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**POLITICAL DISPOSITIONS  
AND DISPOSITIONAL POLITICS\***

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**Abstract**

Recent joint work with Geoff Brennan has explored aspects of individual motivation that depart from the traditional economist's account of instrumental rationality in political and constitutional contexts. On several occasions we have argued for a dispositional account of aspects of motivation. Here I tackle the idea of a dispositional account of political motivation more directly to clarify and extend the discussion of the nature of a disposition; suggest a typology of dispositions; discuss the relationship between dispositions, desires and beliefs; comment on the importance of dispositions in political settings; and say something about the case of multiple dispositions.

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## 1. Introduction

First, a caricature of a ‘typical economist’<sup>1</sup>; he (the typical economist is male) works with a very basic Humean model of individual rationality and motivation that defines a rational action or choice in any given setting as that action/choice, of those actions/choices that are available, that best serves the individual’s desires, given the individual’s beliefs. The understanding of the idea of desires is couched in terms of preferences and their satisfaction, but also in terms of interests – indeed desires, preferences and interests will often be taken as fully synonymous. Preferences provide the mainspring to rational action, are fully consistent with the individual’s interests, are inscrutable (*de gustibus non est disputandum*), and operate on one level. Much of the work of this typical economist in recent years has been focused on the analysis of the implications of variations in the informational environment in which the individual operates, with uncertainty and asymmetric information being key ideas. While there has been some concern with models of bounded rationality, there has been comparatively little attention to other issues associated with motivation, preferences, desires and interests.

This ‘typical’ approach to economics has been evident in the recent burgeoning literature on political economics, where the mainstream economic approach is applied to issues of politics and political institutions<sup>2</sup>. Here the focus has been very much on the political life of *homo economicus* – with the fully rational individual with preferences that are identical to interest at the heart of the analysis.

But not all economists are ‘typical’<sup>3</sup>. Even a slightly richer version of the Humean model<sup>4</sup> would allow of distinctions between an individual’s passions, sentiments, moral judgements, character traits, will, identity and so on, that are lost within the ‘typical’ economist’s schema. My purpose here is not to provide an interpretation of Hume (although I consider the account that I offer broadly Humean), but rather to focus on one particular extension to the typical economist’s model which includes the idea of dispositions as a potentially significant element of the motivational makeup of individuals – an element that plays a role that is in some ways complementary to the role of simple preferences and which builds on earlier work with Geoff Brennan<sup>5</sup>.

A specific benefit of the more detailed consideration of individual motivation relates to the potential disconnect between the descriptive or analytic aspirations of rational choice political theory on the one hand and its normative aspirations on the other. As Christiano (2004) notes, the strict adherence to a narrowly self-interested rationality threatens a ‘basic structural determinism’ under which the normative aims of rational choice theory may be undermined, at least to a significant degree. While we do not accept all of Christiano’s discussion, we are certainly in agreement that there is an important issue here. In our view, the most promising way out of the potential impasse (or, more accurately, the most promising way to reduce the extent of the tension between the normative and the descriptive aspects of the theory) is to develop a more nuanced account of the individual’s motivational structure that is both more descriptively accurate and more connected to normative concerns. The move to recognise dispositions and place them in the landscape of political behaviour is one step along this path.

My title picks out two rather different perspectives – one focussed on specifically political dispositions, which includes an argument as to why the idea of dispositions may be more relevant in the political domain than in the domain of the market; the other focussed on the implications for our understanding of politics that arise from recognising the dispositional input. The next section seeks to be explicit about the idea of a disposition and to identify the role that dispositions play in relation to preferences. Section 3 then develops the discussion of dispositions by contrasting the theme of dispositional motivation with the theme of expressive motivation and presents the argument that dispositions may be particularly significant in the political domain. In Section 4 I discuss the two particular dispositions that Geoff Brennan and I have been interested in, in order to draw out more general issues. Section 5 stands in place of conclusions and returns to the distinction between political dispositions and dispositional politics.

## 2. Dispositions

While dispositions feature prominently in a wide range of philosophical literatures, they are rarely the centre of attention<sup>6</sup>. Often the word is used simply to identify an intentional state, without any very specific implications for the further properties of that intentional state. Where dispositions are at centre stage, the idea of a disposition is most often related to the idea of higher order preferences. For example, Lewis (1989) suggests that something is a value if and only we are disposed, under ideal circumstances, to value it, where the disposition in question is a matter of second order desire<sup>7</sup>. This conception clearly links to the earlier work on higher order preferences by Jeffrey (1974) and particularly Frankfurt (1971); although these articles do not themselves employ the word disposition systematically. Frankfurt, for example, speaks of second order volitions that are a particular class of second order desires such that the individual wants a particular desire to be his will. Holding such volitions is argued to be constitutive of personhood and moral agency. I will retain a link between dispositions and higher order desires, although I do not identify a disposition directly with a second order desire – rather I will suggest that a disposition is a piece of motivational apparatus that may be influenced by first or higher order desires in the long term, and which operates to condition or govern first order desires and behaviour in the short term.

Roughly, a disposition is a kind of commitment that might be identified with a temperament, temper, inclination, trait, commitment, mind-set, or tendency. One might be disposed to tell the truth, or one might be of a cautious disposition, but, if so, this would not necessarily mean that one always told the truth, or avoided all avoidable risks. A disposition – whatever its specific content – is not an absolute determinant or guarantor of behaviour in the relevant domain. Nevertheless, a disposition does carry some motivational force that may modify, and sometimes dominate, what might otherwise be desired and chosen. A truthful disposition will reduce the number of lies told relative to the situation in which the disposition was absent but all other desires are identical.

A disposition, therefore, lies somewhere between the extremes of a hard-wired model of determinism in which behaviour is fully committed and independent of the consideration of desires, and Frankfurt's 'wanton' behaviour in which individuals

follow each fleeting whim or want without any restraint. Of course, the range between these two extremes is considerable, covering all forms of habitual behaviour, rules of thumb, personal and social norms of behaviour, and so on. I will not attempt to categorise all of the possibilities, or to provide a taxonomy of the spectrum. I simply note the family resemblance across this range and stipulate that a disposition occupies a place on this spectrum such that the strength of the commitment relative to simple first order desires is significant, but not necessarily overpowering. This formulation entails a certain structural relationship between dispositions and desires. Dispositions might be said to govern desires or decisions in the same way that a convention governs behaviour over some relevant domain, or the rules of a game govern behaviour within that game. Compliance with the convention, rule or disposition is not automatic, and may be withheld in some cases, but the existence of the convention, rule or disposition is at least influential. This link between the idea of a disposition and the idea of an internal constitutional rule<sup>8</sup> is one that provides a clear connection between the interest in, and analysis of, dispositions and the constitutional political economy approach to politics more generally.

The content of a disposition may also shape its form. The examples already given of a disposition to tell the truth, or to be cautious, might be termed *general conditioning dispositions* in that they apply, to a greater or lesser extent, to a wide range of decision contexts and domains. Other dispositions may be more selective, with relevance to specific domains of behaviour – for example the commitment to be a vegetarian or to support a specific sports team might be described in terms of a disposition that is cultivated and which may from time to time conflict with particular desires. Such dispositions might be classed as *specific conditioning dispositions*.

A third type of disposition is concerned with identifying the mode of decision making itself, rather than influencing decisions within a mode. In an earlier discussion of dispositions, Geoff Brennan and I focussed on this type of disposition. To quote:

A disposition picks out a particular mode of decision making which may then be applied to the choice among possible actions; a disposition involves a procedure or mechanism that allows a set of decisions on actions to be bundled together and made according to a particular rule. Thus a disposition

identifies both a class of choice situations and a choice rule, and involves the application of the specified rule in the specified situations.

Seen in this way, self-interested calculation over actions (together with some specification of the class of actions to which it should apply) is itself a disposition: the disposition of rational egoism. This disposition tells you to take that action which, of those actions that are available to you, makes your life go best for you (i.e. maximises your expected lifetime pay-off). But the disposition of rational egoism is not necessarily the disposition that will make your life go best for you. Your expected lifetime pay-off may be larger if you were to have a different disposition. If this is true, the disposition of rational egoism (the *homo economicus* disposition) is self-defeating in Parfit's sense; and it would be in your own interest to choose a different disposition if only that were possible. (Brennan and Hamlin, 2000, 35-6.)

This class of dispositions might be termed *modal dispositions*<sup>9</sup>.

Dispositions, on this account, are distinct from both desires (of whatever order) and beliefs. Dispositions provide the framework within which desires interact with beliefs in generating decisions or actions. It might be suggested that dispositions are a variety of second order desires – but I would resist this suggestion on the grounds that while one might have second order desires that relate to dispositions (indicting the desirability of having a particular disposition, say) this is not the same thing as the disposition itself. Similarly, it might be argued that a disposition is a variety of belief (for example the belief that morality requires particular actions), but again I would resist this suggestion on the grounds that a disposition plays a role that is rather more specific than a belief – it commits the individual in particular ways that the holding of a belief does not. Beliefs of a certain sort may be a necessary precondition or input to a disposition, but that are not the whole story.

Perhaps the most plausible suggestion is that a disposition is a form of product of a belief and a desire – so that, for example a moral disposition might be formed of a combination of a belief that morality requires particular actions, and the desire to act as morality requires. And this formulation gets close to the suggestion here. Close, but not

quite there. What this formulation still misses is the extent of the commitment involved in a disposition. The combined belief-desire account would still locate the moral motivation at the level of a desire – in the example used, the desire to act as morality requires. And this desire would sit alongside other desires which might point to other actions. There is then the further question of how the individual decides in the face of a complex belief-desire context. The point that I would stress about a disposition is that it implies some structure to decision making rather than simply providing another desire-belief input to decision making.

So far, I have spoken only about the content of a disposition and the position of dispositions in the motivational machinery. I now turn briefly to consider the source and evolution of dispositions. Dispositions may arise and evolve under a variety of causal influences. Some of these influences may lie outside of the control of the individual. I make no claim that all dispositions can be fully determined by the will or behaviour of the individual concerned, even in the long term (clearly the idea of a disposition as a relatively fixed part of the individual's motivational apparatus rules out the short term control of one's own dispositions). However, I do claim that many relevant dispositions - of each of the three types identified above - can be at least influenced by the individual (and, indeed by other individuals – parents, advisors, friends, and so on).

It seems clear that some dispositions of the specific conditioning kind can be explicitly chosen and reinforced by behaviour. Commitment strategies such as vegetarianism or adopting an exercise regime are examples of such dispositions. But it is equally clear that the choice and reinforcement of such a disposition is not a trivial matter – the fate of most New Year resolutions and the difficulties of giving up smoking remind us that dispositional choice and reinforcement behaviour are costly in terms of other desires denied. In this regard, I suggest that more general and modal dispositions are also susceptible to choice and reinforcement, at least to some extent. We can resolve to be more cautious, or more truthful, or more rational in our financial decision making. And our resolve can, at least sometimes be translated into modified dispositions through both efforts of will and reinforcing behaviour.

In Brennan and Hamlin (1995) we offered a very simple model of dispositional choice in which individuals choose on a once-and-for-all basis between two dispositions that

commit the individual to different modes of decision making. The disposition, once chosen, influences the performance of the individual in different social roles, and imperfect selection mechanisms attempt to ensure that persons of a given disposition are matched to appropriate roles. The main point of this model – aside from illustrating dispositional choice itself – was to indicate the manner in which institutional arrangements might themselves influence dispositional choice.

Just as, in simple market models, the consumption and production choices made by firms and individuals are influenced by institutional factors – regulations, taxes, and so on – so the choice of disposition (to the extent that dispositions are chosen) will be influenced by institutional and constitutional factors. And, because of this, the question of institutional design takes on additional dimensions. The most obvious of these is that institutions must be designed which recognise and work with motivational and dispositional heterogeneity. But the dynamic dimension of institutional design may be just as important, if less obvious, than the heterogeneity dimension. Rather than designing institutions that operate well in the presence of individuals with fixed motivations, institutions can also influence the evolution of dispositions and motivations. Of course, this additional dimension should not be overemphasised; the evolution of dispositions will be slow and partial at best, and the more immediate task of institutions may always seem to dominate. But nevertheless, there may be particular issues, or particular aspects of social institutions, where the impact via dispositions may be expected to be significant.

Clearly, dispositions may be relevant to almost all aspects of behaviour, and I have given a range of examples to illustrate this. However, my focus here is on political dispositions – by which I mean dispositions that are particularly relevant to the domain of politics, rather than on dispositions where the content of the disposition might be judged ‘political’ in some other sense. I do not intend to claim that a dispositional account of motivation is uniquely relevant to politics – only that it is relevant to politics and that there may be particular features of the evolution of political dispositions and of the operation of democratic politics that allow us to say something about the likely impact of shifting from an account of democratic politics that operates in terms of interests and first order desires to one that recognises the potential importance of



dispositions. The first step here concerns the relationship between dispositional and expressive motivation.

### **3. Dispositional and Expressive Motivation**

It is useful to distinguish between dispositional aspects of motivation and expressive aspects of motivation, not only because the distinction can help to clarify both ideas, but also because the two aspects each occupy an important place in the approach adopted in various Brennan and Hamlin papers and laid out here<sup>10</sup>.

The key to understanding the expressive aspect of motivation is to recognise that expressive desires are first order desires like any other, but that they generally become significant in influencing action only in circumstances where the individual's action is of relatively low consequential significance. It is not that the expressive desires are irrelevant in other circumstances, or somehow excluded from consideration, but just that they will generally be overwhelmed by more standard instrumental desires. In one sense, the recognition of expressive preferences is not so much a recognition of a different category of desires, but more the recognition of a set of desires that are normally overlooked simply because they are insignificant in the settings that economists normally focus on – settings where individuals are decisive and their decisions carry direct consequences. Of course, in another sense, there is something distinctive about the set of expressive desires – the fact that their satisfaction can be achieved without necessarily involving particular further consequences. Thus I can satisfy my (expressive) desire to voice my opinion that Z should happen, without any necessary requirement that Z should actually happen. It is, in this case, the simple expression of the opinion that matters.

The leading example of expressive behaviour is provided by voting in large-scale democratic elections – where the probability of any individual's vote being decisive is so low as to free the individual from any instrumental reasons for voting (or for voting in any particular way), thereby leaving expressive desires - those that can be satisfied by the act of voting itself regardless of the outcome of the election - as the desires that will determine whether and how the individual will vote.

Dispositions operate in a quite different part of the motivational landscape, picking up the degree of commitment to a particular desire or mode of action, rather than identifying a type or desire or a subset of desires. In this way, one might identify the possibility of either expressive or instrumental dispositions. And indeed, that is part of the intention here. But the fact that dispositions and expressive motivations are logically independent of each other, does not imply that there are not further connections.

I argue that the same logic that promotes expressive considerations over instrumental considerations in the context of large scale political and public decision making also tends to promote dispositions over simple desires or interests. Just as the individually inconsequential nature of public choices such as voting shifts the relative prices of acting on expressive rather than instrumental desires, so it reduces the price of acting according to your disposition rather than your first order desires.

Recall that a disposition - of whichever type - does not guarantee a particular decision or action, the commitment is not absolute. Dispositions will be more likely to be effective when alternative pressures on decision making are low. And the most obvious source of alternative pressures on decision making is instrumental desires. So, if the choice situation is framed in such a way as to background the relevance of instrumental desires, the disposition will be more likely to be effective. In the private context, if you are committed (but not absolutely committed) to vegetarianism the best chance of the commitment being effective is to avoid situations which offer tempting non-vegetarian meals and limited vegetarian options. In the public context, if you are a committed (but not absolutely committed) supporter of a particular policy your support is more likely to be effective if you are asked to vote on it rather than to take individual responsibility for a decision.

Thus, I suggest, democratic politics will typically provide citizens with an arena in which their dispositions and expressive desires are elicited rather than their direct first order desires or interests. This, in itself, is neither a good thing nor a bad thing. Everything will depend upon the particular content of the relevant dispositions and expressive desires. But this does serve to throw attention onto the analysis of the likely content of dispositions and expressive desires and onto the impact that the distinction between dispositions and expressive desires on the one hand and instrumental desires

and interests on the other hand may have on the operation of political and social institutions.

#### **4. Virtue and Conservatism**

The two dispositions that Geoff Brennan and I have discussed in our recent work are the virtuous disposition and the conservative disposition. These dispositions have structural similarities and differences that are informative. I will sketch each in turn.

The virtuous disposition is argued (Brennan and Hamlin (2000) particularly chapters 2 and 3) to derive in the manner briefly sketched in the last section – that is, to reflect an underlying first order desire to act as morality requires, together with a particular belief about what morality requires. The shift from the level of a moral desire to a virtuous disposition is then argued in terms of a modal disposition. In brief, the argument is that a the fully instrumentally rational attempt to make life go as well as possible is potentially self-defeating in the sense that the adoption of a standard rationality calculus will systematically achieve worse results than an available alternative mode of decision making – one which adopts a greater commitment to morality or virtue. The logic here is essentially similar to the logic of the prisoner’s dilemma in that the prisoner’s dilemma identifies a situation I which the instrumental rationality of each prisoner prevents them from reaching an outcome that would be mutually advantageous. Thus the adoption of a virtuous disposition (to the extent that a virtuous disposition can be adopted) is argued to be a rational piece of self-management that pays off when evaluated with respect to the full set of underlying desires.

By contrast, the conservative disposition (Brennan and Hamlin, 2004) is a disposition that grants the *status quo* a normative authority by virtue of its being the *status quo*. Contrary to the case of the virtuous disposition, the conservative disposition does not reflect an underlying first order desire to do as conservatism requires. This is, in part, because we regard conservatism to be a position that qualifies substantive political goals, rather than identifies specifically conservative goals; thus we think it most appropriate to use the word conservative adjectivally – a conservative liberal, or a conservative utilitarian, rather than simply a conservative. But also, and more

importantly, because we analyse conservatism in terms that emphasise its basis in an attitude to two forms of uncertainty – the uncertainty associated with policy outcomes, and the deeper uncertainty associated with the difficulty of identifying appropriate political ideals. Thus, the conservative position is, on our account, largely a matter of taking feasibility seriously in recognising the general properties of consequential evaluation in the presence of uncertainties. But the conservative disposition is a means of making this position effective:

Even economists are familiar with the thought that there is a distinction between justification and motivation. The market produces the benign outcomes that are claimed for it by ‘invisible’ means. In other words, the properties that serve to justify market outcomes are not aspects that necessarily motivate any of the agents whose actions produce those outcomes. In the same way here, what works to motivate conservatives may not be the same as what justifies conservatism. The conservative disposition - an intuitive suspicion of all grand schemes, an intrinsic affection for things as they are, an inclination to be reconciled to one’s general situation and perhaps strongly self-identified with it, a tendency to evaluate policies and reforms in terms of ‘disaster avoidance’ rather than utopian aspiration - may be what motivates conservatives, as a matter of descriptive fact. More to the point, it may be good for those who recognise the intellectual force of the conservative position to positively cultivate that particular disposition. (Brennan and Hamlin, 2004, p690)

Thus, in terms of our earlier typology, we regard the conservative disposition as a general conditioning disposition – a lens or filter through which the world is seen, rather than a mode of decision making.

These two dispositions differ, then, in several important respects: they are of different types – one a modal disposition and one a general conditioning dispositions; they carry different relationships to underlying desires – one building on a first order desire the other not. But despite these differences they both operate to modify the behaviour of the individual in a manner that will be particularly important in the political domain.

Of course, there are many possible dispositions, including many possible political dispositions, and any individual may be characterised by a number of political dispositions. In particular, there is no reason to suppose that an individual cannot be both virtuous and conservative by disposition. Of course, the possibility of multiple dispositions that may each be relevant to a particular circumstance raises new issues. It is no longer the case that we are simply concerned with the tension between a particular commitment or disposition and the range of relevant desires, but also with the tensions between distinct commitments or dispositions.

I will not attempt any general discussion of the resolution of such tensions here; rather I will make a few comments that I hope may prove suggestive, based in part on the two particular dispositions under discussion. First, whether or not there is conflict between dispositions is a matter that is contingent on the particular circumstances. If two (or more) dispositions were never in conflict in any possible situation, then it would be possible to formally combine those dispositions and treat them as one. On the other hand, if two dispositions conflicted in all possible situations it is difficult to see how a single individual could genuinely be said to hold both dispositions simultaneously. In some circumstances virtue and conservatism will point to the same action or decision, in other circumstances their implications will differ. If the dispositions align in terms of their implied actions there is no further issue of major significance – the relevant action is doubly recommended. If they differ, then there are several issues to consider. The first relates to the types of the dispositions. If, as in this example, the dispositions are of different types, this may indicate the manner of the resolution of the conflict between them. Specifically, the conservative disposition indicates a particular stance toward evaluating options that biases one toward the status quo, whereas the virtuous disposition puts in place a mode of decision making that privileges moral considerations over self-interested ones in certain circumstances. Even if these two do not obviously point to the same decision or action in some particular setting (that is, even if the action that morality requires is not in the relevant sense the status quo) they may be procedurally compatible in the sense that the conservative evaluations of alternative options (including the status quo) may be used as inputs to the virtuous mode of decision making. This will provide

a status quo bias to the virtuous calculus in such a way that the resultant decision or action will be likely to depart from that which would be chosen either by an individual who was simply conservative or by an individual who was simply virtuous, but this is a perfectly coherent approach to what it might mean to be ‘conservatively virtuous’. In this way, we see that while there may seem to be conflict between dispositions in the sense that each disposition taken separately would pick out a different decision in a specific context, the dispositions themselves may contain the resolution to this apparent conflict revealing a deeper compatibility between the dispositions.

Not all conflicts may be so easily resolved. But it is surely reasonable to expect the dispositions of a single individual to be coherent in the sense that, under the broad range of circumstances that might be considered normal, the dispositions do not generally suffer from deep conflict. Indeed, if an individual’s dispositions give rise to frequent deep conflicts one might suggest that this indicates a pathology in the individual that might be approached via the questioning and review of the dispositions adopted.

## **5. Conclusion**

In much of our recent work, Geoff Brennan and I have seen a more detailed attention to the motivational structure of individuals as an important step toward enriching the rational actor analysis of political decision making and of political institutions. I believe that the idea of dispositions as motivational structures that govern and partially commit the (first order) desires of individuals sits alongside the recognition of the more expressive elements of desire to provide what we would regard as a considerably stronger starting point for political analysis than that provided by the stripped down motivational structure preferred by the ‘typical’ economist caricatured at the outset of this chapter.

But the proof of the pudding lies in the eating. It is only if the model of motivation that embraces the dispositional and the expressive generates additional or different implications and understandings to those derived from the more stripped down model,

that the exercise is worthwhile. We believe that the extended model does help us to understand a range of political behaviour and a range of institutional phenomena, but this particular pudding requires much further tasting.

I want, finally, to return to two themes – one relating to the relationship between descriptive and normative political theory, the other relating to the distinction between political dispositions and dispositional politics. In pulling these themes together, I want to suggest that the dispositional approach has the potential to enrich the motivational landscape in a way that is particularly relevant to democratic politics on the understanding that dispositions provide a sort of internal, personal ‘constitution’, and that democratic politics provides a particularly fertile ground in which dispositions can flourish; so that political dispositions are both a descriptively plausible part of the motivational structure of individuals and likely to be effective in real political contexts. But I also want to suggest that the study of politics has to adjust to take account of such dispositions. Dispositional politics allows much clearer connections between descriptive and normative political theory by raising the possibility of normatively driven dispositions being significant determinants of individual political behaviour. But dispositional politics also sets different challenges to, for example institutional designers or reformers. If rational agents can be understood as voting their dispositions (or their expressive opinions) rather than their interests, our normative understanding of the operational properties of political institutions must change and so may our institutional prescriptions. The recognition of the expressive and dispositional aspects of political motivation does not just deepen our analysis of political behaviour and institutions; it will also provide us with different diagnoses of political failures, and different institutional remedies.

But my purpose here has not been to detail these diagnoses and remedies. Rather, I have sought to clarify and extend the discussion of the nature of a disposition; suggest a typology of dispositions; discuss the relationship between dispositions, desires and beliefs; comment on the importance of dispositions in political settings; and say something about the case of multiple dispositions. While this is not a jointly authored chapter in the detail of its attribution, it is essentially joint in that it reflects my understanding of what a considerable part of my work with Geoff Brennan has been

about over recent years. Of course, all of this needs considerable further work, and this is work that takes us well beyond conventional economics.

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## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> It must be said that the typical economist caricatured here is less dominant than was the case twenty or even ten years ago. Nevertheless, he is hardly an endangered species. While many economists would acknowledge the limitations of the approach caricatured in principle, it still dominates the profession in practice.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Persson & Tabellini (2000).

<sup>3</sup> For recent examples see Frey (1997a, b), Le Grand (2003), Besley (forthcoming).

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Baier (1991), Bricke (1996), Sugden (1986).

<sup>5</sup> Particularly, Brennan and Hamlin (1995, 1998, 2000, 2004)

<sup>6</sup> For example, the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy includes over 140 articles that include the word 'disposition', but there is no article devoted to the idea of a disposition, and none of the articles offers a definition or extended discussion of the idea of a disposition. Indeed, it is clear that the word is used to mean rather different things by different authors.

<sup>7</sup> See Copp (1993) and Harman (1993) for a modified account and a critique respectively.

<sup>8</sup> The connection between internal personal constitutions and political constitutions appears, for example, in Brennan and Buchanan (1985).

<sup>9</sup> I make no claim that these three types of dispositions exhaust the possibilities.

<sup>10</sup> For detailed analysis of expressive aspects of democratic politics see Brennan and Lomasky (1993), Brennan and Hamlin (1998, 2000).