The Civic Culture in Britain and America Fifty Years On[1]

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[1]. This paper draws on the work of *Social Change: A Harvard - Manchester Initiative* (SCHMi). The authors are very grateful to Robert Putnam for inspiring us with the original idea, and to Josh Bollian and Tom Sander who worked on the project at the US end.

Abstract

This paper seeks to understand how the drivers of civic participation in Britain and the United States have changed in the fifty years since the civic culture surveys were carried out (Almond & Verba, 1963). This paper reviews the intellectual background to *The Civic Culture* study, arguing that critics have tended to neglect the contribution the surveys made to understanding the civic culture, in particular they have overlooked the book's careful analysis of the social and demographic drivers. Using regression analysis, the paper tests whether the differences and similarities between Britain and the USA that were observed by Almond and Verba fifty years ago are still apparent today, using comparable survey items measuring trust, efficacy and political attitudes. The paper finds that the demographic underpinnings of these elements of civic culture have shifted in similar ways in both countries, such as to a more positive civic orientation for women. There is little evidence of increased stratification, especially with respect to income, though Britain remains more stratified than the US. Education has shifted in its effect, away from the absence of educational qualification to having higher education. In both countries, the older generations now have these civic orientations.

The landmark civic culture (Almond & Verba, 1963) study made a deep imprint on the minds of a whole generation of students of political behaviour. It set a high standard for future work in the field, probably pioneering the systematic comparative survey of political attitudes and setting off long-running research programmes on a wide range of topics, such as trust and political efficacy. Political scientists and sociologists across the world owe a debt to this great work.

The book was not just a record of political participation and democracy; it embodied a particular theory of civic participation, setting out the social and psychological foundations for an effective and stable democracy. The intellectual framework of the study, in particular the 'culture-personality' or 'psychocultural approach' to the study of political phenomena (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 11), reflected the intellectual debates and preoccupations of social science of its time. This theoretical orientation sometimes makes it hard to separate out the study's function as a record of political culture from its statement about what are the important drivers of democratic governance. For it is the theoretical claims, rather than the survey analysis, that have caused many commentators to be critical of the work: some found the political culture hypothesis to be circular (e.g., Barry 1970); others questioned the inferences the authors derived about the stability of democracy (Pateman, 1971); and radical social scientists of the 1960s and 1970s focused on the theory's supposedly conservative presuppositions (e.g., Wiatr, 1980).

These attacks may have been justified, but they have obscured the contribution *The Civic Culture* makes as a unique benchmark survey of political attitudes at an important stage in the development of democracies. There are few competitor studies. Widespread and regular surveys of political attitudes only become regular occurrences from the 1970s (Dalton, 2000, p. 913). Perhaps as a result of the preoccupations of a generation of commentators, there are few reanalyses of the survey, and no attempts at

replication, even in the *Civic Culture Revisited* (Almond & Verba, 1980) at the twenty-year landmark.

Time, however, has been kind to *The Civic Culture*. Not only has radical social science receded, but the psychological approach to political participation has leapt up in popularity as resource models have shown their limitations (Sears, 1987; Cohen et al., 2001). More widely in the study of political theory, the possibility that democracy is predicated on pre-existing norms has been a subject of extensive debate, in particular the idea drawn from the Greeks that democracy sustains through civic virtue (e.g., Petitt, 1997; Maynor, 2003), which is the starting point for Almond and Verba's work (1963, p. ix). Most of all, there is a new generation of empirical studies that have explored the civic and social foundations of democracy in a way that has many similarities to Almond and Verba's original account (Putnam, 1993, 2000; Jackman & Miller, 1996).

With these powerful indicators now more of interest, it is time again to take *The Civic Culture* as an important record of the state of democracy. Whilst standing back from the full implications of the theoretical framework, it is possible to describe civic as the key attitudinal measures used in the survey, using the responses as a benchmark for the current state of political culture. For it is just over fifty years since these surveys took place, which is a significant period of time, a good part of adult life for most people. Many of those who were questioned in 1959 and 1960[1] had experienced both depression and war. They grew up in a society that was less mobile, more family orientated, less dependent on the electronic media and less prosperous than now. Are the current generations likely to have the same set of attitudes as before? Are the same social-structural drivers in place?

This paper seeks to understand how these core civic culture countries' civic attitudes, which were both similar and different in 1959, have fared since that time. In part, it builds on the insight from the political culture surveys, and is underlined by a small number of influential US-British comparative studies (Alford, 1963; Rose &

Suleiman, 1980; Sharpe, 1988; Steinmo, 1993), that national differences persist over time because political culture is embedded. This may mean that both countries remain in equilibrium sustained both by their cultures and underlying social structures. Even if the frequencies are changing, they should move in the same direction, and for the US and Britain to retain its differentials on the key measures. The alternative is that the two countries have become more similar in terms of its predictors over time owing to the changes in social structures that have occurred since that period, and the erosion of national cultural differences with globalisation. This paper claims that, contrary to common understandings of the civic culture, Almond and Verba underlined the social structural drivers of civic attitudes, which are common to developed countries and provide an anchor for civic attitudes and help explain how they are sustained in a country context.

To make the comparison, this paper does not report a time series of responses to questions from the surveys asked over the succeeding decades. In any case, not enough of them exist, particularly in the survey-poor decade of the 1960s. Nor is it possible to rely solely on a comparison of headline figures at the start and finish of the five decades because of differences in survey designs and sampling. Rather, it is the change in the predictors of the civic culture between 1959/60 and the 2000s that this paper seeks to explore, which should reliably predict participation in both time periods. To that end, this paper reviews comparisons of the United States and Britain, discusses the social foundations of the civic culture, outlines the data trawl and analysis, discusses the results and makes conclusions about the changes in drivers of the civic culture.

Britain and the United States

At the core of civic culture surveys were the two advanced democracies, the United States and Britain. The authors selected them to indicate the pathways to effective and responsive government in contrast to what were considered to be the more problematic

countries of Italy, German and Japan. Britain and the US were reported as more similar to one another than to any of the other three nations on most measures; for example, they were the only two in which respondents who valued generosity and trust in other people were more likely to express a willingness to form a political association than respondents who did not value these things (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 226). This underpinning of democracy was solidified in each country through the persistent attachment of citizens to particular values that were reinforced over generations. For the United States and Britain, the key to success was the exact balance between participant and subject cultures, and also the role of activism in sustaining the long-term health of a democracy. In other words, democracy needs a civic culture to thrive.

Critics of *The Civic Culture* believe that Britain and America were too similar to offer inferences about the causal dynamics of the cultural support for democracy (see Lijphart, 1980). But the reader soon becomes aware of the subtle distinctions the book suggests. The argument is that these two countries offered different routes to democratic engagement, each with advantages and disadvantages. The primary difference they highlighted was the balance between subject and participant roles in Britain in contrast to the lesser prevalence of subject orientation and the greater prevalence of participant orientation in the US, leading the authors to brand British civic culture as deferential and the American as participatory. The support most often cited in support of this claim was the difference in the measures of citizen competence. Despite its somewhat lower scores on various measures of civic culture, Almond and Verba upheld Britain, rather than the US, as the model of civic culture due to its more effective balance of subject and participant roles. The second major difference between Britain and the US - as discussed in *The Civic Culture* - was the latter's greater tendency towards associational political action and group activity generally, in contrast to the former's relative emphasis on independent political activity.

The social foundations of the civic culture

It is now conventional in research on political behaviour to assume the background of respondents affects the attitudes they have. Respondents have different access to resources, which affect their self-confidence, the extent to which they have a positive view of society and how they view the responsiveness of the political system. In contrast, there is a temptation to see *The Civic Culture* as solely about culture. Indeed, the bulk of the book was about generalising national cultures and comparing them. It assumed that national characteristics were affected by history, democratic ideologies and more diffuse social practices and values. This idea was intrinsic to the psycho-social nature of the study. But, like any classic work, there was a subtle argument about causation. In much of the text of the book, especially its later sections (e.g., pp. 315-335), there was a discussion about link between the civic culture and the underlying social and demographic structures, which was illustrated in many of the tables. There was not as much prominence given to it as would be expected in a modern treatment, which would rely on the easy presentation of tables and regressions made available by recent advances in computing power.

The United States and Britain were selected as examples of developed democracies, which were economically developed and advanced societies, designed to contrast with lack of development in Mexico and Italy. Thus they were expected to be similar in many ways because of their democratic traditions and open social structures. But it is clear that Almond and Verba saw the two countries as different too, both from their histories but also because of the way in which their social structures interacted with cultural factors to produce a different orientation to politics, which sustained different versions of democracy: 'the civic cultures of Britain and the United States have somewhat different contents, reflecting differences in national histories and social structures' (p. 6). The more open and mobile society of the US promoted its activist culture, and Britain's more deferential and class-bound society maintained more subject

roles (p. 315). As the authors of *The Civic Culture* were at pains to show, the civic culture has a close relationship to sex and especially education: 'Our data have shown education to be the most important determinant of political attitudes' (p. 370). In particular, there are ways in which social structure affects the operation of the civic culture, such as its access to key resources, which is why they noted there were similarities across nations at the higher education level (p. 320). The authors realised that culture was segmented and distributed among the different elements of society, between the educated and non-educated: 'those groups whose induction into full political participation has generally lagged – women and those with low education – are more fully inducted into the role of competent subjects than that of competent citizen' (p. 176). Although Britain and America scored highly in terms of citizen competence, it was stronger in the US's more open society. Whilst education was a powerful factor structuring the civic culture, it may have been stronger in Britain because of greater social stratification. Some of the evidence does show Britain to have had a stronger gradient on education (e.g., enlisting support of an informal group, p. 163), though other evidence showed no difference. But overall they concluded that 'education level does affect the *degree* of difference among the nations' (p. 320), which points to a similarity between individuals of the same educational level across nations (p. 165). With this argument, the US and Britain come out as more similar. So there are claims and evidence in *The Civic Culture* that the two core countries are both similar and different in terms of the impact of social structure, and with regard to education in particular.

The other area of discussion was about women. Almond and Verba concluded they tended to have less civic attitudes and behaviours, which reflected their private social status. This effect was observed across the nations and was moderated by education. Again, Britain and America come out as similar, with women tending to spend more time in organised and social activities than in the other countries in the study, which affects their civic orientation. Today's commentators, such as Stoker (2010: 55),

make a great play on the study's portrait of a world divided on the basis of gender, and how this is different to now. But there are contrasts too. Overall, US women were more social and civic than their British counterparts, and the differences between men and women were larger in the US than in Britain, though the differences were small. The authors also acknowledged the importance of the other demographics in their study, such as age and income, but did not discuss them in detail.

The civic culture across fifty years

An implication of Almond and Verba's argument is that cultures persist over time. The frequencies and relative rates the authors discussed in 1963 are likely to remain today, whether similar or different between the US and Britain at the original time point. Even if there has been a decline in some measures, it would be expected that there would be the same distribution among the subgroups, if at a lower level, or perhaps a similar flattening from those with a high level of civic culture on the grounds that it is hard for those who are low in social and political values to go down even further.

Now there are differences in social structures and in the orientations of particular groups in society. For in both countries, the social structure has changed dramatically in the period since 1959. Both countries have seen rapid economic growth, rising living standards and a growth in leisure time. Income has risen for all groups, which may give more resources to less well off groups and lessen the overall impact of income; on the other hand rising wealth may lead to more divisions in the civic culture. The increasing income inequality in both the US (Smeeding, 2005) and UK (Hills et al., 2010) may also influence civic behaviour by increasing gaps between the civic haves and have-nots. Traditional industries characterised by mass production and heavy unionization have been replaced with growing service industries with educated, skilled and specialized workforces. This change has also given rise to the feminization of work with women entering the paid workforce. The role of women has changed, away from the less public

roles that Almond and Verba described, toward more active forms of engagement. Education has expanded dramatically, especially higher education. There have been growing house sizes, with geographic sprawl as a more U.S. phenomenon.

It is not clear in which direction the social changes point. In one interpretation, they indicate greater similarities between the countries as education expands it reaches to more of the population and each country's social structure is broken down by similar global economic changes, the decline of the working class, greater use of information and the rise of a global media. This could indicate a convergence of social predictors, possibly as part of negative trend of civic orientation. Or this could be a race to the bottom as implied in the thesis of gradual discontent and alienation (Norris, 1999; Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Dalton, 2004). Decline could also be consistent with the continuing, internal differentiation of the civic culture, reflecting social divisions within each country. This would be a kind of path-dependent decline, where the US and Britain maintain their distinctiveness. The final alternative would be further differentiation of the civic culture as some groups have access to political resources but others are excluded (see the summary in Dalton, 2004, pp. 83-4). The greater diversity in society could also lead to greater polarisation and divergence.

Research questions

This paper compares a selection of Almond and Verba's measures of civic attitudes between 1959/60 and 2000s in the US and Britain. This yields four observations for each question. This allows the posing of a series of expectations about the extent to which the covariates predict the attitudinal variables, both across the countries and time periods. It is important to be cautious in making inferences from the data because there are only two cases and two time points. However, a careful attention to the variations within cases can aid the making of an inference (King, Keohane & Verba, 1995), which justifies our approach of looking at the covariates.

There are advantages in the contemporary perspective. The analyst has at hand techniques that were not widely used in survey research at the time. Whereas Almond and Verba relied on three-way tables to control for the varying influence of education and sex, for example, today there is multiple regression. So one of the early tasks is to see whether the descriptive differences they described still occur as their data when all the appropriate controls are in place. The expectations are that education should predict the civic culture, particularly higher education. Then sex should predict these variables, with women being less civic in formal terms than men. In terms of the comparison, the expectation is that Britain and the US are largely similar, but the gradient of education and sex on the outcomes should be higher in Britain given its deferential culture.

For the variables that Almond and Verba did not discuss, income should behave in the same way as education but would be more of an indicator of difference among the population, again pointing to more of a distinction in Britain with its class-based society. The other important variable is race, which was not discussed in the book, but is an important sub-division within political cultures (Silver & Dowley, 2000). At the time Britain was largely a non-racial society, with only small numbers of black and Asian people appearing in the survey. In contrast, it is highly likely that ethnicity predicts civic orientations in the US in 1959/60. Similar arguments should apply to the other socio economic indicators, such as region, which reflect long-running differences across the two countries. For the US, the south has been different because of its history; for Britain the north with its industrialised working class legacy, and Wales and Scotland because they are the different nations of Britain with their own civic traditions. Age is important because of the age effects on political orientations and a cohort effect reflecting particular socialisation patterns, such as the civic golden age that existed in the first few decades after the Second World War. In 1959/60, Almond and Verba reported that age was associated with negative attitudes to participation (p. 279), because of the influence

of the parlous interwar years, succeeded by more positive attitudes in younger cohorts in the post-war era.

Rolling forward to the 2000s, it is possible to pose some further hypotheses that rely on Almond and Verba's assumptions. We begin with education. This creates the well-known problem that as college education is associated with the civic culture, and that Almond and Verba indicated that the civic culture converges at higher levels of education. However, we also know the descriptive statistics already belie that assumption because we know the average citizen receives more education now in an age of declining participation (see Brody, 1978). What does this mean for the covariates? Everything else being equal, it could mean that the absolute effect of education weakens over time, partly because it is the relative impact of education that affects participation (Nie et al., 1996; Tenn, 2005) so that education does not discriminate as much between citizens, not unless there is a general decline that expresses itself in citizen orientations (Helliwell & Putnam, 2007). This would mean that the differential between educated and non-educated would remain.

The reduction of education's impact would also be consistent with the reduction in class differentiation, particularly for low education groups, especially as the numbers with no education have reduced in society. The gradient in Britain could reduce because of Britain's shift from a deferential society where education is less about access to privilege to a society more equal in social status. The same argument could apply to income - social class could become less of a discriminator, particularly in Britain as incomes go up and most people gain better life security and better access to resources. The opposite argument is that as society become more unequal so the differentiation of the civic culture increases in both countries. On the other hand, the form of social stratification could shift. Whereas in Almond and Verba's time it was access to any education that was the discriminator, now it may be access to higher education that counts, partly because all education levels have gone up, making higher education the key

dividing point. Gender differences are expected to reduce in both countries as women gain more independence and representation. On the other hand, it is possible that these political attitudes remain entrenched (Verba et al., 1997; Electoral Commission, 2005; Atkeson & Rapoport, 2003). As the nationalisation of cultures continues, regional differences should reduce in both countries, though there is the persistence of a sense of place (Johnston, 1986). While some of these trends point to greater homogenisation, civic culture could become more differentiated with respect to race as more groups appear in society and grow in numbers, particularly as Britain becomes a multi-racial society. The expectation is that Britain would become more like the US in this respect as Britain becomes more ethnically diverse. Age effects are likely to change with a reversal of the age effect found in Almond and Verba, with older groups being part of the civic generation (Putnam, 2000; Mettler & Welch; 2005), possibly extended by the more active cohort of the 1960s (Jennings & Niemi, 1981).

Approach and methods

To make the fifty-year comparison, there is no repeat survey upon which to draw, so comparative analysis has to rely on the existence of questions in other surveys that use Almond and Verba's questionnaire wording, and exist at the same time and in both countries. This is a tall bar. Fortunately, some of these questions have become standard in survey analysis, partly from the influence of the original survey and because of the standard nature of some of the actions and attitudes the civic culture survey wanted to measure.

The initial approach was to indicate the categories of variables for the search. The key constructs we want to capture are social trust as it is a core part of the Almond and Verba analysis, the sense of political efficacy and involvement, and the extent of political discussion. It would have been possible to find other questions, such as on religion, socialising and life satisfaction, but our primary interest is in civic variables. The

research identified the questions from contemporaneous surveys from the mid-2000s, and then trawled the main surveys containing the Almond and Verba question wordings. The UK surveys are the European Social Survey (ESS), British Election Survey (BES), British Social Attitudes (BSA), Citizen Audit of Great Britain or Citizen Audit Questionnaire (CAQ) and the Citizenship Survey (HOCS). The US surveys are the General Social Survey (GSS), National Election Survey (NES), Current Population Survey (CPS), Facilities Management (FM) and the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (SCCBS). This produced a large number of questions with some comparability, which was reduced because of differences in the exact wording. Nevertheless, there is a range of core attitudes in the civic culture, from the more social aspects of trusting others to feelings about politics, such as efficacy. The selected questions and their relative response rates (relative frequencies) appear in Table 1, using the two comparisons. Because these are only two time points, the discussion reports time trends as summarised in the existing literature to contextualise the findings.

As provided in Appendix 1, the selected questions are either with binary response categories (V15, V37, V128 and V132) or four data point ordinal (ordered) response categories (V26, V43 and V44). So for the explanatory (exploratory) analytical part of this research the probit models are adopted. Probit regressions fit maximum likelihood models (see Aldrich & Nelson, 1984; Miranda & Rabe-Hesketh, 2006). For questions with a binary outcome, the Stata command code "dprobit" is used. Where the question has an ordinal (ordered) outcome, the Stata command code "oprobit" is used. All regressions use the standard weights applied to these surveys. It is possible to make comparisons of the regression coefficients, but more care is needed with the standard errors as the civic culture surveys had a smaller number of respondents. Nonetheless, the differences are tolerable. When allowing for missing cases, there are between about 700 for the civic culture surveys and around 1000 respondents for the contemporary surveys.

The regressions use the measures of the covariates from the 1959/60 surveys to make the comparison across the fifty years. For standard demographic variables, such as age range, gender, marital status, number of children and region, there was no problem finding comparable indicators for the 2000s. For the others, the change in the structure of societies and institutions in the period, such as a change in the education system, presented a challenge. For education, the regressions use the Almond and Verba categories of 'no schooling', 'primary school', 'preparatory school' or 'secondary school' and 'advanced technological school' or 'university', which were comparable across the two countries. Employed and unemployed were comparable predictors, with other categories of 'retired', 'homemaker', 'student' and 'disabled' as the reference category.

Income was made comparable in pound sterling across time points and countries by the following rules: (1) when converting the amount of income in pound sterling reported in the 1959 survey of Britain to the amount of income in the contemporary time point year 2004, the 1959 income figures are multiplied by 16.210. The figure 16.210 is derived from 100/6.169 (i.e. GDP deflator at 2004 divided by GDP deflator at 1959; available from: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/data_gdp_annex.htm); (2) when converting the amount of income in US dollar reported in the 1960[1] survey of US to the amount of income in the contemporary time point year 2004, the 1960 income figures are divided by 0.16. The figure 0.16 is the US CPI (Consumer Price index, available from: http://www.bls.gov/cpi); (3) when converting the 2004 income in US dollar to pound sterling, the income figures are multiplied by 0.8051 (i.e. the mean 2004 US-UK exchange rate; available from: www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory).

For race, the Almond and Verba dataset only contains black and white respondents, which created white as the reference term. There were too few black respondents in the British survey to make the analysis meaningful. For the 2000s surveys, it was possible to use the appropriate categories of black, Asian, Hispanic and other for the US, and black, Asian and other for Britain.

Describing the frequencies

This section compares the relative frequencies between 1959/60 and the 2000s. The aim is not to provide a definitive indication as to whether the frequencies have gone up or down, but to discuss the overall direction of change. There are many reasons why the frequencies vary because of the effects of question order and context in surveys. It is hard to draw timelines back to 1959/60 because of the few surveys done in the 1960s and 1970s – many of the comparable question wordings only appear in the 1980s. Nonetheless, with the aid of an extensive secondary literature, it is possible to make some observations about the direction of change in the civic culture, particularly recently.

[Table 1 here]

With these caveats, Table 1 presents the relative frequencies for the group of variables. For social trust (V15) there is a small reduction over the fifty-year period in either country, which corresponds to accounts that suggest that trust has declined in the US during this period (e.g., Jennings & Stoker, 2004). Several studies highlight effects within cohorts, such as among young people (Rahn & Transue, 1998). Rahn and Transue examine the decline in social trust over time since the 1970s, using the General Social Survey (see also Brehm & Rahn, 1997). Some authors consider the UK picture has been more stable with social trust in the British Social Attitudes survey staying stable over time (Johnson & Jowell, 2001), with others pointing to a decline since the 1980s and over the 1990s (Hall, 1999). Newton (1999) finds a decline in social trust in both countries between 1959 and 1996.

A second measure of social trust is whether respondents think other people are 'generally helpful' (V37) and 'try to be fair' (V128). Both these indicators show a substantial increase over the fifty years, suggesting that people have become less cynical over time. Other evidence from the US has suggested a decline in these other indicators

of trust (e.g. Paxton, 1999). Brehm and Rahn (1997) also use the same General Social Survey trust items, and show a gradual decline, with an average correlation between the indicators of 0.94 (see Rahn & Transue, 1998).

Moving from trust to political discussion, the percentage of respondents who are 'talking about politics' (V26) shows an increase over the period in both countries. 'Talking about politics' is somewhat different to political interest as it happens in a face-to-face context, so that authors tend to see it, in part, as an aspect of deliberation (Conver & Sears, 2005). It is important again to be careful because of the time point and because the mid-2000s were a special period in both UK and US politics, when these countries embarked on an unpopular war in Iraq. Other studies have found this to be constant in the US and Britain from the Almond and Verba benchmark up to the 1992 (Bennett et al., 2000).

The Almond and Verba survey contained questions about the likelihood of political action. In beliefs about one's own ability to change a law (V43) there appears to be no change in Britain since 1959. The British were already less likely to believe in this than the Americans, but by the 2000s the gap had widened considerably. Americans were much more likely in 2004 to believe both that they *could* change a law (V43), and that they *would* change the law (V44). Americans in 1960 were also more likely to feel they had a say in government (V132), compared to Britons, but where both countries have experienced a decline. These divergent trends reflect a general decline in trust for politicians and government that does not imply any parallel fall in either the will or the ability to affect decision making more generally (Dalton, 2004, Pew, 2007). Although it appears to be a paradox that greater wish to get involved corresponds with less of a sense of government responsiveness, it might reflect a wider array of tools at the disposal of citizens wishing to influence policy (Norris, 2002).

These descriptive trends show the bulk of attitudes in this selection of questions to be gradually declining with respect to trust, with increasing political interest, but falling

efficacy. The basic differences between the US and Britain remain: similar on trust, but more confidence in political action in the US. It is necessary to be cautious about these surveys, however, as they are based on two time points, even when seen in the context of wider series and the research literature. The next section seeks to examine an area where there is more comparability across the sample – the influence of the covariates.

Correlates of the civic culture

Tables 2 and 3 present the extracted results of the regressions, first for the US, then Britain. The figures in bold show when the 95% confidence interval of the 2000s estimate is different from its equivalent in 1959/60. The analysis then compares and contrasts significant terms and coefficients. The first task is to comment on whether Almond and Verba's own account is borne out by the data. As expected there are the negative coefficients on education, with below secondary education being negatively associated with all but one of the US 1960 indicators and all of the UK equivalents. The one US exception is 'whether people are helpful' (V37), which has negative but insignificant regression coefficient. At the top end of the education scale there appeared to be a positive impact of college education on political efficacy and discussion in the US in 1960, but no effect on trust. In Britain, college level education was a poor predictor of civic values in 1959. By the 2000s, however, as the number of people attending college and universities increased so too does the importance of college education as a predictor of civic engagement. By the 2000s, being a college graduate was positively associated with all our indicators of civic life in the US. In Britain, there was a similar emergence of higher education as a predictor of trust and political discussion. The effect on efficacy was also more pronounced in the 2000s: university educated Britons grew more convinced of their ability to change laws, and also more likely to attempt to do so.

[Tables 2 & 3 here]

So what do these shifts mean? Whereas higher education was a minority pursuit when Almond and Verba were writing, now around a third of adults in both countries have a college education. Rather than simply leading to an increase in civic values, this shift towards a more education citizenry has led to a shift in the discriminatory power of education in both countries: whereas before the main distinction was between those with and without a formal education now the bar has been raised so the real difference is between those with and without a degree. This would seem to confirm Almond and Verba's prediction that more higher education would lead to convergence of the civic culture. But it might show the line of division has simply moved. Moreover, although it was expected that education stratification would be stronger in Britain than in the US, this analysis does not find evidence to support that.

Furthermore, there is little evidence supporting the relative stratification argument in respect to income, which is a predictor for all the items in the US, but not for Britain, with thinking 'whether people are helpful' (V37), and 'likelihood one would attempt to change a law' (V44), not significantly affected by income. Nevertheless, most of the indicators had coefficients of a similar magnitude for income in Britain and US in 1959/60, again suggesting that the social stratification of civic values was of a similar magnitude in the two countries. By the 2000s, there is little change. On the whole, income was and continues to be positively associated with the civic culture, and equally so in the US and Britain. If anything there has been a slight decline in stratification by income despite the widening of income inequalities in both countries.

Gender plays less of a role than Almond and Verba suggested. There was no statistically significant relationship in either country in 1959/60 (after controlling for other factors) with respect to social trust. There was also no statistically significant relationship between agenda and two of the three indicators of political efficacy. However, in both countries in 1959/60 women were less likely to 'talk about public

politics' (V26) and say they would be likely to 'attempt to change a law' (V44). This no doubt reflects the perceived role of women in respect to politics before the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s. However, it is important to bear in mind that the regressions control for employment status, which was important for women's roles in 1959/60, and so maybe reducing the size of the effects observed here. By the 2000s, the difference in political discussion had declined in both countries, and the difference in likelihood of attempting to change laws disappeared altogether.

Age behaves slightly differently to what Almond and Verba suggested. In 1959/60 the younger groups are less trusting. In the US, this is the case for social trust (V15) and for finding others helpful (V37); there is the same relationship in Britain for social trust (V15), and for finding others fair (V128) and feeling of 'having a say in government' (V132). But, just as Almond and Verba indicated, some of the older generations do not appear to be more positive in their attitudes. In the US, respondents aged 41-60 group and the over-sixties were less trusting (V15) and less likely to feel they had 'a say in government' (V132). In Britain, the 41-60s were less trusting (V15) but more likely to 'attempt to change a law' (V44). The over-sixties were less likely to 'talk about politics' (V26) and feel 'having a say in government' (V132).

So what has changed since 1959/60? Tables 2 and 3 suggest that there are important cross-national similarities in the direction of change, a finding that is reinforced by the number of statistically different estimates for the age variables. In the US, the negative effects of the younger age groups have reversed for social trust (V15) and finding others helpful (V37). These age groups believe in their own ability to change a law (V43) and are more likely to 'attempt to change a law' (V44). There is an even more marked switch around for the 41-60 group, with the removal of the negative coefficient on social trust (V15), and the emergence of positive effects on other indicators (on finding 'people are helpful', thinking 'people try to be fair', and in 'talking about politics'). The over-sixties in the US fall neatly into the expectations of the civic generation, with

significant coefficients for social trust (V15), thinking 'people are helpful' and 'try to be fair' (V37 and V128), and for 'talking about politics' (V26), 'belief in own ability to change a law' (V43) and likelihood to 'attempt to change a law' (V44), and moving from negative significant to non-significant for feeling of 'having a say in government' (V132).

There are some similar changes in Britain. The negative significant coefficient for the age 18-25 group has been removed for social trust and thinking 'people try to be fair' (V15 and V128), but there is the negative significant coefficient for 'belief in own ability to change a law' (V43). Similar to their counterparts in the US, the age 41-60 group in general have more positive attitudes, having removed the negative-significant coefficient for social trust (V15), with now positive-significant coefficients for thinking 'people try to be fair' (V128) and 'talking about politics' (V26). The over-sixties are similar to their counterparts in the US with signs of increasing civic values on all indicators except for likelihood to 'attempt to change a law' (V44): moving from non-significant to significant and positive for social trust and thinking of people as helpful and fair (V15, V37 and V128), moving from negative to positive significant for 'talking about politics' (V26), and removing the negative significant coefficient for feeling of 'having a say in government' (V132). These changes by age group probably reflect generational changes, with those who were in the youngest age groups when Almond and Verba were writing are now over sixty. The shift towards civic engagement amongst the more elderly is really just an echo of the young citizens in 1959. In other words, the civic generation has aged in both countries, though there are signs that the younger generation today has a relatively optimistic outlook on civic life.

Race was and still is important in the US in predicting civic values. Most notably African Americans scored lower on social trust indicators than their white counterparts, a difference that is well documented in the trust literature (e.g., Uslaner, 2002), in the form of a negative impact on the trust items (V15, V37 and V128). These differences remain in

the 2000s. Almost no differences were detectable for Britain, though this is likely to reflect the small sample of minority respondents.

Region does not play a role in 1960 in the US, except for the greater propensity for 'talking about politics' in the West. However, it appears that region did play a role in 1959 in Britain. The North was more trusting (V15), but less likely to 'attempt to change a law' (V44) and to feel of 'having a say in government' (V132). Welsh respondents scored lower for thinking 'people try to be fair' (V128), lower for 'talking about politics' (V26), and also lower for likelihood to 'attempt to change a law' (V44) and feeling of 'having a say in government' (V132). People in the Midlands emerged as having lower rates for thinking 'people are helpful and fair' (V37 and V128) and feeling of 'having a say in government' (V132), but had higher rates for 'talking about politics' (V26) and 'belief in own ability to change a law' (V43). Scots felt less likely than other Britons of 'having a say in government' (V132). By the 2000s, regional differences in the US, in particular people from the South, have become more pronounced, with negative significant coefficients emerging for social trust (V15) and 'talking about politics' (V26), though a positive one for 'belief in own ability to change a law' (V43). For Britain, there has been a shift away from regional differences in opinion. Finally, the covariates of 'marital status' and 'number of children' are not consistent significant predictors in both countries.

Overall there is a similar direction of change between the two countries. The key trends are upward shift of the education divide and, to a lesser extent, the weakening of income as a predictor in the US. Another pattern of striking similarity is the effect of the ageing of the civic generation in both countries and the emergence of a more civic younger cohort. Finally, women have become more likely to engage in political discussion and feel more politically empowered since the 1950s.

Conclusions

This paper has sought to revive interest in a classic work as an important statement about the foundations of the civic culture, and a baseline from which to compare two developed democracies as they have faced profound social and economic changes during the fifty years since the production of those surveys. The argument is that a careful reading of *The Civic Culture* suggests the book has a more subtle and penetrating analysis of the determinants of the civic culture than many of the critics suppose. Instead of highlighting the psycho-social theories of the work, this paper has focused on the social and demographic determinants of civic attitudes. When seen in this light, it is possible to observe how these social drivers have shifted over the subsequent years.

Even though Almond and Verba did not adopt regression analysis to control for the impact of demographic and other respondent characteristics, the inferences they made from the data at hand stand up well. The two countries are quite similar in terms of the demographic influence of the key variables, with some differences in terms of sex just as Almond and Verba described. In common with much analysis of the changes in these values, it is possible to come to different interpretations of the trends, either stability or decline, depending on the variable being considered. In general, much of the analysis supports a gradual decline, though the final verdict is that the values that Almond and Verba described have persisted.

The key finding is that the demographic underpinnings of these elements of civic culture have shifted in similar ways in both countries. Education seems to have shifted in its discriminatory focus – lack of education is not the main barrier to the civic culture; rather higher education is the entry into it. In terms of the age structure of the population, the older generations – those who were negative about society and politics - had largely gone by the 2000s. The people who were growing up when their parents were being surveyed are the older group now, and these people have civic orientations. This civic generation is in evidence in both Britain and America. Surprisingly, this paper

did not find the increasing differentiation of the civic culture, at least captured in the measures here. The impacts of race and region do not appear to increase over time though there were important changes for women. It seems the covariates of education, income and age continue to play their role. The civic culture is grounded on these powerful social factors just as Almond and Verba argued in 1963.

Notes

1. Interviews of *The Civic Culture* surveys took place during June and July 1959 in all countries except the U.S. where they took place in March 1960.

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Table 1: The Almond and Verba questions on trust, efficacy and politics, 1959-2000s

Almond and Verba question[1]	US/UK	1959	2000s	change
TRUST		relative freq. (%)		(%)
• V15: whether people can be trusted	US	57.8	54.3	-3.5***
	UK	55.8	55.2	-0.6
• V37: whether people are helpful	US	32.1	55.1	+23.0***
	UK	30.8	32.1	+1.3***
• V128: whether people try to be fair	US	30.2	55.6	+25.4***
	UK	22.6	65.0	+42.4***
POLITICS				
• V26: talking about public affairs/politics[2]	US	24.5	47.1	+22.6***
	UK	23.0	45.1	+22.1***
• V43: belief in own ability to change a law[3]	US	23.9	38.3	+14.4***
	UK	16.5	18.0	+1.5***
• V44: likelihood one would attempt to change a law[3]	US	46.2	60.7	+14.5***
	UK	42.7	40.7	-2.0
• V132: feeling of having a say in Government	US	62.0	51.2	-10.8***
	UK	41.1	32.5	-8.6***

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

[1]. Appendix 1 has the full question wording and the corresponding response categories of the selected questions.

[2]. The cells report regular talk about politics.

[3]. The cells present all "likely" responses.

Table 2: Regression analysis, United States[1]

	V15: whether people can be trusted		V37: whether people are helpful		V128: whether people try to be fair		V26: talking about public affairs		V43: belief in own ability to change a law		V44: likelihood one would attempt to change a law		V132: feeling of having a say in Government	
	1960	2004	1960	2004	1960	20004	1960	2006	1960	2004	1960	2004	1960	2004
Married[2]	+0.01 (0.07)	+0.06 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.08 (0.14)	+0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.17)	+0.09 (0.10)	+0.25* (0.14)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.05)
Divorced, separated or widowed[2]	+0.04 (0.08)	+0.02 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.14* (0.08)	+0.06 (0.16)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.29 (0.20)	+0.02 (0.12)	+0.03 (0.17)	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.16** (0.08)	+0.02 (0.06)
No. of children	+0.00 (0.01)	-0.04* (0.02)	+0.00 (0.01)	+0.00 (0.01)	+0.00 (0.01)	+0.01 (0.02)	+0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	+0.01 (0.01)	+0.01 (0.02)
Have below[3] secondary education	-0.17*** (0.04)	**+0.07** **(0.06)**	-0.03 (0.04)	+0.05 (0.06)	-0.18*** (0.04)	-0.16** (0.07)	-0.54*** (0.10)	-0.33*** (0.07)	-0.43*** (0.11)	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.57*** (0.10)	**-0.03** **(0.11)**	-0.20*** (0.04)	-0.15** (0.06)
have college education[3]	+0.01 (0.06)	+0.10** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	+0.09* (0.05)	+0.03 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	+0.20 (0.13)	+0.38*** (0.06)	-0.03 (0.16)	+0.10 (0.08)	+0.13 (0.14)	+0.04 (0.08)	+0.17*** (0.06)	+0.08* (0.04)
College graduate[3]	+0.10 (0.07)	+0.24*** (0.05)	+0.08 (0.07)	+0.11** (0.06)	+0.09 (0.07)	+0.13** (0.05)	+0.28* (0.15)	+0.48*** (0.06)	+0.24 (0.19)	+0.24*** (0.09)	+0.27* (0.16)	+0.27*** (0.09)	+0.19*** (0.06)	+0.18*** (0.05)
Employed[4]	+0.05 (0.05)	+0.03 (0.04)	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)	+0.18* (0.10)	-0.06 (0.05)	+0.11 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.08)	+0.10 (0.11)	+0.00 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)
Unemployed[4]	-0.14 (0.18)	+0.10 (0.10)	+0.03 (0.17)	+0.05 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.18)	-0.22* (0.11)	-0.60 (0.42)	-0.18* (0.10)	-7.55 (14200)	-0.44** (0.18)	-0.02 (0.48)	+0.30* (0.18)	+0.06 (0.17)	-0.02 (0.11)
Age 18-25[5]	-0.20*** (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.13*** (0.05)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.13)	+0.01 (0.09)	-0.19 (0.16)	+0.22* (0.12)	-0.21 (0.14)	+0.12 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)
Age 41-60[5]	-0.08* (0.04)	**+0.01** **(0.05)**	-0.02 (0.04)	+0.13*** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	**0.25***** **(0.04)**	+0.03 (0.10)	+0.11* (0.06)	-0.16 (0.12)	+0.12 (0.08)	+0.13 (0.10)	+0.10 (0.08)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)
Age 61 and up[5]	-0.10* (0.06)	+0.17*** (0.06)	+0.00 (0.05)	+0.19*** (0.06)	+0.00 (0.05)	**+0.23***** **(0.06)**	+0.01 (0.12)	+0.23*** (0.08)	-0.20 (0.14)	+0.18* (0.11)	+0.02 (0.12)	+0.45*** (0.11)	-0.15*** (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)

[1]. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold indicates that the 95% confidence interval for the 2000s is greater or less than the interval for 1960.

[2]. For marital status variables, the reference group is "single and never married"; [3]. For education variables, the reference group is "have secondary school/high school education"; [4]. for the employment status variables, the reference group includes "retired, student, homemaker and disabled"; [5]. For age variables, the reference group is "age 26-40".

Table 2: United States (continued)

	V15: whether people can be trusted		V37: whether people are helpful		V128: whether people try to be fair		V26: talking about public affairs		V43: belief in own ability to change a law		V44: likelihood one would attempt to change a law		V132: feeling of having a say in Government	
	1960	2004	1960	2004	1960	20004	1960	2006	1960	2004	1960	2004	1960	2004
Income (£)	+0.05*** (0.01)	+0.01** (0.00)	+0.03** (0.01)	+0.02** (0.01)	+0.02** (0.01)	+0.02*** (0.01)	+0.13*** (0.03)	+0.07*** (0.01)	+0.05* (0.03)	+0.01 (0.01)	+0.05* (0.03)	+0.00 (0.01)	+0.02* (0.01)	+0.01* (0.01)
Midwest[6]	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.04)	+0.04 (0.06)	+0.05 (0.10)	-0.14** (0.07)	-0.02 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.10)	+0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)
South[6]	+0.02 (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.06)	+0.02 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.06)	+0.10 (0.10)	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.02 (0.12)	+0.17* (0.09)	-0.03 (0.10)	+0.09 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.05)	+0.00 (0.05)
West[6]	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.06)	+0.02 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	+0.34*** (0.12)	+0.05 (0.07)	+0.15 (0.15)	+0.05 (0.10)	+0.03 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)
Female[7]	+0.03 (0.04)	+0.03 (0.04)	+0.06 (0.04)	+0.12*** (0.04)	+0.06 (0.04)	+0.06 (0.04)	-0.43*** (0.10)	-0.32*** (0.04)	+0.00 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.26** (0.10)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Black[8]	-0.22*** (0.06)	-0.19*** (0.05)	-0.08* (0.05)	-0.15** (0.06)	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.22*** (0.07)	-0.12 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.16)	+0.04 (0.10)	-0.22 (0.14)	+0.18* (0.10)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.05)
Asian[8]		-0.06 (0.11)						-0.46*** (0.15)						-0.00 (0.12)
Hispanic[8]		-0.07 (0.06)												-0.03 (0.07)
N	905	939	901	707	915	699	943	2526	669	1274	851	1283	925	840

[6]. For region variables, the reference category is "Northeast"; [7]. For female, the comparison group is "male"; [8]. For race variables, the reference group is "white".

Table 3 Regression analysis, Britain[1]

	V15: whether people can be trusted		V37: whether people are helpful		V128: whether people try to be fair		V26: talking about public affairs		V43: belief in own ability to change a law		V44: likelihood one would attempt to change a law		V132: feeling of having a say in Government	
	1959	2004	1959	2004	1959	2004	1959	2004	1959	2004	1959	2004	1959	2004
Married[2]	+0.07 (0.07)	+0.04 (0.04)	+0.04 (0.06)	+0.06 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.06)	+0.01 (0.04)	+0.14 (0.14)	+0.07 (0.13)	+0.28 (0.18)	-0.21 (0.14)	+0.38** (0.16)	-0.06 (0.14)	+0.05 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)
Divorced, separated or widowed[2]	+0.01 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.05)	+0.10 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.05)	+0.03 (0.08)	-0.10** (0.05)	+0.27 (0.19)	+0.06 (0.14)	+0.27 (0.25)	-0.15 (0.15)	+0.33 (0.22)	+0.02 (0.15)	+0.10 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.07)
No. of children	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	+0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	+0.03 (0.05)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.01)	+0.00 (0.02)
Have below[3] secondary education	-0.16*** (0.04)	+0.01 (0.04)	-0.20*** (0.04)	**+0.04** **(0.04)**	-0.10*** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.28*** (0.09)	-0.18* (0.10)	-0.24** (0.10)	-0.10 (0.11)	-0.27*** (0.10)	-0.02 (0.11)	-0.26*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.05)
Have university education[3]	+0.01 (0.14)	+0.15*** (0.04)	+0.14 (0.13)	+0.11*** (0.03)	+0.08 (0.11)	+0.08** (0.04)	-0.08 (0.25)	+0.32*** (0.11)	-0.48 (0.33)	+0.05 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.31)	+0.15 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.11)	**+0.18*** **(0.06)**
Employed[4]	+0.06 (0.07)	+0.05 (0.04)	+0.08 (0.07)	+0.09** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.06)	+0.06 (0.04)	+0.45*** (0.16)	**-0.17** **(0.11)**	+0.14 (0.21)	-0.20* (0.12)	+0.13 (0.18)	-0.41*** (0.11)	+0.07 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)
Unemployed[4]	-0.17 (0.22)	+0.05 (0.07)		+0.02 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.13)	+0.06 (0.06)	+0.05 (0.43)	-0.23 (0.24)	+1.03** (0.45)	-0.15 (0.25)	+0.72 (0.46)	-0.16 (0.24)	+0.04 (0.19)	-0.12 (0.10)
Age 18-25[5]	-0.21*** (0.08)	+0.01 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.24 (0.16)	-0.08 (0.19)	-0.30 (0.21)	-0.37* (0.21)	-0.06 (0.18)	-0.16 (0.20)	-0.17*** (0.06)	-0.20*** (0.06)
Age 41-60[5]	-0.09** (0.04)	+0.07 (0.04)	+0.01 (0.04)	+0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	**+0.13*** **(0.04)**	+0.05 (0.09)	+0.21* (0.11)	+0.16 (0.10)	+0.19* (0.11)	+0.19* (0.10)	+0.11 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.04)	+0.05 (0.05)
Age 61 and up[5]	-0.09 (0.06)	**+0.22*** **(0.05)**	-0.02 (0.06)	**+0.20*** **(0.04)**	-0.06 (0.04)	**+0.26*** **(0.04)**	-0.26** (0.13)	+0.28* (0.15)	-0.04 (0.16)	+0.02 (0.16)	-0.22 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.16)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.03 (0.08)

[1]. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold indicates that the 95% confidence interval for the 2000s is greater or less than the interval for 1959.

[2]. For marital status variables, the reference group is "single and never married"; [3]. for education variables, the reference group is "have secondary school/high school education"; [4]. for the employment status variables, the reference group includes "retired, student, homemaker and disabled"; [5]. For age variables, the reference group is "age 26-40".

Table 3: Britain (continued)

	V15: whether people can be trusted		V37: whether people are helpful		V128: whether people try to be fair		V26: talking about public affairs		V43: belief in own ability to change a law		V44: likelihood one would attempt to change a law		V132: feeling of having a say in Government	
	1959	2004	1959	2004	1959	2004	1959	2004	1959	2004	1959	2004	1959	2004
Income (£)	+0.04** (0.02)	+0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	+0.00 (0.01)	+0.03* (0.01)	+0.02** (0.01)	+0.14*** (0.04)	+0.04* (0.02)	+0.10** (0.05)	+0.05*** (0.02)	+0.06 (0.05)	+0.02 (0.02)	+0.03* (0.02)	+0.02* (0.01)
Wales[6]	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.67*** (0.18)	-0.17 (0.19)	+0.25 (0.20)	-0.07 (0.20)	-0.47** (0.20)	+0.07 (0.19)	-0.24*** (0.06)	+0.04 (0.10)
Midlands[6]	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.10** (0.05)	+0.02 (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	+0.25** (0.12)	-0.17 (0.11)	+0.28** (0.14)	-0.24** (0.12)	-0.21 (0.13)	+0.13 (0.11)	-0.14*** (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)
North[6]	+0.10** (0.04)	+0.06* (0.04)	+0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	+0.00 (0.09)	-0.25** (0.10)	-0.00 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.11)	-0.21** (0.10)	+0.07 (0.10)	-0.08** (0.04)	+0.09* (0.05)
Scotland[6]	+0.07 (0.06)	+0.10* (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	+0.12** (0.04)	+0.00 (0.05)	+0.07 (0.05)	-0.12 (0.13)	-0.23* (0.13)	-0.03 (0.17)	+0.09 (0.14)	-0.23 (0.15)	+0.05 (0.14)	-0.16*** (0.05)	+0.05 (0.07)
Female[7]	+0.06 (0.07)	-0.07** (0.03)	+0.11 (0.07)	+0.01 (0.03)	+0.01 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.29* (0.15)	-0.19** (0.08)	-0.17 (0.19)	+0.02 (0.09)	-0.39** (0.17)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.04)
Black[8]							-0.02 (0.63)	+0.02 (0.35)	-0.08 (0.83)	+0.58 (0.43)	-0.57 (0.81)	+0.53 (0.42)	-0.19 (0.23)	+0.16 (0.19)
Asian[8]								+0.13 (0.32)		+0.58* (0.34)		-0.26 (0.35)		-0.12 (0.15)
Mixed, Chinese, or other origin[8]								-0.06 (0.49)		-0.06 (0.56)		+0.63 (0.50)		-0.11 (0.20)
N	802	1122	811	1139	871	1131	905	757	680	715	760	714	879	575

[6]. for region variables, the reference category is "South England"; [7]. for female, the comparison group is "male"; [8]. for race variables, the reference group is "white".

Appendix 1: Full question wording and response categories of the selected Almond and Verba questions

Almond and Verba questions	surveys[1]	question wording	response categories
V15: whether people can be trusted	Almond and Verba	Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?	0. can't be too careful 3. can be trusted
	US [NES 2004]	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?	
	UK [ESS 2004]	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?	
V37: whether people are helpful	Almond and Verba	Speaking generally, would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out for themselves?	0. look out for themselves 3. be helpful
	US [GSS 2004]	Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?	
	UK [ESS 2004]	Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?	
V128: whether people try to be fair	Almond and Verba	If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you. Do you agree or disagree with that?	0. agree (i.e. take advantage) disagree (i.e. try to be fair)
	US [GSS 2004]	Do you think that people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?	
	UK [ESS 2004]	Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?	
V26: talking about public affairs/politics	Almond and Verba	What about talking about public affairs to other people, do you do that nearly everyday, once a week, from time to time or never?	0. never 1. from time to time 2. about once a week 3. nearly every day
	US [FM 2006]	How often do you talk about politics with your family and friends, if at all?	
	UK [BSA 2004]	When you get together with your friends, relatives or fellow workers how often do you discuss politics?	

[1]. NES=National Election Survey; GSS= General Social Survey; FM=Facilities Management; ESS= European Social Survey; BSA=British Social Attitudes.

Appendix 1 (continued)

Almond and Verba questions	**surveys**	**question wording**	**response categories**
V43: belief in own ability to change a law	Almond and Verba	If you made an effort to change this law [i.e. a law you thought unjust], how likely is it that you would succeed?	0. not at all likely 1. not very likely 2. fairly likely 3. very likely
	US [GSS 2004]	Suppose a law were being considered by the Congress that you considered to be unjust or harmful. If you made such an effort [to change it], how likely is it that the Congress would give serious attention to your demands?	
	UK [BSA 2004]	Suppose a law were being considered by Parliament that you considered to be unjust or harmful. If you made such an effort [to change it], how likely is it that Parliament would give serious attention to your demands?	
V44: likelihood one would attempt to change a law	Almond and Verba	If such a case arose [i.e. a law you thought unjust], how likely is it you would actually try to do something about it?	0. not at all likely 1. not very likely 2. fairly likely 3. very likely
	US [GSS 2004]	Suppose a law were being considered by the Congress that you considered to be unjust or harmful. If such a case arose, how likely is it that you, acting alone or together with others, would be able to try to do something about it?	
	UK [BSA 2004]	Suppose a law were being considered by Parliament that you considered to be unjust or harmful. If such a case arose, how likely is it that you, acting alone or together with others, would be able to try to do something about it?	
V132: feeling of having a say in Government	Almond and Verba	People like me don't have any say about what the government does. [Agree or disagree?]	0. agree (i.e. have no say) 1. disagree (i.e. have a say)
	US [NES 2004]	People like me don't have any say about what the government does. [Agree or disagree?]	
	UK [BSA 2004]	People like me have no say in what government does. [Agree or disagree?]	