A Politics in the Absence of a

Universal Human Nature

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Abstract

This paper explores a postmodern critique of Fukuyama's claim that liberal democracy is the end of *history*. While broadly accepting the postmodern critique of attempts to homogenise humans into a specific, universal concept of humanness, the realization of which would bring history to a close, I argue against the postmodern claim that there is *nothing* which can be said to be essentially human, since valuing difference and individuality establishes a concept of what it means to be human. Thus, I suggest that postmodernism, itself, invokes a loose metaphysical claim, whereby humanness is characterised by difference and individuality. Thus, I conclude that the political vision of both liberals and postmodernists is to emancipate the individual through the provision of a narrative space which promotes opportunities for the articulation of individuality and the flourishing of pluralism and difference. What emerges from this discussion is the possibility of reconciling traditional Modernist/Enlightenment thought, which believed in a universal (hu)man, driven by universal desires/objectives, with Postmodern thought, which rejects the totalising of humanness into universal drives and prioritises difference, creativity and pluralism.

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Introduction[1]

This paper explores a critique of Fukuyama's claim that liberal democracy is the end of *history*,[2] by asking, can this claim survive if we call into question the possibility of a universal account of what it means to be *human*? I begin by critiquing attempts to homogenise humans into a totalised, universal concept of the *human* which leads to an account of a metaphysical, ahistoric *human* nature, the realisation of which would bring *history* to a close. I will defend the postmodern critique of the metanarrative[3] and the critique of the notion of an Idea driving *history*, premises upon which Fukuyama's concept of a *history* relies. Specifically, Fukuyama's *history* thesis relies on the Idea of a *human*, which acts as the geist behind *history* – it is what *history* seeks to emancipate/realise. As Goutevitch puts it, for Fukuyama 'human nature is the standard of political action and judgement [and it is because] modern liberal democracy conforms to human nature as closely as a political order can conform to it; it is therefore just, satisfying, stable and therefore it is the completion and fulfilment of history.' (Goutevitch, 1994, 32).

This paper is structured around the questions: why must we problematize the idea of a *human*? And, can we construct a *history* after we have problematized the *human*? In the first section, I show why metanarratives about the *human* are problematic and why we need to call into question the possibility of constructing and legitimising a concept of human nature.[4] I also argue that metanarratives which construct a *human* risk dismissing/ignoring difference, and this could undermine individualism and perform an injustice to the individual. I argue there is something incomparable and unique between individuals which is unrepresentable by the homogenous term: *human*. I then attempt to construct a postmodern politics which valorises the variety of humans, rather than the single *human*, and explore the principles which postmodernism wishes to emancipate e.g. plurality, creativity and difference.

However, the ultimate purpose of this paper is to move toward a reconciliation between traditional Modernist/Enlightenment thought and postmodern thought, rather than simply extending the postmodern critique of the modern. This is not a simple matter since traditional Modernist/Enlightenment thought is premised around a

universal *human* driven by universal desires and objectives, whereas postmodern thought rejects a totalised notion of a humanness driven by a homogeneous desire and drive. I aim to construct a politics in the absence of the *human*, through the politics of Lyotard's notions of "difference" and "the differend" and Rorty's "pragmatism".[5] I also argue that postmodernism cannot avoid creating some kind of *human*, since valuing difference and individuality, itself, invokes a claim of an underlying notion of humanness. Thus, I show that even within postmodernism, there is an ahistoric Idea – an Idea which drives us toward the realisation of a form of individualism, since humanness depends on individual difference. I, therefore, conclude that a postmodern politics which emphasises difference, creativity and plurality allows us to rescue the concept of *history* and some core liberal democratic values. I conclude the paper by arguing that we cannot polarise postmodernists e.g. Lyotard and Rorty, with liberal modernists e.g. Fukuyama, because there is actually substantial commonality between the two positions. Thus, my conclusion represents a radical break with typical postmodern thinking, since I claim it is possible to construct a *history* within postmodern thought/theory; whereas, postmodernists typically reject and oppose the inevitability of a geist/*history*. This attempt to create a dialogue between postmodern and modernists thinkers and forge a way out of the modernist/postmodernist dualism has a parallel to Biebricher's work which tries to incorporate Foucaultian elements into a Habermasian framework, and dismantle the dichotomy which has been established between the two thinkers (Biebricher, 2007).
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A Postmodern Critique of the Metanarrative of the *Human*

In this section I explain: what a metanarrative is; how the concept of the *human* conforms to the definition of a metanarrative and why an incredulity to metanarratives challenges and disrupts both the possibility of the *human* and the possibility of *history*.

A metanarrative has a legitimising function. Lyotard, for example, argues the purpose of grand narratives is to 'legitimate social and political institutions and practices, forms of legislation, modes of thought' (Lyotard, 1992, 61). However metanarratives, Lyotard argues, do not seek legitimacy in the present; they seek legitimacy 'in a future to be

accomplished, that is, in an Idea to be realised. This Idea… has legitimating value because it is universal. It guides every human reality.' Lyotard, 1992, 29-30). A metanarrative rests its legitimacy on truth and universality, and thus the postmodern incredulity toward metanarratives is one aspect of a wider distrust of truth and universality. However, while I cannot completely avoid a general discussion about truth claims and claims to universality, I will try to leave these wider issues to one side, since the purpose of this paper is not to debate the status of all claims about truth and universality, but to focus on the more specific question of whether we can construct a true and universal *human*.

Metanarratives produce a *history* which is moved by an Idea that must be emancipated in a future to come. Thus, metanarratives do not produce historical narratives about what the community has done in the past; they produce ahistorical narratives about the "true" identity/characteristics of an entity (Rorty, 1991a, 198-199).[6] The metanarrative establishes a fixed, totalised/homogenised entity e.g. human nature, the proletariat etc, and this entity/Idea becomes the geist which moves *history* and fixes the future. Thus, the will of the Idea is similar to destiny or the will of God i.e. *history* is, in this sense, pre-determined, since it is the story of the emancipation of the Idea. Therefore, an incredulity toward metanarratives is also an incredulity to *history*, because without a legitimate basis for a total/universal Idea, there is no Idea to propel *history* to a prescribed future. Thus, questioning the legitimising function of metanarratives problematizes *history* since it prises open enforced closures and opens up the future. Williams puts this simply, for 'Lyotard, events cannot be understood in the light of some great measure or master plan [e.g.] the will of God' (Williams, 1998, 56).

Postmodernism opposes metanarratives, since the purpose of the metanarrative is to produce and emancipate unitary categories; thus, the metanarrative disguises/negates differences within that category. The desire to produce a universal concept of the *human* is resisted by postmodernists because they wish to keep open questions and descriptions about what it means to be *human*. The concept of the *human* corresponds to the notion of a metanarrative since it is something universal and something which seeks to be emancipated/realised. However, postmodernists fear that to homogenize

individuals into the unitary category of *human* threatens the very individualism and uniqueness of the individuals whom we are seeking to emancipate. Thus, to emancipate difference, individualism and individuals, postmodernism seeks to avoid foreclosure over what it means to be *human*. Rorty, for instance, argues philosophy's aim should be 'to see human beings as generators of new descriptions rather than beings one hopes to be able to describe accurately.' (Rorty, 1980, 378). Butler argues that to produce totalizing accounts produces new exclusions and thus universality has to be left permanently open/contingent (Butler, 1992). She argues that whilst we do not need to dismiss the term "human", we do need to ask how it works and what it forecloses, and thus, Butler concludes that we cannot produce a single definition of *human* (Butler, 2004, 89-91). Postmodernists are concerned with the individual instances within a unitary category, and argue that if a universal category must stand, it cannot be foreclosed by a single definition or interpretation i.e. we cannot have a *human*, only a variety of humans.

The metanarrative of the *human* is related to the established debate on the metanarrative of the "woman". Feminist debates clearly elucidate the problem with the creation of a unitary category[7] e.g. Ramazanoglu argues 'a feminism which inappropriately speaks for all woman and offers a prescribed way forward is illegitimate.' (Ramazanoglu, 2002, 67). She argues 'we do not need an insistence on totality… a feminist dream of a common language for women is totalizing and so imperialist.' (Ramazanoglu, 2002, 64). Thus Ramazanoglu concludes that we should 'say goodbye to a modern grand narrative of emancipation that overlooks social difference between women' (Ramazanoglu, 2002, 65). The problem with the emancipation of the unitary "women" is that totalized expressions of unity obscure differences within the category and cannot speak for all instances within that category. A unitary category attempts to produce a "common language" and fundamental good which is universal, thus providing legitimacy for a future to come. Although many feminists hold onto the category "women", the category of "women" is critiqued and rejected by postmodernists, causing a schism between modernist and postmodern feminists.[8] Similarly, the category of *human* totalizes humans and the purpose of arguing humans are driven by a single desire/goal is to narrate a story about the

emancipation of the *human*.[9] However within the category of the *human*, there are many different identities and characteristics which are potentially negated. Therefore, our starting point must be to recognise, as Rorty does, that 'man as Hegel thought of him, as the Incarnation of the Idea, doubtless does have to go.' (Rorty, 1982, 207).

Smith elucidates the problem postmodernity poses to modernists, like Fukuyama, who argue *history* has an end point explaining that an end of *history* thesis requires a discussion of the "good" (Smith, 1994). [10] However, Smith argues that if there is no fixed nature that presupposes its own end point of perfection, then we cannot justify our concept of the good or formulate the notion of history moving in one direction. If we reject a universal and fixed concept of good,[11] we lose our basis for arguing our metanarrative of the good is true/legitimate, and thus, there is no Idea to be emancipated. Fukuyama's claim that *history* can end requires a reference to a fixed good to be realised, and thus, he constructs a metanarrative of the emancipation of the good, and for Fukuyama the good which must be realised is the *human*.[12] The postmodern critiques of metanarratives dismantles the concept and possibility of a *history* and opens up history, since there is no "good"/Idea and this establishes what Brown calls a politics out of *history* (Brown, 2001). Brown argues that since there is no underlying metaphysical Idea moving history in a teleological process, politics cannot be the unfolding of historical schemes and transcendental ideals; instead, politics is a matter of opportunity and judgement (Brown, 2001, 117-118). A politics out of history, as advocated by Brown, destabilises Fukuyama's argument, since politics becomes free-ranging, and open to the possibility of new paradigms and developments in the future. A politics out of history is a critique of the legitimacy of liberal democracy, because if there is nothing fundamental to being *human* and no ahistoric values, we cannot argue a social/political system is the realisation of an Idea. Thus, we cannot argue that liberal democracy satisfies/realises the desire of the *human*.

Postmodernists argue "political truth" has no epistemological ground (Brown, 2001, 3-4); no 'philosophical or ideological position can have any ultimate authority or justification. We live in a world of competing stories where no particular narrative has general consent or force.' (Turner, 2002, 34). Therefore, any value is contingent rather

than ahistorical, and thus liberal democracy is not, as Enlightenment thinkers argue, the rationalising of man's desires, but a narrative about something which is desirable given a specific socio-cultural-temporal framework. This is in contrast to Hegel-Fukuyama,[13] who construct a metanarrative of an Idea to be realised e.g. the emancipation of the *human*.

Rorty argues that Hegel-Fukuyama attempt to discover universal conditions which explain: the human condition; the nature of reality; what we really are, and what we are compelled to be by a power outside ourselves and that these external, ahistorical factors provide humanity with its only possible goal (Rorty, 1989, 26-28). Rorty's notion that we are being propelled by something other than ourselves is questionable, since Hegel-Fukuyama argue that what propels us is human nature and our beliefs/desires. To say we are compelled by human nature and our own desires is quite different from saying we are moved by a power that is not ourselves e.g. God, destiny, the cosmos etc. However, Rorty is making an important point: to argue, as Hegel-Fukuyama do, that there is an ahistorical human nature to which the individual is bound, makes a claim that the individual is following a pre-determined goal, and therefore he/she is not entirely self-determining, but merely following the march/will of the universal geist of *human history*. Thus Hegel-Fukuyama's thought produces a concept of a fixed future, a future reached by following the ahistoric geist of the *human*.

In contrast, postmodernists argue the present is nothing more than the present; it is the product of the past, but there is no ahistorical geist determining past, present and future. We have "no skyhook" to free us from the contingency of our acculturation which has determined our options and how we perceive them (Rorty, 1991a, 13-14). Thus, humans are, according to Rorty, made by culture and are 'historical all the way through' (Rorty, 1991a, 176-177). Humans are *historical* not *ahistorical*, and what we deem *human* is local/ethnocentric. Rorty rejects narratives of emancipation because he argues there is nothing to emancipate – there is no human nature; there is only a developed human language which makes nature for itself (Rorty, 1991a, 213).

Williams, Sullivan & Matthews actually characterise postmodern thought by its insistence on the impossibility of objective thinking and its claim that all thought is subjective/cultural (Williams, Sullivan & Matthews, 1997, 166-167). This is especially evident in Rorty's thinking and his claim that we cannot assume liberals can rise above the contingency of history or argue individual liberty, as conceived in our modern liberal state, is anything more than one more value (Rorty, 1989, 50). For Rorty, the inescapability of our own cultural paradigm and its fashioning of our thinking/"reasoning" denies the possibility of objective truth, or at least, the obtainability of "truth". Postmodernism turns away from metaphysics and the concept of truth, and accepts that the values we praise are only praised because of our history; thus all Western philosophising about what is *human* stems from a shared cultural heritage, one derived from the Greek heritage of Socrates/Plato. However this Western way of thinking is based on an historical, *not* an ahistorical framework, and has no natural relationship to transcendental "truth".

The break with metaphysics produces a radical politics which is elucidated by Lyotard. Lyotard wants to remove political thought from: metanarratives, principles of "truth" and discourses which have been legitimated through consensus and "rationality". He argues such discourses are contingent, rather than true. Thus thought about the future can be free-ranging and does not need to concern itself with legitimising its narrative on "truth". Consequently, Lyotard favours petit narratives and a "local" consensus, which is agreed upon by its present players, and is subject to eventual cancellation i.e. consensus limited by space and time (Lyotard, 1984, 66). This poses a direct challenge to Fukuyama, because the petit narratives and local consensus advocated by Lyotard denies the possibility of an end of *history*, since any consensus which favours liberal democracy would be temporary/"local". For Lyotard, the end of grand narratives is an emancipatory opportunity for us to construct a new politics and make new judgments about ethics, since the end of the metanarrative invokes the opening-up of future possibilities, due to the absence of a "truth" or Idea behind our current historical arrangements.

Deconstruction, as a project, destabilises "truth", metanarratives and absolutes. Lyotard questions the notion of truth on which a metanarrative must rest, from a deconstructionist angle. He argues "truth" cannot be expressed in one phrase (Lyotard, 1988, 93-94), since we cannot present the reality of the whole in a single phrase (Lyotard, 1988, 79), and thus the "truth" which is located in a discourse requires several phrases to be linked. However, postmodernists, especially Lyotard, argue each link we make is arbitrary; and the process of linkage rests on presuppositions and speculation, and therefore, linking does not bring us closer to the "truth" (Lyotard, 1988, 94-96). Or to put this more simply, as Lyotard does, 'you never get out of speculation' (Lyotard, 1988, 95). This view is echoed by Derrida, who argues there is no such thing as a "metaphysical concept" – the "metaphysical" is simply something determined by a chain (Derrida, 1981, 6). Deconstruction is simply one way of questioning apparent truths/knowledge, and the universals which flow from them. However, this paper is not the place to engage in a full analysis of deconstruction and how the world is divided into categories which depend on difference e.g. how a grunt was formulated to differentiate "food" from "non-food" (Culler, 1983, 96), since my objective in this paper is to specifically focus on, and question, the concept of a *human*. However, the point I want to make through deconstruction is that we ought to question the basis of all knowledge and truth.

Lyotard's notion of linking, where everything is based on presupposition and speculation, means we are left asking, can we even think without linking? This makes deconstruction problematic, since it is unclear how we can conduct any philosophical deliberation, because we are left wondering how we can justify any discourse. However, Rorty provides a way of talking about politics without relying on metalanguage. Rorty is an ironist and a pragmatist,[14] and although he claims we cannot find a "final vocabulary" which "puts all doubts to rest" (Rorty, 1989, 75), since 'there is no such thing as a "natural" order of justification for beliefs and desires' (Rorty, 1989, 83), he offers more hope for justifying our desired discourse and political vision than Lyotard. Rorty argues the end of the metanarrative does not mean we cannot justify a political vision; it simply means we must shrug off metaphysical claims and must accept we are operating from an ethnocentric basis. Thus he argues

liberal/political freedoms 'require no consensus on any topic more basic than their own desirability' (Rorty, 1989, 84). If, as Rorty argues, political liberalism and liberal democracy are desirable we might be tempted to suggest he has constructed a metanarrative with liberal democracy as the end of *history*. However, for Rorty, the consensus which affirms the good of liberal democracy is local and ethnocentric, and the ironist theorist who defends these values recognises he/she is working from a particular and narrow historical tradition (Rorty, 1989, 97). Thus, 'citizen[s] of [Rorty's] liberal utopia would be people who had a sense of the contingency of their language and moral deliberation' (Rorty, 1989, 61). Essentially, Rorty's argues that whilst we can have a consensus about the desirability of something e.g. liberal democracy, we must recognise this view is contingent, local and framed by our particular historical tradition, and not the culmination of an Idea. Therefore, future developments are not foreclosed; thus, Rorty does not invoke a concept of *history*.

Rorty shows that even without a concept of the *human*, we can produce a defence of liberal democracy. However, unlike Fukuyama's defence of liberal democracy, Rorty provides a conditional and contingent defence of liberal democracy. By rejecting the *human*, we eliminate the geist of *history*, and thus, an end point for *history* to aim toward. Therefore Rorty's defence of liberal democracy ought to be sharply contrasted to Fukuyama's defence of liberal democracy. Rorty, by rejecting the *human*, argues our present system is simply the one which accords best with our present desires, but although our desires may seem reasonable, they are historical and ethnocentric, and therefore we cannot construct a permanent consensus. This contrasts with Fukuyama's position which produces a *human* and argues our present system is the end point of *history*, because it satisfies the Idea/geist of *history* i.e. the *human*.

Rorty closely analyses his own his political/philosophical position. He recognises his political position puts him at odds with most postmodernists (Rorty, 1989, 64-65) and aligns him with liberal Enlightenment thinkers (Rorty, 1989, 67),[15] but his philosophical position reverses this. Unlike postmodern thinkers e.g. Foucault, Rorty is prepared to say "we liberals" (Rorty, 1989, 64-65), but where he has political differences with postmodernists, he has 'what are often called "merely philosophical differences"'

(Rorty, 1989, 67) with liberal Enlightenment thinkers e.g. Habermas and Fukuyama. However, the "merely philosophical differences" between Rorty and Fukuyama have a real bearing on the substance of Fukuyama's argument, since Rorty's "philosophical differences" with Fukuyama question the inevitability of liberal democracy and the argument that it is the end of *history*. Rorty's "philosophical differences" with Fukuyama dismantle the notion of *history*, even though both thinkers use the language of "we liberals", because for Rorty, liberal democracy is not the product of the desire of the *human*, but a contingent good.

The Absence of the *Human* and Fukuyama's End of *History* Thesis

In the previous section, I argued human nature is a fallacy and not an ahistorical entity moving *history*. I argued individuals and difference could not be represented in a universal category and human nature is essentially fluid and malleable, or, as Sim puts it, 'human nature is not a given set of characteristics with which we are stuck for all time; rather, it is constructed – and if it is constructed, it can be taken apart and reconstructed in other way.' (Sim, 2001, 52). I have also shown that for Rorty, liberal democracy is compatible with a non-fixed *human*, because liberal democracy allows *humans* to progress; or at least, Rorty argues humans have progressed. He, thus, defends liberal democracy because he believes it has had a positive effect on humankind. However, Lyotard is perhaps more representative of postmodern thought and rejects the necessity of supporting liberal democracy and questions the proposition that humanity is progressing. He is sceptical about our ability to progress, and argues that if we believe we have progressed, it is only because 'humans would have developed an ear so attuned to the Idea… that they would supply the very proof of progress by the sole fact of their susceptibility' (Lyotard, 1988, 180).

In this section, I analyse whether Fukuyama's concept of the *human* totalizes/universalizes what is essentially an incommensurability[16] between individual humans. I assess what it means to be *human* for both Fukuyama and postmodernists, and highlight their points of difference and convergence. In the final section of this paper, I will try to formulate a politics without the *human* based on the postmodern

valorising of the individuals within the unitary category. I will show postmodernism aims to emancipate difference, the differend, the incommensurable and unpresentable. I will, thus, conclude by showing that, even in the absence of the *human*, we can construct a *history* and argue it ends in liberal democracy.

It is worth noting that Fukuyama is alive to the critique that liberal democracy is merely the product of the history[17] of the West and accepts this up to a point, acknowledging liberal democracy's cultural roots originate from 'a secularised version of the Christian doctrine of universal human equality.' (Fukuyama, 2002b, 4). He recognises liberal democracy is a system rooted in a specific ethical-cultural-historic background – one which emerged in the West during the Enlightenment when questions were raised about the legitimacy of absolute Monarchies and religion lost its power as it was challenged by science/rationality. However, Fukuyama does not accept liberal democracy is simply a contingent product of history and argues it is universally and ahistorically desirable. He rejects the claim that liberal democracy is merely an ethnocentric set of beliefs, arguing 'Western values and institutions are immensely appealing to… non-Western people.' (Fukuyama, 2002b, 4). He also argues the history of the West did not necessarily lead to liberal democracy, since views were held in the West which were incompatible with democracy e.g. the defence of slavery. The West had to adapt its values to embrace liberal democracy. It is important to realise that Fukuyama's claim is that the West is *not* culturally pre-disposed to liberal democracy, but has *become* compatible with liberal democratic values (Fukuyama, 2000, 311). However, Fukuyama's basic argument rests on the claim that liberal democracy has universal appeal because all *humans* are on the same road. Thus the geist of *history* is universal and it is merely a question of time before everyone adopts liberal democratic values, since there exists a universalized/totalized *human*, which acts as the Idea driving *history*.

As we have seen, the core of Lyotard's and the more general postmodern critique of the *human* is a rejection of the possibility of a universal, homogeneous *human* and a valorisation of difference, which 'objects to the very notion of unity as an ideal' (Browning, 2000, 137). This poses a distinct contrast to Fukuyama's thinking, where

the *human* is what gives *history* direction. Fukuyama emphasises the notion of human nature as the basis of his end of *history* thesis and is quite happy to defend this. The concept of a universal *history* rests on an idea of a "trans-historical standard" and for Fukuyama, this is human nature. Fukuyama endorses the use of the idea of the *human*, and in fact, wants to re-establish the use of human nature as the basis of philosophy. He sees it as a mistake that "natural rights" have gone out of vogue and believes rights *should* be based on human nature (Fukuyama, 2002a, 101-102 & 112). Fukuyama goes further, arguing that human rights *are* based on human nature, since it is human nature which provides the epistemological grounding for human notions of rights, justice and morality (Fukuyama, 2002a, 101-102 & 129).

Fukuyama constructs an account of human nature, by establishing a universal *human* experience through an understanding that we all share the same desires/motivations. This idea of the *human* appears to refute the possibility of incommensurability and difference between individuals and cultures, and thus risks producing an exclusionary account of what can be considered *human*, because if all individuals are part of the homogenous *human*, there is a danger of negating individualism and even individuals. Thus Fukuyama's thesis which seeks to emancipate individuals and individualism ends up jeopardising its own objectives.

Despite my reservations about the idea of a *human*, I find Fukuyama's concept of what makes one a *human* to be very appealing, especially, his claim that 'all human beings believe they have a certain inherent worth or dignity' (Fukuyama, 1995, 358). However, this may appeal to me merely because Fukuyama is talking my language, and has hit upon my personal motivations, rather than because he has located something more universal. By utilising Fukuyama in an idiosyncratic manner, it is possible to argue that the geist of *history* is the *human* drive/quest for self-esteem/self-worth. I, personally, find the notion of a thymotic core to human nature,[18] which acts as the geist of *history* to be plausible, even intuitively accurate and commonsensical, but it may be that this thymotic desire for pride and justice is particularly convincing as a consequence of my own personality traits, or because I have become accultured into a society which valorises the individual and defines the *human* as a being who is striving

for self-esteem. However, this concept of the *human* may not have prevalence across all people, times, genders and places, and we have to assume this notion of the *human* is merely the product of the individual author's personality and/or his/her accultured perspective.

Although I have argued that we cannot construct a homogenised, universal *human*, there could still be something in Fukuyama's concept of the *human* which can be salvaged. The *human* I wish to draw from Fukuyama is a valorisation of difference, individualism and individuals. . The concept of the *human* I am taking from Fukuyama is actually rather hazy, because it invokes a complex and multifaceted picture of the *human*. Thus, I will argue that it is possible to argue liberal democracy is the end of *history*, because the concept of the *human* which Fukuyama's *history* is seeking to emancipate is one driven by the need for the emancipation of diversity, individualism and difference.

Fukuyama defines the *human* as a being driven by two components: economic/material desires and thymotic/"spiritual"[19] desires; but this actually oversimplifies Fukuyama's complex notion of what it means to be *human*. The thymotic desires of Fukuyama's *human* encompass a range of desires including the desires for: self-esteem/self-worth, pride, megalothymia, isothymia,[20] recognition of one's worth by others, liberty, equality and justice etc. Essentially, Fukuyama's concept of the thymotic side of the *human* boils down to a claim that *humans* wish to feel good about themselves, where each *human* has a range of desires, and the individual's unique personal make-up means he/she experiences these desires uniquely. This picture of the *human* is so opaque and complex that we cannot even determine to what extent the *human* values material things, security and the things which are necessary to sustain life. On the one hand, the *human* desires modernization and scientific/economic development, and this produces a directional history because material accumulation satisfies our need for security. But on the other hand, the *human* is anti-Hobbesian and does not place preservation of the body above all else; the individual *human* wants to demonstrate that he/she has freedom by showing he/she is not merely driven by bodily/economic needs. The individual *human* wants to prove

he/she is more than a mere complicated biological machine and can act for/from principles of justice.

This *human* is far from a universalising/totalising account of what it means to be *human*, since it entails drawing each individual in a unique way. All *humans* share a range of desires, but how these desires interact is individual and the specific weighting each individual gives to his/her various desires is unique and fluid. I wish to push this idea of a fluid/individual *human* further than Fukuyama may accept, but he does occasionally draw the reader's attention to his inability to produce a definite answer to the question: 'what is *human*?'. He acknowledges, explicitly, that human nature is 'complex and flexible' (Fukuyama, 2002a, 128) and "humanness" cannot be simplified into a single "Factor X"[21] – "Factor X" is not possession of moral choice, reason, language, sociability, emotions or consciousness; "Factor X" is all these qualities competing together; "Factor X" is something every *human* possesses, but it is the coming together of factors which produces "Factor X" (Fukuyama, 2002a, 171). In a sense, it is the complexity of the *human* which is "Factor X". This notion of the *human* is a celebration of difference and individuality and a proclamation that to be *human* is to be an individual and the essence of "humanness" is that "we are all individuals". This notion of humanness is complex, since the *human* only exists as an individual who possess a range of desires. Therefore, we have to invert "Factor X" and argue that possessing the range of competing factors/desires which belong to the *human* are "Factor X" i.e. possessing "Factor X" denotes being *human*; but being *human* is the "Factor X" for "humanness". Thus the *human* which acts as the geist of *history* is made up of individuals who have their own personal and heterogeneous goals.

This account of the *human*, where the *human* is a being characterised by individual difference, is really not far removed from Lyotard's philosophical position. Although Lyotard rejects the possibility of a *human*, he still seeks to preserve difference because he sees this as the core of humanity. As Sim points out, 'without difference, in Lyotard's world, we have lost the human' (Sim, 2001, 29). Thus even Lyotard cannot avoid making claims about what it means to be *human*. He is forced to develop a notion of *human*, since he argues "humanness" is lost in the absence of difference. A

posthuman world in which humans lost their individual desires and acted solely on logical/computerised thought, or where desires could be satisfied through a universal and mechanical mechanism, such as the administering of *soma* in Huxley's *Brave New World* would be the end of the *human* for Lyotard, since individuality and difference would be gone. We can only say there is nothing *human* if we do not claim individualism is universal and an essential component for one to be *human*. Thus Lyotard *too* sets up a concept of "humanness", albeit a limited concept of "humanness". Lyotard's *human* is a being capable of individual thought and not just reasoning: 'to be worth preserving… thought has to be more than just logical reasoning of the computer program form; it has to carry the creative, and often seemingly anarchic, element that marks out the human variety.' (Sim, 2001, 35). As Lyotard, moves toward his ideal society, one premised on diversity, his antifoundationalist programme is left suspect (Sim, 1992, 115). As Sim points out, it is easy to pick holes in foundationalism but difficult to articulate a position without smuggling in foundational principles, and Lyotard is frequently guilty of this (Sim, 1992, 117). Lyotard produces a foundationalist discourse premised on "humanness" as difference and variety. Thus, Lyotard's concept of the *human*, defined by individuality and difference, is not essentially different from the concept of the *human* which I take from Fukuyama, where "humanness" is to say "we are all individuals". By seeing the *human*, in Fukuyama's modernist thinking, as something where the "Factor X" for humanness is difference/individualism, and by showing that Lyotard's postmodern thinking relies on the notion of difference/individuality for there to be humans, it is possible to show real convergence between the two positions, and show how we can bridge the lacuna between modernist and postmodernist philosophising about the human/*human*.

However, there remains a crucial difference between the two concepts of the *human*, pluralism, difference, individualism and the individual advocated by liberal modernists and postmodernists. For the postmodernists, individualism/difference is "all the way down" – it is what characterises us as *human*. Thus, whilst postmodernists cannot avoid constructing a *human*, they construct a *human* defined by individualism; thus difference and pluralism are the defining/constitutive characteristics of *humans*. However, the liberal theorist who wants to argue liberal democracy is the end of *history* produces the

human as an Idea to emancipate. Even though the "Factor X" of this *human* is to be an individual, the liberal modernist valorising of plurality, individualism and difference does not run as deep as it does in postmodern thought, because the modernist constructs the universal category, *human*, which then acts as the Idea to be realised/emancipated. In contrast, postmodernism removes the *human* and argues individualism and difference is the only way of understanding a notion of the *human* and takes individual instances, rather than the universal category, as it starting point. Thus, postmodernism is intrinsically premised around diversity and plurality. Ermarth elucidates this point of conflict: for the modernist, whilst there is a pluralism/diversity between individuals and groups, the modernist wishes to transcend difference and arrive at consensus; whereas, the postmodernist treats difference as constitutive, and therefore, the postmodernist does not try to transcend it, but simply respect it (Ermarth, 2007, 12-13). Although Ermarth has hit on a crucial difference between modernism and postmodernism, this philosophical difference conceals a real convergence between the two positions, since both positions seek the emancipation of individuals and individualism, and thus both embrace pluralism, difference and diversity.

During this section, I have shown that we cannot avoid making, at least, a thin reference to "humanness" even if this only amounts to arguing "humanness" is difference, individuality and plurality. I have also shown that it is possible to avoid the problematic universalised/totalised account of the *human* by constructing a *human* where "humanness" is the ability is the ability to say "we are all individual". This thin definition of the *human* as individuality seems to open up *history* and allow for incommensurability between cultures and individuals, because it does not appear to imply an Idea or a geist which must be satisfied. However, in the next section, I will look at how we can construct a politics in the absence of the *human*, or rather, a *human* defined by nothing more than individualness and difference. I will show that even the thin definition of the *human*, where the "Factor X" of the *human* is difference and individuality produces a metanarrative, since difference and individuality is something universal to all *humans* and an Idea to be emancipated.

A Politics in the Absence of the *Human*

In the previous section, I used Fukuyama's *human* as the basis for producing a non-totalising account of the *human* and to show that what makes us alike is that we are all different. I argued there is no "Factor X" for "humanness", except possessing the range of factors/characteristics of "humanness", and that to be *human* is to have a multitude of desires, where each individual experiences being *human* in a unique way and prioritises the various *human* desires differently. In this section, I move on to discuss the political consequences of this notion of the *human*, and ask, if we are all unique, how can we proceed to find a social/political system which emancipates this difference?

Lyotard argues that we cannot do justice to difference, since difference represents an incommensurability between discourses. This does not mean Lyotard wants to do away with politics, political action, justice, ethics or deciding, but Lyotard is arguing that 'claims for political justice, in terms of freedom, social justice [etc]… appear to be subject to conflict precisely because there are no ultimate yardsticks to which a final appeal can be made.' (Smart, 2002, 46). Smart summarises Lyotard's ethical position: for Lyotard, there is nothing ontological on which we can base justice/ethics, since justice/ethics do not correspond to reality; thus, what is just/ethical is an open question, which cannot be answered with models (Smart, 2002, 52). There are no criteria to determine just/unjust and in the absence of such criteria, we reach judgements about what is just, but these judgements are simply that – something decided/said about what is just – but the judgement does not correspond to what is just in any objective way (Smart, 2002, 51).

For Lyotard, we just can't get away from the differend,[22] incommensurability and the heterogeneity of phrases/discourses and the 'impossibility of subjecting… [discourses] to a single law' (Lyotard, 1988, 128), since each discourse presents a 'mode of presenting a universe and one mode is not translatable into another.' (Lyotard, 1988, 128). For Lyotard the incommensurability between different notions of justice produces a differend, where the differend is, by definition, a situation where what is just cannot be "sorted out". Lyotard discusses the Nuremberg Trials, as an example of the differend. Nuremberg represents an incommensurability between the language games

played by the judges and those on trial. Nuremberg was supposed to establish the existence of a crime, but there was a lack of consensus – the "criminal" saw the judge merely as a criminal who was in a more fortunate position, and had better arms, than himself (Lyotard, 1988, 56-58). Lyotard's point is complicated, but he is arguing that since the "criminals" did not recognise their guilt or the legitimacy of the Court, the two sides were speaking in incommensurable language games which could not be resolved due to a lack of a rule for making a judgement between their arguments, and this represents a differend. This raises the question: if we are condemned to the differend and incommensurability, what kind of politics can we construct?

Browning argues that Lyotard 'is essentially deconstructive of other totalizing political ideas [i.e.] Lyotard's sensitivity to difference… renders his perspective devoid of recourses to engage in the construction of political procedures' (Browning, 2000, 9). I agree and Lyotard, himself, confesses that a politics which gives pride of place to the differend is an impossibility, since litigation cannot neutralize the differend – to govern in accordance with the differend would require a politics of supermen: it 'would be human, all too human.' (Lyotard, 1988, 142). If Lyotard cannot conceive of a politics which can work with the differend or incommensurability, can we still work with difference as the defining characteristic of "humanness"? In my view, the answer is yes, but this involves constructing a metanarrative – this time, the metanarrative of the emancipation of difference, individualism and plurality. Postmodernists, who reject the notion of anything fundamentally *human* apart from individuality, still try to construct a politics and a concept of a just order, and this is one which emancipates difference, individualism etc and this produces an Idea to be realised, a metanarrative. However, this raises the question: how do we emancipate the Idea of the *human*, if we take the *human* to be essentially plural?

First, we need to move on from the impossibility of constructing a politics based around the differend. We can accept the presence of a differend, but we cannot govern with it. Instead, we need to act pragmatically, and construct a politics which provides space for various voices and the expression of difference, rather than emphasising the incommensurable. Rojek concludes that Lyotard's 'political philosophy boils down to a

form of radical pluralism in which the imperative is to guarantee "narrative space" to allow individual difference' (Rojek, 2002, 10). It is this politics which I wish to take from Lyotard – a politics with a strong note of liberation; a politics which, Rojek concludes is 'consistent with Humean Liberalism' (Rojek, 2002, 12). If Lyotard's politics is a politics of personal liberation and the emancipation of individualism, it is, as Sim notes, 'a basically libertarian programme' (Sim, 1992, 96). Lyotard's libertarian programme aims to wrestle control/power from the state/society and allow for radical individual action. His project of delegitimising metanarratives is designed to maximise the "freedom" of the individual. Thus, to try to delegitimise metanarratives is, itself, a project with a political agenda, since its aim is to 'remove the teleological constraints of [the] grand narrative… in order to leave room for individual initiative.' (Sim, 1992, 89).

This libertarian desire to free ourselves from the constraints of being *human* has a distinctly Nietzschean flavour. It echoes Nietzsche's call to men to transform themselves into Overmen, go beyond the limits of what they are and become individually determining. Thus, possibly the clearest summary of a postmodern political vision is one which is "nihilistic-Nietzschean", and offers an "optimistically libertarian note" (Sim, 1992, 85). A postmodern politics is nihilistic since it aims to break convention, rules, power and universals and realise individuals as self-determining beings who construct their own rules and ethics. This is, in itself, optimistic and libertarian, since it seeks to realise individuals as free, self-determining beings. Thus, the most useful way to read Lyotard may be the one suggested by Rorty, who sees Lyotard as a thinker arguing that the problem with Habermas is not so much his metanarrative of emancipation, but the need to legitimise it (Rorty, 1991b, 167). Thus, a postmodern politics tries to negate questions of justifying politics, but still wants to ask questions about how to organise a social/political system which seeks to emancipate individualism, difference, plurality and narrative space.

The valorising of difference and plurality, as Rojek suggests, directs us toward a liberal society, and thus, it is odd that postmodern thinkers are not inclined to defend liberal democracy and adopt the tag "we liberals". Lyotard does occasionally praise

liberal democracy, noting that the 'commandments of liberal democracy are good' (Lyotard, 1993, 110) because liberal democracy allows free expression, encourages individuals to have conviction in their opinions and publish their own 'reflections without difficulty and anyone who does not agree with them can always discuss them.' (Lyotard, 1993, 110). However, Lyotard does not accept there has been any progress in humanity and argues capital, knowledge and science have merely created new power structures and tyrannies, with modernity leading to the impoverishment of the 3rd world, unemployment, tyranny of opinion and prejudice echoed in the media (Lyotard, 1992, 110-111). Rorty's willingness to embrace the tag "we liberals" separates him from Lyotard and most postmodern thinkers. Rorty recognises the "advances" which liberalism has produced, and argues modern subjectivity has allowed humanity to make gains in freedom and expression, and facilitated the emancipation of individual difference. He takes Foucault to task for failing to recognise this:

> you would never guess from Foucault's account of the changes in European social institutions during the last three hundred years, that during that period suffering had decreased considerably… [and] people's chances of choosing their own styles of life increased considerably. (Rorty, 1991b, 195).

Rorty offers a robust defence of both liberal democracy and plurality/difference. He passionately valorises individual freedom/difference and recognises an incommensurability and historical/cultural subjectivity between competing language games, but argues liberal democracy is the best way of expressing these differences. This is in contrast to Lyotard's "Paganism"[23] which valorises the divergent and the inventive, but fails to provide a coherent social/political system which corresponds to these ends. It is Rorty's clearer political vision which offers a way of emancipating the individual, diversity and difference. Rorty's pragmatism recognises liberal democracy as a system which can free expression and emancipate the divergent and inventive. Rorty praises 'a culture which prides itself on *not* being monolithic – on its tolerance for a plurality of subcultures and its willingness to listen to neighbouring cultures' (Rorty, 1991a, 14) and sees this vision realized in liberal democracy. For Rorty, the objective of the social/political system is to find space/opportunity for difference/freedom, but he rejects the Foucaultian desire to *create* a society, since this creates a "new kind of

human" and this is akin to Hitlerian/Maosist fantasies. In fact, Rorty praises liberal democracy because 'the point of a liberal society is not to invent or create anything but simply make it as easy as possible for people to achieve their widely different private ends' (Rorty, 1991b, 196).

In this paper, I have argued for a rejection of a substantive notion of the *human*, and argued "humanness" is merely the expression of difference between individual *humans* and thus the *human* is an adherence to the notion that "we are all individuals". I have also argued that difference/individualism is best ensured through a liberal society. However the final question I want to pose is: do we have to give up on an end of *history*? If we define the *human* by, and claim its only universal characteristic, is difference, individuality and uniqueness, can we still construct a *history*?

Conclusion

If postmodernism could entirely dispose of the *human*, we would be left without a geist of *history*. However postmodernism cannot completely free itself from the concept of the *human*. Postmodernism relies on a thin concept of the *human*, where "humanness" is defined by difference. I, therefore, conclude that the deeper pluralism of postmodernism, where difference is constitutive, rather than something to manage, can act as a geist for *history*, since the emancipation of difference becomes the Idea which *history* must realise.

My argument has built toward the conclusion that we can construct a *history* because postmodernism cannot avoid a concept of the *human*, and thus an Idea to emancipate. In postmodern theory, the Idea behind *history*, the Idea which *history* must emancipate, is the realisation of difference and individualism, because we cease to be *human* in the absence of such difference/individualism. Thus, postmodernism produces a metanarrative of emancipation – the emancipation of individualism and difference. The need to give expression/emancipation to individualism gives *history* both direction and an end point; thus, we cannot brush *history* aside because if we want to defend the divergent and emancipate difference, we must have, in place, a system which protects

these objectives. An ethical commitment to valuing individuals and difference, is a rejection of any totalitarianism or any attempt to suppress difference. The Idea behind a postmodern politics is realised in a liberal society, but not the liberal society Rorty defines as 'one which is content to call "true" (or "right" or "just") whatever the outcome of undistorted communications happens to be' (Rorty, 1989, 67). A liberal discourse which valorises difference and defines "humanness" as "we are all individuals" must be opposed to, and resist, totalitarianism; it cannot call "true" *whatever* is the outcome of communication; it can only allow views which protect difference, individuals and individualism.

A postmodern politics premised on the Idea of emancipating difference, individualism and creativity produces a concept of *history*, since there is a geist to *history*, one which reaches its end point in a society where these values are realised. These values are also at the core of liberal democratic values. Liberal democratic values centre on the individual and the valorising of individual difference, plurality etc. As Gilbert argues, at the core of liberal democratic values is an individuality where 'each person can pursue a good life as he sees fit, revising his conception in the light of experience, so long as he does not harm others' (Gilbert, 1995, 170). Thus liberal democracy is a social/political system seeking to realise the Idea/geist of a postmodern politics. Rorty, and at times, even Lyotard recognise that liberal democracy is a system premised around the individual, and the expression of difference. The postmodern critique of the metanarrative and rejection of metaphysical foundations of a *human* does not preclude the possibility of constructing a notion of *history*, and a *history* which ends in a form of liberal democracy. Instead, the postmodern concept of the *human* seems to re-affirm the hypothesis that the geist of *history* is the realisation/emancipation of individualism, difference and individuals and thus the geist behind *history* finds its end point in liberal democratic values.

<u>Notes</u>

1. I would like to express my thanks to Alan Hamlin and Angie Wilson for reading the various drafts of this paper and the valuable comments they have provided; in particular, they have helped me to refine and clarify the structure of this paper.

2. As matters of terminology and language, I introduce the following distinctions: history and *history*; human and *human*; idea and Idea. In each case, the second word involves a specific or technical meaning, which is not expressed in the first. Firstly, history refers to the discipline of history, the study of past events and the narratives constructed about the past; whilst *history* refers to a specific kind of history – a teleological, philosophical, universal *history*. Fukuyama's concept of history is actually what I am terming *history*. In this paper, I will explore what *history* means to Fukuyama and why his work is a *history*, rather than a history. Secondly, I need to differentiate human from *human*. By human, I simply mean someone whom we would typically define as belonging to the specie of human beings; whereas, by *human*, I am making a claim about what it means to be a human. The *human* homogenises all individual instances of human beings into one unitary category and claims all individual instances within that category possess universal characteristics and goals, which make them *human*. I will explore and develop the concept of a *human* more fully in this paper. Thirdly, idea and Idea need to be differentiated to avoid confusion. An Idea is very specific and refers to something which moves *history*; it is something which must be emancipated; it is an ahistoric entity, and thus a powerful concept which is central to Fukuyama's claims about *history* and liberal democracy. Thus, an Idea is entirely different from the common usage of the word idea.

3. I will provide a definition, or rather utilise Lyotard's definition of the metanarrative, later in this paper. It is important to recognise that the use or rejection of metanarratives is a key point of contention between modernists e.g. Fukuyama and Hegel, and their postmodern critics e.g. Lyotard, Derrida and Rorty.

4. In this paper, I make reference to the term "human nature". However, the paper does not explore natural law theory or human nature per se; rather, the paper is a discussion about what it means to be *human*. The concept of a *human* and humanness are related to the idea of the existence of a human nature, but my discussion leaves aside the issue of human nature and is concerned, instead, with those characteristics we can call universally *human* – those things which define us as *human*.

5. "Difference" and "the differend" are central to Lyotard's political thought and ideas he passionately defends. I will explore these two concepts in the main body of the text. Rorty defines his political/philosophical position as "pragmatic" and argues that he takes his philosophical cues from Dewey's pragmatism. In the main body of this paper, I will explore and elaborate on what Rorty's political and philosophical "pragmatism" entails.

6. Rorty provides some examples of an "entity" e.g. the self, the Absolute Spirit, the Proletariat. An entity is something which seeks emancipation; it is the Idea behind *history*; thus, the *human* or human nature are other examples of "entities".

7. In this case, the unitary category is "woman", rather than "human".

8. Postmodern feminists e.g. Ramazanoglu, Butler etc critique the category "women", but this has lead to a significant tension between themselves and modernist feminists, who want to retain the category "women".

9. The driving desire of the *human* could be: reason; freedom; self-preservation i.e. bodily/material desires/security; equality; a desire to feel good about one's self etc.

10. The postmodern rejection of a universal history and metanarratives poses a problem for all modernists including opponents of liberal democracy. For instance, Marx is a modernist since he argued *history* could end.

11. In this case the "good" which needs to be realised is the *human*.

12. The postmodern critique of metanarratives is not merely a critique of the idea that *history* has ended. Rather, it is a critique of the idea that history can end. The rejection of metanarratives means we cannot talk of a *history*, only a history.

13. By Hegel-Fukuyama, I am referring to ideas expressed by Fukuyama, which he has filtered through Hegel. This is because I am interested in the idea, rather than the author who constructed the idea. The creation of Hegel-Fukuyama is based on Fukuyama's method of reading Hegel. Fukuyama says he is not interested in uncovering the original Hegel and interprets Hegel through Kojeve. Fukuyama is 'interested not in Hegel *per se* but in Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojeve, or perhaps a new, synthetic philosopher named Hegel-Kojeve. In subsequent references to Hegel, we will actually be referring to Hegel-Kojeve, and we will be more interested in the ideas themselves than in the philosophers who originally articulated them.' (Fukuyama, 1992, 144). I embrace the same attitude to understanding Hegel, and produce a version of Hegelian thought, which is actually Fukuyama's, or maybe I create a new philosopher, called Hegel-Kojeve-Fukuyama.

14. Rorty repeatedly uses these terms to categorise his philosophy.

15. Rorty directly acknowledges the ways in which he is aligned with and opposed to the politics and philosophy of Foucault. Foucault's political position is shared by many postmodern thinkers esp. Lyotard, Derrida & Nietzsche, who all refuse to say "we liberals". However, like Rorty, their philosophical position is premised on an opposition to rationality, consensus and universality. Rorty directly acknowledges the ways he is aligned with and opposed to the politics and philosophy of Habermas. Whilst Habermas' position is different to Fukuyama, they both defend liberal democracy, and base their defence of liberal democracy on deeper epistemological grounds than Rorty is prepared to accept.

16. The notion of incommensurability is central to Lyotard's political/philosophical thinking. It refers to the uniqueness and incomparability between two modes of thinking or being. Incommensurability refers to the existence of a state of indeterminacy between two values due to a lack of secure grounds for establishing a notion of consensus of what is just. We experience an incommensurability between two individuals or two cultures when their values are heterogeneous and cannot be translated or bridged. Lyotard's dense philosophical style makes it difficult to get an exact understanding of what incommensurability is and he does use the term in a complex and idiosyncratic

manner. However, the above is my understanding or take on what incommensurability is, and how I will use the term. Lyotard only rarely offers a clear definition of incommensurability, but here is one definition he does offer: 'incommensurability… [is] the heterogeneity of phrase regimes and of the impossibility of subjecting them to a single law… [since] for each of these regimes, there corresponds a mode of presenting the universe, and one mode is not translatable to another.' (Lyotard, 1988, 128).

17. It is important to note here that I *am* discussing history, and not *history*. When I talk about the history of the West, I am discussing the events, narratives and philosophies which have shaped our current beliefs. The *history* of the West would be a completely different story, as it would argue we are moving ever closer to realizing an Idea.

18. A "thymotic core" to humanity is Fukuyama's language for arguing *humans* do not merely seek material/economic things, and *humans* also seek things such as pride, self-esteem/self-worth etc.

19. Thymos is an important concept to Fukuyama. Thymos is a term taken from Plato, but he uses it in conjunction with Hegel's notion of the desire for recognition. Thymos refers to the non-material side of man and thus the desire for recognition is thymotic desire. I have also used the word "spiritual" as another way of describing the thymotic side of *humans*. By "spiritual" desires I am making no reference to goodliness or region; I am simply referring to desires which are part of the non-material, non-bodily, side of humans. Thus the definition of the "spiritual" side of human nature which I wish to invoke is one which would allow us to argue the Nazis and Hitler were driven by the "spiritual" side of human nature, since the Holocaust refuted economic logic and was driven by a desire to assert the superiority of the Aryans.

20. Megalothymia and isothymia are both Greek terms used by Fukuyama. Since I am interested in how these terms can be used, my understanding of them is derived from Fukuyama, rather than their original context. To summarise, Megalothymia is the desire to be recognized as superior to other people; isothymia is the opposite i.e. the desire to be recognized as equal to others.

21. "Factor X" is Fukuyama's term for the essential characteristic of "humanness".

22. The Differend is a case which cannot be resolved due to a lack of a rule for judgement between two arguments i.e. 'one sides' legitimacy does not imply the others' lack of legitimacy'. This quick summary/definition of the differend is based on Lyotard's own definition in *The Differend,* (Lyotard, 1988, Preface [xi]).

23. Paganism is a term Lyotard uses to describe his political vision.

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