Gendering the 1991-95 Bosnian Peace Process: Current Research and Future Directions

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Abstract

This working paper maps the possibilities for developing a gender perspective of the peace process that took place in BiH between 1991 and 1995. By synthesising the existing literature (which broadly speaking does not have a gender perspective) the working paper identifies where further research and analysis could provide a gendered perspective on the peace process in BiH. This task is a challenging one, not least because it is not an “obvious” case study, given that the oft-repeated narrative in BiH is that women were not involved. The working paper largely proceeds in a chronological order, and is divided into three parts. Part One begins with an overview of the peace processes that took place before the bulk of the diplomatic work on Dayton started. Part Two focuses on the run up to the Dayton negotiations, as well as the negotiations themselves and giving a feminist analysis of the peace agreement (known as the General Framework Agreement). Both Part One and Part Two end with suggestions for more research to develop a gender perspective on the peace negotiation process. All the suggestions are substantive research projects in their own right and are outlined to provoke further reflection on what it means to develop a gender perspective about the peace process in BiH. Part Three moves away from a more general gender perspective and focuses on a substantive discussion of female presence during the peace process. Drawing on scholarship concerned with feminist and women’s organising in BiH, and female political roles in BiH, as well as interviews with feminist activists during 2013 and 2014, Part Three offers some thoughts about why female presence in the Bosnian peace process was so limited. This is crucial work for drawing out reasons for female exclusion, and like in Parts One and Two, I outline a number of directions that future research could take. In conclusion, this working paper argues that it is important to develop a gender perspective on the 1991-5 peace process, in particular because the Dayton Agreement continues to be criticised for the constitution that was produced through that process (Husanović 2015; Mujkic 2008; Sebastian 2007).
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Acronyms (in alphabetical order)

Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina – ARBiH
Bosnia and Herzegovina – BiH
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women - CEDAW
Dayton Peace Accords (DPA)
European Conference on Yugoslavia – ECCY
European Union Action Plan – EUAP
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – FbIH
Former Yugoslavian Republic –FYR
International Conference on the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – ICFY
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia – ICTY
Non-Governmental Organisation – NGO
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE
Republika Srpska – RS
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia –SFRY
Union of Three Republics – UTR
United Nations Protection Force – UNPROFOR
Vance-Owen Peace Plan – VOPP
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom - WILPF
Keywords

Gender, Peace Agreements, Dayton, Bosnia, Constitutional Negotiations, Post Conflict Negotiations, Political Settlements.
Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Introduction

Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) has faced numerous attempts at constitutional design since 1991. The dissolution of Yugoslavia was especially traumatic for BiH, where a complex and horrifically violent three-way civil war took place between 1992 and 1995. The violence ended with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in November 1995, which included a new constitution for BiH within the annexes. Much of the scholarly literature about BiH since 1990 tends to be centred upon critiques of liberal internationalism (for instance, Chandler 1999; Bose 2002, 2005; Paris 2004), or focus on the various ways that Dayton has failed and necessary reforms needed to the “Dayton Constitution” (for instance, Belloni 2009; Caplan 2000; Tuathail et. al. 2006). There has also been a very rich field of scholarship which unpacks a range of important gender questions related to BiH. This scholarship focusses on identities (Cockburn 1998), the effects of the Dayton Peace Agreement for the lives of women (Björkdahl 2012; Chinkin and Paradine 2001; Grebäck and Zillén 2003; Rees 2002), transitional justice (Björkdahl and Mannergren Selimovic 2015; Campbell 2007; Mertus 2004), wartime rape (Stiglmayer 1993; Allen 1996), feminist and women’s organising (Helms 2013; 2003; 2007; Milnarević and Kosović 2011; Popov-Momčinović: 2013); the challenges of reconciliation (Helms 2008; 2010); peacekeeping (Pupavac 2005); and the memory of wartime rape (Henry 2011). Specific attempts to develop a gender perspective on the actual negotiation processes for peace and constitutional reform remain limited in both academic scholarship and in policy research. As a consequence, there is very little research specifically looking at women, gender concerns and/or feminism in the 1991-5 Bosnian peace process.

This working paper aims to map the possibilities for developing a gender perspective of the peace process that took place in BiH between 1991 and 1995. By synthesising the existing literature (which broadly speaking, does not have a gender perspective) the paper identifies where further research and analytical consideration could provide a gendered perspective on the peace process in BiH. This, as I discuss in more detail later in this introduction, is challenging, not least because it is not an “obvious” case study, given that the oft-repeated narrative in BiH is that women were not involved.

0.1: Background: War in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was a one-party socialist state that emerged out of the events of the Second World War. Under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) were unified “in brotherhood”. The reasons for the wars of the 1990s and the collapse of the SFRY in 1992 remain an area of debate (Baker 2015; Ramet 2005). These debates cover issues from the role and importance of the 1974 Yugoslav constitutional reforms, which defined the powers of the republics; the effect of Tito’s death in May 1980; the concerns about the power of Serbian nationalism and the rise of Slobodan Milošević during the 1980s; and economic crisis in the region from the late 1970s. However, to provide the necessary background to this working paper, I will focus on the political events that specifically resulted in war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Towards the end of the 1980s, there were concerns within the Yugoslav republics about increasing Serb centralisation and the leadership of the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević. During a January 1990 Extraordinary Congress, the delegations of the six republics could not agree on the direction of the Yugoslav federation, resulting in the Slovenian and Croatian delegates leaving the Congress and provoking the first free elections in Slovenia and Croatia in April 1990. Similar free elections took place in Macedonia in November, and Serbia in December. BiH held free elections for the Presidency, Assembly, and the first round for the House of Peoples on 18 November 1990, with the second round of voting for the House of Peoples on 3 December. Tensions between the republics continued throughout 1991, with Croatia and Slovenia declaring independence in June, and Macedonia in September. The Yugoslav Federal Army invaded Slovenia and Croatia in the summer of 1991. While the conflict was short-lived in Slovenia, it was a different matter in Croatia, where the conflict was drawn-out and violent, in part because of the high population of ethnic Serbs in Croatia. The EU recognised the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992.

Against these tensions, BiH was in a particularly precarious position. The republic was always considered the most multi-ethnic within the Yugoslav federation, and indeed, this had been recognised by the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, which granted a collective presidency to BiH (Gavric et al 2013: 31) in which the presidency rotated between nine members drawn from different ethnic groups (Serbs, Croats and Muslims (sometimes described as Bosniaks) and ‘other’ (naroda)). The 1991 census suggested that around 44% of the population of BiH identified as Muslim, 17% as Croat, 31% as Serb and 8% as other (Gavric et al 2013: 18). However, the use of these ethnic claims should be treated with a degree of caution: they do not necessarily represent coherent categories, and these labels and their relationship to religion and to being “Bosnian” are more complex than it might initially appear. Nevertheless, the multi-ethnic nature of the republic meant that debates about the future status of BiH were hotly contested, with a high degree of involvement from Croatia and Serbia, who sought to protect “their” ethnic group within BiH.

Figure 1: Map showing contemporary Republika Srpska in blue.


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1 For more on the complexity of these ethnic, identity and/or national categorisations, and their relationship to being “Bosnian” see Tone Brinda Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1995) 20 – 36.
In October 1991, the Bosnian Parliament informed the Yugoslav federal parliament of Bosnia’s state sovereignty, in the same way that Croatia and Slovenia had. However, this claim to sovereignty was disputed from two quarters. Many Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats did not agree with the actions of the Bosnian Parliament, and the events that took place at the end of 1991 appeared to entrench divisions that provided the context for a three-way civil war by spring 1992. First, many of the Bosnian Serb members within Parliament opposed this move, leading to a plebiscite in the Serb-dominated regions of BiH during November 1991. At least 90% of those who voted opted for union with Serbia and Montenegro. This particular movement resulted in the creation of a Serb assembly, based in Banja Luka, a city in the north of BiH. This Serb assembly later declared its independence from BiH, creating the Republika Srpska (RS). (See Figure 1). However, it is important to understand the complexity of “Serbian” in relation to the Bosnian war. Not all Serbs were necessarily hard-line nationalists wishing for a “Greater Serbia”.

There were many Serbs who sought to preserve a unified BiH (for instance Tatjana Ljubic-Mijatovic and Mirko Pejanovic, who were Serb members of the Bosnian presidency during the war). Second, the sovereignty of BiH was also disputed by the Bosnian Croats who established communes in various pockets of BiH during November and December 1991, eventually leading to a late 1991 declaration of a separate Croatian state in Western Bosnia called ‘Herzeg-Bosnia’. Against these tensions, a referendum on Bosnian independence took place at the end of February, resulting in a formal declaration of independence by the Bosnian government on 3 March 1992. The sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was subsequently recognised by the United States and the European Community - but this served to simulate a violent and horrific three-way civil war. The Bosnian Serbs fighting for unification with Serbia and preservation of Yugoslavia (supported by Milosevic’s Serbia and the Yugoslav People’s Army), alongside this, sharing many of the same aims, a paramilitary group led by figures like Randovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. During the war, this paramilitary group was frequently supported financially and militarily by Slobodan Milosevic. These forces fought against the (largely Bosniak) Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) on one side and the Croat forces in the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) on the other. Until the Washington Agreement of March 1994 (detailed in the first part of this working paper), HVO and ARBiH forces also fought each other. With the Washington Agreement, which created the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), Bosniaks and Croats allied themselves against the RS. The war was marked by strategies of ethnic cleansing, population movement, genocide, mass rape, the use of concentration camps and the destruction of significant historical and religious sites.

The peace process for BiH took place against this background of war. This long – and at times, complex – process took place with a number of different actors and with varying levels of involvement by domestic and international actors. The first part of this working paper details a number of international interventions which attempted to deliver peace via a constitutional settlement for BiH. These initiatives were initially spearheaded by the European Community (EC) via the ICFY (International Conference on the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and later, the Contact group. It is argued that these earlier attempts failed because of the lack of American will and support (Gow 1997). Following a policy review at the end of 1994, US involvement in BiH increased. The second part of this working paper picks up from August 1995, when President Clinton appointed Richard Holbrooke as the State Department’s Special Envoy, tasking him with making a peace settlement to end the war in BiH. During August and September

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2 Turnout was around 60%.
1995, he held “shuttle negotiations” in Belgrade (with the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic), Sarajevo (with the Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegovic) and Zagreb (with the Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman). At the beginning of November, the three leaders were taken to Dayton, Ohio, USA for 21 days of formal peace negotiations. The agreement was generally thought to be a ‘shabby compromise’, and there were no celebrations in Sarajevo at the news of the peace agreement (Bjorkdahl 2012: 294).

0.2: Developing a Gender Perspective: Notes on the Research Process

As I alluded to above, there are a number of interrelated challenges involved in developing a gender perspective on the Bosnian peace negotiations. These challenges relate to (1) the gender-blindness of the peace process; (2) the process of doing research in BiH and (3) to ontological and epistemological perspectives about what constitutes “gender”. These three reasons are heavily interlinked and so I have not separated them as discrete categories below. The peace process itself was marked by gender-blindness in all sorts of ways. The process featured only a handful of women, and at Dayton there were no women within any of the regional negotiating teams. Furthermore, according to Björn Lyrwall, a Swedish advisor during the Dayton negotiations, gender aspects were not discussed as the focus was ending armed hostilities (cited in Grebäck and Zillén 2003: 3). Moreover, women did not organise as women to be present or to have their concerns heard. Indeed, a Kvinnatill Kvinnan report points out,

The Dayton Peace Negotiations were a dialogue of men, often with purely militaristic overtones. No women were present around the negotiation table, and there was only one women represented among the signatories. (Lithander 2000: 20).

This has been considered surprising (Lithander 2000: 20). First, because Dayton came very soon after the 1995 Beijing Platform, which incorporated a call for women to be included in all aspects of a peace process. Second, because media coverage of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was characterised by stories of widespread gender violence, including genocidal rape (Stiglmayer 1994). In short, the dominant (gender) narrative about the Bosnian peace process is that women were not present, feminists did not seek to be involved, and gender concerns did not form part of the negotiation process. This absence represents a challenge in the sense that gender was simply not a consideration and no-one thought about the need to ensure the presence of women.

One consequence of this gender-blindness became evident when I interviewed people during several data gathering research trips to Bosnia in 2013 and 2014 as part of an ERC Advanced Grant (Understanding Institutional Change: A Gender Perspective). Several interviewees responded to my questions with bewilderment and a straightforward response of “there were no women” and “we didn’t think about these things”. This response in part ties in with attitudes about what a “gender perspective” means (i.e. the infamously problematic gender = women). Of course, as I

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3 Most interviewees alluded to this, especially in the initial communication. See in particular interviews between author and Hajrudin Somun, Delegate for Bosnian Presidency 1992-3; Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993-2003, Sarajevo, 26 September 2013; Amila Omersoftic, co-founder of Social Democratic Action Party 1990-1996, Sarajevo, 27 September 2013; Memnuna Zvizdić, Director Zene Zenama, Sarajevo, 26 September 2013; Besima Borić, Delegate, House of Representatives, Federation of BiH, Sarajevo, 26 September 2013.
later suggest, this could be resolved by not asking questions about gender at all, and merely collecting stories about the peace process itself, then analysing the gendered representations embedded within these stories. However, this analysis needs to be conducted in relation to the ethics of interviewing in BiH.

There is widespread consensus that BiH is a heavily researched environment. Having done my previous research in Serbia, where I encountered two other western researchers in the nine months I spent there, I found the research environment in BiH (and Sarajevo in particular) a shock. There were, to not put a too fine a point on it, a slew of other researchers – a phenomenon also observed by Janine Natalya Clark (2012), Stefanie Kappler (2013) and Audra Mitchell (2013). This has a range of ethical, methodological and practical consequences which Clark (2012) and Kappler (2013) identify. In particular, as Kappler astutely points out, there are a range of subtle tactics of resistance and impact that research participants choose to engage with (2013: 126). Certainly, potential participants would refuse to be interviewed. But of more interest here is to consider why interviewees sought to (subtly) evade certain questions or refuse to be interviewed in the context of this particular project concerned with the peace negotiations in BiH. One very likely reason is the simple fact that the peace negotiations were taking place alongside extreme violence: for many potential participants it may be the case that questions asking them to recall aspects of the peace negotiations (unintentionally) invoke a number of painful and traumatic memories. One potential participant that I approached said that she could not talk to me precisely because she did not feel strong enough to talk about that moment of her life.⁴ This is not to say that this kind of qualitative research – based on interviews with those directly involved in the peace process - could never be done. It may be the case that this kind of research could well be carried out by a researcher who would define him/herself as Bosnian, or who has spent a number of years (rather than weeks) building trust. For these reasons, developing a gender perspective through interview data could be challenging.

Finally, the term “gender perspective” is somewhat loaded and can mean many things: from deliberations about the inclusion of female bodies in elite processes, to feminist demands for social and political transformation, to representations of masculinity and femininity. In this working paper, in order to identify a range of future research directions, I have taken the broadest possible understanding of a “gender perspective”. These various suggestions are bullet-pointed at the end of each chapter. It is reasonable to assume that each suggestion would form a substantive work agenda in its own right. This does mean that the range of bullet-pointed suggestions at the end of each chapter are not ontologically coherent if taken together (and nor do I necessarily personally subscribe to all of them as means of achieving a meaningful gender perspective). Rather, they are intended to point to ways in which a gender perspective could be developed as a means of thinking about gender in this instance of institutional creation and change.

⁴ Fieldnotes, Sarajevo, 7 October 2013.
0.3: Outline of paper

The working paper largely proceeds in a chronological order, and is divided into three parts. Part One begins with an overview of the peace processes that took place before the bulk of the diplomatic work on Dayton started. Part Two focusses on the run up to the Dayton negotiations, as well as the negotiations itself and giving a feminist analysis of the peace agreement (known as the General Framework Agreement). Both Part One and Part Two end with a set of suggestions for more research to develop a gender perspective on the peace negotiation process. All the suggestions are substantive research projects in their own right and are outlined to provoke further reflection on what it means to develop a gender perspective about the peace process in BiH.

Part Three moves away from a generalised gender perspective and focusses on a substantive discussion about female presence during the peace process. Drawing on scholarship concerned with feminist and women’s organising in BiH, and female political roles in BiH, as well as contemporary interviews with feminist activists during 2013 and 2014, Part Three offers some thoughts about why female presence in the Bosnian peace process was so limited. This is crucial work for drawing out reasons for female exclusion, and like Part one and two, I bullet-point a number of directions that future research could take. In conclusion, this working paper argues that it is important to develop a gender perspective on the 1991-5 peace process, in particular because the Dayton Agreement, continues to be criticised for the constitution that was produced through the peace process (Husanović 2015; Mujkic 2008; Sebastian 2007).

A peace process generally refers to all the agreements, and attempts at agreements, leading up to the final agreement. For instance, a single peace process in Guatemala produced 16 agreements between 1990 and 1996 (Anderson 2014: 6). While the Dayton Agreement remains the most infamous peace agreement related to BiH, there were, according to the Transitional Justice Institute (TJI) Peace Agreements database, 14 agreements relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) between 1991 and 1998. Furthermore, prior to the Dayton negotiations there were a number of attempts at negotiations which failed to produce an agreement. Thus, Part One focusses on a chronological discussion of the various attempts at reaching a peace agreement preceding the Dayton negotiations.

Attempts to Reach a Settlement

As discussed in the introduction, following the first free multiparty elections across Yugoslavia in April 1990, Yugoslav republics started to pull away from the federation. Slovenia achieved independence following a brief war with the Yugoslavian federal army during the summer of 1991. Croatia, under the leadership of Franjo Tudjman, sought independence at the same time, but conflict was drawn-out and violent: in part because of the high population of ethnic Serbs in parts of Croatia. Croatian independence was recognised by the EU in January 1992. However, even at the end of 1991, there were broader diplomatic attempts to keep the states of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia together, albeit under a looser federation than the one designed by Tito in the 1974 constitution, known as the Carrington Conference, chaired by Lord Carrington.

These talks proved fruitless, as war broke out in BiH from April 1992. The negotiations that took place from the start of 1992 increasingly focussed on the territorial division of BiH and all peace plans proposed some variation of ethnic division. The Bosnian government continually opposed proposals for ethnic partition, urging for a unified BiH and for an international recognition that the war was primarily one of Serbian chetnik aggression. The aim of many Serbian nationalists who were fighting was to reject independence of BiH, as they preferred to remain part of Yugoslavia (what is now Serbia). The Croats were also pursuing a nationalist agenda and a “Greater Croatia”: during the war they controlled ‘Herzeg-Bosnia’ (roughly, southwestern BiH).

The peace process that took place in the early 1990s generated widespread popular as well as scholarly interest. This resulted in a field ‘with roots in the swamp of instant histories, shoddy policy “analyses” and journalistic accounts of the early 1990s’ (Glaurdić 2014: 23). Some accounts

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5 The database can be found at [http://www.transitionaljustice.ulster.ac.uk/peace_agreements_database.html](http://www.transitionaljustice.ulster.ac.uk/peace_agreements_database.html). Accessed 9 June 2015. The TJI database operates with a broad understanding of a peace agreement, including all agreements that set an institutional framework (McLeod 2014: 14): for instance, the Dayton peace negotiations (which I discuss in Part Two) produced six different agreements.

6 There is a difference between “Bosnian” (could be used to refer to Serbs, Croats and Muslims) and “Bosnik” (a reference to Bosnian Muslims). The Bosnian government, even during the war, was made up of Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs, although the majority were Bosnik.

7 Yugoslavia existed until 2004, when it became Serbia and Montenegro. Montenegro became independent in 2006, and Serbia was renamed The Republic of Serbia.
are very colourful, such as Mark Almond’s Europe’s Backyard War (1994), which paints a picture of the diplomacy around the peace process as foolish and led by aging statesmen who moved far too slowly. For instance, Almond when talking about Lord Carrington, and his attempt at shuttle diplomacy for peace in 1991 suggests that ‘it soon acquired the attributes of an Ealing comedy, ‘Carry on Carrington’” (1994: 243). Furthermore, some material is marred with historical inaccuracies (Glaurdić 2014). However, perhaps most problematic is the way that the popular (international) perception of the conflict as part of a coda of intractable Balkan differences dominates much of the early literature. Crucially, many of these early analyses advocated the popular view that partition was the only solution to the war in BiH. An extreme view of the partition position was adopted by Mearsheimer who felt that the international community should ‘create instead a Bosnian state people almost exclusively by Muslims, a Croatian state for Croatians and a Serbian state made up mainly of Serbians’, and to undertake population movement to achieve this (cited in Campbell 1998: 117).

However, the prevailing view is that constructions of intractable ethnic conflict were largely flawed. Amongst others, David Campbell (1998) and Swanee Hunt (2004) point out that framing the conflict as another stage of an on-going ethnic conflict was highly damaging and served to reinforce divisions that did not exist. BiH was always the most diverse republic of Yugoslavia, and the diversity of Sarajevo is held in special regard across the former Yugoslav states. In the region, there was – and remains – resentment about the perception of the international community that the war was part of a coda of Balkan conflict.

Related to the dominant view that partition was the only way forward is the widespread argument that many of the peace plans proposed failed because of the reluctance of the international community to back diplomatic efforts with military options (Ashdown 2007: 5; Gow 1997; Malcom 1994: 234-52).

To make sense of the peace process prior to Dayton, it is best to understand it, loosely, in three “parts”. The first part is easily chronologically bounded as it refers to the set of negotiations that were chaired by Lord Carrington until his retirement in August 1992, which also saw the disbandment of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia. Part two, covering August 1992 – summer 1993, refers to the negotiations in the run-up to, and the demise of, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP), and the retirement of Cyrus Vance. Part three, from summer 1993 until July 1994, covers peace proposals put forward advocating de jure partition. I draw upon David Campbell’s analysis of the peace negotiations process which focusses on the ‘political presuppositions’ of the diplomatic initiatives responding to the violence in BiH (Campbell 1998: 125-153). Crucially, this means that, like Campbell, I pay limited attention to the important military questions that inevitably surrounded the peace process – such as arms embargos, air strikes, sanctions policy and UN peacekeeping operations (see Malcom 1994: 234-271 for a short summary of these, Gow 1997 too weaves together the military and diplomatic process with aplomb). While the following discussion does not have a clear gender perspective, I use it to highlight suggestions for developing a gender perspective about the peace process in the conclusions to Part One.
1.1: The EC Conference on Yugoslavia (ECCY): 12 September 1991 – August 1992

Lord Peter Carrington (a former British Foreign and Defence Secretary in the Conservative governments of the 1970s) chaired the EC Conference on Yugoslavia (ECCY). He was felt to have the ‘diplomatic background’ and ‘personal qualities’ to address the conflict, having previously handled the 1980 settlement on Zimbabwe (Gow 1997: 53). The ECCY held thirteen plenary sessions in Brussels between 12 September 1991 and 14 August 1992 (Campbell 1998: 125-6; for a detailed discussion of the entire Carrington process see Gow 1997: 53 -98). The ECCY also established a number of working groups on different issues, including one detailed below (the March 1992 Statement of Principles). These talks mostly took place before fighting had broken out in BiH (at this stage, much of the fighting was in Croatia), and so they were attempts initially focussed on preserving Yugoslavia. This is evident when we look at the November 1991 Carrington Plan (detailed in Campbell 1998: 126-8), which sought to develop a constitutional structure where all the Yugoslav republics could have sovereignty under a loose federation.

Following Milošević’s rejection of the November 1991 Carrington Plan, talks continued, trying to secure a durable ceasefire in Croatia (Gow 1997: 60-6). At the same time, there was also pressure to recognise Slovenia and Croatia as independent states, which may have escalated the crisis (c.f Touval 2002; Glaurdic 2011). The January 1992 the Bandinter commission, chaired by Robert Bandinter, then the president of the French Constitutional Council, provided advice to the ECCY on questions of sovereignty and self-determination (Gow 1997 67-77). While Bandinter recommended recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, in the case of Bosnia, it was decided that the ‘situation was uncertain and might be clarified by the holding of a referendum on independence’ (Gow 1997: 78-9).

It is worth quoting Gow at length to explain the significance that the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia had on the shape of the negotiation process:

> The purpose and work of the Carrington Conference – to negotiate an overall settlement of intra-Yugoslav disputes and the framework for future relations between the republics following the dissolution of the old federation – was obviated. Although Lord Carrington was asked to continue with the work of the Conference (to resolve matters such as formal succession, division of assets and repayment of debts), there was little scope for progress as the main negotiating incentive at his disposal, on behalf of the EC, was the attitude to recognition. With this gone, his resources were limited. The one area where the EC could still concentrate its efforts, however, was Bosnia.

(Gow 1997: 79)

Statement of Principles (18 March 1992)

The first substantive set of talks for Bosnia took place within the ECCY framework. Lord Carrington requested that Portuguese diplomat Jose Cutilheiro chair the talks during Portugal’s Presidency of the EC. Meetings in Sarajevo and Lisbon during February and early March 1992 developed what would be the March 1992 Statement of Principles. Two important events that serve as the context to these discussions: (1) the EC-assisted referendum on independence on 29 February and 1 March, which was boycotted by many Bosnian Serbs, (2) a shooting incident at a wedding in Sarajevo which left one Serb dead. While war and widespread violence had not yet broken out, tensions were running extremely high.
The key proposal within the Statement of Principles was for an independent BiH within existing Yugoslav Republic borders, but the state should be partitioned along ethnic lines into three nations, based on the 1991 census figures. However, a look at a map of BiH based on the 1991 census (see Appendix 2) indicates that this is easier said than done. More problematically, the proposal was essentially a diluted version of a Serbian nationalist idea (Gow 1997: 81) supported by Karadžić’s SDS party.

No party endorsed this plan (see Gow 1997: 81-90 for details): Karadžić’s SDS party, claiming to represent Bosnian Serbs, wanted greater independence for the constituent entities and more territory. The Bosnian Croats, broadly equated with the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), were undergoing internal dispute about the direction of the partition policy. The Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegović (also the leader of the SDA, Party of Democratic Action, the main party supported by Muslims in Bosnia) opposed partition but as a result of pressure accepted the agreement – an acceptance that was later retracted.

While the Statement of Principles did nothing to prevent war breaking out in BiH, the discussions were important because they established many of the rules informing later negotiations. First, as Campbell points out, ‘the first peace proposal for Bosnia embodied, prior to the outbreak of open conflict, the very nexus between identity and territory on which the major protagonists also relied’ (1998: 129). In other words, we can see the reinforcement of the ideas about ethnicity and the nation-state that lead to the Bosnia that we see today. Second, the early talks identified elites with whom to negotiate the peace. The international community did not move very far away from the template of negotiating with just the representatives of the three ethno-national groups (Perry and Keil 2014: 34-5). In part, this is because, as new political parties emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s in BiH, the ethno-nationalist parties consolidated more easily than non-nationally orientated parties (Pejanovic 2002, cited in Perry and Keil 2014: 34-5), and were in a better position to be seen as inoculators of choice by the international community. Indeed ‘from the first moments of international discussion regarding the possible structure of a post-Yugoslav BiH... the political and subsequent structural rules of the game seem to have been irreversibly reified and established’ (Perry and Keil 2014: 34-5).


The early summer of 1992 saw much diplomatic dancing between the EC and the UN regarding engagement in BiH (see Gow 1997: 90-8; and 223-4 for details), against a series of emerging media stories about the horrific violence taking place in the war.8 By now the ECCY process was all but inactive, and made more challenging as a result of the divergent positions taken by EC member states (Gow 1997: 156-83). In August, in part to address the range of tensions within international diplomacy regarding BiH, a new joint initiative between the EC and the UN was established, formally titled International Conference on the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (ICFY). The opening conference was held in London during the last week of August, during the British Presidency of the EC.

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8 The first stories of concentration camps, rape as a war strategy and forcible population movement were printed in The Guardian during spring and early summer 1992, and widely reported in the international media.
The London Principles 26-27 August 1992

A conference at London instigated the joint EC and UN process, creating the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). While the conference did not seek to develop a peace settlement per se, it was a critical part of the development of a number of principles that would eventually lead to the January 1993 Vance-Owen Peace Plan. There are three reasons why the London conference was important.

First, the conference saw a change of guard: Lord Carrington retired and he was replaced by another British former secretary: Lord David Owen, who became the EC mediator (see Owen 1995: 21-5 for details of the appointment process, including his refusal of a salary). The chair of the UN team was Cyrus Vance, an American lawyer and former US Secretary of State (between 1977-80, as part of the Carter Administration). In his memoirs, Owen describes his delight that he would co-chair with Vance;

That night [27th August 1992], I sensed that the Vance-Owen team was back in harness – fifteen years from when we had started developing Anglo-American policy towards southern Africa together, and thirteen years from when Cy [Vance] had rung me on the Friday morning after Labour had lost the general election. Since then we had kept in constant touch….

(Owen 1995: 25)

Second, the London conference was also instrumental in establishing the framework for further negotiations. Unlike the Lisbon negotiations, the London conference sought to establish a series of principles to serve as the basis for a negotiated settlement. A number of documents were issued (see Gow 1997: 229-30 for overview). Central to these documents included thirteen principles (called ‘Statement of Principles’) - listed in full in Campbell (1998: 131-3) – which established the standards that all parties agreed to be judged by. They called for compliance with international human rights conventions and asserted the importance of individual rights, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

Another document, which established the structure of the negotiations: the ‘Work of the Conference’, was also finalised at London. This established that the ICFY would go into permanent session in Geneva until talks had been settled, as well as clarifying the roles of the key players (see Gow 1997: 230). Importantly, it created a series of working groups to develop various aspects of the discussion. These included: Bosnia and Herzegovina Humanitarian Issues; Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities; Succession Issues; Economic Issues; and Confidence, Security-Building and Verification Measures (Gow 1997: 230).

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9 A list of ‘key players around the Table at the London Conference 26-7 August 1992’ has been deposited at ‘D731 - David Owen’s papers on the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia’ at the Sydney Jones Library, University of Liverpool, UK.

10 David Owen has produced a comprehensive set of documents relating to his role in BiH: The memoir Balkan Odyssey (1995); a CD-ROM (1995) which has all the relevant documents referred to in the memoir; and an edited collection of papers relating to the Vance-Owen peace plan, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Vance/Owen Peace Plan (2013). A full set of papers (specifically from his time as co-chair of the ICFY) has been deposited at the Sydney Jones Library, University of Liverpool, UK.
The third reason that the London conference was critical was that it solidified the international response to the war as primarily a humanitarian one. The UN Security Council had authorised resolution 770 on 13 August 1992, which authorised ‘all necessary measures’ to be taken to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. During the conference, there were discussions about the use of armed force (see Gow 1997: 226-9), which resulted in the deployment of a very ‘small and lightly armed UN force’ that were now, in effect, ‘hostages, making the Western governments extremely reluctant to adopt any policies which might invite retaliation by the Serbs’ (Malcom 1994: 247). In short, this conference is seen as the point when ‘British diplomacy... skilfully transformed the Bosnian legal issue into the Bosnian humanitarian issue’ (Lavić 2009: 217). Rather than framing the conflict as a war of aggression by Serbian Chetnik forces based in Pale (a framing which would have allowed the international community to take legal and military action against the Serb chetnik forces), the conflict was viewed as a humanitarian crisis. As a result, it became very difficult to deploy, or even threaten, military action to enforce any peace agreement.

The London Principles, in short established the basis of discussions that took place in Geneva at the end of 1992, which would culminate in the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.


Discussions opened in Geneva on 3rd September 1992 in the Palais des Nations, overlooking Lake Geneva. As an interesting side point, the Palais was built between 1929 and 1938 to serve as the headquarters of the League of Nations. It is perhaps no surprise then that so many commentators (cf. Gow 1997; Malcom 1994; Almond 1994) frequently draw parallels between appeasement policies of the 1930s and the failures of international diplomacy in the early 1990s. Indeed, David Owen sometimes ‘wandered at night through the deserted art deco halls’ and ‘felt haunted by the 1930s and wondered whether Yugoslavia would do to the UN what Abyssinia did to the League of Nations’ (Owen 1995: 41). Meetings were initially structured around the six working groups that had been established at the London Conference in August 1992, but rather quickly, a number of them were suspended until July 1993 (Gow 1998: 234).

The most prominent remaining working group was the ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina Humanitarian Issues’, chaired by the Finnish diplomat Martti Ahtisaari. This working group pursued negotiations for a constitutional settlement for BiH that culminated in the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (Campbell 1998: 134; Gow 1997: 235-6). This process started with Ahtisaari collecting written responses from all Yugoslav parties on the organisation of the republic. Five options were presented to Vance and Owen on 4 October (listed in Campbell 1998: 134-5; see also Owen 1995: 62). Owen makes it clear that the second option, a centralised federal state with significant functions carried out by 4 – 10 regions was considered the ‘best compromise’, promising ‘the most stable government form for the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina’ (Owen 1995: 62). David Campbell has pointed out that the selection of this option deviates from the principles established at London, because of the potential of this plan to realise ‘ethnic homogeneity’ (1998: 136), which he describes as ‘the ethnicization of Bosnia in the ICFY process’ (1998: 137). Furthermore, this option ‘overlap[ed] the wishes of one group (even though they were not just a group but the legitimate government of Bosnia)’ by endorsing the principle that the

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11 Campbell 1998: 134; Pejanović 2004: 162-3 describes the discussions held by the multi-ethnic Bosnian government with Ahtisaari on this
constitutional structure of Bosnia would reflect the ethnic composition of the country (Campbell 1998: 137).

Nonetheless, discussions continued through November and December to develop plans for a centralised federal state, eventually presented as the draft Vance-Owen Peace Plan in January 1993. These drafts formed the basis of all-party talks that took place during January 1993.

All-Party Direct Peace Talks: Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) January 1993

On January 2 1993, Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance opened a conference in Geneva presenting a draft proposal of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan to the three warring parties in BiH. The month of January was devoted to face-to-face negotiations between all three parties (Gow 1997: 236). The parties focussing on the political aspects, chaired by Martti Ahtisaari, included delegations of the Bosnian government, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats (headed by Alija Izetbegović, Randovan Karadižić and Mate Boban, respectively). The military aspects were presented by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) commander General Satish Nambiar to Generals Sefer Halilović (Bosnian government), Ratko Mladić (Bosnian Serbs) and Milivoj Petković (Bosnian Croats).

The proposal was a ‘three-part package’ including ten constitutional principles, a detailed military paper for cessation of hostilities and a map (Owen 1995: 89-90). The proposed map outlined the political framework for nine provinces plus a capital district for Sarajevo, ensuring that each community ended up as a majority in three provinces, with Sarajevo becoming the de facto fourth Muslim area (Campbell 1998: 140). The talks focussed on developing and refining many of these aspects (Owen 1995: 89-106). By 30 January, enough had been agreed for the co-chairs to present an ‘Agreement for Peace in BiH’ (Gow 1997: 236). Nine signatures were required – three on each part of the package – and quickly, the Bosnian Croats, led by Mate Boban accepted all aspects of the plan. Izetbegović, leading the Bosnian (elected government, Muslim, Bosnik) team refused to accept the military document or the map; and Karadižić refused to accept the map (Gow 1997: 237-41). This left the ICFY negotiators with ‘the unenviable task, therefore, of persuading the Bosnian President and the leader of the Bosnian Serbs to sign on the appropriate dotted lines’ (Gow 1997: 241).

It was felt that only via the UN Security Council could ‘the necessary pressures be bought to bear on the three parties to sign up to the VOPP’ (Owen 2013: 285). The next three months saw significant efforts to secure international backing for the plan, which ‘should have been a sideshow, but came to be the main event’ (Gow 1997: 241). It quickly became clear that Washington, with the newly anointed President Clinton was demonstrably reluctant to support the VOPP. Furthermore, clear statements were made that the US would not back up plans with military support. In part, this is because of lack of knowledge on the part of the new Administration (Gow 1997: 243) which perceived the plan as support for the Serb policy of ethnic cleansing (Owen 1995: 109). Vance and Owen played a very public ‘political hardball’ (Owen 2013: 285; 1995: 106-116). The US position eventually reversed on 10th February, and the next few months saw a number of UN Security Council Resolutions tightening international sanctions on Belgrade and her proxies.

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13 Documents relating to these talks can be found in Owen 2013: 201-283.
14 Documents relating to this moment of ‘political hardball’ can be found in Owen 2013: 285-436.
By 25 March, Izetbegović had signed the required parts of the agreement, leaving the Bosnian Serb, Karadžič ‘alone in opposition’ to VOPP (Gow 1997: 245). The leadership of the Bosnian Serbs were adamant that they would reject the VOPP, as it was deemed to be ‘provocatively anti-Serbian’ (Petrović 2014: 194). Against the background of increasing UN-led pressure (UNSCR 819 and 820) which sought intervention to prevent further Serbian advances (via creating UN-protected zones in eastern Bosnia) and increasing sanctions towards the FYR (Petrović 2014: 201), and the threat of air strikes, Karadžič reluctantly signed VOPP on 1 May 1993 in Athens.

At this point, David Owen talked of this being a ‘bright day’ for the Balkans, feeling that ‘it seemed this bloody Bosnian war was over at last’ (1995: 149). 1 May was also Cyrus Vance’s last day as co-chair, as he was retiring. For David Owen, that day seemed like a ‘wonderful retirement present’ (1995: 149). However, it was not to be. Over the coming weeks VOPP came under intense pressure following a referendum held in the Bosnian Serb Republic, where 96% rejected the VOPP map (Gow 1997: 247). When it transpired that the threat of international military action was not credible16 (Owen 1995: 151-170), VOPP quickly died (Gow 1997: 253). The failure of the international community, and in particular the US Administration, to persevere with VOPP has come under heavy criticism (Gow 1997; Owen 1995: 184).


After Cyrus Vance retired in May 1993, the new Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the former Yugoslavia and Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia was the Norwegian politician, Thorvold Stoltenberg. He arrived at a challenging time, as the demise of the VOPP had a number of consequences for the shape of negotiations to come. First, both Owen and Stoltenberg were determined that ‘what emerged should not be called the Owen-Stoltenberg map…this was neither our map nor our plan and it was important that it should be seen to have come from the Serbs and Croats’ (Owen 1995: 191). In short, the negotiating process was passed over to Croatia and Serbia, ‘to see if it could evolve in a way that would make it acceptable to President Izetbegović’ (Owen 1995: 191).

Second and related to this, the death of VOPP laid the ‘foundations for three peace plans “basically of the same family”’ (Campbell 1998: 144). As Campbell notes:

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15 While evidence suggests that other Serbian leaders (Dobrica Ćosić / President of FYR; Slobodan Milošević / President of Serbia; Momir Bulatović / President of Montenegro) advocated for a continuation of negotiations (Petrović 2014: 195), there remains a debate amongst historians about the extent to which Milošević engineered events to create this division between the Serbs in Pale and other Serbian leaders to ultimately achieve his goal of not signing the VOPP while still maintaining his international image (see Petrović 2014; Casperson 2010).

16 Famously, President Clinton is said to have been influenced by his reading of Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History, a travelogue written prior to WWI which paints a picture of the region as one with intractable ethnic conflicts.
Although the not-so-covert ethnic principles of VOPP meant division and possible de facto partition, the plans that followed – the Union of Three Republics (UTR), the European Union Action Plan (EUAP), and the Contact Group proposals – resulted in proposals for de jure partition.

(1998: 144)

That is, a three-way partition of BiH was now looking inevitable.

The Union of the Three Republics Plan June-September 1993

During meetings in Geneva on 11, 13 and 15-16 June 1993, the foundations of the Union of the Three Republics were laid (Owen 1995: 189-90). The Serbs and Croats came forward with a plan which ‘carved up’ Bosnia into a three-part confederation of mini-republics, ‘the borders of which would, to some extent, reflect and legitimise the military consequents of the previous two years’ (Malcom 1994: 253; full text of the principles in Campbell 1998: 145-6). Izetbegović, the Bosnian President who wanted to maintain a unified Bosnia, was initially reluctant to participate, but eventually decided to go forward with negotiations (Owen 1995: 194-7). Discussions supported by the ICFY took place during July and August 1993 (Gow 1997: 253-5) before finalising the deal aboard the British warship HMS Invincible on 20 September.

The plan divided the territory of BiH by ethnicity: Serbs 53%; Muslims 30%; Croats 17% (Malcom 1994: 253). Sarajevo and Mostar would become UN-administered cities. The Plan also developed a weak central administration appointed by the constituent republics, and left open the possibility of a plebiscite ‘that could lead to Republika Srpska and Herceg-Bosna being annexed by Serbia and Croatia respectively’ (Campbell 1998: 148). While signs suggested that this plan could be agreed by all parties, the Bosnian Parliament in Sarajevo rejected it (Gow 1997: 256).


As a means of keeping the Union of Three Republics plan alive, Owen requested that the EU Foreign Affairs Council backed a version of the agreement made aboard HMS Invincible (Gow 1997: 256). Thus, the European Union Action Plan was not new but rather a political push to encourage acceptance of the Union of Three Republics Plan. Meetings took place in Geneva between October and December 1993, with a final conference in Brussels in January 1994 (see Owen 1995: 223-54 for details). The final agreement developed what became known as the 51-49 principle, where the Bosnian Serbs “had” 49% of the territory of Bosnia, with the Muslims holding 33.5%, and 17.5% of BiH for the Croats (=51%). While the EU Action Plan failed, mostly because of the lack of American interest (Owen 1995: 250-4), it was still important because, as will become clear in Part II, the 49-51 principle was frequently returned to throughout the Dayton negotiations.
Pressure on the US to do more increased during early 1994. At a meeting in late January, President Clinton and his principle foreign policy advisors agreed that ‘a more aggressive US approach to the negotiations was necessary’ (Daalder 2000: 24). It is worth pointing out here, as a means of introducing some major players, that there was already a critical mass within the Administration supportive of increased involvement in BiH: Madeline Albright (US Ambassador to the UN); Tony Lake (National Security Advisor) and Warren Christopher (Secretary of State). They all pushed for increased US involvement, believing that it was necessary for the US to take a lead in diplomatic efforts (Daalder 2000: 24-5). One part of this increased engagement was a flurry of diplomatic activity around the threat of NATO air strikes against Bosnian-Serb artillery (Owen 1995: 256-68).

The other aspect of increased US involvement was the concentrated efforts to end the Muslim-Croat conflict via the creation of a Muslim-Croat Federation. This was meant to reduce the parties involved in negotiations and to address the military balance of power on the ground, in the hope that this would achieve a ‘better (and more acceptable) settlement for the Bosnian Muslims’ (Daalder 2000: 27). Charles Redman, the US Special Envoy to former Yugoslavia was the key mediator between the Muslims and Croats, and the key principles for the Washington Agreement was signed in Washington DC on 1st March 1994. Further details were refined during March, and the final agreement was ratified by the Parliament of Bosnia on 29 and 30 March.

Many of the basic principles of the Washington Agreement remain today. The Muslim-Croat federation that was created then still exists as the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). Bosniacs and Croats were given superior rights in the federation. This latter point ‘drew the ire’ of Bosnian Serbs, who noted that the political exclusion of Serbs from the Bosnia Federation rested on the assumption that Karadzic and the SDS leadership could represent them (Campbell 1998: 151). The Federation government ‘would have exclusive authority over the conduct of foreign affairs, defence policy, citizenship, economic and commercial policy, finance, energy policy and inter-cantonal policing, the cantons would have responsibility for all other areas of policy, either exclusively or in joint jurisdiction with the Federation government. A federal legislature was created, with a House of Representatives of 140 members and a House of Peoples of 30 Muslim and 30 Croat members’ (Malcom 1994: 256). The key outcome of the Washington Agreement was that the constitutional future of Bosnia itself now relied on a link between territories and ethnicity.

The Contact Group Plan July 1994

Early 1994 also saw increased Russian involvement in Balkan diplomacy (Daalder 2000: 28). With the involvement of the US and Russia, and the realisation that any negotiation would essentially be an inter-governmental one, it was no longer practical to organise diplomacy around the ECCY (Daalder 2000: 28; Owen 1995: 276). As such, activity had started to move away from the ICFY and a smaller and more informal ‘ad hoc diplomatic arrangement’ known as the Contact Group met for the first time in April 1994 (Campbell 1998: 152). The Contact Group was designed to establish ‘closer negotiating relationships’ to make it easier to reach agreement (Owen 1995: 277). The Contact Group was made up of representatives from the US (Robert Frasure; Charles Redman), Russia (Vitaly Churkin; Igor Ivanov), Germany (Wolfgang Ischinger), UK (Pauline Neville-Jones) and France (Jacques Blot).
The Washington Agreement had developed the notion that 51% of the territory of BiH would consist of the Federation. However, the wartime map at that point in 1994 looked rather different – the Croats and Bosnian Muslims actually only controlled 30% of the territory. The aim of negotiations then, was to ‘get the Bosnian Serbs to the table and then agree to give up large parts of their ill-gotten gains’, which proved to be the main preoccupation of negotiations during 1994 (Daalder 2000: 28).

Meetings between April and July 1994 focussed on developing the “contact group map” which envisaged the territorial division of BiH according to the 51-49 principle. Constitutional questions were put aside at the (apparent) wishes of the Bosnian Serbs (Campbell 1998: 152). On 6 July 1994, the Contact Group Plan was presented on a take-it-or-leave it basis (Gow 1997: 263). The Bosnian Serbs refused the plan, and despite several meetings over the next year - including a brief appearance by the former US President Jimmy Carter as a negotiator17 - the Contact Group plan stayed on the table for over a year (Gow 1997: 265).

While peace had not been negotiated as a result of these discussions, the process between 1993 and 1994 was important to the final settlement. As we are reminded by Owen,

> The Dayton Accords stemmed from the three-way division which had evolved through the negotiations which Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg conducted on HMS Invincible in September 1993. This became the EU Action Plan in December 1993 to which all EU Foreign ministers had contributed. Also the two-way de facto partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina when a Muslim-Croat grouping negotiated by the US in the spring of 1994 and which was included in the 1994 Contact Group map that summer. The eventual two way division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into a Muslim-Croat 51 per cent entity and a Bosnian Serb 49 per cent entity existing in the Dayton Accords of 1995, was therefore guided by the percentage allocation for the three-way spilt in the EU Action Plan and which was then applied in the Contact Group Plan.

(Owen 2013: 441-2)

By the end of 1994 hope for peace was limited. We can see how the war seemed to become intractable at this point if we look at the front cover of Dani, a Bosnian news weekly, on New Year’s Eve 1994. The cover pointed out that Sarajevo had been under siege for 1000 days by December 30 1994. The back cover printed a calendar for 1995, but instead of the dates, continued to count the days going by. In short, at the end of 1994, peace in BiH seemed impossible and many people – including politicians involved in the negotiation process – did not think that it could be made in 1995. As we will see in Part Two, peace was indeed made in 1995, and surprisingly quickly.

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1.4: Summary of Future Research Directions: Developing a Gender Perspective on the Negotiation Process before Dayton

There is no evidence that gender was a consideration in any shape or form (including having a gender perspective or analysis on the provisions being made, women’s rights, or the specific inclusion of women) in any of the negotiations prior to Dayton. Discussions seem to exclusively focus on cartographic and military concerns. The dominant narratives produced by scholars about the negotiations prior to Dayton focuses on diplomatic efforts and failures of the international community.

- Archival research would be required to develop accurate lists of who was involved in these talks, which could be used to generate quantitative empirical data about the presence of female bodies\(^\text{18}\). Between 1991 and 1995, hundreds of actors (domestic and international) were involved. The constant flux of participants in peace processes is one reason why it is challenging to trace and accurately measure percentage of men and women involved. A comprehensive and accurate list could be used to provide statistical empirical data on the numbers of women and men involved at various points in the process, and in various roles. Some of the footnotes in this section identify known archival locations for lists of participants.

- A reading of the narratives of masculinity across all the memoirs written would draw attention to the patterns of masculinity that may underpin the negotiation processes. This analysis could take place along the lines suggested by Claire Duncanson, where autobiographies ‘are not being used as sources of historical fact about the conflict in the Balkans, but for what they tell us about the constructions of masculinity of the authors’ (2009: 67). Possible sources for the pre-Dayton period include Mirko Pejanović’s *Through Bosnian Eyes: The Political Memoir of a Bosnian Serb* and David Owen’s *Balkan Odyssey*.

- Memoirs could also shed light on how issues were understood, which may have gendered ramifications. For instance, Owen’s memoir includes an interesting anecdote about his pre-scheduled appearance on *The Phil Donahue Show*, where he had planned to talk about the VOPP to an American audience. He tells us that;

  on the morning of his live show, after reading in a newspaper that he was planning to talk about rape in Bosnia, with audience discussion, I cancelled my appearance – only to be rung up by Phil Donahue trying to persuade me to go on. Eventually I did, but as my price I had a full twenty minutes to explain our plan, with a map on the screen, before there was any discussion of rapes.

  (Owen 1995: 111)

This anecdote is perhaps a curious insight into the ordering of the agenda by key players in the negotiation process, and could be said to indicate how the issue of wartime rape...
was seen to be tangential to the peace settlement, rather than a central aspect of any peace settlement.

- Semi-structured oral history interviews could shed light on the gendered dynamics of the peace process. However, access could be challenging as many of the Bosnian actors are reluctant to talk about the peace process, and some are no longer alive. This has to be understood in the context of a peace process that was taking place during a traumatic and violent war: asking people to recall events in the peace process may well be associated with personal traumas. Furthermore, the peace process is not viewed as a success in contemporary BiH, which increases the reluctance of people to talk about the process. It might be possible to reach out to international actors who were involved, and this is increasingly more likely as many of the diplomats involved are now retired.

- It would be possible to track – over a much longer period of time, and with less of a focus on one particular set of negotiations – the importance of “old boys” networks within international diplomacy. Much of these networks are mentioned in memoirs. For instance, it has already been noted that Vance and Owen had worked together on previous mediation attempts, and had long been friends. Vance and Owen asked for Martti Ahtisaari to work with them during the Geneva meetings in late 1993 because he has worked with them before – in 1978 during negotiations over Namibia (Owen 1995: 27). These male networks likely have important implications for who is included, pointing to broader structures of patriarchy. In addition it would also be useful to analyse the role of the Contact Group, as a small informal grouping, in the negotiations process.

- Taking Cynthia Enloe’s (2014) query, “Where are the women?” to heart, we could trace the women in unexpected (or more accurately, not narrated) places in the peace process. In addition to analysing the role and significance of Pauline Neville Jones, the only female member of the Contact Group, this would involve looking at women ‘placed as midlevel negotiators and professional and legal advisors, and also served as spokeswomen and secretaries’ (Aharoni 2011: 391). Sarai Aharoni (2011) has already carried out similar work in relation to the Oslo Accords for Israel and Palestine. This could also be done for the pre-Dayton period via interviews with actors such as Maggie Smart who was David Owen’s personal assistant.
The Contact Group map and all subsequent revised versions were discussed throughout late 1994 and spring 1995 (Blidt 1998: 17-21). However, it became increasingly apparent that there was no clear American policy towards resolving the conflict in BiH, despite the best attempts of Robert Frasure, the US Representative of the Contact Group (see Blidt 1998: 22-72; Gow 1997: 276-7; Daalder 2000: 37-80; Chollet 2005: 7-30). Against this background, a series of horrific events were reported from BiH during summer 1995, notably the fall of Srebrenica, a UN protected safe enclave, where some 8000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys went missing, presumed massacred by Bosnian Serb forces. During this period, the US President Clinton started to articulate a willingness to pursue military intervention in BiH, culminating in a set of principles for NATO strikes against Bosnian Serbs, established at the Lancaster House Conference on 21 July 1995 (Chollet 2005: 11-30).

A few days later, at a meeting on August 7, Clinton sought to develop an ‘endgame strategy’. By 9 August, Clinton was convinced that the ‘endgame strategy’ was the way forward, and had instructed his National Security Advisor, Antony Lake, to fly to Europe to present the seven points that formed this strategy (Daalder 2000: 111; 112-3) details the seven points). Crucially, the negotiations were now underlined by “sticks”: should the Serbs be the cause of any collapse then there would be NATO air strikes against the Serbs, a lifting of the arms embargo and the provision of American military training to the Bosnians. Should the Bosnians be the cause of failure, then the US would provide no airstrike, arms or training (Chollet 2005: 44).

Summer 1995 also saw a change of guard on a number of counts. David Owen resigned as co-chair of the ICFY at the end of May to join the UK House of Lords. He was replaced by the former Swedish Prime Minster, Carl Bildt on 9 June. Immediately following his ICFY role, Bildt also went on to be the first High Representative of BiH in January 1996. However, while ‘Bildt and Stoltenberg continued to be significantly involved, this was in a lower register and somewhat in the background’ (Gow 1997: 277-8). Occupying the heart of the negotiation process now was Richard Holbrooke.

Richard (Dick) Holbrooke was a controversial appointment as US State Department’s Special Envoy, tasked with making peace in BiH. He was selected because he was thought to possess ‘the kind of ego, drive, aggressiveness, and bluster necessary to negotiate with intransigent parties such as those in Bosnia’ (Daalder 2000: 115). As Warren Christopher, the then US Secretary of State said;

I could imagine no better match for the likes of Milosevic, Izetbegovic, and Tudjman, and I knew many who would have paid money from their own pockets for ringside seats.

(Christopher, cited in Chollet 2003: 42).

Holbrooke was frequently described as a bulldozer, and a raging bull for his controversial manipulative and egotistical negotiating style (Daase 2012: 113-9). He certainly preferred to cast

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19 for specific details of how the Administration developed this strategy see Daalder 2000: 81-116
20 His 1998 memoir, Peace Journey: The Struggle For Peace in Bosnia covers the peace negotiations between June and December 1995, but generally focuses on his role as High Representative.
himself as a negotiator rather than a mediator, ‘yelling and cursing at Presidents and Foreign Ministers, negotiating agreements at all costs and being the last man standing at two o’clock in the morning’ (Daase 2012: 115-6). While Cindy Daase does not specifically seek to develop a gender perspective in her analysis of the role of mediators and negotiators in peacemakers, there are many suggestions of a hyper masculine superhero fighting for peace in the way that Richard Holbrooke is portrayed, including his own self-representations in his memoirs (see McLeod 2015).

Before holding a peace conference, Holbrooke felt that he needed to ‘approach this negotiation piecemeal, step by step, locking in your gains’ (cited in Watkins 1999: 13). These steps included establishing agreement on a set of institutional principles, lifting the siege of Sarajevo and a temporary peace agreement. He achieved these steps primarily through shuttle talks in Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb during August and September 1995 and meetings in Geneva and New York. These meetings preceded the formal peace negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, USA November 1 – 21 1995.

The US-led involvement in Dayton is covered extensively in English, with a number of full-length books which explore the process during 1995 in day-by-day detail. Notably, Richard Holbrooke’s (1999) dramatic memoir To End A War extensively detail the shuttle talks and Dayton itself. Ivo Daalder’s (2000) book Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy offers a perspective from inside the Clinton Administration and is more Washington-focussed. Daalder was a staff member on the National Security Council during the mid-1990s, and wrote this book as a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Derek Chollet’s (2005) The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft draws on still-classified (but available to cite) sources and in-depth interviews. Taken together, this material is very rich in the detail of day-to-day negotiations. Thus, while this section overviews the process between August – December 1995, I primarily offer a summary in order to identify avenues for future research developing a gender perspective.

2.1: The Shuttle Talks: August 1995

The ‘endgame strategy’ continued to define US engagement with the peace process. The first step was a series of shuttle talks, in which the American negotiating team flew between the Balkan capitals to get all sides to agree to the seven principles and to take seriously the sticks and carrots that had been established by the Americans. These shuttle talks were seen by Holbrooke as the ‘jazz of diplomacy’, and many of the decisions made were taken by Holbrooke and his team, rather than Washington (Chollet 2005: 74).

The first shuttle, which started on August 14, with General Wesley Clark (Lt. General, US Army), Rosemarie Pauli (Holbrooke’s administrator), Robert (Bob) Frasure (US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs), Joe Kruzal (US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs) and Nelson Drew (Snr Staff National Security Council). What is evident from the job titles is that this was very much an elite US-led team made up of senior staff across the US State, Defence and Security departments. Talks involved meetings in Sarajevo, Zagreb, Belgrade which served to reinforce the message that the US ‘finally meant business and was willing to use the full range of “sticks” – economic, political and military – if the parties refused to cooperate’ (Chollet 2005: 52; see 47-52 for discussion of first shuttle). The first shuttle abruptly ended on the morning of 19 August when a car carrying Frasure, Kruzal
and Drew (all members of Holbrooke’s shuttle team) slipped and rolled off a cliff on Mount Igman, just outside of Sarajevo, killing all three (Chollet 2005: 54).

By August 23, a new team was formed. Alongside Holbrooke, Clark, Pauli, the team now included Christopher Hill (Director, Office of South-Central European Affairs, replacing Frasure); the Washington lawyer Roberts Owen (who had served as legal advisor to the State department); Brigadier General Donald Kerrick (to represent International Security Affairs, replacing Drew) and James Pardew (director of Balkan Task Force at the Pentagon, to become the civilian Defence department representative, replacing Kruzal). This team ‘would remain unchanged through the next six months, although many other people became vital parts of the effort’ (Holbrooke 1999: 83).

By August 28, the team had flown to Europe, stopping in Paris to push for American air strikes and to meet Izetbegović and Sacirbey to determine what the Bosnians wanted from a peace deal (Holbrooke 1999: 94-105). The team flew to Belgrade on 30 August to meet Milošević – a meeting which Holbrooke recognised as a significant turning point (1995: 105). Here, Milošević produced the ‘Patriarch Paper’ which authorised him to sign on behalf of the Bosnian Serb Republic (i.e. the Pale Serbs – including Karadzic and Mladic). As such, ‘Pale need not even show up for an agreement to be concluded’ (Daadler 2000: 129). This changed the dynamics of negotiations because Milošević’s primary aim was to lift the international sanctions on Serbia – and agreement was the only way that this could happen. At this point, Holbrooke and his team were able to talk about ‘almost every issue that we would later negotiate to a conclusion at Dayton. For the first time, everything was on the table, including several issues that had never been discussed before as part of the peace process’ (Hollbrooke 1995: 106).

Agreed Principles: Geneva and New York, September 1995

Once all sides had agreed to the principle of negotiating and had made a series of ‘limited interim agreements’ (Holbrooke 1999: 111), Holbrooke wanted a series of quick one-day meetings at Foreign minister level to ‘create a sense of momentum toward peace’ (1999: 111). Meetings in Geneva (8 September) and New York (26 September) established the principles that guided talks at Dayton.

On 8 September, the Geneva Joint Agreed Principles were declared, which established the principle that BiH would be a single state with two entities (the FBiH and RS). Crucially, this meant that;

The single most important result of the Geneva meeting was the acceptance by all of Republika Srpska as a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In some way, this was the issue over which the war had been fought. Izetbegović had to swallow the legal existence of Republika Srpsksa, and the Serbs had to accept that they would remain part of Bosnia. Had this been accepted in early 1992, the war might not have not been necessary.

21 Holbrooke does not elaborate on what these issues are.
Talks in New York took place between 18-26 September (Holbrooke 1999: 169-84) as all the foreign ministers were there for the opening of the UN General Assembly (Bildt 1998: 105). The New York Further Agreed Principles were announced on 26 September, stating an agreement to share institutions of political power, including a joint presidency, a National Parliament and a constitutional court. These principles were important for developing connections between the two entities, as ‘without this, the agreement could easily be construed as having partitioned Bosnia, when the exact opposite was our goal’ (Holbrooke 1999: 141).

While the Foreign Ministers’ talks at Geneva and New York produced further formal progress towards the Dayton Peace Agreement, shuttle talks continued. Holbrooke describes how the Labor Day weekend (1 – 4 September), prior to the Geneva talks, saw the shuttle team visit Belgrade, Bonn, Brussels, Geneva, Zagreb, Belgrade, Athens, Skopje, Ankara and for the third time, Belgrade, as well as resolve the ‘Macedonian Question’ (1999: 112-135). Between 30 August and 20 September, NATO planes bombed northern and western Bosnia. Holbrooke suggests that this was important for pushing the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate (1999: 147-52). Furthermore, late August and September saw a successful military ground offensive by the Croatian army, and related military successes of the Bosnian army (Holbrooke 1999: 112-168). Daadler points out that this was crucial because this fundamentally changed the map and placed the Serbs in their weakest position since 1992 (2000: 119 – 27).

Ceasefire and Final Preparations for Dayton: October 1995

A crucial step in the negotiation process was to ensure a temporary ceasefire agreement. This took effect on Wednesday 11 October, although further skirmishes continued until the weekend (Bildt 1998: 112). The fighting had bought all parties ‘extremely close’ to the 49:51 principle which had been the focus of peace efforts since the 1994 Contact Group Plan.

Throughout October, talks continued in a wide range of locations in both Europe and the US between all the various parties involved – the Bosnians, the Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, Croatia, Serbia, the Contact Group, the US, the UN, NATO - on the various aspects of any peace deal (see Bildt 1998: 105-119; Holbrooke 1999: 205-227). Against the background of the regional shuttle and proximity talks, which Holbrooke had given a large degree of latitude on (Daalder 2000: 139), there were discussions throughout the autumn in Washington. These discussions were less to do with the structure of the agreement (which Holbrooke’s team were dealing with) and more to do with the international community’s responsibility for assisting the implementation of any peace settlement (see Daadler 2000: 139-161 for details).

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2.2: The Dayton Peace Negotiations: 1-21st November 1995

The Dayton Peace Negotiations opened on November 1, under a heavy press embargo, and over the next 21 days, the various components of the peace agreement were finalised. As several accounts offer a day-by-day description of the talks (Holbrooke 1999; Blidt 1998; Chollet 2005), the following paragraphs offer a sense of the key themes that occur, pointing to ways in which a gender perspective could be developed in further research.

The Location

The location of the peace talks had been selected during October. The job had been tasked to the Assistant Secretary of State for Administrative Affairs, Patrick F. Kennedy and his aide Ken Messner. Holbrooke insisted that the so-called “site X” would need to hold nine delegations, could be sealed off from outsiders, yet close enough to Washington to allow senior Administration officials to visit, but remote enough to prevent ‘Balkan Warlords from running off to television studios’ (Dobbs, cited in Holbrooke 1999: 204). Camp David was ruled out as it was too closely associated with the 1978 negotiations between Egypt and Israel. The signing ceremony would be in Paris and an implementation conference in London – apparently to soothe European sensitivities (Holbrooke 1999: 200-01, 203-4). The Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio was selected following a number of site visits by Patrick Kennedy and Holbrooke’s administrator, Rosemarie Pauli.

The size of the air base ‘impressed the participants’, and indeed, Holbrooke and his team ‘wanted them to see this physical symbol of American power’ (Holbrooke 1999: 233). The talks took place in military barracks that formed a quadrangle around a parking lot had been transformed into accommodation for all delegates (Blidt 1998: 122). Offices occupied by each delegation were named after military aircraft. Blidt describes them;

The Europeans had the somewhat old-fashioned F86 Sabre; the Russians were symbolically hidden away in F117 Stealth, and the opening ceremony had taken place in B52-room with its impression of power


A ‘peace dinner’ took place on Friday 10 November within the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base museum, one of the largest in the world. Delegates sat under the wing of the B52 bomber, with the cruise missile pointing in Milošević’s direction and Glenn Miller music in the background. The running theme here seems to be the importance of demonstrating American military muscle, and further research could delve into ways that this is tied up to ideas about military masculinities.

Who was present and what were their key concerns?

At the opening session, the three presidents outlined their demands. This was the only formal and scheduled session during the negotiations. These demands had shifted over the course of the pre-negotiation talks: the opening session talks enabled the three parties to clarify their core goals. Izetbegović wanted a unified state (albeit with two entities) with effective joint
institutions along the basis of the Contact Group map, free elections, the stationing of NATO forces all over BiH, a fully respected war crimes tribunal and financial aid. Tudjman’s main concern was eastern Slavonia and the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Croatia. Milošević’s main concern was the lifting of economic sanctions. Thanks to the Patriarch Papers (August), Milošević was present on behalf of Karadžić and Mladić, the two Bosnian Serb leaders. Karadžić and Mladić had wanted to be part of the Serbian delegation – but as they were indicted by the Hague Tribunal, the return journey would have been directly to The Hague (Blikt 1998: 115).

Negotiations were led by the shuttle team (see above) and key Washington staffers: their aim was to produce a comprehensive peace agreement (Holbrooke 199: 240). For Holbrooke, the Contact Group was a source of frustration, slowing progress in the talks (1999: 241-2), and so regular meetings were held with just the senior representatives in Carl Blikt’s room. Both the Europeans (represented via Blikt and the Contact Group) and Americans were concerned with matters of peace implementation – specifically constitutional, electoral, peacekeeping, military and policing matters.

Topics discussed

Holbrooke felt that Dayton needed to be absolutist: ‘what we didn’t get at Dayton we would never get later, so we would try to put everything on paper’ (Holbrooke 1998: 233). As a result, there were various negotiations on a range of different issues during the Dayton Conference. Negotiations were needed in order to strengthen the Bosnian-Croat Federation developed during the 1994 Washington Agreement (which was signed on 10 November); Eastern Slavonia (see footnote 20); between the Contact Group and US Administration about the shape of the international peacekeeping effort (specifically in relation to the police force and the role of High Representative); and the format of elections (Blikt 1998: 147) Some talks descended into a ‘time-consuming side-show’, such as the negotiations for the Russian gas pipeline to Belgrade, which additionally required the support of the UN Sanctions Committee (Blikt 1998: 129).

Central to the negotiations, however, were territorial issues, and specifically “the map” – and how the 49:51 split would be achieved (see Blikt 1998: 139-145). A number of strategies were developed to force discussion about the territorial division of BiH, including the use of the Department of Defense’s 3D imaging system called “PowerScene” which; enabled the negotiators to travel through Bosnia in virtual reality, visually surveying the geographic details via computer...PowerScene also became one of the rare forms of entertainment for many at Dayton, who passed what little spare time they had “flying” through Bosnia. The map room became such a popular attraction that the US delegation began to refer to it as the Nintendo Room”

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(Chollet 2005: 167).

As will be discussed later, what is significant here is that gender aspects ‘were never discussed’ as parties ‘were only focussed on letting the armed hostilities end’ (Lyrwall, cited in Grebäck and Zillén 2003: 3). The focus of discussion was on cartographical concerns and the development of a comprehensive peace agreement which did not specifically consider gender.

**Approach to negotiations**

Holbrooke viewed Dayton as a ‘Big Bang approach to negotiations: lock everyone up until they reach agreement’ (Holbrooke 1998: 232). This meant that the talks were shut off from the press. Crucially, they were proximity talks, where the team could walk between the Balkan Presidents easily, allowing for multiple unplanned visits. The result was that ‘days (and nights) became a blur of unscheduled meetings’ (Holbrooke 1999: 233-4).

Another strategy, used one morning, to force discussions about the map was ‘parking-lot diplomacy’ where delegates walked around the quadrangle-parking lot to bump into each other, chatting. Here, Milošević reasserted to Blidt that he could not abandon the 49:51 principle, and to achieve it, ‘give me something! Steppes, rocks or swamps – anything will do’ (Blidt 1998: 155).

This is indicative of the extent to which territorial issues dominated the discussion.

On the formal structure of negotiations at Dayton, Pauline Neville-Jones offers a useful summary;

> The Dayton negotiations were complex in structure and agenda. They involved eight negotiating teams - three from the parties (the Federation, the Serbs and the Croats) and five from the Contact Group countries - plus a separate team headed by the EU Mediator, Carl Bildt. There were several oddities in the negotiating framework. The Bosnian Serbs, never having signed up to the Contact Group plan, were permitted to be present only as a subordinate and passive part of the Serb delegation, their negotiating powers having been handed over to President Slobodan Milosevic via the Orthodox Church. The Contact Group countries found themselves sorted by their US hosts into two tiers. The three West Europeans, headed by their Political Directors - Wolfgang Ischinger, Jacques Blot and myself - with small teams limited to eight each, were nominally subordinated to Carl Bildt who, however, had no direct authority over them. The Russian negotiator, Deputy Minister Igor Ivanov, was accorded a status on a par with Bildt and both he and Bildt were in theory equal to US negotiator Richard Holbrooke - but only in theory. This elaborate American construction enabled the US negotiator, supported by a very large team, to organise the agenda and run the negotiation as he wished, with the acquiescence of the rest. They were informed but not consulted, and their primary role was to assist so far as needed, witness and ratify the outcome. But they were not to interfere.

(Neville-Jones 1996: 48)

Neville-Jones points out that the structure was ‘elaborate’ and that this allowed Holbrooke to run the talks process the way that he wished. This opens up questions about how the structure of peace talks works to exclude participants and particular topics of discussion. Further research would be needed to unpack the gendered ramifications that the structure of negotiations has.
Negotiation life

The memoirs by Holbrooke and Bildt detail a number of extra-curricular activates, including ‘soccer, football and bowling for the delegations’ (Holbrooke 1999: 245); tennis matches (Holbrooke 1999: 260-1); dinners (Holbrooke 1999: 279); shopping trips where Milošević purchased ‘shoes and various presents for his wife’ (Bildt 1998: 143). ‘Many hours’ were spent at Packy’s Sports Bar where most of the meals were taken, although Milošević allegedly preferred the nearby Officers Club, which saw the site of much ‘napkin diplomacy’ (Holbrooke 1999: 232). Furthermore, agreements were struck over late-night drinking (Holbrooke 1999: 285, 299, 306; Bildt 1998: 145). These stories of negotiation life point to ways in which particular forms of masculinity might be sustained and used in an informal manner to shape the tone of negotiations and the relationships that are forged. Similar patterns of negotiations as the ‘ultimate boys game’ – fishing, drinking, back-slapping - have been found in South Africa (Waylen 2014: 510), which served to exclude women from participating in many of the deals made in South Africa. That there were so few women even present at Dayton perhaps served to reinforce such patterns of masculinity.

Agreement was made at the 11th hour on November 21 1995, despite Izetbegović’s reluctance (Holbrooke 1999: 307-9). It was formally signed in Paris, France on December 14 1995. The next section explores what was covered and the gender implications of the text of the Dayton Peace Agreement itself, before concluding with an overview of future research directions.

The Agreement and (the lack of) Gender Provisions

The Dayton Peace Agreement is frequently described as a comprehensive peace agreement. This means that not only does it set the terms for peace, but also that the peace agreement also establishes the institutional framework for peace. The agreement is made up of a short framework and twelve Annexes. As David Chandler points out, most of these annexes ‘were not related to the ending of hostilities... but the political project of democratising Bosnia’ (1999: 43). These annexes provide for arms reduction, boundary demarcation, human rights, refugee return, an International Police force, the creation of a civilian office for a High Representative to implement the Dayton agreement and electoral rules.24 Especially significant to the issues covered in this working paper is annex four, which contains the constitution of BiH. The constitution specifically refers to a number of international conventions, such as CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women). In this respect, international provisions made for women are written into the constitution of BiH.

However, as already stated, according to Björn Lyrwall, the advisor to Carl Bildt during the Dayton negotiations, gender aspects ‘were never discussed’ as parties ‘were only focussed on letting the armed hostilities end’ (Lyrwall, cited in Grebäck and Zillén 2003: 3). A 2003 report by Kerstin Grebäck and Eva Zillén reviewed the consequences of the Dayton agreement for women. This report highlights the consequences of a presumed gender-neutrality in relation to the Dayton agreement. Gender-neutrality refers to the notion that a particular issue has nothing to do with gender. This is dangerous because the very ‘norm of neutrality is profoundly gendered’ (Chappell 2006: 226). The more entrenched and embedded the assumption of “neutrality” is, the more difficult it is for gender-change advocates to advance gender equality goals which are

24 see Chandler 1999: 44-51 for a detailed overview
considered (under the assumption of gender-neutrality) to be “biased” (Chappell 2006: 227). For instance, Grebäck and Zillén point out that the Dayton Agreement does not explicitly separate Church and State, which is surprising in such a multi-ethnic country as BiH, and,

...also has a bearing on the status of women because ethnic nationalism and religious fundamentalism on all sides has had a negative impact on the traditional patriarchal perception of, and policy toward, the actual status of women in society.

(Grebäck and Zillén 2003: 3)

The report also points to the lack of proactive equality or gender-differentiated measures within the Dayton Agreement with regard to female inclusion in Parliament, the Presidency, and Constitutional Court; or in relation to women’s specific human rights (including rape in war); property laws; and concerns about refugee returns (Grebäck and Zillén 2003: 3-5). The report goes on to explore the early years of post-Dayton development (Grebäck and Zillén 2003: 6-9) before making a number of recommendations about peace agreements as a means of promoting gender equality (9-13). While discussion about female presence in the peace negotiations are limited to generalised points about the need for female participation, this report is a very powerful reminder of the ramifications of not having a gender perspective. This is what much of the existing research about gender and Dayton focusses on: the consequences of not including women or gender, rather than developing a gender perspective about the negotiations itself. This section concludes by pointing to a range of suggestions about how a gender perspective on the Dayton negotiations could be developed.

2.3: Summary of Future Research Directions: Developing a Gender Perspective about the Dayton Negotiations

What Part Two has noted is that the peace agreement made at Dayton was developed over a relatively short space of time. Gender does not seem to have been on the agenda in any way, shape or form. As will be noted in Part Three, there were relatively few women involved in the process. That women and gender considerations were largely absent from the Dayton negotiations does not mean that the final peace agreement does not have gendered ramifications, as the 2003 report by Grebäck and Zillén demonstrates. To conclude Part Two, I bullet-point a range of directions that could be pursued in order to develop a gender perspective about the Dayton negotiations itself;

- Searching for female bodies in memoirs would identify some of the women mentioned in passing: for instance, Holbrooke refers to how his administrator, Rosemarie Pauli and his wife Kati Morten held informal conversations with the Balkan Presidents during the shuttle and at Dayton itself. He implies that these conversations – about the future and home life – were important in pushing protagonists toward peace. Holbrooke also mentions how Madeleine Albright is instrumental in persuading the UN to not be involved in the Dayton talks, indeed, she “stepped up to the task without complaint and performed a toughness that was productive if not always popular” (1999: 202). Rosemarie Pauli carried out all the site visits that selected Dayton as the ideal location for talks. In many respects, a discourse of “no women” actually serves to hide the number of women who were present. There were some, as we will see in Part Three, although they were not
key players. Further research could follow the popular feminist query, “where are the women?” not only as a means of noticing the role that they did play, but also to provoke consideration on why their stories are not heard.

- Perhaps the richest possibility (which surprisingly has not been done) is to utilise the memoirs about Dayton to develop a sense of the role that various manifestations of masculinities had upon the negotiation process. Certainly, memoirs about Dayton note the importance of personal bonds, late night drinking sessions, lunches in sports bars and so on. Possible sources would include Richard Holbrooke’s *To End a War* and Carl Bildt’s *Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia*.

- The insistence that the peace process was merely a pragmatic action to stop the fighting and end the war opens up a set of questions about the links between the stated purpose of making peace and how this affects who is at the table. While of course, all peace processes are about ending violence, how they see violence ending and how comprehensive the agreement is hoped to be undoubtedly affects who is present at the table and may also translate into ramifications for female presence.

- The space of the negotiations could be an avenue for further research developing a gender perspective. The Dayton process is filled with high-powered shuttle hops between various European capitals, compressed in a short space of time, and the use of an intimidating military US military base are both suggestive of patterns of masculinity apparent at Dayton.
Part Three: Where are the Women? Female Presence in the Peace Process

The previous two sections have pointed to ways in which a gender perspective about the 1991-5 peace process could be developed. This section maps existing public information about the female bodies that were actually present as well as exploring the reasons offered for the lack of female inclusion in the 1990s. As such, this section develops a different way of thinking about developing a gender perspective about the peace process – one which looks specifically at women and female bodies. This means that this chapter does not look at gender representations or the effects of not including a gender perspective or women. In the case of BiH, the approach of focussing on female bodies is rather more challenging as it requires us to (a) develop a broader idea about what participation in a peace process could mean; (b) to pull together rather disparate pieces of information; (c) to develop a (largely) speculative consideration of why women were not included.

The Dayton Peace Accords were the first negotiations to take place after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (September 1995) which acknowledged the need to ‘increase the participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels... and integrate a gender perspective in the resolution of armed or other conflicts’. 25 It is worth repeating what a Kvinna till Kvinna report points out about the peace negotiations:

The Dayton peace negotiations were a dialogue of men, often with purely militaristic overtones. No women were present around the negotiation table, and there was only one women represented among the signatories.

(Lithander 2000: 20)

While much of the attention about female exclusion from the peace process has focussed on the Dayton negotiations (not surprising, given that Dayton represented a dramatic end-point to the process), it would be fair to suggest that the failure to include women was prevalent throughout the entire peace process. In this section, I first offer a perfunctory mapping of the women who were present in various roles. I then unpack some of the reasons usually put forward to explain the failure to include women. I conclude with some thoughts about further research that could open up a deeper understanding of how women (female bodies) were present in the peace processes.

3.1: Female presence in the 1991 - 1995 Bosnian Peace Process

Parts one and two outlined the peace process and pointed to ways that a gendered perspective could be developed: here I present a range of rather disparate information that has been recorded about female bodies within the peace process. This material has been collected through the reading of memoirs about the peace process and various attempts to record the lives of Bosnian women, as well as some names suggested to me by academics and activists in the region. What is clear is that the claim that there were ‘no women’ is accurate if we look at the

bodies present in the regional delegations around the negotiation processes. However, if we think about participation in a much broader way, then there were women present. Of course, this requires us to leave aside questions about influence and how far women were acting for women.

Swanne Hunt was the US ambassador to Austria during the war, and while it was not part of her job description, she chose to visit Sarajevo during the war (on official and unofficial visits). She has long campaigned on issues around women’s participation in conflict contexts (see Institute for Inclusive Security: https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/, a programme of Hunt Alternatives), often tracing her interest back to the peace process in BiH, where she notes her disappointment with how women ‘were almost never present in policy settings’ (Hunt 2001: xvii). She highlights how there were just 5 women (and 99 men) present at the White House signing for the 1994 Washington Agreement which created the Muslim-Croat Federation of BiH. These five women were all American and included Swanee Hunt and Madeline Albright (Hunt 2004: xix). It seems that ‘US hosts did not think to invite them, and Bosnian leaders did not think to send them’ (Hunt 2004: xix).

Madeleine Albright was the US Ambassador to the UN and she was instrumental in pushing for US intervention (Hunt 2004: xvii). This is especially notable in her hawkish June 1995 memo which strongly advocated deeper engagement backed up with military intervention, calling for the President to ‘recognize reality’ and avoid appearing weak (Chollet 2003: 19). This memo was described as a must-read inside the Administration, and it is noted that ‘she earned respect for daring to challenge the prevailing caution’ (Chollet 2003: 19; see also Daalder 2000: 92-4).

Following the circulation of this memo, she had a number of meetings with Antony Lake (US National Security Advisor), including ‘once over Chinese food at Albright’s house’ to discuss how the ‘endgame’ strategy might look (Daalder 2000: 93). She has one chapter in her autobiography describing her involvement in the peace process (Albright 2013: 178 – 194).

Tatjana Ljuljić-Mijatović was perhaps the most publically visible woman in Bosnia during the war, as she was only women elected to government following the 1990 elections. She was elected as a Bosnian Serb member of the Parliament as a replacement of Nenad Kecmanović, who left Sarajevo at the beginning of the war (Aganović and Delić 2014: 145). While she had not been elected to serve on the Presidency, because so many Bosnian Serb politicians had left Sarajevo by June 1992, she was next in line for the presidency according to the 1990 election results. She served on the Presidency between 1992-6. From 1993 she was also the BiH Ambassador to the UN in Vienna where she continued to campaign for a multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina (Aganović and Delić 2014: 145; Hunt 2004: 245). Given her central role in wartime Bosnian politics it is surprising how rarely she is mentioned. One notable exception is Mirko Pejanovic’s memoir (2004), where she is frequently referred to as someone who he consulted on major government decisions. Mirko was the other Serb member of the multimember Presidency. He talks of how she participated in the talks leading up to the July 1993 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. She spoke about the importance of preserving a multiethnic and united BiH, and feared that an ethnic division into three republics would lead to a mass exodus of Serbs and Croats from Sarajevo (Pejanović 2004: 179, 181). At a working dinner during the Owen-Stoltenberg talks, she ‘attacked the theory that a common life for all nations is impossible in Bosnia... she also emphasised that Bosnia could have a hopeful future only if the peace solution ensured the equality of the three nations and all citizens, and included punishment for war crimes’ (Pejanović 2004: 181). Pejanović describes how Ljuljic-Mijatović continued to lobby for a multiethnic, integral Bosnia and Herzegovina of equal nations, and visited London and Washington just before the Dayton negotiations to present these ideas to relevant officials (Pejanović 2004: 209-217), voicing her opposition to the principles agreed at
Geneva in September 1995. She was vocally against the division agreed on at Dayton and ‘told Mr. Clinton in person that we have many cultures, traditions, ethnic groups. Any division would be artificial’ (Hunt 2004: 128).

Biljana Plavšić was elected as one of the Bosnian Serb members of the presidency in November 1990. She held her seat until April 1992, when as a member of the (nationalist) Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) she became the first president of what became the Republika Srpska (RS). She held this post between 28 February and May 1992, when she was replaced by Radovan Karadžić. She was also elected as the first postwar president of the RS in 1996, before being convicted of war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in February 2003. Her role in making a peace agreement was minimal – indeed she famously held hardline nationalist views, claiming, for instance, on national television that ethnic cleansing against non-Serbs was a ‘natural phenomena’ and that Serbs were unable to negotiate with the Bosnian Muslims due to genetics. What is interesting to note, in relation to the peace agreement, is that the ICTY accepted her post-conflict conduct, especially in relation to upholding the Dayton Agreement as a ‘substantial’ factor mitigating her sentence. Witnesses of significant international standing, including Madeline Albright, testified for her support of the Dayton Agreement, saying that ‘she stood up for that at times when it was very difficult, when there were those who wanted to destroy the Dayton Accords’. Plavšić herself has suggested that she was put in the top position by Karadžić ‘precisely because he thought he could control her since she was a woman’ (cited in Hunt 2004: xviii). Indeed, many have been intrigued by Plavšić for her femininity mingled with violent, brutal nationalism (see, for instance Drakulić 2004: 155–63). During her time in prison, Plavšić wrote a memoir (in Serbian) Svedoćim, (I Testify) which mostly reports on the habits of Bosnian Serb leaders, such as how Radovan Karadžić had a habit of cleaning his ears with a pen.

At Dayton, the leader of the UK team was Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, who was Political Director in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1994. It was in this capacity that she participated in the Contact Group (the only woman to do so) and led the British delegation to the Dayton negotiations. She has written an article (Neville-Jones 1996) which overviews both the Contact Group and Dayton process, and makes an early assessment of implementation challenges.

At Dayton itself, the head of the Bosnian team Alija Izetbegović, had two female interpreters: Amira Kapetanović, and his daughter, Sabina Berberović. Following Cynthia Enloe’s 2004 insight that we should be curious about women in international politics, we should not think of interpreters as neutral black boxes, but rather as agents in the negotiation process (Baker 2012). Amira continued her career in diplomacy after the war, as an ambassador to the Czech Republic and later Australia, and has said that she ‘learned about diplomacy not from books but “on the spot” during the conflict’ (Banham 2006). In describing how she responded to the media focus on her, she would rub herself with towels because there was no water to bathe in, and would

29 https://iwpr.net/global-voices/plavsic-dishes-dirt retrieved 4 June 2016
30 I would like to thank Catherine Baker for pointing me into this direction.
'put on some shawls which were presentable, because I was the interpreter, translator, PR, secretary, everything. Then I would come out and talk and pretend I was sort of something [like the] people I used to see on TV’ (Kapetanović, cited in Banham 2006).

Holbrooke’s administrator, Rosamarie Pauli, who had travelled with the American delegation during the shuttle talks was asked to ‘befriend the [Bosnian Prime Minister, Silajdzić], taking him for walks, joining him for meals, or talking with him about his family and future’ (Chollet 2005: 165). Other negotiators also had female support staff, including Maggie Smart who was David Owen’s PA.

Holbrooke’s wife, the Hungarian journalist Kati Morten, was present at a number of official dinners (Holbrooke 1999: 247).

Elisabeth Rehn had been appointed as UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in the territory of former Yugoslavia in September 1995. When the Dayton negotiations were taking place, she was invited by the European Commission in Washington on a speaking tour of the US, where she discussed the human rights situation in BiH in a number of media appearances and meetings, including a half-an-hour meeting with Hillary Clinton in the White House. As she knew Carl Bildt and Richard Holbrooke, Rehn was also invited to attend the Dayton negotiations for one day, where she was asked to present on the human rights situation in the region.31 Rehn describes her day to me by email;

In Dayton I had a tight schedule with meetings with all parties, Alija Izetbegovic was during that day the only president in Dayton, and others were on the level of ministers. I had also a meeting together with the Quintett and described my findings about the human rights situation, and they told me about how negotiations developed….. As the UN was not a party in the negotiations, when I returned to New York from Washington there was great interest from the UN leadership to learn about my meetings, as very few UN-people had been invited to Dayton.32

Rehn notes that ‘the Dayton accords had very little space for human rights [considerations] and the situation of women’.33

Female bodies were also present as American legal advisors or as part of broader diplomatic teams. These include: Elizabeth “Beth” Jones (US State Department); Miriam Sapiro (US State Department, Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff and the Office of Legal Adviser)34; Laurel E Miller (US State Department).

That said it is apparent that there were very few women involved in the process, and certainly rarely in elite political positions or as civil society actors, or specifically to put forward a gender

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31 Email communication with Elisabeth Rehn, 13 June 2016.
32 Email communication with Elisabeth Rehn, 13 June 2016.
33 Email communication with Elisabeth Rehn, 13 June 2016.
34 As Obama nominated her as his Deputy US Trade Representative in 2009, there are frequent mentions of her role at Dayton on the internet in the run-up to her senate confirmation. For instance, “In 1995, as a member of Steinberg’s office, Sapiro played a role as a backup to Richard Holbrooke, who led the negotiations that resulted in the Dayton Peace Accords that ended the war in Bosnia. Basically, Sapiro and her colleagues had to master the thorny details of the political map that set up Bosnia, and of course the infighting between the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia” retrieved from http://rushfordreport.com/?p=163 13 June 2016.
perspective. The relative lack of women was disappointing to Tatjana Ljubic-Mijatovic who pointed out that she was

The only woman in the highest rank of politics, although we have a lot of educated, multilingual women who could have filled these jobs. Women are much more flexible, and they bring charm into negotiations. They constantly think of life rooted in their concern for their families. But at these high-level meetings, I don't see a single woman except Madeline Albright. It's a disaster, a parade of one man after another.

(Hunt 2004: 143)

In short, there were women present in the peace process, primarily in a range of bureaucratic and professional roles. Thinking about this kind of presence involves expanding our perception of what is meant by participation. As Aharoni points out, when this expansion includes the informal sector of peace work, we have to take care to avoid ‘reconstructing a rigid, binary picture of a gendered division of labour in which only “men” negotiated the agreements on behalf of Israel, while women were backstage “making coffee” (2011: 409). Female bodies were present, but there was no deliberate attempt to include female bodies or a women’s civil society perspective, and certainly, there were no regional women at the Dayton negotiations itself. This opens up the question of why Bosnian women were not actively involved in the peace process – either at the table, or as civil society representatives.

3.2: Why were (Bosnian) women not involved in the Bosnian Peace Process?

The following paragraphs offer three reasons for the lack of involvement by Bosnian women. These reasons need to be set against a crucial gender dynamic relating to political activity (in all its forms) in BiH: that politics is immoral and not a suitable sphere of activity for women. This is well captured by Elissa Helms in her anthropological studies of women’s activism in BiH, and how gender goals are often co-opted to support various ethno-nationalist stances within Bosnia (see in particular 2003; 2007; 2013). Helms draws attention to the ways in which narratives of victimhood are utilised to support the (Bosnian Muslim) state, and that some NGO activists respond to these narratives via drawing upon strategic gender essentialisms in order to pursue their activities. Crucially, the way in which gender is linked to notions about the Bosnian nation also feeds into the way in which women in politics are thought about. For Bosnians, the realm of formal politics – political parties, elections, government - is je kurva (a whore). While this primarily refers to the high levels of corruption within elite politics, the phrase has gendered implications (Helms 2013: 159). This adds up to a context where being in politics is not thought to be a respectable profession for women: for most, it is easier to call their work humanitarian (Helms 2013: 159). Care is taken to cast activities as apolitical, humanitarian and connected to women’s roles as mothers and wives (Helms 2003), especially within the NGO sector.

This specific social, historical, political, economic, and cultural context is crucial to understanding the challenges and opportunities facing women. As some commentators have said: ‘who participates in peace talks, how peace agreements are drafted, what is contained in them, and how they are adhered to and implemented is largely dependent on these contexts, which are themselves always already gendered’ (de Alwis et al. 2013: 170).
Lack of autonomous feminist organising in socialist Yugoslavia

In interviews during 2013 and 2014, one reason frequently cited for the lack of engagement by feminist and women’s organisations in BiH with the peace process was that feminist and female activism during the 1990s was primarily focussed on humanitarian demands.\(^{35}\) This has much to do with the development of autonomous (i.e. not connected to the Yugoslav Communist Party) feminist organising across Yugoslavia in the 1970s and 1980s. In relative comparison to Zagreb and Belgrade, feminist organising in BiH was minimal before the war (Mlinarević and Kosović 2011: 131). Belgrade and Zagreb – far larger cities with a greater sphere of influence – were early centres of autonomous feminist organising (on Belgrade in particular, see McLeod 2016: 47-54). As such, the theoretical knowledge about feminism as an ideological social movement is not as widespread in BiH as in other parts of ex-Yugoslavia.

Thus, with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, there was no established history of feminist organising in BiH. It was in the climate of war which raised women’s and feminist political consciousness in Sarajevo and the rest of BiH (Mlinarević and Kosović 2011: 132). As a result, many of the organisations which developed were humanitarian or related to peace activism (Mlinarević and Kosović 2011: 132). Furthermore, a number of women’s organisations which emerged during the war ‘were not necessarily feminist and indeed in some cases patriotically nationalist, or religious’ (Cockburn 2013: 28). What this means is that there were very few formally organised spaces for women to think about organised involvement and responses to elite political processes.

This adds up to a climate where women activists simply did not think that they needed to be involved. This is captured in a story by Nuna Zvizdić, the coordinator of a feminist NGO in Sarajevo, who talks of a meeting with Roberts Owen and his wife in Sarajevo around 1995;

I found out that he will be working on Dayton, even before it was widely known. He asked me about my life, my work and the situation... his wife started laughing when I said, ‘you don’t have a clue about Bosnia and Herzegovina and you will be working on the [peace] agreement?’ So not even at that moment did it cross my mind, to ask him where the women are.\(^{36}\)

Crucially, ‘not even at that moment did it cross my mind’: feminist and women’s activists simply did not think about the importance of involvement. This might seem almost incredible now, in the post-1325 era where transnational feminist activism often explicitly organises around participation (Shepherd 2015). But, as research participants reinforced in conversation with me, the focus was very much on humanitarian concerns.\(^{37}\) That the focus was primarily on humanitarian concerns has to be placed in the context of the extreme violence that was a feature of the war in BiH. The focus of activists (and perhaps of international actors too) was very much upon resolving the immediately apparent problems being caused by the conflict, rather than thinking about a long-term, sustainable peace.

\(^{35}\) For instance, see interviews between the author and Besima Borić, Delegate, House of Representatives, Federation of BiH, Sarajevo, 26 September 2013; Memnuna (Nuna) Zvizdić, Director, Zene Zenama, Sarajevo 26 September 2013.

\(^{36}\) Interview, author with Memnuna (Nuna) Zvizdić, Director, Zene Zenama, Sarajevo 26 September 2013.

\(^{37}\) For instance, see interview, author with Besima Borić, Delegate, House of Representatives, Federation of BiH, Sarajevo, 26 September 2013.
A 2012 Kvinna till Kvinna report drew together insights from contemporary feminist activists in BiH who say that during the Dayton negotiations, ‘awareness about the process was low, women were not organised and did not have the necessary know-how to run successful lobbying campaigns’ (Kvinna till Kvinna 2013: 9). Certainly, ‘local NGOs report that they were given no information about the peace processes. They knew no details about participation or who was representing various interests and had no opportunity to contribute or receive any information, (Chinkin and Paradine 2001: 149). In a context where political activity is associated with immorality, with a somewhat embryonic feminist movement, with an international context that was only starting to wake up to the need for a specific set of goals for gender inclusion it is perhaps hardly surprising that few women activists even thought about needing to be involved in peace negotiations. Indeed, it was not until 1997-8 that the OSCE started to run programmes on “women in politics” placing political activism onto the NGO agenda (Helms 2013: 170; Borić 2004).

The only real source of feminist activism specifically in response to the peace negotiations that has been recorded is that on the day that the Dayton Peace Accords were signed, a group of international NGOs addressed a letter to the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeline Albright to highlight the lack of sensitivity towards women’s interest in the DPA (Lithander 2000: 20). This letter is not mentioned in her autobiography (Albright 2013).

(2) Lack of women in formal politics

One reason why women were not present in political roles at the Dayton negotiations is because there were few women in positions of formal political power during the war. To understand this, we need to look at the last elections that took place before war broke out: the first free, multi-party election in 1990 and place this in relation to the specific circumstances of Yugoslav communism.

Under state socialism, women were expected to take an active role in socialist political life, and The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina applied a system of reserved places for women (Bakšić-Mufšić et. al. 2003: 51). During the 1980s, women made up 27% of the Communist Party membership; 50% of the Socialist Union of Workers (trade union); and 36% of the membership of the Confederation of Free Trade Unions (Bakšić-Mufšić et. al. 2003: 51). In the 1986 elections, 26% of those elected to the Parliament of BiH were female, and 17.5% of local authority seats were taken by women. However, with the collapse of communism in Yugoslavia, women lost many of these rights, and the first multi-party elections in 1990 also saw the right to reserved places for women revoked. For many, this meant that ‘the real nature of political relations’ were revealed, and the numbers of women fell very dramatically (Bakšić-Mufšić et. al. 2003: 52). Just under 3% of the elected MPs in the Parliament of BiH following the 1990 election were female (i.e. 7/240 MPs), and 5% of local authority seats were occupied by females (315/6299 seats) (Bakšić-Mufšić et. al. 2003: 52). It was only in 1998 that gender quotas were reintroduced, requiring that at least 30% of the (closed) party list were female (Bjorkdahl 2012: 306).

It might sound very obvious, but there simply were not enough women within formal political positions to populate the delegations that participated in the peace process, given that actors were chosen from current elected representatives.
(3) The structure of the negotiations

The very way in which Holbrooke configured the Dayton negotiations served to exclude women from BiH: many Bosnians (regardless of sex) felt shut out from the negotiation processes. Talks were led by international teams and took place in various locations overseas, in stark contrast to the negotiations taking place in Northern Ireland, where sustained efforts were made to democratically elect people specifically to participate in the peace negotiations which designed a new constitution (Fearon 1999). As one interviewee put it to me:

Well, one of the issues that a lot of people have with the Dayton Agreement... actually, if you look at the legitimacy of the actors who were sitting at the table... who authorised them? You had Izetbegović, but he’s not the one who won the elections. The one who won the elections for the Muslim seat – they were called Muslims then – in the Presidency of BiH was Fikret Abdić who forfeited to Izetbegović, so he’s not even elected...But to have someone from different countries! We didn’t choose Milošević, we didn’t choose Tudjman... so that’s ridiculous.\(^{38}\)

The point here, sharply illustrated by the exclamation ‘of someone from different countries,’ is that Holbrooke himself selected people to participate in the peace negotiations. It was a diplomatic effort that involved cajoling people. In sum Dayton (especially) was a negotiation effort that bought together warlords to end a conflict, rather than parties interested in developing a sustainable, long-term peace.

3.3: Summary of Future Research Directions: Understanding Female Presence in the Peace Process

The findings in this chapter point to a number of additional ways in which we can develop a gender perspective on the peace process in BiH:

- Diplomacy, and in particular Track I conflict mediation, where the key stakeholders to the talks are present, is viewed as a ‘formal, masculinised domain where all the “hard” issues are discussed and debated’ (de Alwis et. al. 2013: 173). The ‘feminized spaces’ are thought to appear in Track II meeting with ‘secondary stakeholders’ who might be concerned with ‘“soft” social issues’ (ibid.). There were no Track II talks at Geneva or Dayton, unless you count the lobbying activities of Mirko Pejanović and Tatjana Ljubic-Mijatović described above. This may raise productive questions about how the design of the negotiations (i.e. how they are structured) affects who is there and what issues are discussed.

- Looking at transnational feminist activism during late 1995 would perhaps better locate Bosnian feminism in relation to the global feminist movement, and help make sense of the lines of activism. This could productively be set against the Beijing Platform talks that took place in September 1995. Women from BiH did participate in the talks: Jasna Baksić-

\(^{38}\) Interview between author and Mia Karamehić, Project Manager, Swiss Development Agency Sarajevo 10 October 2013.
Muftić was part of the official BiH delegation. Amela Sabcanin (the secretary to the BiH UN mission in New York) and Vesna (from Tuzla, eastern BiH) also attended.

- The discussion above about how exclusion is not just gender exclusion but Bosnian exclusion provokes questions about how the gender debate ties into a bigger debate about inclusion and exclusion from peace negotiations.

- It would be useful to carry out a large-scale study investigating the link between formal political roles and/or the numbers of women elected as political representatives and female presence in peace negotiations, as a means of highlighting the links between political representations at all levels.

- Holbrooke’s references to his wife, Kati Morten, point to another possible area of exploration: the female spouses and the influence that they have upon the peace process (see Dobson 2012: 439-48 for a discussion of this in relation to the G8 and G20 summits). It is often thought that Milošević’s wife, Mirjana Marković, influenced him.

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39 Interview between author and Jasna Baksić-Muftić, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo 10 July 2014.
40 Interview between author and Jasna Baksić-Muftić, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo 10 July 2014.
41 see Dobson 2012: 439-48 for a discussion of this in relation to the G8 and G20 summits.
Conclusions: Developing a Gender Perspective on the Bosnian Peace Process

This working paper has sought to map the 1991-5 peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and identify ways that a gender perspective could be developed. What is clear from this working paper is how little we know about gender in relation to the Bosnian peace process. Part of this is because much of the public and academic debate has overwhelmingly been focused upon the top-level of military and state institutions, an approach which the historian Eric Gordy points out is ‘superficial’ and ‘carries with it a risk of lost knowledge and a risk of methodological incompleteness’ (Gordy 2014: 11). Gordy advocates for a rethinking of our knowledge about the dissolution of Yugoslavia (of which the Bosnian peace process is a part of) by paying attention to ‘society as well as the state, and within the state to look at actors who are not constantly visible in public’ (Gordy 2014: 13). It is Gordy’s point about the need to understand the social contexts in which these institutions operate that this working paper concludes with. He suggests that there is a need to ask more specific research questions, as opposed to a generalised agenda seeking to make sense of the dissolution of a state (Gordy 2014:19). While Eric Gordy does not specifically call for a gender perspective, his point that the focus of scholarship about the dissolution of Yugoslavia has been on dominant narratives about elite political activity is important. Developing a gender perspective on the peace process in BiH could make an important contribution to the debates about how we can understand the dissolution of Yugoslavia, as well as the scholarship on gender and peace processes.

Developing a gender perspective about the peace process in BiH inevitably provokes interrelated questions about how we think about gender. Throughout this working paper, at the end of each section, I developed a series of bullet-points highlighting the various research directions that could develop a gender perspective about the Bosnian peace process. Taken together, these various recommendations have not necessarily been ontologically or methodologically coherent: they are suggestions for avenues of future research. However, in themselves, these bullet-points provoke important questions about what it means to think about the inclusion of gender and/or women in peace processes. That is, they each offer different gender perspectives that could be developed about the peace process in BiH. On the one hand, a gender perspective could be developed through a study of the various masculinities that manifest in memoirs about BiH. Alternatively, a gender perspective could be developed through paying attention to the women in unexpected places, or as diplomatic spouses. The Bosnian peace process could be used as part of a project mapping the formation and role of ‘old boys networks’ in peace mediation and negotiations (that many of the actors in the Bosnian peace process cut their teeth in the peace settlement for Vietnam is perhaps significant). These are just some of the ways in which a gender perspective could be developed, and perhaps inevitably, responses will depend upon how gender itself is conceptualised.

Furthermore, I suggest that generating any knowledge about gender and the peace process for BiH requires contextualisation in the contemporary context. Central to this is the realisation that the DPA itself has deeply, and negatively, affected women in the post war moment (Rees 2002). Indeed, the DPA served to reaffirm ‘patriarchal nationalism as a dominant ideology and social system in post-war Bosnia’ (Cockburn 2013: 127), and the peace which was established was far from gender-just (Björkdahl 2012). That the DPA has produced a constitution which has produced a ‘barely functional, ethno-nationally instituted state’ (Husanović 2015: 115) has been widely discussed (see Sebastián 2007, 2011 for excellent summaries). Thus, contemporary debates about
constitutional reform have become productively interlinked with a historical memory of gender exclusion at Dayton. For instance, civil society organisations have noted the exclusion of women from various negotiating tables:

Women were excluded from all negotiating teams, which have been deciding about the fate of BiH, starting from the time of the Dayton Peace Accord signing onwards. (The) Butmir talks are no exception to this... contrary to the expectations of the BiH women, but also of the women from the region, (the) Butmir talks initiators... proceeded with the practice of ignoring and excluding women.

(Kvinna till Kvinna 2012: 9)

The articulation of a heritage of female exclusion ‘since Dayton’ has prompted an initiative: the Women’s Platform for Constitutional Reform. Another initiative within feminist and women’s civil society in BiH that also recalls a heritage of exclusion from the peace process is the ‘women organising for change in BiH and Syria’ project supported by Women International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) which partly aims to draw on ‘Bosnian experience, [to] strengthen the capacities of Syrian women’s organisations... to engage in peace negotiations’. Also paying attention to these contemporary contexts is crucial if we are to make sense of the ways in which gender and the peace process in BiH can be understood.

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## Appendix One: Timeline of Key Events: Making Peace in BIH, 1992 – 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 February 1992</td>
<td>The Lisbon Statement of Principles: suggested that BiH could be a state comprised of three constituent units reflecting ethnic lines.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March – April 1992</td>
<td>First casualties of war in Northeastern BiH and Sarajevo.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 1992</td>
<td>Creation of ICFY (International conference on the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a joint initiative between the EC and UN.</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 1993</td>
<td>The Union of Three Republics Plan. Formal articulation of intention for three constituent republics under a weak central administration and Sarajevo to be a UN-administered city.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1994</td>
<td>Washington Accords. Agreement to create a joint Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH).</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1994</td>
<td>The Contact Group Plan: a map reflecting 49-51 split.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spring 1995</td>
<td>Robert Frasure, American envoy to the contact group, meets with Milosevic several times in Belgrade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 8 – 11 1995</td>
<td>Srebrenica: some 8000 Bosniak men and boys presumed massacred by Bosnian Serbs in a UN protected “safe zone”. International outrage and horror.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 14 1995</td>
<td>Shuttle Talks led by Richard Holbrooke begin. American negotiating teams make a series of one-day trips to Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo to establish basic principles.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 19 1995</td>
<td>Mount Igman Tragedy. Three members of the initial American negotiating team killed in a car accident on the way to Sarajevo.</td>
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<td>August 30 1995</td>
<td>Patriarch Papers. Bosnian Serb leaders in Pale agree that Milosevic can negotiate on their behalf.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 8 1995</td>
<td>Geneva Joint Agreed Principles. Established the broad constitutional principles: most importantly, that BiH would be a single state with two entities, the Federation and RS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 19 1995</td>
<td>Official end of the siege of Sarajevo</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 2 1995</td>
<td>US agree to host peace talks at Dayton, Ohio.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 5 1995</td>
<td>General Ceasefire announced.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 28 – 31 1995</td>
<td>Discussion of draft peace agreement in Washington and New York between US team, Contact group members and the Bosnian team.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 1 1995</td>
<td>Start of peace talks at Dayton.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 10 1995</td>
<td>Agreement made about FBiH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 15 1995</td>
<td>Elections agreed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 18 1995</td>
<td>Decision made to unify Sarajevo</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix Two: Map of Bosnia Showing Ethnic Distribution