-35)

On the issue of the conferment of "appropriate authority" (question c) the document is strangely silent, possibly because the Programme was to address the use and management of all natural resources¹⁴ and could not rest solely on the

Parks and Wild Life Act. However by implication "appropriate authority" would still rest with RDCs since the natural resource co-operatives would still be nested within the VIDCO and WADCO structures of local government. (pp. 17, 26)

In retrospect one can see how the document was flawed. Nevertheless it was a "landmark" document, impressively detailed and sufficiently persuasive to convince the Ministry of Environment and Tourism to embark on a Programme with the ultimate objective, in the document's words, of "the realisation of an agrarian system able to optimise land-use patterns and maximise group and individual investment and effort." (p.19)

4. GAINING ACCEPTANCE : THE TACTICS OF PRAGMATISM

Ministerial endorsement of a programme and its implementation are of course different things. In 1986 DNPWLM had an approved CAMPFIRE Programme but little means of putting it in place. A "CAMPFIRE Agency" located in DNPWLM had been projected in the 1986 document (pp. 30-31) but the cash-strapped Department had no funds for it. DNPWLM thus turned to the agencies that had participated in the conceptual development of the Programme for assistance in its initiation. Among these were the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) at the University of Zimbabwe, which had been assigned a socio-economic research and evaluative role in Appendix 8 of the 1986 document. (pp.104-110) Another was the WWF Multispecies Animal Production System Project in Zimbabwe, and the third was the Zimbabwe Trust, a rural development NGO. This brought together a coalition of partners with different objectives. By their mandates DNPWLM and WWF had a primary conservation objective. The Zimbabwe Trust had an interest in facilitating rural economic and institutional development while CASS had a mandate for the conduct and application of social science research in the fields of rural development and governance. There were thus multiple objectives in the coalition with the order of means/ends being different. Formally, DNPWLM and WWF were interested in the Programme as a means to the sustainable use of natural resources. The Zimbabwe Trust was interested in the Programme as a means to sustainable rural development. For CASS the Programme provided that rare opportunity in social science methodology, the chance to engage in a "natural successional experiment".¹⁵ It also provided the training ground for a new generation of young Zimbabwean social scientists. What was important was that these different formal objectives were complementary, and compatible both programmatically and conceptually.

Over the period 1986-1988 DNPWLM and its partner agencies involved themselves in extensive proto-CAMPFIRE discussions with district councils and communities.¹⁶ In part this was to identify locations for the inception of the Programme using two main criteria: a) voluntary interest in participation by communities and district councils; and b) the presence of wildlife populations capable of producing sustainable and economically significant revenues. Regarding the first of these criteria, the exercise involved extensive debates and meetings over many months. Given the colonial history of wildlife policy, the idea of the Programme met with a great deal of scepticism from hard-headed communal land farmers. In cases the idea was rejected categorically at communal meetings;¹⁷ in

others it was side-lined by polite prevarication. However in certain communities the Programme gained provisional acceptance after much debate, with each instance having its own particular profile of decision-making.¹⁸

The second criterion, that of the presence of wildlife at economically significant levels, clearly reflects the weight given to economic incentive by the Programme. Of the natural resources putatively addressed by CAMPFIRE, it was wildlife which could produce high returns with little capital investment in a short time-frame. It followed that the initial "test cases" should be selected in areas with high wildlife densities. In the event, the combination of these criteria produced an initial focus on the Nyaminyami District, the western end of Zambezi Valley District and the southern tip of the Chipinge District at Mahenye.

During the 1986-1988 period DNPWLM and its CAMPFIRE partners were also involved in adjusting the Programme proposals to the views of political and bureaucratic gatekeepers and the demands of institutional and administrative detail. It has already been noted that the 1986 Programme document represented a strategic compromise between concept and policy (section 3). For Programme acceptance at this stage further compromise was needed. These compromises reflect the "pragmatic tactics" that have been a component of CAMPFIRE's evolution. I mention three:

4.1 *Natural Resource Co-operatives*

This approach to creating tenurially strong communal regimes in the absence of any radical change in communal land tenure status was quietly shelved. It became apparent that RDCs would not support such a development, seeing it (rightly) as a step which would effectively remove areas of communal land from significant aspects of their authority and appropriate significant revenues currently flowing to them. As recently established local authorities struggling to demonstrate their financial viability in the face of central government cut-backs in budgetary allocations from the central fiscus, RDCs were not interested in any de jure devolvement of their control over the management and control of what was, actually or potentially, their greatest source of revenue. The compromise was that RDCs would undertake to effect a de facto devolution of management and revenue.

This rejection of a de jure tenure status for wildlife production units in communal lands created what is the most major current weakness of the CAMPFIRE Programme. It creates pervasive uncertainties in the perspectives of producer localities regarding the security of any of their investments in sustainability. It undermines the actualisation of one of CAMPFIRE's fundamental conceptual roots. It perpetuates the legal discrimination between access rights to wildlife accorded to farmers in the commercial sector and those accorded to communal land farmers. Finally, by placing devolution at the discretion of councils, it has led to the wide variation in the Programme's degree of success as councils have responded to their commitment in different ways.

4.2 *Defining the "Community"*

The definition and delineation of the communal natural resource property rights regime (or natural resource co-operative) was, in the Programme document, to be a task of a process, negotiation and self-definition. Ideally this would take cognisance of long-established traditional jurisdictions and resource aggregations that made managerial sense, marrying social and ecological topography. Once again, this notion was quietly shelved. Three main reasons were involved. Firstly, the process would be a massive and drawn-out exercise, for which neither the time or resources were available. Secondly, with the scrapping of the natural resources co-operative approach no legal imperative for delineation was now required. Thirdly and most importantly, the Ministry of Local Government and the RDCs were committed to the sub-district structures of wards and vidcos which had been delineated after Independence and were negative to some different, socio-ecologically derived mapping to be superimposed on the communal land landscape with competing management structures.

The result was again a compromise. CAMPFIRE would operate within the existing sub-district structures, and the localised unit of management and production would be the ward. Legally the status of these wards would remain that of lower-tier structures of the RDC, which as the designated "appropriate" and responsible authority would delegate to wards such aspects of proprietorship as their commitments to the Programme implied. This was the easy way out; ready-made structures were on the ground and both councils and the Ministry of Local Government were comfortable with the approach. It carried with it however the possibilities of dissonance between ecological and social configurations and the seeds of intra-ward, ward-ward and ward-council conflict.

4.3 *Revenue distribution*

Having won general acceptance for the Programme through these compromises, DNPWLM remained adamant that the cost/input/benefit linkages of its principles (principles b and c) could not be lost, otherwise it would fail. Wards had the costs of production and they should receive its fruits. As the legal proprietors of wildlife resources, it was the RDCs which entered into the lease arrangements which marketed wildlife and were in receipt of the cheques which the concessionaire paid out.¹⁹ They could not be allowed to appropriate such revenues for council purposes without compromising the necessary incentives to producers. RDCs countered that they also had some of the costs of production - the provision of infrastructure, administration and district-level wildlife management.

In this situation DNPWLM fell back on a tactic of conditionality. "Guidelines" for implementation and revenue distribution would be attached to the conferment of Appropriate Authority status to RDCs which would have to be followed. If they were not, the Appropriate Authority states would be withdrawn. The

guidelines for revenue distribution specified that the RDCs could keep 15% of revenue as a levy (or tax), up to 35% for district wildlife management costs, and would distribute not less than 50% of revenue to producer communities. The guidelines also specified that it was the wards who should decide on the use of this revenue.²⁰

With the three accommodations made above the Programme was in a form which had the support of all the major gatekeepers and CAMPFIRE was formally born in October 1989 when by notice in the Government Gazette two RDCs - Guruve and Nyaminyami - were awarded Appropriate Authority status. In the process of CAMPFIRE's embryonic transition from concept to acceptance and birth DNPWLM had conceded on two fundamental points, the legal status and the self-definition of the communal units of management and production. It was forced to fall back on conditionality and intent as the instruments to produce its intended profile. In so doing it produced at birth a programme with inherent defects. At the same time it gained the inception of an approach which, for all its defects, had the potential for evolution to a closer approximation of its conceptual ideal. Whether the pragmatism of these negotiated compromises was appropriate is a matter for debate. It can be argued that it introduced flaws which will ultimately be fatal for the programme. It can also be argued that without it CAMPFIRE would still be "on the drawing board," a concept stillborn and incapable of experimentation, adaptation and growth. This is a theme to which this paper returns later.

5. GROWING UP. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SUCCESS

5.1 An Overview

With the conferment of appropriate authority status to the Nyaminyami and Guruve Districts in October 1988 came their right to be in direct receipt of 1988 hunting revenues. The deposit of these monies into the two RDC accounts had a dramatic effect. CAMPFIRE meant cash, significant cash. CAMPFIRE meant real devolution in the ownership of wildlife revenues from central government to RDCs. As a result the historically underdeveloped but wildlife rich districts on the periphery of the Country lined up for inclusion in the Programme. They had little to lose and much to gain. By the end of 1989 seven additional districts had received appropriate authority status. In the national press and in public circles CAMPFIRE was hailed as a leap forward in rural development and the Programme received the ultimate approbation when, in the lead-up to the 1990 General Elections, the manifesto of the ZANU-PF ruling party stated that CAMPFIRE had been a party innovation.

By the end of 1991 twelve districts were in the Programme and collectively grossed US\$1 106 000 (one million, one-hundred and six thousand dollars) in revenue for that year. (See Table 3) By 1995 there were 25 districts in the

Programme and revenues had continued to move upwards, revenues for that year being in excess of US\$1,600 000 (one million, six-hundred thousand dollars).

This expansion in the Programme was paralleled by an expansion in national structures to support it. The need for extension services grew and donor moneys flowed in to support them. It is impossible in this paper to go into the details of this expansion but one development must be mentioned, that of the establishment and growth of the Campfire Association. The Association (its full name being the Campfire Association of District Councils) was formed in April 1990, full membership being comprised of councils with Appropriate Authority status, although other councils could have associate membership. In addition to providing various services to its membership its objectives included the following which are important to this analysis and are quoted verbatim from the Association's Constitution:

"to promote and protect the rights and interests of Appropriate Authorities and to make such representations and take such steps as may be deemed necessary or desirable in connection therewith for the common interests of the Appropriate Authorities; to encourage the introduction of legislation aimed at further strengthening Appropriate Authorities to better administrate and manage their wildlife resources; to promote the fundamental principle enshrined in the Campfire concept of proprietorship of wildlife resources by producer communities." (Campfire Association 1990 : 2-3)

The first two objectives define lobbying functions for the Association at the national political centre in the interests of member councils. In this regard the record is clear that the Association, over the period 1990-1995, did establish itself as a politically salient voice for an important segment of Government's constituency. The third objective introduces an incipient tension in terms of the Association's identity. Was it to be an association of councils or a producer association?

In summary, CAMPFIRE's growth from 1989-1995 can be considered a success, if the criteria used are geographical spread, RDC acceptance and participation, public and political endorsement, revenue generation and the devolution of the control of this revenue to RDCs. To judge it a success in terms of the realisation of its central conceptual objectives - the creation of economic incentives to make wildlife a competitive form of land use where this made ecological and economic sense, and to create strong communal proprietorial natural resource regimes - is more problematic since the record shows a wide spectrum of result. The reasons for this are now explored, first by describing a case study in relative success and then by looking at the factors which have meant that such instances are relatively scarce.

5.2 Masoka: A Case Study in Relative Success

The example is Kanyurira Ward, a 400 sq. km. area and its farmer population in the Dande Communal Land of the Guruve District.²¹ "Kanyurira Ward" is the government administrative designation for this sub-unit of the Guruve Rural District Council, which has 24 such wards, each with designated and mapped boundaries. Kanyurira is the name of the sub-chief, but the area is locally and commonly called Masoka, from the name of spirit medium Nemasoka, who represents the ancestral spirit "owners" of the land. In local perspectives, these land spirits have a much larger territory than the ward boundaries of the Council map, and includes parts of the neighbouring Doma and Chewore Safari Areas under state control.²²

The people of Masoka are residentially clustered along a six kilometre stretch of the Angwa River which flows through the ward. In 1988 the settlement was made up of 60 households, with a total population of 482 people.²³ Household subsistence came from dry-land cultivation of grains, winter cultivation of riverain lands for maize and vegetables, and some remittances from the export of male labour. There was one cash crop, cotton, grown by 73% of households. For most households net revenue from this source was small since the remote location posed formidable transport and marketing problems. Owing to the presence of tsetse fly, no cattle and only a few goats were present. Some of the population's protein requirements came from poultry, and a larger proportion from game meat, illegally "poached" and yielding about 40 kg. per person per annum.²⁴ The benefits of this harvest were, however, balanced in farmers minds against its costs. Nearly every household experienced regular crop raiding by wildlife, the principal species involved being elephant, buffalo, wildpig and baboons/monkeys. These costs extended to personal jeopardy. Fourteen households (23.3%) reported incidents of injury or death due to wildlife in the previous three years, three of these being deaths (Cutshall 1989: 28-31).

Modern infrastructural services were almost completely absent. Prior to 1988 there was no school, and the few children whose parents wanted them to have schooling had to walk 30 km. through the bush to the nearest primary school at Angwa Bridge on Sundays, sleeping in grass shelters and cooking for themselves during the week and returning home on Fridays. No clinic existed, and the sick had to make the same journey to the clinic at Angwa Bridge.

Since Masoka was a wildlife rich area there was a hunting safari camp in the ward. The professional hunter, operating under a concession issued by DNPWLM in Harare, would occasionally provide transport for the seriously ill. He also provided work for 5 males in the settlement.

In retrospect, we can see how 1988 was a pivotal year in determining the directions which the farmers of Masoka would take with their wildlife. Three events were of particular significance. The first was the erection of a two-roomed school in January 1988 by the District Council, using wildlife revenues made available to it by DNPWLM through Project WINDFALL. Researchers from CASS and WWF had been suggesting to the people of Masoka previously that their wildlife had far higher values than their local off-takes represented. The

erection of the school had a significant impact on the farmers' view of this message. "We see now that you are right," they said, "these buffalo are worth money to us."

But ambivalence remained, spurred by the second major event of 1988. This was the clearance of tsetse fly by aerial spraying under the EEC's Zambezi Valley tsetse control programme (cf. Derman, 1990; Derman and Murombedzi, 1994). This opened the way for the introduction of cattle and the encouragement of new settlement by immigrants, who were already flooding into eastern wards of Dande. People were not blind to the fact that cattle and immigrants would over time diminish their wildlife resources, but on balance were in favour of encouraging immigrants to settle in the ward. Three reasons were put forward. Immigrants would be allocated lands on the periphery of the settlement and thus take the brunt of crop damage by wildlife. Secondly, there was plenty of land. Thirdly, more people would mean a better case for Masoka when it appealed to the Council for a school, a clinic, transport and other facilities (Cutshall, 1989: 21-23). This last reason is revealing; the farmers of Masoka were still strategising in the extractive dependency mode created by colonialism and still characteristic of centre-periphery relationships in much of rural Sub-Saharan Africa.

The third event was the conferment of Appropriate Authority status to the Guruve District in October 1988, followed by a series of debates leading to a wildlife revenue distribution in Masoka in March 1989. In the Council debates which took place on the use of 1988 hunting revenue, two issues were paramount. Firstly, should Council appropriate all these revenues and use them in all wards? The ward councillors from wards with no wildlife were not surprisingly in favour of this approach, arguing for "equity." Fortunately for Masoka the Council, with the insightful leadership of a Council Chairman, District Executive Officer and District Administrator, adopted the principle that "*differential inputs must result in differential benefits.*" The decision was taken that wildlife revenues, less Council levies and administrative costs, should be returned to wards in proportion to the safari hunting take-offs (under district-wide quotas) which had been provided by these wards. As a result, Masoka received the "lion's share" of 1988 hunting revenues distributed to the wards, Z\$47,000.

The second issue was what Masoka should do with this Z\$47,000, and who should make the decision. Again, there was an element in these debates which argued that Council should make the decision and that the money should be used for community infrastructure. There were paternalistic and instrumental components to this argument. The people of Masoka were really too unsophisticated to make decisions on such a large amount of money, they would squander it on beer and self-indulgence. And, if Council made the allocation and built, for instance, another two classrooms for the school it would be seen by Government as fulfilling its development responsibilities. Fortunately again for Masoka, and with the enlightened guidance of the leadership mentioned earlier, Council resolved to give the entire Z\$47,000 to Masoka and let its people decide what to do with it. Their decision was to declare a wildlife dividend of Z\$200 to each household (now numbering 64) and use the balance to improve their school.

At a ceremony in Masoka in March, 1989, representatives of each household stepped forward and received \$200 in cash. The impact was profound. For all households, but particularly for the poorer ones including those headed by widows, the amount involved was substantial, equivalent to an additional 56% on average gross income from cotton. More subjectively, but no less importantly, perceptions of their wildlife resource were changing. *"We see now,"* said the Chief, *"that these buffalo are our cattle. We are going to farm them."* The resource was valuable and it was theirs to use sustainably.

If the buffalo (and other wildlife) were theirs, how should the resource be managed? CASS and WWF researchers suggested to the Masoka farmers that they needed to do some land use planning, only to be told that they already had a plan *"in their heads."* Their plan allocated an 18 km² area around the settlement for residential and cropping purposes to be surrounded by an electric fence to keep out buffalo and elephant. The plan was submitted to the Council for approval, assertively. Their councillor was charged with presenting the proposal to Council with the following words : *"Tell them that these are our animals and these are our plans. We will not accept any changes imposed by others."*

The plan was approved and the fence built during 1989, with funds accessed by WWF.²⁵ The one technological intervention in the Masoka case study , the impact of the fence was significant in a number of dimensions. Firstly, it worked in its explicit objective. Crop raiding within the fence become insignificant.²⁶ No deaths, and only two injuries, due to wildlife have occurred since its erection. Institutionally, the fence accelerated organisational development for collective resource management since the fence had to be monitored and maintained, which Masoka's wildlife committee does by employing (from wildlife revenues) four uniformed fence minders. Finally, its subjective and attitudinal impact was profound. Wildlife, for the farmers of Masoka, was no longer an uncontrollable and amorphous asset. It was an asset which could be controlled and managed for sustainable benefit. It had, in effect, been semi-domesticated and taken on some of the characteristics of livestock.²⁷ Sometime after the erection of the fence I asked the Masoka farmers if the fence was working. *"Marvellously,"* was the reply. *"Only we have some buffalo inside the fence at the moment which were driven in by lions."* *"How many?"* I asked. *"Six: two bulls, two cows and two calves. But no problem, we will drop a section of the fence and drive them out."* They were, in fact, living up to their resolve. They were farming their buffalo and, like any good farmer with his livestock, they were beginning to see buffalo in terms of number, sex and age. And also like good farmers, they are today looking after the habitat of their wildlife "livestock". Today, Masoka's 400 km² are under a fire control regime. A wildlife water point development plan has been initiated. There are no snares, species numbers have increased and Masoka is entering the live-sale market with the sale of roan antelope.

The development of local collective management of wildlife production is, however, only half of the picture. Equally important is people management: the management of internal conflict and deviance; the management of external

relations; the management of market conditions; and fiscal management and revenue allocations. In each of these aspects, the Masoka case study provides a wealth of data which cannot be fully analysed here, but I will comment on certain aspects of Masoka's management regime relevant to this paper:

- a) Locus of decision making. In Masoka the focal point for most, although not all, of this management is the Wildlife Committee, which in practice is merged with the Ward Development Committee, Government's officially designated unit for local development planning. Typically in Zimbabwe these Ward Development Committees are weak, since they have no fiscal resources of their own and act primarily as conduits to articulate ward aspirations and requests to district councils. Masoka's relative and conditional proprietorship of resources and revenues has meant that its Wildlife Committee has significant finance and powers. Membership on the Committee is thus important and the subject of intra-ward political manoeuvring, drawing on "traditional" and "modern" elective legitimations. Membership has changed considerably over time, the composition of the Committee reflecting an organic evolution in response to the demands for administrative and negotiatory skills while maintaining its responsiveness to local consensus. That the Committee is representative is in little doubt. The latest survey on this issue shows that 81% of the households were satisfied with the decisions of Committee.²⁸ Equally important is that the decisions of the Committee are primarily responsive to its own local constituency. The Committee has had "light touch" facilitative guidance from the District Council and NGO agencies, but decisions remain firmly under its control.
- b) Poaching. Masoka has developed bye-laws which regulate all use of the commonage and which apply not only to terrestrial wildlife but to fish and woodland resources as well. They have never read Ostrom's "design principles" (Ostrom 1990) but they have "graduated sanctions" which are progressively applied. One household has been expelled after having been found guilty of setting veld fires three times. But the most effective instrument bringing compliance is the peer pressure of a tightly knit, social grouping. Poaching is no longer seen as individual and entrepreneurial defiance of state regulations; it is now theft from the community and one's neighbours since it reduces the size of household dividends and collective resources.
- c) Immigration. After the 1989 dividend ceremony attitudes towards immigration began to shift rapidly. Wildlife was valuable, and the more habitat it had available the greater its numbers and value would be. Wild land thus became more valuable, it had to be used parsimoniously and made available only for the "children" of Masoka. With Masoka's economic success, many of these "children" returned and by 1995 there were 123 households on the dividend list. This listing, this membership in the communal regime, is a valuable economic asset. It is conferred carefully, since the farmers of Masoka can do their arithmetic and know

that the size of the denominator will influence the size of a household dividend in any given year.

- d) Managing market relations. The farmers of Masoka have enthusiastically entered the market for wildlife resources. Their "taste" for subsistence usage of these resources has been, in their calculations, displaced by the realisation that the safari market provides components which make the value of an impala sold to the operator far higher than its meat value. In 1990 the District Council, in an effort to "sell" the CAMPFIRE Programme throughout Dande, instituted a cropping programme to provide wards with a limited amount of fresh meat. When the cropping team came to Masoka it was told to leave. Farmers there would prefer to have the safari price of an impala which would buy ten goats, the team was informed.

Masoka still does not have control of the hunting concession lease, which under current legislation is still in the hands of the Council. They are thus not ultimately responsible for negotiating with the market. But they are on a sharp learning curve regarding the details of their market,²⁹ and exercise their authority to the extent permitted. They employ out of their wildlife revenues four game scouts who monitor all safari hunts. The records of the operator and District Council are carefully checked against their own. A healthy realisation has developed among both the farmers and the operator that success for both depends on mutual co-operation.

- e) Allocation of wildlife revenues. Wildlife revenue allocations by the farmers of Masoka for the years 1990-1995 are indicated in Table 4. The Table aggregates the 15 line items of Masoka's budget prepared annually into the three categories of resource management, household dividends/food relief and community projects. The "household dividends/food relief" category includes direct cash payments to households, and in some years funds are used collectively to purchase grain for distribution to households.

Table 4 underscores the following points:

- * The value of Masoka's off-farm wildlife resource is significant, and escalating as market values rise and their resource management improves. By entering an export-orientated and foreign exchange generating market, these farmers are capitalising on the comparative international advantages that their large mammal populations provide.
- * This exploitation of an "off-farm" natural resource is highly significant for the household economies involved. Per household cash revenues from wildlife are now more than double the average household income from their other cash crop, cotton. There is, furthermore, an equity impact. Cotton production is highly skewed in Masoka, with revenues ranging from Z\$0 to Z\$40,000 (forty thousand). Wildlife revenues are distributed equally between households on the membership list.

- * The farmers of Masoka are reinvesting a significant proportion of their wildlife revenues in the management of the revenue.
- * By entering the wildlife market these farmers are reducing their vulnerability to the vagaries of drought and growing conditions. Note that 1991 revenues were allocated at nearly 80% for household dividends and drought relief, owing to an almost complete crop failure in the 1991-1992 growing season. By contrast, 1992 revenues were used primarily for the development of local infrastructure because of good crops from the 1992-1993 growing season. In other words, they are shrewdly using their wildlife revenues flexibly, in good crop years for collective development, in years of crop failure as food security. Their preference, when conditions permit, is to tilt revenue allocations towards collective infrastructure and today Masoka has a six-roomed school and a new Z\$350,000 clinic, all planned and paid for by themselves. Not one penny of government or donor aid has gone into these buildings, and Masoka's sense of self-accomplishment is perhaps as important an output as the services these buildings provide. They are, in effect, lifting themselves out of the "extractive dependency" syndrome mentioned earlier. This is an essential element in any programme aimed at sustainability.

The Masoka case study is one of relative and conditional success in linking sustainable wildlife use and rural development through local empowerment. Relative, since Masoka's empowerment has not yet reached the stage of legally backed proprietorship. Conditional, in that Masoka's empowerment remains dependent on the Council's continued devolution of *de facto* authority and responsibility to the ward. The people of Masoka are well aware of this conditionality. In one discussion on their budget allocations the comment was made:

“In times of drought we have to use our wildlife revenues for household food needs. But when the crops are good we use as much money as possible to improve our community, because we do not know how long Government will let us keep our wildlife.”

5.3 *Constraints to Generalised Success*

As noted, instances of relative success such as Masoka are scarce. The nation-wide performance of CAMPFIRE shows a wide spectrum of approximation to its ideal, ranging from a few examples similar to Masoka to instances of almost complete negation, with most on-the-ground situations falling somewhere in between and each with its own complex combination of determining variables. Of the factors which have constrained success I mention seven:

- a) Devolution through persuasion and conditionally rather than statutory mandate. The delegation of proprietorship to RDCs on the basis of intent and guidelines gave them wide discretion given their statutory powers. The threat of the withdrawal of Appropriate Authority status in cases of non-conformity was relatively hollow, as RDCs realised. As a result some

RDCs have appropriated the bulk of the revenues generated by their producer communities, made promises which they have not kept, marginalised any participation in wildlife planning and management by communities, and created hypertrophic district-level wildlife management structures which serve the interests of RDC bureaucracies. They have, in effect, replicated the extractive pattern of the older colonially-generated policies of the state at district levels. In such instances the "decentralisation" of CAMPFIRE has become the "recentralisation" of a district-level elite.³⁰ The result has been ignorance of or hostility to the CAMPFIRE Programme, mistrust of the councils concerned, increasing intolerance of wildlife in localities and a continued lack of communal environmental controls.

- b) Imposition. The integrity of CAMPFIRE's conceptualisation rests, *inter alia*, on the self-definition and voluntary participation of localised natural resource management entities. This aspect was compromised by the designation of pre-existent, administratively designed wards as the communal production units. In some instances, where the profile of socio-ecological topography³¹ was suitable, this compromise worked, as it has at Masoka. In many instances, however, ward boundaries do not supply this profile. Wards are often internally differentiated socially and ecologically and lack the cohesion to motivate consensual entry into the Programme.³² This has been the case particularly in wards with histories of recent migration. Councils on the other hand have had strong economic motivations to expand wildlife land and in several instances have imposed their district versions of the Programme, re-locating settlement to make way for contiguous wildlife areas.³³ Such cases are the prescription for council wildlife utilisation programmes, not communal wildlife management regimes.
- c) The differential contexts of economic incentive. A conceptual assumption of the programme is that high wildlife values, combined with collective interests, can create the necessary incentives for individual or household participation. However the Programme has not fully addressed intra-communal differentiation or the difference between household and communal economic strategies with their inherent implications for incentive. A community may, for instance, reach the conclusion that buffalo provide greater collective economic value for the use of their range than cattle and have a collective incentive to move into wildlife production. This value is however realised through collective receipts and finds its way back to households through the filter of communal decision-making. At the household level the farmer, while recognising the higher value of buffalo in comparison to cattle may nevertheless wish to opt for cattle since cattle are individually owned and the disposal of worth is at his sole discretion. Murombedzi (1994) has suggested that under small-holder agricultural conditions prevailing in communal lands cattle are a main form of household accumulation and that unless CAMPFIRE revenues at household levels are at levels sufficient to off-set the perceived loss of the accumulative potential of livestock the Programme is likely to encounter

opposition at these levels. His research suggests that this opposition is likely to be particularly strong in wealthier households (p. 280), a conclusion supported by Madzudzo's research. (Madzudzo, 1995a)

- d) Resource / demand ratios. This is an issue tightly related to (c) above. CAMPFIRE benefits in cash and kind (community infrastructure) at household levels are clearly related to these ratios and are highest where human populations densities are low and wildlife resources high. Within the Programme districts these ratios differ widely. Bond's 1993 data show that all wards in the Programme earning above Z\$200 000 had population densities of less than 20 persons per square kilometre.³⁴ This could lead to the conclusion that the Programme can truly be successful only in certain favourable demand/ratio contexts, especially if it continues to be based primarily on economic incentive.
- e) Devolution in value appropriation. The devolution of revenue appropriation from state to councils and from councils to producer communities (at various levels, see (a) above) is demonstrable in the Programme's history. Whether this has meant a devolution of resource value in real terms has been questioned. At the state level the state has foregone direct revenues from safari hunting but has maintained the base for a rapidly expanding tourism industry which is taxed, suggesting a win/win arrangement for both the state and district councils. At the council level the Programme has provided revenues from a commodity which previously had little financial value to councils, leading Hill to make the perceptive comment that CAMPFIRE "not only is a wildlife program; it is also very much a rural taxation program". (Hill 1946: 116) At the locality level there remains the possibility that real appropriation of value can be siphoned away. For instance Masoka has built its own clinic in a policy climate where it assumed that this is a Government/council responsibility. This is in effect a Government/ council savings and if these savings are used to build a clinic elsewhere this is an indirect re-appropriation of value. CAMPFIRE communal regimes are not unaware of this, but the inherent contradictions between the concurrent policy stances of self-reliance and Government paternalism in communal lands has not as yet been resolved. In the absence of such resolution, the incentive dynamic of the Programme could be diluted.
- f) The politics of resource appropriation. The high and escalating values of the wildlife resource have had the effect of intensifying political conflict over the appropriation of these values at community, district and national levels. Within communities and districts the Programme has brought into sharper focus competing interests drawn on class, status and ethnic lines.³⁵ At the national level the economic performance of the industry has attracted the attention of the political elite and their private sector allies, who seek to appropriate a higher share of its value through patronage, shrewd negotiation or bureaucratic re-centralisation. CAMPFIRE, which from its conceptualisation had profound political implications, has though its relative successes now become a high-profile arena of political

manoeuvring with outcomes which will remain dynamic and dependant of the strength of its constituency.

- g) Vertical Compartmentalisation in Legislation and Agency Responsibility. Legislatively CAMPFIRE has been based largely on the Parks and Wild Life Act as amended. Other resources, notably forestry and water resources, fall under different legislation and are served by other Government agencies. Beyond this a number of other Government ministries have jurisdictional responsibilities relevant to the Programme, including the Ministry of Agriculture.

This vertical compartmentalisation of resource jurisdictions is one of the reasons why CAMPFIRE, in concept and name a holistic programme encompassing all natural resources, has in practice been a programme focused on wildlife, fisheries and tourism. In local contexts such as Masoka communities have ignored these divisions and have placed all natural resources under the control of the ward wildlife committee. Mineral resources constitute an important appropriation issue in some districts and wards as their constituencies watch valuable exports from their land with little or no value returned to them. The CAMPFIRE Association is now beginning to lobby for the transfer of mineral rights to their members. The Mines and Minerals Act is one of the most entrenched pieces of Zimbabwean legislation and with the high values involved its amendment to accommodate approaches of local proprietorship is likely to be the cause of intense centre-periphery conflict.

Devolution as conceptualised in CAMPFIRE requires a much wider legislative base than its current Parks and Wild Life Act. Strategically, the Programme needs to shift its Government linkages to a broader spectrum of ministries. The CAMPFIRE Association is aware of this, and is attempting to form alliances with farmer associations and closer communication with the Forestry Commission and the Ministries of Agriculture and Lands.

The seven issues discussed above are among the primary factors constraining a pan-national success profile for the Programme. They are CAMPFIRE's "clay feet", arising from conceptual gaps, implementational compromise and, paradoxically, its elements of success. They have been outlined in a form which masks the fact that the Programme has made progress in dealing with some of them. Particularly in regard to the first two it should be noted that revenue retention by councils has progressively dropped (cf. Figure 5) and that imposition in implementation is diminishing (cf. Madzudzo 1997). They nevertheless remain high on CAMPFIRE's evolutionary agenda and must inform any attempt to use the programme as a model elsewhere.

6. THE PROLIFERATION OF THE MODEL

CAMPFIRE has been developed in a national context by nationals for a national objective. The intent has never been that of a package export of the Programme in its specifics to other countries. It cannot be denied however that CAMPFIRE'S core conceptual foundations have been vigorously propounded in international debates. Nor can it be denied that, within the Southern African region, its principles have influenced policy directions in neighbouring countries. A regional SADC³⁶ conference held in Botswana in April 1995 on community based natural resources management used CAMPFIRE's "five principles" as the framework for a comparative analysis of initiatives in member states. The report of this conference (Rihoy, 1995) shows wide regional variation in programmatic detail and considerable variation in policy alignment with the principles. Two countries, Botswana and Namibia, came closest to Zimbabwe in policy congruence. This congruence arises in part from certain similarities in their wildlife policy histories and their land tenure situations. It also stems from conceptual discourse between their wildlife policy makers over the past decade, which has been fairly constant and intense.³⁷ Thus the development of CBNRM programmes in the three countries is best seen as a case of parallel evolution conceptually linked by continuous dialogue. This section briefly compares aspects of CBNRM policy and performance in Botswana and Namibia with that of Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE. It then concludes with a brief examination of a different mode of "proliferation", encapsulated in a case study of communication across the Zimbabwe / Mozambique border.

6.1 Botswana

While exhibiting a significantly different ecological profile, Botswana shares with Zimbabwe the profile of significant wildlife resources located on state/communal lands. White settler land appropriation has never had the policy prominence that it has had in Zimbabwe and up until the 1960s low human population densities meant that little pressure was placed on wildlife populations in most of the tribal or communal lands. Competition over wildlife habitat rose sharply after Independence in 1964 as national elites rapidly expanded their land accumulation for livestock pasturage.³⁸ Competition over the wildlife resource itself rose sharply in the 1970s with the development of the safari industry and a rapid escalation in wildlife values. This competition was exacerbated by a rise in meat hunting by an emergent national elite, equipped with modern equipment. Under the existing legislation access to this type of hunting was relatively open and local communities experienced the frustration of having their land base eroded and their wildlife exploited without benefit to themselves. Thus the central problem of wildlife policy strategists was similar to that faced in Zimbabwe: the loss of wildlife habitat and the potential foreclosure of a high-value land use option through a lack of incentive structures for localised sustainable management and use.

Their response was a CBNRM policy similar in its essentials to the CAMPFIRE approach. As in Zimbabwe, the transition from policy to programme and implementation took a long gestation period. The land tenure context for the realisation of communal property rights regimes was somewhat different. Land authorities in Botswana are the District Land Boards, whose spatial jurisdictions

(in the relevant areas) are far larger than RDC jurisdictions in Zimbabwe. Their devolution of rights and responsibilities over land and wildlife to communities required extended negotiation. In the event the Botswana version of the Zimbabwean compromise was agreement that Land Boards would provide long-term (10 year) leases of designated land to communities at nominal rates. These communities would then be legally entitled to lease tourism concessions and hunting rights to operators at market rates. (Rihoy 1995: 112-113) In essence this arrangement is remarkably similar to the natural resources co-operative approach originally proposed for CAMPFIRE. The first such entity or "Community Trust" was established in the Chobe enclave in 1994, comprised of the five villages in the enclave. Such community trusts have stronger legal proprietorship than wards in the CAMPFIRE Programme, and in this dimension Botswana can be said to have more closely approximated the communal property rights regime ideal than Zimbabwe.

6.2 *Namibia*

The evolution of Namibia's wildlife policy closely parallels that of Zimbabwe. The owners of alienated commercial farms and ranches were accorded use rights over wildlife in 1967. This devolution, reinforced by the Nature Conservation Ordinance (No. 4 of 1975), was based on the landowner meeting certain requirements including boundary game fencing. As in Zimbabwe the wildlife industry boomed into a multi-million dollar game farming, tourist and hunting enterprise. Economic and ecological considerations dictated that collaboration between game farms and ranches was desirable and in 1991 the Ministry of Environment and Tourism produced a policy encouraging such collaboration in voluntary units called conservancies. The Ministry's policy document defined conservancies as follows:

"A conservancy is a group of farms on which neighbouring landowners have pooled their resources for the purpose of conserving and utilizing wildlife on their combined properties. The conservancy concept does not have to be restricted to the commercial farming areas, but can be extended to communal land as well." (Namibia, 1995:2)

The last sentence of this quote indicates the intent to transplant commercial land wildlife industry success to communal lands, in many dimensions replicating the CAMPFIRE approach. Indeed the rationalisations for this approach cite CAMPFIRE's five principles. (Namibia 1975:7)

However Namibia's conditions are different, including the fact that to date lower tier structures of governance in communal lands are not as clearly defined as they are in Zimbabwe. Thus policy has used the conservancy model to create the management context for wildlife and natural resource in communal lands. The promulgation of the 1996 Nature Conservation Amendment Act provides that:

"any group of people residing on communal land and which desires to have the area which they inhabit, or any part thereof, to be declared a

conservancy shall apply to the Minister of Environment and Tourism... ("conservancy" means any area declared a conservancy in terms of section 24A(2) (ii) - notice in the gazette giving boundaries)". (Namibia 1996:4)

Thus, through application to the Minister to have their land designated a conservancy a community can acquire the authority necessary under Namibian wildlife legislation to manage and utilise wildlife and natural resources within the designated conservancy area. The group's membership must be listed and be structured as a conservancy committee, served by a conservancy constitution. The key institutional ingredients are: listed membership; constitution; designated boundaries; administrative and financial competence; sustainable management and utilisation objectives; accountability; and transparency. The Minister retains regulatory oversight and ultimately may use such external sanctions as withdrawal of recognition, amendment or withdrawal of conditions.

By pushing forward this conservancy legislation in advance of any definitive legislation on lower-tier structures of local governance Namibia has avoided the "socio-economic topography" dissonance introduced into the CAMPFIRE Programme by its designation of wards as the collective units of wildlife proprietorship. Whether this pre-emption is followed by local government legislation remains to be seen. Furthermore, the conservancy legislation confers communal use rights over wildlife and tourism resources only. It does not confer communal tenure over land itself, and in this respect Namibia's CBNRM status resembles that of Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE.

6.3 Mozambique

Botswana and Namibia are cases where conceptual cross-fertilisation has taken place between CAMPFIRE and other regional CBNRM approaches at the level of agency officials, planners and scholars. As programmes have developed exchange visits between locality-level leadership have also taken place. The cross-border Zimbabwe/Mozambique example taken up here falls in a somewhat different category, in that the initiation of a pilot CBNRM project involved, at an early stage, communal leadership in the exchange of perspectives and the specifics of planning.

Mozambique, with its colonial legacy of highly centralised administration and distracted by a long civil war, did not begin to give serious policy attention to devolution issues until the beginning of this decade. Within the wildlife sector the government agency involved (DNFFB, the National Directorate for Forestry and Wildlife in the Ministry of Agriculture) was interested in CBNRM and, together with other agencies (in particular the Ministry of the Environment and the Institute for Rural Development, INDER) convened meetings in Maputo which solicited regional profiles of policy and experience on the approach. Political flux and capacity constraints have however meant that explicit national policy shifts have been slow in emerging.

In this context, Government has taken a cautious, experimental approach. Legislation has been enacted allowing for the decentralisation of resource management and retention of benefits to provincial and district levels. The extension of this decentralisation to community levels is now under pilot project experimentation in the community of Bawa in the Tete Province, located on the border with Zimbabwe. The project, locally entitled Tchuma Tchato ("Our wealth"), is facilitated by a DNFFB officer and has been supported by the IUCN, IDRC and the Ford Foundation. As Cruz comments,

"It is an interesting feature of evolving CBNRM in Mozambique that policy and legal changes are taking place in tandem with implementation (and sometimes led by projects) as opposed to the more usual development of policy and legal aspects prior to programmes. Given the complex political, policy and legal changes occurring in Mozambique, pilot programmes will probably continue to play an important role in advancing the policy and legal framework for CBNRM in Mozambique."
(Cruz, 1995 : 207)

To return however to the theme of this sub-section, the Tchuma Tchato project provides an example of lateral cross-fertilisation between communities themselves. Initiated at the end of 1994, external facilitators first encountered the mix of interest and scepticism typical of much of CAMPFIRE's experience. Community opinion oscillated between acceptance and rejection from meeting to meeting as collective and individual assessments attempted to weigh the implications of implementation. An important event leading to acceptance and participation was a three-day exchange visit between the "natural resources council" of Bawa and the wildlife committee of Masoka. In its first phase the Masoka committee visited Bawa and, having introduced their approach and experience to a general meeting, answered a broad range of incisive questions with equally incisive answers. In the second phase the Bawa council travelled to Masoka, examined their management techniques and had another round of debate with the Masoka wildlife committee. I was privileged to attend these meetings as an observer and what struck me was conceptual insight and grasp of implementational detail that characterised them. Many of the issues raised in this paper were touched on, and debated in a local and experiential idiom far more powerful than the abstractions of professional intellectual discourse.

This example has profound implications for "proliferation". The mode of extension it represents is the only one which has the in-built resources to reach down to the multitude of locality contexts of the region comprehensively. Beyond this, it is the most effective one. In the rural settings of CBNRM the messenger is as important as the message. The tests required for acceptance and involvement are those of similar experience, emic as much as etic. Similarity in social location provides a communicative channel which is closed to others, however adept they may be in professional techniques.

7. CAMPFIRE AS A MODEL? Some Concluding Reflections

CAMPFIRE was conceived and has been developed in a Zimbabwean context, its contextual specificity being further sharpened in that it has sought to transfer a successful policy innovation in one tenure category to another. Its history thus reflects a situational focus and is inherently an argument against "genericization". (I can spell the neologism of our organisers even if I cannot pronounce it.) It cannot serve as a model in its specifics, and any attempt to do so would be self-contradictory. If it has value for other similar approaches, this value must be sought in some of its more general features. To comment on these I return to the title of this paper.

7.1 *Congruent Objectives*

CAMPFIRE's central objectives - ecological sustainability, economic efficiency and institutional effectiveness and acceptability - are congruent. This congruency is not however unique to CAMPFIRE. This is a general configuration of compatible objectives and as our organisers point out constitutes much of the appeal for CBNRM approaches universally.

What singles out CAMPFIRE from the generality of CBNRM approaches in this congruence is the robust form in which it has been conceptualised. This takes two forms. Firstly, its analysis is a grounded one, taking as its starting point objective realities and constraints, examining alternatives and seeking a direction rationalised on the basis of viability. Secondly, it takes the congruence of its objectives but prioritises their means-and sequence differently to those of most CBNRM approaches which have common currency. To date most CBNRM approaches which have had international inception and support have been crypto-conservationist in their motivational core. A dissonance then arises in that, current state endorsements of the international prioritisation of environmental concerns notwithstanding, the real priorities of these states are economic growth. CBNRM approaches are therefore consistently accorded second-order prioritisation in the national contexts where they are implemented. A further dissonance arises in national contexts. Governments are interested in economic growth, centrally led and controlled. At locality levels the priorities are the appropriation of power and value from the centre. The CAMPFIRE Programme in its conceptual core prioritises the congruent objectives in terms of local appropriation, as a means of economic growth and economic rationality as an incentive for ecological sustainability, thus reversing the means-end sequence implicit in many CBNRM approaches.

7.2 *Competing Interests*

Most if not all initiatives for change involve competing interests but they are typically put forward in a guise which masks this. CAMPFIRE, in its conceptualisation if not always in its implementation, has always recognised that

it is about power, about centre-periphery relationships, about resource and value allocations. It is, in other words, about politics. For the situation in which its primary constituency lives it is inherently revolutionary. This situation is one where small-scale farmers exist in the fiefdoms of bureaucracy under tenurially discriminatory conditions, in a system where "title deeds are the emblems of competence, and communal land ownership the badge of incompetence." (Parker 1993: 3) CAMPFIRE contains the seeds of a change in this situation and in this dimension its implications reach far beyond its stated congruent objectives. This is both its strength in terms of its synergy with mounting pressures for the further development of civil society in Zimbabwe; and also constitutes its obstacle as elite centres of power and privilege resist change.

7.3 *Strategic Compromise*

Conceptualised with a profile inherently political, CAMPFIRE has been implemented politically. This has involved the acceptance of strategic compromise as a political imperative in process. In this acceptance, has it introduced crippling and ultimately fatal flaws, or has it provided the basis for stochastic and progressive change? Any categorical conclusion on this question is elusive but I instance one development which may indicate the latter.

Over the period 1 November, 1993 - 15 November, 1994 a Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Appropriate Agricultural Land Tenure Systems under the chairmanship of Prof. M. Rukuni carried out a comprehensive review of the topic, in an exercise including hearings at over 80 locations in communal lands. Its findings, presented to Parliament in May 1995 constitute a landmark document with wide implications for Zimbabwean policy.³⁹ For this paper's purposes it is sufficient to note that the Commission paints a dark picture of resource degradation in communal lands and singles out the CAMPFIRE Programme as the one approach which has provided the incentive for communities to "manage and use their natural resources sustainably." (Vol. I, p. 29) In its recommendations the Commission suggests that security of tenure "should improve if the State relinquishes the *de jure* ownership of Communal Land and passes on full rights to village communities." (Vol. I, p. 49) It goes on to state:

The Commission strongly recommends that Government recognise the traditional village, which should be constituted under the kraalhead as the basic unit of social organisation in Communal Areas. Members of a traditional village should be given formal perpetual rights over land all resources in each village. A schedule of rightful members of the village community needs to be maintained and regularly updated on permanent record. The village community must have the discretion to accept or reject new persons or families wishing to enter its community.

The Commission recommends that the administrative functions on land and natural resources be shifted from Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) to the traditional village where the structure of a village

"Dare" (Shona) "Inkundla" (Ndebele) is to be formalised to act as the local land, water and natural resources board." (Vol. I, pp. 50 - 51)

Thus the conceptual foundations of CAMPFIRE re-emerge, in a broader arena and a higher forum. Government has stated its acceptance of the Report's recommendations "in principle". Whether they are translated into policy and legislation remains to be seen, and will depend inter alia on the assertiveness of the constituency for which they were made.

Ian Parker, with his usual pithy cynicism, wrote in 1993 a brief essay on why CAMPFIRE would fail. He found its fatal flaw to be the discrimination in ownership status of communal farmers which the Programme had accepted in its strategic compromises. He concludes:

"Hopefully the dichotomy in policy is transient: a stepping stone to conceding the benefits of full ownership. Yet if it sticks halfway - as at present - the CAMPFIRE programmes will stress to the owners what they are missing - not what they are getting. And for this reason the project will fail." (Parker, 1993: 3)

I share with Parker the sentiment of his first sentence. I agree with the analysis of the second. But I part company with Parker on the conclusion of the third. To the farmers of communal lands, the delineation of what they are missing is a critical step in the escalation of their assertiveness. CAMPFIRE's role in raising this assertiveness and channelling its voice may, in retrospect, constitute its greatest contribution to Zimbabwe's societal progress.

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Endnotes

- 1 This paper was originally presented at a conference on “Representing Communities: Histories and Politics of Community-based Resource Management” at the Unicoi Lodge, Georgia, USA, 1-3 June 1997. Marshall Murphree was Professor of Applied Social Sciences and Director, Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe, from 1970 until retirement in 1996. He is now a Professorial Fellow in the Centre.
- 2 cf. Brandon and Wells, (1992).
- 3 Dix (1996). Hill suggests that “Indeed very little research exists on the ability of CAMPFIRE to bring about true institutional change and to facilitate local decision-making in the rural areas” (Hill, 1996: 114) To anyone familiar with this literature, this statement is astonishing. It may in part be a function of a protracted period between writing and publication. Hill’s references include no items published after 1992.
- 4 This agro-ecological mapping has formed the basis for much of national policy and planning. While having considerable analytic utility its aggregated characteristics masks micro-ecological variation and can inhibit consideration of the full range of factors necessary for adequate planning. As noted by Moyo *et al.*, *“In reality, numerous conflicts exist between expected and real land uses because the zones are not based as they should, on human requirements and technological developments, reflecting a static approach to planning and little commitment for investment to change and improving the environment”*. (Moyo et al, 1991:3) Further discussion on this example may be of interest under Cluster 2a.
- 5 For elaboration see Arrighi (1973), Murphree (1975), Palmer (1977).
- 6 Zimbabwe, Republic of, Central Statistical Office (1984: 6).
- 7 For a detailed analysis of this history see Murombedzi, (1994: 23-50).
- 8 This approach was not new. It had been propounded by Aldo Leopold in the United States in the 1930s to (largely) deaf ears. (Leopold, 1933)
- 9 cf. Dasman and Mossman (1961), Cumming (1990), Mossman (1963), Child (1988).
- 10 Murphree (1993: 135-136)

- 11 The analytic pedigree of this formulation in Common Property Theory will be apparent. Note that a communal property regime is a type of common property regime. They are not synonymous, although analysis frequently conflates the two.
- 12 The five principles are stated, with minor modification, in Murphree (1993: 6-7).
- 13 Martin, R.B. (1968) Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) This was a revised version, based on earlier drafts, cf. Metcalfe, (1984: 164).
- 14 Wildlife, forestry, grazing and water are specified. (p.12)
- 15 Social science generally operates under a comparative constraint in that it is not able to experimentally manipulate variables in the manner of e.g., chemistry or biology. Furthermore its ethos is generally adverse to social manipulation for experimental purposes. Its analysis of process is thus usually retrospective. The "natural successional experiment" is one in which a long-term institutional development profile can reasonably be predicted, critical variables identified at the outset and then tracked diachronically. One reason for the interest of social science in research in developing country contexts is the opportunities afforded for this methodological approach. Unfortunately since this type of research programme is usually initiated by expatriate universities with tenuous relationships to host countries, the methodology is not carried through over adequate time-frames. There are exceptions to this such as the Colson/Scudder studies of the Gwembe Tonga before and after the construction of Kariba Dam, and the Sri Lankan studies of Norman Uphoff from 1979 - 1990 (cf. Uphoff, 1992).
- 16 For a more detailed history, see Metcalfe, (1994).
- 17 An instance is Simuchembu in Gokwe North. (CASS Files: 1989) For a later period Madzudzo (1995) and Dzingirai (1997) record details of initial communal rejection. Alexander and McGregor (1996) provide an extreme instance from the 1994-1995 period in the Nkayi and Lupane districts.
- 18 For descriptive case studies see Child and Peterson (1991), Peterson (1991).
- 19 To date CAMPFIRE revenues have derived primarily from international sport hunting marketed by professional operators. (see Figure 4) Concession fees for the lease of "non-consumptive" tourism ventures are now a growing component of total revenues in districts with the scenic environments to attract it.
- 20 The guidelines also specified that DNPWLM would initially set off-take

quotas. When RDCs and wards had attained sufficient training and experience, quota setting would then become their prerogative. Subsequently, DNPWLM issued revised guidelines which specified that 80 per cent of revenues should be returned to producer wards, and that councils could retain up to 20 per cent of revenues, 15 per cent for programme management and 5 per cent for general administration. (Child 1995: 6)

21 Brief descriptions of Kanyurira's experience in the CAMPFIRE Programme also appear in Murphree (1983: 9-10) and Metcalfe (1994: 179-181). This account is taken, with minor alteration, from Murphree (1996: 12-20).

22 This is a highly compressed statement on the ecopolitical and ecoreligious dimensions of land and resources in Masoka which are highly relevant but cannot be addressed here.

23 The Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the University of Zimbabwe has been conducting research in Masoka for over 10 years. 1988 statistics are from Cutshall (1989).

24 This estimate is based on Murindagomo's study of the neighboring ward, Chisunga, which exhibits similar conditions (Murindagomo, 1988: 82).

25 The fence cost Z\$70,000, labour being provided by Masoka farmers. This \$70,000 and funding for initial 2 year maintenance has been the only direct external project input into Masoka's programme.

26 Some cropping of riverain alluvium takes place outside the fence, in areas impossible to include within the fence because of seasonal flooding . Masoka's view is that farmers using these areas do so at their own risk, and without any collective liability being accepted.

27 Arguably, the best way of ensuring the survival of a species. Bos taurus appears on no one's "red book." The "domestication" of the ostrich (Struthio camelus) and the Nile crocodile (Crocodilus niloticus) are more recent examples.

28 The specific question yielding this statistic was whether the decisions of the Wildlife Committee were in the interests of both men and women. (Nabane, 1997: 85)

29 Three years ago, in a wildlife committee meeting at Masoka, I was asked for the current exchange rate between the Zimbabwean and US dollars. When asked why they wished to know, the reply was that they knew that the operator's contract had been signed the year before in Zimbabwe dollars. "But," they said, "we know that the operator receives money from his clients in US\$ and that these now buy more Zimbabwe dollars. Where

has the extra money gone?"

30 Murombedzi (1992), Hill (1996).

31 For a discussion of this concept see Murphree (1996: 20-22). Turner
(1986) provides significant data related to the concept.

32 cf. Moore (1996) and Dzingirai (1996).

33 cf. Madzudzo (1997), Nabane, Dzingirai and Madzudzo (1996).

34 Bond, I., unpublished material. cf. Murphree, (1996: Figure 3), supplied by
courtesy Ivan Bond.

35 cf. Madzudzo (1995, b), Dzingirai (1996).

36 The Southern Africa Development Community. SADC is a formal inter-
governmental consortium of Southern African states for co-ordinated
regional development, with sectoral co-ordinative responsibilities being
assigned to specific states. Malawi holds this responsibility in respect to
forestry, fisheries and wildlife.

37 The fact that Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe have since 1989 been in
an alliance to change the CITES, Appendix I listing of their elephant
populations is relevant.

38 For a much more fine-grained analysis see Werbner, (1993).

39 Zimbabwe, Govt. of (1994) Report of the Commission of Inquiry into
Appropriate Agricultural Land Tenure Systems.