



Brazilian Foreign Policy under Lula: from non-intervention to non-indifference

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Abstract: This article examines how the foreign policy of the Lula administration adopted a different stance from Brazilian diplomatic tradition on the principle of non-intervention. The sovereignty concept that arose from the Treaties of Westphalia was re-signified due to the difficulties experienced by humanitarian institutions and countries. Non-indifference emerged in the African Union's treaty, and afterwards Brazilian official discourse adopted the expression as a legitimate instrument that would allow the Planalto Palace to intervene in domestic affairs of other states. However, the Brazilian government never established criteria for its applicability, which resulted in different attitudes in similar junctures. The article highlights the inconsistencies of this new trend in Brazilian diplomacy, taking the Brazilian engagement in Haiti as a case study.

Keywords: Non-intervention - Non-indifference - Brazilian diplomacy - Haiti

Resumo: O presente artigo analisa como a política externa do governo Lula adotou um posicionamento diferente da tradição diplomática do país acerca do princípio da não intervenção. A noção de soberania advinda dos Tratados de Westfália foi relativizada, ou melhor, ressignificada diante das dificuldades institucionais e humanitárias vividas por outros países. A não indiferença, um conceito surgido no tratado constitutivo da União Africana, apareceu no discurso oficial da política externa brasileira como um instrumento legitimador da atuação do Planalto em assuntos internos de outros Estados. No entanto, falta ao conceito a devida regulação e critérios de aplicabilidade, pois o governo brasileiro adotou posturas divergentes em conjunturas semelhantes. O artigo destaca as inconsistências desta nova tendência na diplomacia brasileira, utilizando o engajamento brasileiro no Haiti como estudo de caso.

Palavras-chave: não intervenção – não indiferença - diplomacia brasileira - Haiti

Introduction

The diplomacy of the Lula government adopted a more flexible position on the

principle of non-intervention. As an outcome, Brazil began to play a larger role in its region and elsewhere in the domestic affairs of other nations. On the one hand it shows a more assertive country on the international stage, on the other, the government had to deal with situations of which it was not accustomed.

This article is divided into three sections. First it copes with theoretical aspects of the principle of non-intervention, followed by non-indifference. The second part addresses how the Brazilian government has integrated non-indifference in its diplomacy. The third section analyses the Brazilian engagement in Haiti. Finally, the conclusion closes the paper.

1. A New International Principle

During Lula's administration, the Brazilian foreign policy was guided by a principle which is not in the Constitution: non-indifference. According to former Chancellor Amorim the principle was a new interpretation of non-intervention. To address the differences of both it is helpful to briefly analyse each principle.

The Treaties of Westphalia (1648) resulted in an international system of national states supported by a secularised international law. These units were characterised by a territory, a population and a government that successfully claimed the monopoly of legitimate violence and which had sovereignty over their territorial extension. The legal fiction of sovereignty was used to stabilise international relations amongst the system members. (Carneiro, 2009: 184-187).

History showed that the juridical concept of sovereignty was built on fragile premises, once it didn't prevented wars. For this reason during the nineteenth century the British Empire instilled the principle of non-interference on the international stage to save itself from the conflicts of continental Europe because peace was important for its business. George Canning, British Chancellor (1822-27), understood that peace in Europe and in the world relied on the containment of the use of force by European powers against one another. Embracing a more pragmatic perspective rather than idealistic, he sought by all means to prevent intervention by the Holy Alliance in Spanish colonies in the Americas. Canning found in US President James Monroe (1817-1825) an ally to support a policy that repudiated any intervention of a European power on American soil. In 1823, the president released the Monroe Doctrine, known as "America for Americans" (McCarthy, 2007).

The principle of non-intervention was adopted by the foreign policy of several newly independent states. This diplomatic stance had two purposes: first, to reassure the members of the international community that the country would not engender expansion wars (predictability); the second was based on the expectation that once giving up the the use of force other countries would reciprocate, especially the powerful ones (Badie, 1999, Danese, 2009: 68-70). For instance, during most of the XIXth century, Brazil opted for arbitration instead of wars concerning its borders, the

Paraguayan war was an exception.

During the Cold War, sovereignty and non-intervention were interpreted according to the interests of superpowers, which didn't hesitate to intervene either directly or indirectly in countries of their respective spheres of influence. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the gap between powerful and weak states became even more explicit, since the lack of an alternative economic model reduced the strategic importance of countries that could lean toward communism, discouraging foreign aid from the West. Oswaldo de Riveiro called these countries "ungovernable chaotic entities" (UCE). Thus, these "failed states" cannot fulfill their primary functions within the Westphalian syntax, requiring the action of the international community (Riveiro, 2001: 143).

In 1992, the UN released "An Agenda for Peace" which encouraged a greater involvement of member states on issues of peace and security through: 1) preventive diplomacy; 2) peace enforcement; 3) peacekeeping; and 4) post-conflict peacebuilding. These new concepts weren't immediately incorporated by the international community, because there was disagreement amongst its members regarding any breach on the concept of sovereignty, many states paralyzed several initiatives in the UNSC (United Nations Security Council), as the conflicts of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda showed.

In 1999, the UN Secretary-General encouraged humanitarian intervention to prevent further genocides. So the Canadian government worked with the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to develop the concept of responsibility to protect (R2P), which can be summarised as:

1. The responsibility to prevent – to address both the root causes of internal conflicts and other man-made crises that put populations at risk.
2. The responsibility to react – to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.
3. The responsibility to rebuild – to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.

(International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001: XI).

The redefinition of state sovereignty has been discussed in international forums, so far it has received different designations: right of intervention, responsibility to protect, humanitarian intervention and, finally, non-indifference. According to the new grammar of international relations the first three expressions are traditionally used by developed countries, whilst the latter arises in developing countries,

especially in Africa and in Brazil. According to Tickner, concepts of International Relations are received in different ways in countries that do not integrate the epistemic communities. This is why she stresses the hybridity of the guidelines in foreign policy of Third World/Developing countries. After all, different cultures problematise their environment according to their worldviews and their places in the world (Seitenfus, 2007: 12; Murithi, 2009: 91; Tickner, 2003).

The concept of non-indifference emerges in the African Union (AU) as a response to the shortcomings of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which failed to halt conflicts in the region¹. It was the former chairman of the AU Commission Oumar Konare who struggled for a new attitude concerning non-intervention in order to develop non-indifference to avoid previous mistakes (Murithi, 2009: 92).

In Africa non-indifference takes place into a multilateral framework, according to the fourth article of the AU constitution. The General Assembly of the AU or any member state has the legitimacy to request assistance. Once the intervention is approved, it will be monitored by the Peace and Security Council of the AU, in accordance with the provisions of the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). Thus, the AU has the interventionist power which challenges the Westphalian-grammar based on national states and provides a post-Westphalian view of the world, or post-national state. In this sense, the gradual erosion of absolute sovereignty allows intervention in states that refuse to provide answers to the needs of their populations or that somehow put their safety at risk² (Murithi, 2009: 94-5).

In Brazilian foreign policy, non-indifference has a hybrid character as it is not regulated by national law, nor subjected to a multilateral organisation. It's rather a concept used in the statements of top officials of the Lula government. Besides, it tries to focus not only to the military solution, but also to address the roots of the political and economical crisis. Therefore, non-indifference is a selective incorporation of assumptions concerning into preexisting analytical frameworks adapted to Brazilian needs. According to Antonio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha, professor at Brasilia National University (UNB), it is still early to find out if this principle will be incorporated by the Brazilian diplomacy (Alles, 2011: 157; Tickner, 2003). Meanwhile, it remains a diplomatic component devoted to peace, which enables a mediating role in conflicts, humanitarian aid and even gentle intervention. This current trend was synthesised by Bertrand Badie as: 'each State is responsible on the world stage as most of its actions and challenges to which it is confronted have global effects, therefore, it can be morally obliged to intervene outside its territory' (Badie, 2004: 51).

¹ Angola, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Rwanda.

² This principle was recently applied in Ivory Coast when the government of Laurent Gbagbo rejected the results of presidential elections.

However, there are several reasons why foreign intervention should be seen with skepticism. First, states will not intervene solely for humanitarian purposes. Second, states, especially democratic ones, avoid risking the lives of their nationals to protect foreigners. Third, a right of intervention could foster abuses by powerful countries. Fourth, states would intervene selectively, measuring risks. Fifth, in lack of consensus, an intervention could undermine international order. Sixth, the intervention will always be based on the cultural preferences of the powerful (Bellamy; Wheeler, 2008).

The Lula diplomacy used non-indifference in symbiosis with the ideals of solidarity and the quest for social development within the societies in which Brazil cooperates. Therefore, it is important to analyse how Brazil has acted under non-indifference.

2. Non-indifference in Brazilian Foreign Policy

In his inaugural speech Lula expressed the main strands of his foreign policy, guided by the search of a “solidarian and humanist globalisation”, whilst Foreign Minister Celso Amorim mentioned the supportive aspect of Brazilian co-operation³ (Brazil, 2003). It was Amorim who introduced the “non-indifference” concept (also known as “active solidarity”) to Brazilian diplomacy which was entwined to the constitutional principle of non-intervention. This paradigm was used by the Brazilian government to justify its actions in order to solve social and political crises in other countries⁴.

It must be recognised that this new syntax for foreign policy dates back to 1980 when the Workers Party (PT – acronym in Portuguese) was founded. In its first guidelines there was the search for an ‘international political solidarity amongst the oppressed peoples and mutual respect amongst nations to enhance co-operation and serve the world peace.’ Thus, PT corroborated its solidarity with liberation movements, particularly “oppressed peoples”, keeping harmony with its historical roots of Catholic left (Valler Filho, 2007: 223). This partisan view remains in its website as: ‘The success of Brazilian humanitarian aid to countries such as Haiti, Iraq and Sudan, amongst others, is exemplary of its attitude to the world’ (Partido Dos Trabalhadores, 2010).

According to Maria Regina Soares de Lima, professor at State University of Rio de Janeiro, “non-indifference” is a revealing concept of Lula’s foreign policy, taking

³ The selectivity of Brazilian foreign policy became more explicit in the “paper mills affair” between Uruguay and Argentina. The Brazilian government expressed its willingness to help the outcome of the crisis, but it avoided mediating the issue.

⁴ The Brazilian government applied non-indifference in Venezuela, when Chávez was ousted from office; in Bolivia, when the gas sector was nationalised by Morales; in Paraguay, when Lugo renegotiated the terms of Itaipu; in Iran, when MRE tried to mediate a nuclear deal with Ahmadinejad; and Haiti.

responsibility in the fight against hunger, poverty, and also seeking the social inclusion of disadvantaged people. For the scholar, non-indifference also legitimises intervention, but does so for reasons of social justice, especially for people abandoned by the international community. (Lima, 2005: 5)

There is no clear line separating non-indifference from diplomacy of solidarity. In the speeches of Chancellor Amorim they are entwined most of the times. It can be said that the latter is a supplementary concept.

It was Professor Seitenfus, a consultant for Brazil on Haiti, who developed the concept of diplomacy of solidarity:

It is the use of a collective international action, under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council, by third parties, which lack motivation, national interest and that are moved only by a duty of conscience, in a domestic or international conflict. The disinterest in material and / or strategic is the hallmark of this model. For this lack of interest it is necessary that the intervening state had not had any special relationship with the object of State intervention.

(Seitenfus, 2006)

Valler Filho analysed the concept of solidarity:

In official speeches, from 2003 on, the concept of solidarity combined to international relations is a current trend, this is why Professor Ricardo Seitenfus, from Federal University of Santa Maria, conducted an in-depth study on what he called “diplomacy of solidarity”, which is present and largely explains the Brazilian presence in Haiti.

In fact, what he calls the development of a new ideological and operational guideline that is capable of providing an alternative to the current litigation system is unprecedented in the categories of intervention known so far, it has been built to represent a different way compared to the traditional model applied by developed countries. This new matrix is linked to the tradition of mediation of territorial disputes, a practice derived from historical legal experience, in which diplomacy played the leading part.

(Valler Filho, 2007: 224)

According to Alexandre Guido Lopes Parola, non-indifference is at risk of being misunderstood, because “a foreign policy driven by values is constantly under threat of being perceived (...) as nothing more than a way to promote its own values under the guise of its supposed universality” (Parola, 2007: 439).

Leaving good intentions aside, history showed that aid policies mask national interests of donor countries. Even though, the Brazilian government does not frame

its aid policy as “tied aid”, some projects launched by MRE (acronym for Brazilian Foreign Ministry in Portuguese) benefit the use of technologies developed in Brazil⁵, ethanol is the most emblematic case because it spread this technology and fostered sugar cane crops in other countries. The incentive for policies like this expands business opportunities for Brazilian enterprises. Moreover, the Brazilian engagement in The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), based on “non-indifference” is a textbook example of the promotion of the Brazilian candidacy for a permanent seat at the UNSC, as it will be discussed in the following section.

Uziel has a more realistic approach for aid policies:

the motivations of states tend to be multiple as there is no exclusion of selfish motives and humanitarian, on the contrary, there is a coordination between them based on the importance of multilateral security. The central theme seems to be the maintenance and strengthening of the multilateral security, particular of peace operations as a privileged instrument (2006, p. 100)

In order to apply non-indifference MRE had to go under changes. In 2006, it was created the Interdepartmental Working Group on International Humanitarian Assistance, coordinated by the MRE and composed by fourteen other ministries. Until 2009, more than thirty-five countries have benefited from the Brazilian humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters, civil wars, epidemics and famine⁶. Furthermore, in order to provide efficient and faster aid the federal government allocated a warehouse at the International Airport of Galeao (2009), in Rio de Janeiro, to facilitate the deployment of donations (MRE, 2010: 04).

The Brazilian aid under Lula was also discreet, what makes the budget of US\$ 52 million (2010) of the Brazilian Co-operation Agency (ABC – acronym in Portuguese) just the “tip of the iceberg”. Other federal agencies might have spent fifteen times the budget of ABC, as estimated by Canada's International Development Research Centre and Britain's Development Institute. The statement makes sense when the pieces of an intricate puzzle are put together. The country paid its annual share of US\$ 20-25 million for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), providing, in addition to its financial duty, goods and services worth more than US\$ 100 million. For the UN World Food Programme the Brazilian government contributed US\$ 300 million. Regarding Haiti, the Planalto Palace invested nearly US\$ 350 million, whilst Gaza received US\$ 10 million. If we add the value of US\$ 3,3 billion in credits granted by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES – acronym in Portuguese) to Brazilian companies that operate in underdeveloped countries the figure exceeds US\$ 4 billion. However, the Brazilian aid is still small compared to China's, but it resembles traditional soft powers like

⁵ The statement of the Brazilian ambassador in Maputo, Antonio de Souza e Silva, explains this reality: “Brazil opens these work fronts (in Mozambique) and Brazilian companies have come together (Bbc, 2010).

⁶ Since 2006 the country donated more than 1,700 tons of food and 82.000 medicines.

Sweden (see table below) (The Economist, 2010).

**Table 1 - List of 10 Major Donors in 2009
(Figures in US\$ Billion)**

CHINA	39,437
USA	29,659
JAPAN	16,440
FRANCE	14,113
GERMANY	13,342
UK	11,490
SPAIN	6,984
NETHERLANDS	6,585
SWEDEN	4,552
NORWAY	4,085

Source: OECD – XINHUANET

The Brazilian initiatives go even further, the government pardoned US\$ 52 million from the Bolivian debt (2003). The benefit was extended to Cape Verde and Gabon, amounts of US\$ 2,7 million and US\$ 36 million, respectively. In 2004, Mozambique had 95 per cent of its public debt redeemed, US\$ 315 million out of the US\$ 331 million. Finally, in 2007, Lula administration forgave the debt of the Republic of Congo estimated at US\$ 400 million.

Marco Farani, director of ABC, claimed that the success of Brazilian foreign aid is related to its social approach, based on domestic policies such as the anti retroviral drugs for HIV and cash transfers (Bolsa Familia). In addition, the country has advanced technology in agriculture which helps to promote local food production and job creation (The Economist, 2010).

A possible reading for these efforts from Lula's administration could be that the Brazilian aid is a response to Chinese and Indian initiatives in Africa, and Hugo Chavez's in Latin America. Second, the government acquires sympathy and support for the country's candidacy as a permanent member of UNSC. Third, the delegations sent to other countries seek business opportunities for Brazilian enterprises (either public or private).

According to Carlos Puente:

[...] the motivation for such cooperative ventures is based on the principle of solidarity and national interest, although a bit fuzzy, but based on the intention of consolidating relations with developing countries to which we have special bonds (neighborhood, historical, cultural, etc). Add to that the growing importance for the country to contribute to the dictates required by the South-South co-operation.

(Puente, 2010: 249)

The diplomacy of solidarity increases Brazilian soft power⁷ that combined to the economic, democratic and regional stabilities make Brazil a more attractive country than its BRIC counterparts, especially China and Russia. However, if Brasilia would like to be more assertive on foreign aid it should be stressed that there are a lot to be done. Brazilian laws do not facilitate the donation of funds or assets to other governments. An example is the Provisional Measure (MP – acronym in Portuguese) 481/10 that is under analysis at the National Congress in order to allow the Brazilian government to donate up to 260 thousand tons of food to poor countries and others that undergo natural or social disasters⁸. (Agência Senado, 2010).

To understand the strands of non-indifference in Brazilian foreign policy in a deeper level, the Brazilian engagement in Haiti was chosen as a case study as a part of methodology. The reasons why Haiti plays such an important role in Brazilian foreign policy are the following: change in Brazilian diplomacy concerning military intervention in other countries; deployment of a large contingent of troops (the largest since re-democratisation); for the first in its history Brazil leads a peacekeeping mission; investment of large amounts of money; the Brazilian proposal for Haiti does not rely solely in peace enforcement, but also in state building; it is part of a greater strategy for the Brazilian bid towards a UNSC permanent seat, once the government can project power outside its region; and finally the importance given in the speech of Brazilian top officials (Arraes, 2011; Vidigal, 2011).

3. Brazilian Engagement in MINUSTAH

The Brazilian government was paying attention to the UN reform that could expand the UNSC. This was the reason why the Planalto Palace expressed willingness to engage Brazil in the mission that would succeed the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) deployed to Haiti in February 2004. Although Brazil had voted in favour of MIF at the UNSC, the MRE rejected to deploy troops because MIF was based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows the use of force. Brazil never took part in such missions under the UN because the principle of non-intervention is enshrined in its constitution⁹. Brazil's participation in United Nations Mission for the Stabilisation of Haiti (MINUSTAH) is the result of a phone call made by French President Jacques Chirac to Lula. At the time Lula argued that his government had eleven hundred soldiers to be deployed in a future peacekeeping operation. A new

⁷ According to Joseph Nye, soft power is an attractive power.

⁸ The MP benefits Haiti, El Salvador, Guatemala, Bolivia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique.

⁹ However, in 1965 under a dictatorship led by Castelo Branco Brazil intervened in the Dominican Republic to prevent a civil war that could generate a "new Cuba". The Inter-American Peace Force (composed by thirteen hundred Brazilian soldiers) was deployed to the Caribbean country under the aegis of the OAS (Organization of American States). The intervention combined with the projection of the Brazilian economy tarnished the image of Brazil in Latin America (Vizentini, 2004).

mission under the leadership of the US involved in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, or France that had a colonial past with the country did not seem appropriate¹⁰. Thus, Brazil was thought to lead the new mission, as Kofi Annan wished.

According to Rocha, President Lula took the decision to include Brazil in MINUSTAH. The scholar reported that in 2004, members of the government requested him a technical report about the Brazilian capability to lead a peacekeeping mission. The document expressed that the country didn't have trained troops, clear objectives or good communication between the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, despite the professionalism of both institutions. Nevertheless, the engagement prevailed so the Brazilian government could assert its candidacy to a UNSC permanent seat (Alles, 2011: 157).

In April of that year, the UNSC issued Resolution 1542 establishing the creation of MINUSTAH. The new resolution was also based on Chapter VII, but this time Brasilia agreed to deploy troops to Haiti arguing that contrary to the Resolution 1529, based on Chapter VII of the Charter since its preamble, Resolution 1542 made reference to this chapter only in § 7, which doesn't mean that the whole chapter applies to the rest of the resolution. This interpretation changes the category of the operation from peace enforcement to peacekeeping (Diniz, 2006: 327). Moreover, if the country refused to lead MINUSTAH, the Brazilian candidacy to a permanent seat at the UNSC could be in jeopardy.

The Brazilian stance on the chapters of the UN Charter is noteworthy, once the government changed its position over the years. In 1994, Haiti faced an institutional crisis that was appreciated by the UNSC. Back then, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim stated 'that any action taken should be fully in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Organisation of American States, especially as regards the basic principle of non-intervention' (Brazil, 1994: 18).

Brazil abstained on Resolution 940 because of the Foreign Ministry position was that a peacekeeping mission to Haiti should be based on Chapter VI of the Charter. Ten years later, the Brazilian government faced the same dilemma. However, it changed its traditional position. Besides the UNSC candidacy, other reasons can explain this shift. First Brazil has a long history on UN peacekeeping missions, the role the country plays in Haiti was considered for the mission in East Timor (1999), but the currency crisis which struck Brazil was disastrous for the national budget. In 2004 the situation was different because the government had the resources. In addition, the Brazilian engagement in Haiti could express the domestic social policies of Lula's government in its foreign policy (Alles, 2011: 157).

¹⁰ The US vetoed Chile once the Chilean government had voted against the Iraqi war in 2003 at UNSC (Alles, 2011).

The Brazilian discourse concerning the deployment of troops to Haiti was demystified in two diplomatic cables. The first reports a meeting between U.S. Ambassador Donna Hrinak and Subsecretary of Political Affairs, Vera Pedrosa, who told Mrs. Hrinak that the Brazilian constitution only allowed the deployment of troops in missions based on Chapter VI. However this interpretation could be “managed” as long as there was political will from the Brazilian government (Wikileaks, 2004a).

In the second cable, Marcel Biato (aide of Marco Aurélio Garcia¹¹) exposed to Dennis Hearne (the political representative of the U.S. embassy) the main obstacles for the deployment of troops. First, congressional approval; second, the required budget; and third, getting the support of the press and leftists (including within PT), once the engagement in the mission could be interpreted as consent to the US “hegemony” in the Americas. Biato requested Hearne to use the expression “Friends of Haiti”. Hearne commented that he had already talked to Carlos Duarte (responsible for the UN division in MRE) regarding the Brazilian lobby on Canada, Chile, USA and France, to justify the deployment of troops to the Caribbean country under the aegis of socioeconomic development in order to convince the Brazilian Congress to approve it (Wikileaks, 2004b).

In May President Lula requested the Congress, Presidential Message (MSC – acronym in Portuguese) 205/04 to deploy twelve hundred soldiers to the Caribbean country at a cost of US\$ 150 million. The MSC 205/04 was approved after the review of the Constitution and Justice Committee and of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. Opposition members were skeptical about the Brazilian engagement in MINUSTAH, their main concern was the manipulation of the Planalto Palace by the White House and the Elysee.

Civil society also expressed itself. Protesters took the streets of Sao Paulo, something rare in the history of Brazilian foreign policy. The criticism was based on the violation of Haitian sovereignty and by the consent given to the “imperialist and interventionist policies” of George W. Bush. There was also criticism of the Haitians. Yannic Etienne, leader of the Batay Ouvrye (Workers’ Battle – the largest labor movement in that country), stated during the Boston Social Forum that: “Haiti is under a foreign occupation, masked by the UN umbrella.” He emphasised that “everything happens in a more acceptable way because Haiti is passionate about Brazil” (Gauthier; Sousa, 2006: 3; Silva, 2004: 82).

For the Brazilian government MINUSTAH is an important aspect of its diplomacy of solidarity, both regionally and globally. According to Chancellor Celso Amorim this perspective even conditioned the activism of the country, as stated:

¹¹ Senior Advisor to the President.

This same concern to incorporate a social dimension and economic stabilisation processes led Brazil to participate, as the protagonist, of the United Nations effort in Haiti. (...) Moved by active solidarity: the principle that I call “non-indifference”, as I see it is as important as the “non-intervention.” In fact, just as it does not interfere with the sovereign right of each people to solve their own problems, we need to show our neighbors and friends willingness to help whenever called upon, especially when there are evident signs of political and social crisis.

(Amorim, 2005: 8)

The same solidarity inspires Brazil’s participation in peace efforts of the United Nations in Haiti. (...) Three main objectives encourage us: 1) creating a safe environment, 2) the promotion of dialogue among political forces, toward a true democratic transition, and 3) the effective international support for social and economic reconstruction of Haiti.

(Brazil, 2005b: 755)

The Brazilian presence in Haiti is controversial for several reasons. First, regarding the overthrow of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Brazil legitimised its presence in the Caribbean country based on a “resignation letter” received by the UNSC. The authenticity of this document was not questioned. Second, the interim government was not recognised by CARICOM (a regional bloc). Third, the instated Prime Minister Latortue had ties with armed groups responsible for the fall of Aristide. Fourth, according to Rocha the autonomy degree assigned to a mission as complex as MINUSTAH made explicit the violation of Haitian sovereignty. The fact that the intervention was legitimised by the request the local government and the UN does not relieve the presence of foreign troops. The support of Brasilia to a government, whose legitimacy and legality were doubtful demonstrates the selectivity of the Planalto Palace, the criteria and goals are not always clear¹². Furthermore, Brazil’s role in the Caribbean could be seen as an American attempt to outsource the security burden concerning Central and South America (Rocha, 2009: 211-12; Silva 2004: 80-1).

The controversies express how strong was the desire of the Brazilian government to take part in MINUSTAH and it can be only explained as part of its bid for a permanent seat in the UNSC. As the UN undergoes a structural reform the Brazilian government seeks to build a moral authority to strengthen its candidacy. After re-democratisation, the mandates exercised within the UNSC did not result into meaningful participation in peacekeeping missions. Thus, MINUSTAH emerged as an unique opportunity due to political visibility and the potential to boost (or at least legitimise) the Brazilian leadership in South America and surrounding areas as a

¹² In 2009, Brazil defended Miguel Zelaya who was removed from Office in Honduras.

regional peacemaker, obtaining the support from the countries of these regions to its candidacy at UNSC (Diniz, 2006: 330; Gratius, 2007: 18-9).

3.1. The Haiti: a test for the Brazilian government

In Haiti General Augusto Heleno coped with the decrease of the military contingent due to the closure of MIF. However the transition was brief and the mission reached six thousand men from thirteen countries. It must be emphasised that MINUSTAH is composed largely by South American troops¹³. The mission is a co-operative effort amongst the military and can be seen as the extension of political-economic approach that the region has developed and culminated in UNASUR (a regional bloc composed by all countries in South America) and the South American Council of Defense.

The mission had to pacify three neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince (Bel Air, Cite Soleil and Cité Militaire) that were ruled by armed gangs. The Brazilian military followed the guideline of ‘don’t shoot and investigate first’, which frustrated many inhabitants in Cité Soleil once peacekeepers didn’t intervene in shootouts. President Lula replied to criticism stating that MINUSTAH ‘was not considered an occupation force but a peacekeeping force’ (Gauthier, Sousa, 2006: 4).

The thesis of the Brazilian government that MINUSTAH was just a peacekeeping mission fell apart when the Brazilian military accompanied by Peruvian troops stormed Cité Soleil to capture Emmanuel Dread Wilme, the leader of local gangs. The operation required use of intelligence, relying on aerial mapping of the obstacles that prevented access to some sites. As a result, Dread Wilme was killed. However, General Heleno expressed his concern stating that a UN peacekeeping force should not carry out war operations.

In Haiti the Brazilian approach to intervention stood out for its social dimension compared to the previous missions. Brazilian soldiers distributed food, removed garbage from the streets, opened medical and dental care facilities (Gauthier, Sousa, 2006: 5). In addition, the Brazilian government also explored a passion shared by both countries: football. Lula’s diplomacy sponsored a friendly match between the national teams of both countries (Silva 2004: 76).

After five years from the beginning of the mission, the diplomatic, political and military efforts of Brazil in Haiti extrapolated earlier spending estimates. MINUSTAH cost the public treasury (until 2009, i.e., before the earthquake) about US\$ 577 million, invested in training, deployment and maintenance of troops - according to the Ministry of Defence (MD). Out of this amount, only US\$ 126 million were reimbursed by the UN. For the MD these expenses will benefit the

¹³ Such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, the largest contributor of military troops.

insertion of Brazil in the decision-making system of international organisations and improve the country's image abroad.

3.2. The Technical Co-operation Brazil – Haiti

Parallel to the military presence, the Brazilian government attended the Donors' Conference for Haiti, coordinated by the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), IMF and European Commission. Brazilian officials confirmed the desire to support the reconstruction effort, institutional and socio-economic recovery of the Caribbean country, pledging to send a mission to Haiti to evaluate possible co-operation projects. Brazilian diplomats have proposed technical co-operation as the most appropriate instrument to address some problems faced by Haitians, since Brazil has experience in co-operation, technology and human resources, which accredits the country to develop initiatives in several scientific fields (Valler Filho, 2007: 182).

The priorities of the reconstruction in Haiti were settled by a group of consultants who drafted the "Interim Co-operation Framework". Based on this document, ABC sent a multidisciplinary delegation to Port-au-Prince. The technical co-operation for development (TCD) of the Brazilian government to Haiti required high investment of resources by ABC, from 2004 to 2005 the amount increased from US\$ 8 million to US\$ 32 million, demonstrating the importance given by the Lula administration to the diplomacy of solidarity. The Caribbean country received up to 77.14 per cent of the co-operation initiatives led by Brazil, which corresponded to US\$ 2,751,928 that year (Alles, 2011: 115).

The impetus for co-operation between Brazil and Haiti took place in November 2004 when it was signed the Basic Agreement on Technical and Scientific Co-operation. However, the first projects only started in the following year with the travel of Brazilian technicians. The TCD between both countries happens on a bilateral and triangular (or trilateral) basis, when two actors (countries, IOs or NGOs) join efforts to help a third part (the country recipient of aid) to reduce the difficulties faced by the latter.

During 2004-2008, according to ABC, the Brazilian investment in TCD to Haiti totalled US\$ 7,146,588. Brazil has implemented five projects during the period. The first initiative transferred technology on production of cashew. The second project combined job creation and security, it improved the removal of solid waste whilst reduced gun violence in Carrefour Feuilles. The project was sponsored in partnership with the IBSA Fund. Third, there was the prevention and eradication of the worst forms of child labor, and fourth, the Haitian program on immunisation received vaccines against several diseases. These initiatives involved the Brazilian government (ABC and the Ministry of Health) and the Canadian International Development Agency.

The fifth project developed by Brazil demonstrates the multidisciplinary of its co-operation program. The “Management and Recovery of Vegetation in Mapou Basin” sought to recover the ecosystem around the river basin and is linked to the “Mapou Araucaria Program” which is executed by the Spanish Agency for International Co-operation in southeastern Haiti.

This section highlighted the first projects developed by the Lula administration. Until 2008 the number of initiatives already concluded between both countries totalled seventeen. The earthquake in 2010 posed new challenges for the Brazilian government, especially regarding humanitarian aid.

3.3. Prospects for Brazilian performance post-earthquake in January 2010

On 12 January 2010, an earthquake of magnitude 7 on the Richter scale struck the capital Port-au-Prince. It is estimated that 250,000 homes and 30,000 buildings collapsed, leaving 270,000 dead, whilst more than one million people were displaced. The disaster in the Caribbean country led the Obama administration to demonstrate all its military might by deploying troops and supplies to Haiti.

The UNSC passed Resolution 1908 to increase the effectiveness of MINUSTAH. The Brazilian government expressed worries because the mission ran the risk of being perceived as an occupying force. However, the Lula administration deployed nine hundred soldiers followed by another four hundred to reinforce the contingent, doubling the number of military in Haiti.

Brazil dispatched medicines, mineral water, food and other essential items. Another measure announced by the government was a donation of US\$ 18.8 million, revealing the country’s intention to assume a prominent role amongst the main donors in the meetings that sought to trace the lines of TCD to Haiti in the coming years. Chancellor Celso Amorim expressed the desire of launching a “Lula Plan” for Haiti, in analogy to the Marshall Plan (Alles, 2011).

During the “Donors’ Conference for a New Future for Haiti” Brazil composed the presidency with the US, Canada, France and Spain - the main donors. Chancellor Amorim announced the donation of US\$ 172 million in additional aid. The conference established an Interim Haiti Recovery Commission to manage the aid effort. Meanwhile ABC deployed another mission to Haiti with two purposes, first to assess the undergoing projects and second to identify new project opportunities concerning the current needs of the Caribbean country. As a result over 12 co-operation projects were signed in order to re-establish the living conditions of the population affected by the earthquake.

The aid flow from the Brazilian government quadrupled in 2010 due to the reconstruction effort in Haiti. Whilst in 2009 Brazil donated US\$ 67 million, in the first half of 2010 the budget for such measures exceeded US\$ 354 million. Haiti alone received US\$ 340 million. The cost of such initiatives reflected in the public treasury because the amount exceeds nearly twenty times the amount of R\$ 35 million estimated by the Ministry of Planning, the Executive had to issue an interim order to integrate the donation in the general budget of the Union (Terra, 2010).

However, the Brazilian aid is far short from the real needs of the Caribbean country, which experience delays in its reconstruction, two years after the tragedy. According to UN calculations, Haiti needs US\$ 11,5 billion to carry out the reconstruction of Port-au-Prince. Besides in the last twenty-five years there were held eight interventions by international forces in that country and these initiatives were not enough to reverse the high rate of destitution that affects 80 per cent of the population surviving on less than US\$ 2 per day.

The destruction of Haiti's infrastructure and poor housing conditions resulted in a cholera epidemic that by January 2012 caused 7,000 deaths. The misfortune is that the bacteria responsible for epidemic arrived in the country through the Nepalese military contingent of MINUSTAH. As a result violent protests took place against the mission. The Brazilian government had to develop a policy of damage control by investing about US\$ 1 million to combat the epidemic; the amount was assigned to a clinic in Carrefour.

The earthquake created a peculiar situation for Brasilia, once it undermined political gains achieved to date and extending the stay of Brazilian troops in Haiti, since it is impossible to leave the Caribbean country in such delicate situation. According to Rocha, the Brazilian participation should have ended in 2008, but the government was unable to take the decision to withdraw, perhaps other considerations beyond efficacy have been taken into account. At this juncture, it is estimated the withdrawal of the Brazilian military in 2012¹⁴ (Alles, 2011:157).

The political landscape in Haiti is still fragile. President Rene Preval extended his mandate for three months raising suspicion from opposition and the international community, protesters went to the streets demanding his resignation. The first round of elections held in November 2010 was challenged on allegations of fraud. The initial result of the poll indicated a shift in the second contender between the former first lady Mirlande Manigat (who had the most votes) and the government candidate Jude Celestin.

¹⁴ Amorim, current Defence Minister under Dilma administration, announced the return of troops last March (2012). The government opted for a gradual withdrawal.

Twelve out of the eighteen candidates stated that there was a “conspiracy” led by Preval and the electoral commission to benefit the candidate supported by the president. The crisis lasted for two months, the result of the first round was only released in February 2011, which resulted in the exclusion of Jude Celestin. Apparently, the pressure from Washington was decisive to solve the impasse, because the US threatened to suspend aid to Haiti if the recommendations of OAS were not accepted. In the second round Manigat and the musician Michel Martelly, without any political experience, ran for presidency. Martelly was elected and took office in May 2011.

There are also other disturbing variables as the former dictator Baby Doc and Aristide returned to the country resuming political ties with former supporters, which include armed groups. Moreover, the work done by MINUSTAH, Brazil and NGOs are far from achieving the goals for the country, resulting in criticism from experts, given the lack of coordination and delay in remitting the funds pledged by donor countries. Amongst them, Ricardo Seitenfus, former attaché of the OAS in the Caribbean country, he had to quit his job after an interview to Swiss newspaper *Le Temps*. According to Alex Dupuy, professor at Wesleyan University in Connecticut, the Haitian government was removed from the decision making process – the action of humanitarian agencies end up reinforcing Haiti’s dependence on foreign aid. The delay in solving urgent problems the country is also affecting the MINUSTAH forces that are to be interpreted as occupation troops (Bbc, 2011). Brazil can be seen in the awkward position of having to bail out (with its troops) unpopular decisions or worse, undemocratic.

Conclusion

Brazilian foreign policy changed during Lula’s administration. The country exerted a more active role in the international arena which demanded its engagement in situations to which its diplomacy was not accustomed. The Brazilian foreign policy, traditionally based on the principle of non-intervention, had to work under the aegis of non-indifference.

In Haiti, President Lula decided to engage the country in a costly and uncertain peacekeeping operation. The move could create a conflict between the constitutional guidelines of the Brazilian foreign policy, but it appears to be within the new international trends in relaxation of sovereignty, although without any regulatory support. The financial costs exceeded original estimates and the earthquake of 2010 extended the stay of the Brazilian military in the country.

The Brazilian government sought to mitigate the effects of military troops equipped with combat power by investing in the multidimensional side of peacekeeping missions. Thus, several co-operation projects were initiated in order to promote economic and social stability of the country. All these efforts and costs raise the

question whether Brazil will be able to build the moral authority expected to be included in international decision-making forums with greater voting power.

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