Chapter 7

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The Urban Grassroots Women’s Movement and Women’s Food Organizations

1. INTRODUCTION

During the 1960s and 1970s, Lima experienced a demographic explosion, the result, primarily, of internal migrations. As a part of this growth, various social organizations came into being. Among the most visible and strongest were women’s organizations. These have different beginnings, some are more autonomous, others are the result of interventions by the state, political parties, NGOs, churches or some other sector of society. But, in general, they are organizations that have become important in the social life of many people, with a significant level of representativeness.

In light of the fragmented structure of women’s organizations, together with the existence of patronage, some analysts believe that the phenomenon cannot be considered a social movement. However, in part due to the scope of the phenomenon, but also for reasons we will outline in this chapter, we believe that it is appropriate to speak of an urban grassroots women’s movement. In addition, this case, in particular, allows us to explore the tensions that arise within social movements when they come in contact with programs that address poverty reduction.

As in previous chapters, we will focus on an analysis, in general, of the urban grassroots women’s movement, but using a port of entry that facilitates understanding how the movement functions. Our entry point will be those organizations we call “women’s food organizations” (Organizaciones de Mujeres para la Alimentación, OMA) – the Community Kitchens (Comedores Populares, CP) and the Glass of Milk Committees (Comités del Vaso de Leche, CVL). The OMAs facilitate a study of the movement beginning with its most important organizations. Both the CPs and the CVLs are the best known women’s organizations and are recognized at the national (and, in some cases, international) level, and have the largest membership. We discuss how each functions, internal dynamics, the relations maintained with external actors, objectives and means used to reach these. This will facilitate the subsequent analysis of the movement in general, its functioning, its current form of existence and its interaction with discourses on, and programs for, poverty reduction.

1 In fact, this was one of the major subjects discussed in workshops held to present the preliminary reports for this study, in both 2008 and 2009.
2 This term comes from Tocón Armas (1999) and from Cueva and Millán (2000), who use the concept “feminine food organizations.”
The major limitation of this focus is that it centers our attention on the movement’s best known organizations. According to an expert on the movement, these are not the only women’s organizations and it is important to make visible the presence of women in other spaces. Thus, we should be conscious that we are starting from a look at the privileged within the movement. On the other hand, this facilitates a focus on the group with the longest history, allowing us to follow its evolution and functioning within the most familiar space and the one that brings together the largest number of women.

The CPs and the CVLs have their own history and objectives. Thus, after a presentation of some general ideas on the urban movement and on grassroots urban women, we will describe the reality of each of these organizations individually, and then conclude with an analysis that takes into account the reality of the movement as a whole.

2. THE CASE STUDY: THE URBAN GRASSROOTS WOMEN’S MOVEMENT AND WOMEN’S FOOD ORGANIZATIONS

2.1 Origins: The urban movement in Lima

In the mid-twentieth century, the city of Lima experienced exponential demographic growth. According to data from INEI, between 1961 and 1972, the city’s population doubled (Chart 1). This “demographic boom” was the consequence of large migrations that took place in the middle of the last century. Many persons who resided in cities and towns in the rest of Peru migrated to Lima, the country’s capital. In many cases, it was a rural-urban migration. The migrants settled on the city’s periphery, where they created new settlements that would give way to new districts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lima’s Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,750,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3,288,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>4,523,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6,345,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8,445,211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Lima’s growth was never planned. From the Municipality of Metropolitan Lima (MML), there was no design as regards how to manage territory to incorporate the new residents into the city’s dynamic, satisfying their basic needs. At the same time, citizens were forming a variety of organizations. Thus was Lima’s urban movement born. The movement was centered on demands for housing and services. Many areas of Lima were being populated by squatters. In a “classic” squatter cycle, in order to take over a
specific piece of land, various people would organize beforehand. After taking over, there was a process of defense of the land, in which squatters faced off with the police who attempted to evict them. At this point, possible solutions to the conflict were negotiated. One of the best-known invasions led to the creation of Villa El Salvador (VES), one of Lima’s most populated districts today. According to Julio Calderón, the urban movement in defense of the land existed in Peru began with the presidency of Bustamante y Rivero, and returned in force in 1961, beginning with the “Neighborhood Law.” The movement’s strongest period was during Alan García’s first administration, when even private lands were taken over. These new populated areas of the city were known as “barriadas” [neighborhoods, translator’s note (TN)]. The name was changed, first to “pueblos jóvenes” [new towns, TN] during the Velasco administration and then to “asentamientos humanos” [human settlements, TN] during Belaúnde’s second administration.

After the land had been defended, the next step was to demand basic services, a struggle that appeared in the 1970s. The movement centered on demands for water and sewage services, especially, but also for lights, paved streets, and so on. Over time, the state satisfied residents’ demands, which implied the weakening of the movement, reflecting its specific objectives: when these were achieved, the movement lost impetus. It was a movement that suffered from “the failure of success.” Today there is no urban movement because the major reason for its existence – demands for land and public services – has been satisfied. The state has implemented institutionalized mechanisms to deal with demands for land, housing, and public services (for example, with the installation of running water and sewage), thus avoiding the need for residents to organize to deal with these problems. These services have also been provided by private enterprise, especially in the case of electric energy, which is administrated by the private sector today.

Although there is no urban movement in the city, this does not imply that there is no social movement working on urban issues. Social movements do exist and the two most significant are the workers’ movement and the urban grassroots women’s movement. This chapter deals with the latter.

2.2 The urban grassroots women’s movement

The urban grassroots women’s movement is not a uniform movement. Its principle components are three food organizations: 1) the Glass of Milk committees (CVLs), 2) community kitchens (CPs) and 3) Mothers’ Clubs, originally created as a series of production workshops. The Mothers’ Clubs, however, function today basically as community kitchens and even the presidents of the “Mothers’ Clubs organizations” state that today there is not much difference between their organizations and a community kitchen. There are also a number of neighborhood and labor organizations, as well as organizations for marginalized groups (handicapped, retired, lesbian) made up exclusively of women.

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3 Calderón related the information included here during an interview. However, to learn more about the urban movement, we recommend reading Calderón (2005).
4 See for example Turner (1969) and Matos Mar (1984)
variety of NGOs, parishes, outreach workers, and activists provide support and advice to these organizations.

The beneficiaries of the organizations' efforts are primarily women and minors from urban areas, though there are also some beneficiaries from rural areas. In general, they are poor families from the lower classes although some researchers (Vásquez, 2004, 2008; Monge et al., 2009) and national government spokespersons have doubts about the commitment of these organizations to the poor, accusing them of “filtration” and propose measures to focus state-administered programs in order to prioritize the needs of families in situations of extreme poverty. These attempts have run into resistance from organizations.

The grassroots women’s movement came into being in an attempt to complement the fight against poverty. The intention was to confront the economic crisis and, at the same time, revalue the role of women. Thus, leaders were always concerned about the internal strengthening of their organizations. Through the years, the principles of organizations within the movement have moved away from an exclusive emphasis on food and members have turned to tasks in many other areas: health, violence, political participation. The organizations have become a space for the development of women’s abilities. Over time, they have incorporated the gender equality focus. The leadership does not believe that there has been a change in objectives but, rather, a broadening of the agenda and a change in strategies. They state, for example, that they used to carry out massive consultation processes. This they no longer do as they believe that it is a waste of time, because in the interim the government creates norms that change the context. Reality has forced them to adjust their strategies to the context (interview with a Community Kitchen leader).

### 2.3 The Community Kitchens

#### 2.3.1 Major characteristics of Community Kitchens

The Community Kitchens function as associations whose purpose is to provide lunch. There are CPs throughout metropolitan Lima and a few in the provinces. They include leadership and a group of members who provide labor, helping prepare food in the kitchen. Most members are also beneficiaries who receive food at a reduced price (Chart 2):

![Chart 2](chart-2.png)

**Prices for three types of beneficiaries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Price of a meal (in soles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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5 “Filtration” is the phenomenon according to which people who do not fulfill eligibility requirements benefit from the program. Specifically, it is a reference to the poverty issue. People who are not poor receive benefits from social programs designed for the poor; in other words, they have “filtered” into the program.
### Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General public</td>
<td>S/. 1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>S/. 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cases</td>
<td>S/. 0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the authors

Note: In a few cases, the dining rooms charge S/. 2.00 but in most cases, the meal costs S/. 1.50.

Anybody can eat at a CP, unlike other food programs, such as the Glass of Milk or school breakfast which are restricted to children. Members pay less for the meal because they invest their labor in the dining room. In addition, each dining room has “social cases,” that is, persons living in extreme poverty who cannot pay for the meal. These are special cases, identified by those working in each dining room, and are usually no more than 10% of beneficiaries. Charging for the meal makes it possible to pay for the special cases, who are the poorest of the poor. In a certain sense, the poor subsidize the poorer. In addition, charging for the meal facilitates paying preparation costs that are not covered by state subsidy.

According to one of the major criticisms of the community kitchens, the beneficiaries are not really the poorest. However, the program’s leaders defend their work, stating that if it were not for those who eat and pay, the community kitchens would not exist because, in spite of what the law says, women assume the major cost of the daily rations. According to a study by economist Humberto Ortiz, the “production has a cost of which around 81% is paid by the women, through payment for each meal and their contribution to the organization itself, and the state provides 19%. The 81% includes labor, infrastructure, inputs, and food that the dining room buys at market prices. The 19% is made up of some food items donated by RPONAA” (Ortiz 2009: 62). The way in which the community kitchens currently work, which many criticize as “filtration,” is what keeps them afloat. If they were to offer food only to the poorest of the poor, the CPs would not exist. Finally, it is important to indicate that the special cases are identified by the leaders of the community kitchens. According to Ortiz (2009), this is the CP’s added value: they can identify those in extreme poverty by name, though this could also lead to patronage or filtration.

### 2.3.2 The history of the Community Kitchens

In this section, we will review the history of the Community Kitchens. While the CPs have a long history, rich in details, it includes a number of large, transversal themes. On the one hand, there is the gradual increase in the kinds of organizations that eventually will concentrate on offering food at midday. And the second is the change in the relation among the CPs, Mothers’ Clubs, and the administration in power. Some have been closer to the government, others have opted to remain more distant. This, in turn, reflects a third large theme: the constant tension between autonomy and dependence. This tension has characterized the community kitchens and remains evident to the present.

#### 2.3.2.1 From the 1950s to the first half of the 1980s: “independent” and “Belaundistas”
The first Mothers’ Clubs were founded in the mid-20th century, between 1948 and 1956, during the government of General Odría. As would become customary from that time, they were sponsored by the First Lady of the Republic, at that time, María Delgado de Odría. Thus did programs for the distribution of food come into being among women in Lima’s neighborhoods. A few years later, in 1959, the United States government, through USAID, would begin donating food. However, over time these first Mothers’ Clubs lost their initial impetus and finally disappeared.

During the national strike at the end of the 1970s (which, as indicated in the previous chapter, represented a milestone in the Human Rights movement), significant numbers of women organized in solidarity with the strikers and started soup kitchens. At the same time, two processes of tremendous importance took place: the government created the National Office for Food Support (ONAA, Spanish acronym), an autonomous organism of the Ministry of Agriculture created to distribute food. On the other hand, Caritas changed its mechanism for delivering food, demanding that women prepare the food, that is, a condition for receipt was that women organize kitchens. It seems that this change was intended to avoid the resale of food and, thus, assure that it got to those who most needed it. With these two events, plus the appearance of soup kitchens, in 1978 the first Independent Community Kitchen was created in the Comas district. The independent CP had the support of local parish priests and Catholic Church activists.

During the first half of the 1980s, coinciding with Belaúnde’s second administration, the National System of Grassroots Cooperation (COOPOP, Spanish acronym), which had existed during the 1960s, was reactivated. The COOPOP supported the creation of community kitchen. This led to a second period CP creation. Between 1978 and 1982, kitchens came into being as a result of social initiatives linked to some parishes and religious activists. It is due to this social origin that the kitchens are said to be independent. Beginning in 1982, a new group of kitchen appears, sponsored by the central government and known as “Family Kitchens,” because they were created as part of the Family Kitchens program of the Belaúnde administration.

Thus, by 1982 there were three groups of community kitchens, whose various origins are indicated in Chart 2.

### Chart 3

### Groups of Community Kitchens to 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of creation</th>
<th>Reason for creation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mothers’ Clubs</td>
<td>1948-1956</td>
<td>Sponsored by the government, through the Center for Assistance, headed by the First Lady, María</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 For a long time, support from Sister María Van der Linde, a nurse, was significant, according to a number of persons interviewed, both movement leaders and experts on the subject.

7 These Mothers’ Clubs, which were the first, did not, in fact, work with kitchens. They were a mechanism to distribute food, but their members did not cook it. The first kitchens, strictly speaking, were those created in 1978.
By the beginning of the 1980s, the original Mothers’ Clubs of the Odría administration had practically disappeared, but the independent kitchens were strong and well-known. The creation of Family Kitchens not only created parallel organizations dedicated to the same objective, this fact led those running the Independent Community Kitchens to come up with their name in order to differentiate them from the Family Kitchens, emphasizing their autonomy as regards whatever administration happened to be in power (an achievement that characterizes them to the present).

During this first period in the creation of Community Kitchens, the three major themes mentioned at the beginning of this section appeared. The number of CPs increased as did the Family Kitchens, each with its own relation to the administration. While the “independent” kitchens were the result of grassroots initiatives and decided against ties to the state, the Family Kitchens were an initiative of the Belaúnde administration and were financed by the government. This reflects, again, the differences in terms of autonomy and dependence between the two types of kitchens.

### 2.3.2.2 The first Aprista administration: a new kind of kitchen and differences in support

In mid-1985, Alan García became president of Perú. During his campaign, the Peruvian Aprista Party (PAP) encouraged the creation of CPs, known as “People’s Kitchens,” which the party financed. One of the new administration’s first measures was the creation of the Direct Assistance Program (PAD, Spanish acronym) in September of that year. PAD created the Mothers Clubs along three lines: production workshops, community kitchens and centers for early childhood education. The Mothers’ Clubs were coordinated, as during previous administrations, through the First Lady’s Office. Unlike what had occurred with the Family Kitchens, PAD recognized the existence of other CPs and proposed that they become members of PAD. Members – both Mothers’ Clubs and other CPs – would receive an economic subsidy. Those who did not become members would not receive said benefit. This led many CPs that had come into being as Family Kitchens, as well as some independent CPs, to participate in the Aprista proposal. However, many independent kitchens decided not to affiliate because the viewed the PAD offer as an attack on their autonomy: if they signed up, they would receive economic support, but would lose their independence, becoming subordinate to the administration. As a result, as the Aprista

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8 Through Supreme Decree 077-85-PCM.
9 A term used first by the Odría administration. But, as we noted, those Mother’s Clubs no longer existed.
administration came to an end, the national stage included two large sectors of community kitchens (Chart 4).

Chart 4
**Community Kitchen groups to 1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of creation</th>
<th>Reason for creation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent Community Kitchens</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Soup Kitchens were formed in solidarity with the National Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mothers’ Clubs</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>-The Aprista administration created Mothers’ Clubs within the framework of PAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Many of the kitchens that already existed (and had different beginnings) decide to affiliate with PAD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the authors

Once again, there were parallel organizations: kitchens affiliated with PAD (which functioned as Mothers’ Clubs) and the independent variety. During these years, food was procured through donations, especially from the USA, and distributed by a number of religious organizations and NGOs. Thus, the kitchens that decided not to affiliate with the administration’s program did not suffer a reduction in supply. The difference between the two types of kitchens was the fact that only those affiliated with PAD received economic support.

Once again, we observe a multiplication of kitchen styles, now with the appearance of the Mothers’ Clubs. And there also appear different ways to relate to the government. While some kitchens decide on direct dependence (those that sign up for PAD), others opt for remaining autonomous and distancing themselves from any kind of activity associated with the administration (the “independent”).

The differences in economic benefits did not stop the growth, in size and number, of the independent CPs. Thus, in 1986, the First National Encounter of Independent Kitchens took place, and there the National Commission of Community Kitchens (CNC, Spanish acronym) was created, an entity believed to be the first attempt on a national level to bring the CPs together in a coordinating committee. One of the CNC’s first demonstrations took place in 1988, when the entity organized a protest in Lima where some ten thousand women protested price hikes and drastic economic measures. That same year, the CNC created a food basket that would allow the CPs to fulfill rations. The CPs were acquiring the solidity needed to work together, to make demands and present proposals. They were also consolidating politically, entering into the political arena to negotiate and dialogue with the state. This was a process of consolidation and institutionalization by this sector of the urban grassroots women’s movement.
In 1988, leaders, with support from NGOs, asked the government to subsidize 58% of the basket and said that the CPs would provide the other 42%. This proposal was presented to the Ministry of Agriculture but a response was never received. The women presented the subsidy proposal using a rights discourse: “The notion of a right was clearly proposed, but it was reduced to the right to survive” (Blondet and Trivelli 2004: 41). This is a very important point, both in terms of understanding the grassroots urban women’s movement in particular and for understanding Peruvian social movements in general. This will be analyzed in greater detail in the following section, but for the moment it is important to note that, as we have seen in both cases presented above, social movements tend to present a series of demands and to seek changes in policies and in society in general by applying a rights discourse. But when these issues become state matters, entering into the bureaucracy and coming under government control, the rights discourse falls to the side and the issue is couched in terms more closely related to poverty and compensations.

When the Garcia administration ended, he left the country in one of the worst economic crisis ever. This crisis, added to the difference in benefits between kitchens affiliated with PAD and those that were not, revived the discontent of the grassroots and their leadership, who had moved much closer to feminist NGOs with which they worked on political issues, but which did not satisfy day-to-day demands.

2.3.2.3 Fujimorism and patronage

In 1990, Alberto Fujimori came to power in Peru. In spite of problems within organizations, the leadership of the independent kitchens maintained a strong alliance with NGOs. Thus, by 1990, they had created a bill that recognized the efforts of grassroots organizations dedicated to providing food and that provided for the creation of a program to support these efforts. This issue became one of the major bastions of the organizations. The struggle for state recognition marked the first months of the new decade and was undertaken with the technical and legal support of NGOs. They succeeded. On February 12, 1991, law 25307 went into effect, recognizing the work of grassroots organizations (OSB) (Inset 1).

Inset 1. Law 25307

The first article stipulated: “declare of national priority interest the work undertaken by Mothers’ Clubs, Glass of Milk Committees, Independent Community Kitchens, Family Kitchens, Family Centers, Mother-Infant Centers and other grassroots social organizations in matters related to food support services provided to low-income families (Law 25307, art. 1). On the other hand, organizations had to become formal, registering in Public Registries and Municipal Registries. But the most important aspect of the law is article seven, in which the Support Program for Food Services by Grassroots Social Organizations is created. The first objective of this program is as follows:

“Attention to the food needs of the population with low economic resources, through provision of food to Grassroots Social Organizations, as announced in article1. The state will provide the food in the form of a donation and will cover at least 65% of the daily per capita ration offered by said organizations to their beneficiaries (Law 25307, art. 7, clause 1).
Thus we see that, on the basis of this law, the state not only recognized and declared a priority the efforts undertaken by OSBs dedicated to providing food, it also assumed a portion of the responsibility, the financing of 65% of the daily ration, through food donations. For the first time in the history of OMAs, there is a norm that requires the state to donate a certain quantity of food covering more than half the ration (though, in practice, the state never complied entirely with this obligation). It was an important achievement for the urban grassroots women’s movement.

Finally, Law 25307 created the Management Committee, that was to be “constituted by representatives of Grassroots Social Organizations involved in food efforts, a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, and a representative of the corresponding Local Government” (Law 25307, art. 8). At the same time, it was established that “the participation of Grassroots Social Organizations [...] be included both in the execution of ends and in the control and supervision of compliance with these and with the overall program (Law 25307, art. 9). Thus, women would not be entities receiving donations, charged exclusively with preparing food rations and delivering them to beneficiaries. Women now had a voice and a political presence in the program, taking on control and supervision duties, relating directly with state employees in charge of the issue, within the Management Committee. As can be seen, at the time the bill was signed into law (early 1991), the CPs were a program that was part of local governments, as a result of which there was a Management Committee at each site. In addition, the central government organism charged with food distribution was the Ministry of Agriculture. That would change soon after.

End of inset

Law 25307 is an important milestone in the grassroots urban women’s movement: thanks to demonstrations and lobbying, members achieved a law that recognized them and forced the state to provide more than half the ration. This law continues to guide activities by OMAs. However, in spite of the importance its passage represents, it would take more than a decade before the pertinent regulations were created, and thus the milestone was more symbolic than real.

In order to resolve the economic crisis, the Fujimori administration announced a package of economic adjustment measures; one of the first was hike in consumer prices. From one day to the next, Peruvians discovered that their money wasn’t worth anything. As a direct result, families in Lima found themselves in a crisis situation, especially the poorest. Thus, in neighborhoods with the least socioeconomic wherewithal, residents once again set up soup kitchens as a form of assistance and social solidarity. This was the beginning of a new group of community kitchens.

On February 5, 1992, with Supreme Decree 020-92-PCM, the National Food Assistance Program (PRONAA, Spanish acronym) was created as an entity of the Presidency of the Ministers’ Council. As Gloria Cubas (2009) indicates, PRONAA delivered food support only to those kitchens registered with PAD during the García government (Cubas 2009: 14). This is a very important point, demonstrating how
an instrument of political party cooptation created by a governing party (APRA in the 1980s) survived the administration and continued to play a similar role in subsequent administrations.

With the creation of PRONAA, all food donations were centralized in this organism. Thus, gradually access to CARE and other organizations that donated food disappeared. This created a problem for independent CPs given that, as Cubas indicates, in order to receive food from PRONAA, organizations had to be affiliated with PAD. This fact, added to the gradual disappearance of support from NGOs, led to a crisis within independent kitchens: their existence was in danger as food ran out. Only in 1994 would the independent kitchens in Lima begin to receive food from PRONAA.

It is important to emphasize that the OMAs were not isolated from political violence, especially the presence of Sendero Luminoso/the Shining Path (SL). Many leaders and organizations were threatened and some were killed, the most widely publicized case being that of María Elena Moyano, leader of the Grassroots Federation of Women of Villa El Salvador, murdered by SL in 1992. This crime, increasing violence and continuous threats led many leaders to leave their positions and their organizations (Emma Hilario, for example, from Villa María del Triunfo, who decided to seek asylum). Thus, the OSBs in general, including the OMAs, entered a period of organizational crisis due to the terrorist threat.

One element characterizing the 1990s was the administration’s attempt to co-opt grassroots social organizations. Political patronage and manipulation were common. Many women today charge (charges also heard at the end of the second Fujimori administration) that they were forced to attend political rallies as a condition for receiving food rations. During the 1990s, many organizations lost autonomy and independence, values that had been very important during preceding years, and were subordinated to the administration. This was a result of the Fujimori administration’s strategy, which was to divide and control organizations, thus gaining social support in exchange for patronage. The independent kitchens devoted themselves to survival. The 1990s are seen as a difficult decade and one of the principle achievements was survival. But many organizations decided to join government plans. The kitchens that had affiliated with PAD and were members of the APRE party received money from PRONAA from the beginning and maintained a close relationship with the administration. But a third group of kitchens appeared, openly supporting Fujimori and creating an organization, Lima’s Departmental Coordinating Committee of Mothers’ Clubs and Community Kitchens.

Thus, during the 1990s, we have a new groups of community kitchens (which are formalized only at the end of Fujimori’s time in power), which changed the national context vis-à-vis the previous decade (Chart 5).

Chart 5

It is important to note that, in spite of changes in administrations, the kitchens affiliated with PAD continued to receive an economic subsidy, and do so to this day (end of 2009), which comes in the form of a monthly check, the amount varying between 300 and 400 new soles (Cubas 2009: 12).
### Community Kitchen groups to 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year created</th>
<th>Reason for creation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent Community Kitchens</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Soup Kitchens created in solidarity with the National Strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mothers’ Clubs</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>- The Aprista administration creates Mothers’ Clubs within the framework of PAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Many already-existing kitchens (with varied beginnings) decide to affiliate with PAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Kitchens</td>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>- As a result of the Fujishock, new community kitchens are created, originally as soup kitchens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Some preexisting kitchens decide to support the Fujimori administration, becoming openly fujimoristas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the authors

In light of the above, the grassroots urban women’s movement entered the new millennium in an extremely fragile state. A third group of kitchens had appeared, broadening the situation, and revealing even more divisions. The ties with the administration were varied: one group openly supported Fujimori, publicly defending the regime; another group that depended on the administration did not defend its autonomy but also did not define itself as “fujimorista”; finally, a third group that had always maintained its distance from the government, defending its autonomy and independence and allying itself with the work of NGOs, participated with them in marches and events at the end of the decade to demand that Fujimori step down.

#### 2.3.2.4 The new century: return of the discourse in defense of autonomy

With the transition to the administration of Valentín Paniagua and, subsequently, Alejandro Toledo, the leaders of independent kitchens recognized a new political environment that would allow them to become stronger, in institutional terms, and to propose objectives beyond simple survival. In light of this, led by the Federation of Women Organized in Centers of Independent Community Kitchens and Related Organizations in Metropolitan Lima (FEMOCCPAALM, Spanish acronym), they took up again an old idea: the creation of a national organization of independent kitchens. This implied meetings and consultations at the national level, steps the women began to take. At the same time, organizations supporting Fujimori felt a similar need. Thus it is that, in 2001, the first national organization of

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11 The metropolitan central committee of independent kitchens, created in 1991.
independent kitchens was created: the National Coordinating Committee of Mothers’ Clubs and Community Kitchens (with a fujimorista orientation).

During the first year of the Fujimori administration, a law had been passed that recognized the efforts of the OMAs, that created PRONAA, and that required that the state contribute 65% of the ration, but the regulations were never written. Only in 2002, during the Toledo administration, and with Cecilia Blondet as Minister of Women, were regulations written through DS 041-2002-PCM. To get the regulations written was an arduous task for the women’s movement. Leaders of independent kitchens and NGO activists had been working together since the previous decade to get the law’s regulations in place. Blondet had ties to an NGO that, in addition, had worked for a long time with the CPs. She was thus the ideal person for the movement. Blondet believed that the state owed it to women to write the law’s regulations: “It was a historical debt to women who had won their recognition” (interview), and thus it was one of her major priorities. On May 24, 2002, more than ten years after its passage, Law 25307 had its regulations (box 2).

**Box 2. Regulations of Law 25307**

The first articles of the regulations establish that OSBs should become formal organizations, registering in Public Registries and in municipalities. “These organizations are recognized with their registry in Public Registries with the sole requirement that they present a municipal resolution that authorizes that they be registered” (DS 041-2002-PCM, art. 5). In addition, the sixth and seventh articles establish that OSBs have books for documenting membership and minutes of meetings, which should include

- the General Assembly of Associates (the supreme organ)
- the Board of Directors (executive organ)
- other information required by bylaws (DS 041-2002-PCM, art. 7)

The ninth article would be of tremendous importance for the creation of the scenario of organizations that would come into being in the country. It requires that: “the OSBs of second or greater level must guarantee that they represent at least twenty per cent (20%) of first level OSBs registered in that jurisdiction” (DS 041-2002-PCM, art. 9). That is, by means of this article, any district level organization must prove that it represents at least 20% of the community kitchens in the district in order to be formally recognized. And thus, metropolitan organizations should have as affiliates at least a fifth of district organizations. Therefore, the law does not require a single organization monopolizing the scene but it does put limits on fragmentation (there might exist a maximum of five organizations of second or higher level). This disposition presupposed that all higher level organizations had to guarantee a specific

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12 We should emphasize that the efforts of NGOs were extremely important and decisive for the movement, but only for some social organizations: in the case of both community kitchens and Glass of Milk committees (as we will see in the following section), the NGOs had decided to ally solely with those sectors that described themselves as “independent.” These are the sectors closest to the NGOs, with a perspective that tends to be leftist and reluctant to work with government (a reluctance shared by the NGOs).
degree of representation or they would disappear. Article 15 reaffirms that PRONAA should cover at least 65% of the cost of the daily per capita ration offered by OSBs.

The composition of the Management Committee was also changed and various Management Committees were created. Thus, the National Management Committee is made up of:

- a. Three representatives of OSBs benefitting from the Program, democratically elected among representative institutions of the highest level in their jurisdiction
- b. Two representatives of entities implementing food programs, one of which will correspond to the Women and Human Development Promotion Sector - PROMUDEH
- c. A national representative of democratically elected Local Governments (DS 041-2002-PCM, art. 17).

The Regional Management Committee should be made up of:

- a. Three representatives of the OSBs in the region, democratically elected from among representative institutions of the highest level in their jurisdiction.
- b. Two representatives of the Women and Human Development Promotion Sector (PROMUDEH)

And the Local Management Committees are made up of:

- a. Three representatives of the region’s OSBs, democratically elected from among representative institutions of the highest level in their jurisdiction
- b. Two representatives of the Women and Human Development Promotion Sector (PROMUDEH)
- c. A representative of Local Government (DS 041-2002-PCM, art. 19)

Thus, Management Committees exist at three levels of government. In the case of community kitchens, at this time (end of 2009), there are Regional Management Committees and, throughout the country, local committees in most municipalities. But the case of Lima is special. Lima has been the only region to which social programs have not been transferred. That is, the CP program continues to function within the MIMDES for Lima. Thus, Lima’s Management Committee should function within MIMDES. However, as of this writing it has not been created, according to Ministry functionaries, due to problems with social organizations who have not fulfilled certain legal requirements

Finally, the regulations establish the participation of OSBs in the creation and oversight of programs that PRONAA is in charge of. According to article 24, “OSBs participate in the creation and oversight of food support programs administered by the National Food Assistance Program – PRONAA, through a representative of each, acting as Ad Honorem delegates, with voice and vote, in the central and decentralized administrative organs (DS 041-2002-OCM, art. 24). This article established two important points. On the one hand, the participation of social organizations in the implementation of the program that directly affects them and, on the other, recognition of the fragmentation among OSBs, and thus the designation of one representative from each existing organization. This is evident in the third,
complementary disposition, that establishes the following: “Members of the First Committee of National Management, in representation of Social Grassroots Organizations, include: the Representative of the Federation of Women Organized in Central Committees of Independent Community Kitchens and similar organizations in Lima and Callao, the Representative of the Metropolitan Coordinating Committee Association of Mothers Clubs and the Representative of the Metropolitan Coordinating Committee of the Glass of Milk Committees, in light of their outstanding efforts on behalf of the development of the Social Organizations of our country. In addition, members of the First National Management Committee may include the Representative of the National Coordinating Committee of Mothers’ Clubs and Community Kitchens or of any other grassroots social organizations. In all cases, organizations should accredit their current recognition as a Grassroots Social Organization” (DS 041-2002-PCM, third complementary disposition). In other words, the participation of two large community kitchen organizations is accepted (the independent and the organization created during the aprista administration) and the entry of a third (the fujimorista) is allowed. (See chart at the end of this section, with the specific major characteristics of these organizations.)

(END OF BOX)

The regulations for Law 27307 formalized the OMAs, requiring that they comply with a series of procedures and ways of working. They had at last been recognized by the state, but they were also subject to a series of obligations which set limits on their work as social movement organizations. The regulations changed the rules of the game. They had a dual influence: both on the way in which OMAs should function from now on, as well as on the way they would relate to one another and to the state. A series of procedures was created, to which OMAs had to adhere, as well as new entities in which they were to develop dialogue and negotiations. This meant that, unlike the other two social movements studied, in this case dialogue with the state was institutionalized, via formal channels. As a consequence, other ways of making themselves heard, such as marches and demonstrations, were no longer a priority.

The administration of Alejandro Toledo had begun a strong decentralization process at the national level, for which the National Council for Decentralization (CND, Spanish acronym) was created. According to the CND’s timeline, at the end of October 2003, a process of transfer of social welfare programs to provincial governments began throughout the country. In the case of the CPs, by the end of 2009, the program had been transformed to local governments, with the exception of Lima. In Lima, the MML had not received the program (it seems this was due to objections from the MML itself), as a result of which it remained under the Ministry of Women.

By the end of the first five years of the new decade, the independent kitchens had consolidated again, after a very difficult decade. This facilitated the creation, in 2005, of the National Confederation of Organized Women for Life and Integral Development (CONAMOVIDI, Spanish acronym). With the creation of CONAMOVIDI, the national scenario of community kitchens was defined. Today, there are

\[13\] It no longer exists.
three large organizations at the level of metropolitan Lima, but only two of these have a national organizational structure (the independent and the fujimorista). They tend to differ according to party affiliation: some are known as “leftists” or “independent,” other as “apristas” and the third as “fujimoristas.” But, in fact, these are only labels that do not represent what is actually going on. After the Fujimori government, during which organizations lost autonomy and had to subordinate themselves to a government that attempted to co-opt and manipulate them, today organizations defend their independence. This has become one of the major principles which these organizations go to great lengths to defend. In July 2006, Alan García began his second term as president of Peru, but in spite of this, the organizations known as “aprista” remain autonomous. Its members do take advantage of benefits their contacts make available, but never in exchange for their autonomy. All organizations have learned to relate to persons interested in their work, and they develop ties more to individual congresspersons than to political parties. This is a way to directly reach the interested party and to get that person to make a difference in their favor. And it is also a way in avoid a relationship with a single party. Party affiliation has gone out of favor, beyond what the labels by which they are known might indicate.

In spite of the fact that party affiliations are today no more than labels, in practice we find significant differences among the diverse community kitchen organizations. The group led by FEMOCCPAALM (the independent) values its autonomy and its self-management. It does not want to be a part of the state, but it does want to receive the same benefits other organizations enjoy (whether that be donated food – a demand of the first years of the 1990s – or economic subsidies – a current demand). They look to develop capabilities among women that will allow for changes in leadership. They are, besides, the only CP group that has fluid and close relations with the NGOs,14 with whom they develop proposals and from whom they receive technical, legal and training support. On the other hand, the group known as the “aprista” is politically handled. The leaders, especially Rosa Castillo, know how the state works from within, which facilitates access and the ability to move from within to achieve objectives. They are well-connected to this administration, with a number of key friends in congress. In addition, they receive a government subsidy and fiercely defend it, unwilling to see it vanish or diminish. They do not have significant relations with NGOs or other civil society sectors (such as churches or activists). Finally, the sector led by the Coordinating Committee (the “fujimoristas”) is the smallest group. Since the decade of fujimorismo, they have had a low profile and are not seen in a very positive light by many organizations or NGOs. Theirs is an entrepreneurial perspective. Unlike the independent kitchens, which attempt to promote political leadership, these are concerned about the promotion of business abilities. The goal is that eventually the kitchens disappear and that women create small businesses that generate income. Until then, they look for various ways to get additional income. That is, they promote the generating capacity of income. They have no relations with NGOs or with state sectors. We might say that, currently, this is the least political organization (in spite of their absolute defense of and veneration for former president Fujimori).

Chart 6 indicates the major characteristics of the grassroots dining room organizations today.

14 Especially the feminist NGOs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Way in which they are known</th>
<th>Name of the Metropolitan Center</th>
<th>Metropolitan President</th>
<th>Name of the National Organization</th>
<th>National President</th>
<th>Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“the leftists” or “the self-managing”</td>
<td>FEMOCPPAAALM</td>
<td>María Bozeta</td>
<td>CONAMOVIDI</td>
<td>Relinda Sosa</td>
<td>1977 → National Strike Soup Kitchens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“the apristas”</td>
<td>Coordinating Association of Mothers’ Clubs of Metropolitan Lima</td>
<td>Rosa Castillo</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>1985 → Aprista government, Pilar Nores PAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(dissident sector of “the apristas”)</td>
<td>OSB – Coordinating Association of Mothers’ Clubs and Community Kitchens of Lima and Callao</td>
<td>Aurea Carranza</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“the fujimoristas”</td>
<td>Departamental Coordinating Committee of Lima of Mothers’ Clubs and Community Kitchens</td>
<td>María Luisa Ruiz</td>
<td>National Coordinating Committee of Mothers’ Clubs and Community Kitchens</td>
<td>Gabriela Pastor</td>
<td>There is no single origin. A mixture of Violeta Correa Community Kitchens (1980), kitchens created by <em>fujimorismo</em>, and others At the end of the Fujimori government, the metropolitan organization was created and, in 2001, the national organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the authors
During 2009, the movement has focused its activities on two large issues: the economic subsidy and the focalization system promoted by the Ministry of the Economy and Finance (MEF). In term of the former, the independent kitchens, which did not receive the subsidy because they had not registered with PAD during the first aprista administration, have been demanding a level playing field. Finally, this year an agreement was reached among the central committees, except for the “aprista” committee and a document was signed granting the economic subsidy to all central committees. While a change in ministers suddenly brought these plans to an end, this is an important example of how the movement has managed to present proposals and to dialogue and negotiate with government entities, primarily through instances of institutionalized dialogue. In addition, it reflects the differences within the movement, given that one sector never supported the demand. This is not a solid, consolidated movement, but, rather, still experiences internal distances and conflicts.

As for focalization, the Ministry of the Economy and Finances (MEF) began to implements the Home Focalizations System (SISFHO, Spanish acronym), a tool intended to identify families who qualify as potential beneficiaries of social programs and compare these to the list of beneficiaries of programs such as the Community Kitchens and the Glass of Milk programs. The grassroots urban women’s movement had intense negotiations with the state on this issue. At base, the problem was different ways of understanding poverty. We will return to this subject in section 3.5.

2.4 Glass of Milk Committees
2.4.1 Major characteristics of the Glass of Milk Committees

The CVLs offer breakfast. Beneficiaries receive a glass of milk (thus, the program’s name) and cereals. Unlike the CPs, beneficiaries do not consume the meal in a specific place, but take it home. The Glass of Milk program is a municipal initiative. No beneficiary should pay to receive food. However, as in the previous case, mothers have to prepare it. The milk and cereal are donated (not by PRONAA, but by municipalities). According to estimates by leaders, the state provides 20% of the ration (donating the milk and uncooked cereal) and leaders provide the other 80% (unpaid labor, fuel, electricity, water and cinnamon). Women begin to prepare the meal at around four in the morning and deliver it at seven, working for three hours. Because they do not charge for the meal and CVOs have to obtain income in order to survive, given that they assume 80% of the costs, they charge each beneficiary a weekly payment of S/. 1.00 (one new sol).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Weekly payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
<td>S/. 1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cases (very few)</td>
<td>S/. 0.00 + labor for the Committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the authors
Beneficiaries are children between 0 and 6 years of age, pregnant and lactating mothers (first priority), and children from 7 to 13, people suffering from TBC and the elderly (second priority). Unlike the Community Kitchens, the CVL do not regularly serve those unable to pay, referred to as “social cases” (in part because the payment is a minimal weekly amount). However, it is understood that if a family with eligible beneficiaries cannot pay for some reason, they will nevertheless receive the food in exchange for the mother’s help with the Committee’s work.

The committees are organized into two large metropolitan central committees. Each district contributes economically to the organization. The largest districts (with more Committees) have to pay S/.10.00 monthly, the smallest pay S/. 5.00. This is the major source of income of second tier organizations. In addition, their relationship is directly with district municipalities in their jurisdiction and with the MML, unlike the CP which deal with PRONAA.

2.4.2 History of the Glass of Milk Committees

Within the history of the Glass of Milk Committees run several major themes that are highlighted in the following analysis; these include the movements internal disputes, focused especially on leaders; the relation with the state and political parties; and the relation of this movement with businesses or other potentially corrupting agents and the effect this can have within the organizations.

2.4.2.1. The 1980s: appearance and strengthening of the Glass of Milk Committees

The major difference between the CPs and the CVLs has to do with their origins. The first community kitchens, appearing at the end of the 1970s, were an initiative of citizens who, in light of the political and economic crisis, saw the need to organize in order to offer food. They were a social creation. However, the Glass of Milk program was a political creation by a local government. In 1983, Alfonso Barrantes Lingán, founder and leader of the United Left (IU, Spanish acronym) coalition, was elected mayor of Lima. In April of the following year, he began implementing the Glass of Milk Program. It was a program that functioned with committees run by mothers with state assistance. At the beginning, the program existed only in metropolitan Lima and was aimed at mothers and children. “The design was a system for distributing milk rations among minors from 0 to 5 years 11 months of age, and among women who were pregnant or breastfeeding, and to reinforce the diet of children 6 and 7 years of age during vacations, given that during the school year, they were served by the ministries of health and education. But the basic idea was the participation of mothers through grassroots committees at the zone, district, and metropolitan levels” (García 2001: 15).

The Glass of Milk program was a success and committees quickly multiplied throughout the city. Organized mothers demanded formalization of the program, and at the end of 1984, on December 5, more than 25,000 mothers from 33 districts organized a demonstration (García 2001: 33). They marched on Congress to demand that the program become official through passage of a law. The first major triumph of this sector of the grassroots urban women’s movement was quickly achieved, and on January 6, 1985, Law 24059 was passed, making the program official in cities throughout Peru. That is, it was no
longer a program limited to Lima, but a national program, intended to serve the “mother-infant population, including children from 0 to 6 years of age, pregnant and breastfeeding mothers with a right to a daily ration of 250 cc of milk or a nutritional equivalent from the state through municipal government at no cost to the beneficiaries” (Law 24059, art. 1).

Law 24059 was the first major victory of women participating in the Glass of Milk program. It was the first time women made a public appearance on the national political agenda (and in city streets), and they did it based on a rights discourse. When the law was passed, women wanted to reinforce the fact that it had been their achievement and that, for the first time, they used a rights discourse to defend their goals. A few days after the bill was signed into law, mothers distributed flyers with this message:

“Sister, this law is not a favor congress people have done for us. It is the result of our efforts, as organized mothers, to get the state to support the task we have undertaken in favor of our children so that even when the administration changes, the Glass of Milk is guaranteed for all children throughout Peru. And for that reason, we marched in the streets, making our voices heard. So this is not a gift from political parties or the administration; it is a right won by our organization which is fighting for the survival and a better future for our children” (García 1994: 102).

This was the first appearance of a strong organization that, like the CPs, defended its autonomy. Members made it clear that the program was not available because they were poor but because it was a right they possessed.

In mid-August of the same year (1985), the first Metropolitan Assembly of Glass of Milk Committees was held, with 1,200 mother-coordinators from 33 districts participating (García 1992: 18). The Glass of Milk was becoming consolidated as a major program in Lima, one that promoted the organization of women. Mothers of the Glass of Milk committees became, in less than a year, an organized group within society, making their voices heard and eager to participate in the country’s political agenda. This was evident in December 1985, when they again took to the streets to demand the financing necessary to comply with Law 25307. They succeeded once more, getting the program included in the Public Budget for 1986.

In October 1986, the mothers organized again, after the previous year’s annual assembly, and held the First Metropolitan Convention of Glass of Milk Committees (García 2001: 35). At that event, they agreed on the need to create a metropolitan coordinating committee to represent the organization. Until then, district committee existed but there had been no coordinating entity to bring all of them together. After two days of meetings, on October 26, they elected the first board of directors of the Metropolitan Coordinating Committee, led by Teresa Aparcana.

Finally, 1986 would end with one of the most important political decisions for the program. The Municipality of Lima and the Glass of Milk Metropolitan Coordinating Committee (recently created) signed an agreement that authorized co-management of the program. The agreement regulated dealings between district and metropolitan authorities and those of the Glass of Milk Committees. Thus,
a program that had begun as an initiative by a local government was now to be implemented by the state and civil society. It was no longer simply a state program but one based on co-management. It continues to be today. The agreement was ratified at the end of 1987 by Lima’s new mayor, Jorge Del Castillo. In addition, the following year the municipality established that the Glass of Milk program would be a de-concentrated organ of the MML, for which purpose a Steering Committee was created, made up of four representatives of different political parties and two representatives of the VL Metropolitan Coordinating Committee.

During the crisis of the 1980s, programs like the CPs or the VLs, that offered food at minimal cost, multiplied in the city. According to García Naranjo, in January 1986 there were 7,220 Glass of Milk committees in metropolitan Lima. Four years later, in January 1990, metropolitan Lima had 10,230 CVLs (García 1992: 22; chart 7). The CVLs had multiplied in the city, meeting a growing demand.

Chart 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>7,220</td>
<td>7,150</td>
<td>7,306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 1980s witnessed the strengthening of these new organizations. The Glass of Milk Committees were created as a municipal initiative, but that did not presuppose that they were simply recipients of social support. From the beginning, they were created as social groups with their own objectives, whose members made demands of and negotiated with the state. They were thus able to achieve changes in legislation of importance to them. In this first period, the organizations were strengthened internally and there were no major internal disputes or disputes among leaders. These were years, above all, in which they fought for their objectives and became an important actor on the city’s agenda.

2.4.2.2 Fujimorism: approaches to the administration and internal divisions

In the new decade, with a new government, the work of OSBs was recognized through Law 25307 of 1991, as indicated above. By the end of 1991, the mothers of the CVLs had their first contact with those of the CPs. Until then, each group had worked on its own, although their objectives were to satisfy the same needs (food) of the same group of beneficiaries (the poorest members of the population). Law 25307 recognized both programs as part of the same sector (OSB for food support), and that became the first basis on which the organizations came into contact with one another. As we indicated, the origins are the major difference between the organizations, and they were also a source of distancing. The CPs, as an initiative of the population, were in contact with parishes and activists. In addition, the independent CPs had close alliances with NGOs. On the other hand, the VL was always a municipal program. It began as an initiative of local government and not the population. Thus, it always had contacts with municipal functionaries. The leaders of the VL did not have relationships with churches nor with NGOs (beyond some isolated cases). An indicator of this situation is the fact that while there are numerous academic studies of the CPs, there is very little information on the VLs (beyond a
particular case, by an advisor of a CVL who worked with an NGO\textsuperscript{15}). They were two distinct types of organization. Each had its own dynamic, which did not facilitate major joint efforts. While from 1991 sporadic coordination has taken place, there exists no institutionalized relationship between the two organizations.

During the Fujimori administration, the Metropolitan Coordinating Committee of the VL ended its autonomous existence and became very close to the governing party. Members participated in political rallies, came out in defense of the president and supported his programs. But not all leaders were in agreement. Thus, in 1999, some members of the organization called for a convention, in which a new board of directors was elected, but was not recognized by the organization. Thus, by the end of 1999, the Glass of Milk Metropolitan Coordinating Committee split. The new organization, made up of women critical of the original board, accused its members of forming an alliance with Fujimorism and participated in Women United for Democracy, a collective that fought for an end to the Fujimori government. In this way, the new group worked with organizations that fought for a return to democracy. Thus it was that contacts were made with a number of NGOs, especially feminist organizations, which had already worked with OMAs, but especially with CPs though not with CVLs.

In light of this situation, the decade witnessed significant changes for the Glass of Milk Committees. The patronage forms of government, characteristic of Fujimorism, led to the Metropolitan Coordinating Committee’s forming a very close relationship with the administration, a relationship of political support characterized by patronage and dependence on the administration. This kind of tie was not agreeable to all the leadership, leading to an internal split. It was during the rule of Fujimori that the Metropolitan Coordinating Committee split, forming two organizations that exist to this day. Unlike the CPs, in which each group of dining halls has its own history, in this case the VL Committees have a common origin, but differing opinions and ways of acting within the group led to the separation. The differences between the two would continue in the following decade.

\textbf{2.4.2.3 The new millennium: consolidation of the split and different action styles}

During 2000, the two leadership groups had a series of discussion and fights, for example, over the organization’s name. Finally, the dissident organization maintained the title of “coordinating committee,” and registered as such in the MML, obtaining official recognition. In September 2000, the mothers of the Coordinating Committee took to the streets in protest, demanding an increase in its budget and rejecting government meddling. Members defended their autonomy and criticized the work of the other metropolitan organization, charging that they were working with Fujimorist congresspersons in order to get more members and win votes in elections. A month later, they called for another march, in which more than a thousand mothers gathered at the building of the Congress of the Republic to request a budget increase (García 2001: 97). In this way, the differing tendencies of the two groups representing the CVL swere made manifest: on the one hand, the Fujimorist sector, on the other, the opposition.

\textsuperscript{15} García (1992, 1994, 2001)
By the end of 2001, Fujimori resigned as president of the Republic and Valentín Paniagua was sworn in as head of the Transition Government. Among the measures he took is the signing of Law 27470, establishing complementary norms for implementation of the Glass of Milk program. Through this law, the Administration Committees were created, which were to be made up of “the mayor, a municipal functionary, a functionary of MINSA and three representatives of the organization of the Glass of Milk program” (Law 27407, art. 2, clause 1). This law extended greater power to social organizations, by creating said committees.

After some changes in leadership, leading to Pilar Britto being elected as president of the Organization of CVLs in 2002 (the original organization) and, in 2003, Ivonne Tapia as president of the Coordinating Committee (the dissident organization), today we have two large Glass of Milk metropolitan organizations. In spite of the public presence at the end of the Fujimori government and contacts with other actors, such as NGOs, the Coordinating Committee (today led by Tapia) is the smaller of the two and, thus, the less representative. The leaders themselves recognize that the organization began in a weak state, working in only a few districts and that they had to grow little by little. Today, at the end of Tapia’s second period in the presidency, there are more CVLs affiliated, but the number is still significantly below that of the VL Organization led by Britto. This organization does not recognize the existence of the dissidents. They claim that they are not representative and consist only of women leaders with little support from the grassroots. For its part, the Coordinating Committee accuses Britto and the rest of the leadership of being allied no longer with a political party but with Leche Gloria, a milk producer.

Accusations of an alleged alliance between the organization led by Britto and Leche Gloria are the result of a discussion that took place in 2009. The Coordinating Committee wanted to end the use of

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16 This would become a form of organization parallel to the Management Committees of the community kitchens.
17 The Administration Committee was responsible for electing food providers (Law 27407, art. 2, clause 2) who would be members of various VL committees. In addition it was established that beneficiaries would be “children from 0 to 6 years, pregnant and breastfeeding mothers, with priority to those who are malnourished or affected by tuberculosis. In addition, to the extent that attention is provided to the population described, attention will also be extended to children from 7 to 13 years of age, the elderly and those affected by tuberculosis” (Law 27409, art. 6).
18 Both remain in office to the present (end of 2009), which demonstrates the tendency of OMAs to be lead by “eternal board members.”
19 In March, the Coordinating Committee, led by Tapia, demanded the publication of a report by CONSUCODE that recommended that only whole milk be distributed. MINSA paid attention to the demand, and at the end of April, Britto’s organization began a series of protests, claiming that MINSA planned to eliminate children between 7 and 13 years of age as beneficiaries, and that whole milk costs more than processed milk, so that the same budget would serve fewer beneficiaries. Although MIMDES and MINSA denied this, the protests continued. On May 5, while Britto met with then Premier Yehude Simon, the Coordinating Committee, the opposing group, protested at the PCM, demanding that the norms be changed so that any company could deliver milk to the program. Britto was described as corrupt for allegedly looking to benefit Leche Gloria by insisting that processed milk be delivered, in spite of the fact that CONSUCODE has determined that it did not satisfy nutritional requirements (Diario La Primera, May 5, 2009). On May 15, MINSA changed the norm, via Ministerial Resolution 330-2009/MINSA, that approved the minimum nutritional requirements of the program’s ration. As a direct consequence, the Britto faction announced a huge march to protest the resolution. In light of this threat, MINSA repealed the norm, before
processed milk in the program, but the CVL Organization protested against this possibility. According to charges from Tapia and company, this was due to the fact that the company delivering the processed milk is Leche Gloria, with which the CVL Organization has an alliance. This subject demonstrates how interventions to alleviate poverty (in this case, through action by both the state and the Leche Gloria company) can become instruments of high level corruption, or can at least create a perception of corruption. This corruption then has consequences for the internal dynamics of the social organizations involved with these programs, in this case, the Glass of Milk Committees and their metropolitan central committees.

**Chart 8**

**Glass of Milk Organizations toward the end of 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the organization</th>
<th>How it is known</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>National organization</th>
<th>Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Glass of Milk Coordinating Committee for Lima – Peru</td>
<td>Not very representative, with links to NGOs (dissident group)</td>
<td>Ivonne Tapia</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1984 Barrantes creates the Glass of Milk program. 1999 At a congress, a faction opposed to the president calls for an election and creates a new board of directors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the authors

The current context of the Glass of Milk organizations is described in Chart 8. As with the community kitchens, the Glass of Milk program also split. In this case, the division is only a decade old and was the result of practices by the Fujimori administration. Currently, there is no major tie between the two organizations: each has an independent relationship with the state and with other actors. While the VL Organization has contacts with private businesses (which would facilitate, for example, the donation of a

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the march took place. In spite of this victory, Britto’s organization took to the streets to make its voice and its presence felt. The Coordinating Committee stated that this proved Britto’s ties to Leche Gloria, and thus it was in her interests that processed milk continue to be distributed. It is assumed that Britto’s organization receives some sort of compensation for this defense of the company, through donations to the organization and its leadership. Both organizations see this process as positive: while the norm was repealed and matters returned to their original state, the very fact that it had been emitted constitutes a great achievement, Tapia and her followers believe. For her part, Britto and her supporters are satisfied with their successful defense of the status quo.
television and a DVD player to each district organization during the anniversary celebration of the organization in 2008), the Coordinating Committee maintains close ties with feminist NGOs. The disputes between the two leaderships reflect two types of management: one linked to the government at one point and then to private enterprise, and the second linked to NGOs. The approaches of these sectors have consequences for the internal dynamics of the committees, some more vulnerable to possible acts of corruption, but achieving economic benefits and with a more “entrepreneurial” mentality; and the others emphasizing their autonomy, taking advantage of technical ability and the ability to present proposals, but much less representative and with less support due to a reduced base.

Chart 9

Total Programmed Base Committees and Beneficiaries, Metropolitan Lima 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Committees</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Lima</td>
<td>12,923</td>
<td>831,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lima</td>
<td>11,331</td>
<td>767,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callao</td>
<td>1,592</td>
<td>63,878</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INEI (2009).

As we saw in the previous section, in 2009 the state decided to implement the SISFHO. The Organization, which is larger and more representative, undertook a census together with INEI, which validated the registry. In June the INEI presented a report based on these statistics, stating that in metropolitan Lima there were almost 13,000 Committees and more than half a million beneficiaries (Chart 9). Compared to almost two decades earlier, the number of CVLs had increased, but not exponentially. This reflects the population’s urgent need for this service, though the need has not increased significantly. In terms of SISFHO, within both VL organizations there are criticisms regarding its application, especially because there is disagreement about the way in which poverty is measured. Thus, while it is true that they comply with the census, they remain critical about state attempts to regulate who is poor and who is not and, therefore, decide who can benefit from the program, a responsibility that has always been in the hands of the CVL leadership, and which they would like to maintain.

3. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

As we have noted, there are three major women’s organizations dedicated to providing food: the Community Kitchens, the Mothers’ Clubs and the Glass of Milk Committees. The first two were separate organizations at the beginning while, in some cases, the latter have been assimilated into the former. It seems that today we have a basic level of organization and articulation basically in the Community Kitchens and the Glass of Milk Committees.

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20 See Chart 7.
21 In other cases, the Mothers’ Clubs have remained independent organizations but without joining together and dedicated to activities unrelated to food.
As we have also indicated, the major differences among the Community Kitchens, the Mothers’ Clubs and the Glass of Milk Committees is due to their origins and the way they function. Currently, all of the original Community Kitchens and Glass of Milk Committees have split. Thus, we find two Glass of Milk organizations and three (or even four) Community Kitchen organizations. Formally, there are three Community Kitchen central committees. However, one of these (directed by Rosa Castillo) has experienced internal divisions: one faction, led by Aurea Carranza, has split from the group and these leaders claim to be its legitimate representatives.

In this section, we will present the major conclusions based on the current situation of both the Community Kitchens and the Glass of Milk Committees, an analysis of their relationship with the state and other actors (primarily NGOs, churches, and political parties), a discussion about the discourse on poverty by the movement and the state, a description of the three management models that we believe are competing both within the movement and within the state, and, finally, a discussion on whether we can speak of a “social movement” made up of urban grassroots women.

3.1 Community Kitchens

There are different Community Kitchen organizations, with distinct origins. In general, the three moments most important in the creation of Community Kitchens have been:

- In 1977, soup kitchens appeared, an initiative of the population to support labor union members fired as a result of the national work stoppage and the national teachers’ strike. Subsequently, with support from Catholic Church groups, the soup kitchens turned into Independent Community Kitchens.
- Between 1980 and 1985, the Family Kitchens were created by First Lady Violeta Correa, with government support but without any significant links to the already existing community kitchens.
- Between 1985 and 1990, the Aprista government, led by First Lady Pilar Nores, created the Mothers’ Clubs, associated with PAD (Direct Support Program), which included kitchens and production workshops. The kitchens created in the 1970s or during the Belaunde administration could only receive state subsidies if they affiliated with PAD.

Thus, through state actions by a series of administrations, the creation of community kitchens was promoted within a relationship of political dependency, recruiting participants as supporters of the ruling party rather than of the state or as members of an independent movement. With each change in government, the existing kitchens were abandoned by the new administration. In addition, there were no efforts to work with kitchens from the previous period due to mistrust and reluctance generated by the circumstances of their creation and maintenance. As a result, to date the work relationship among the Community Kitchen organizations is almost nonexistent (as is the relationship between these and the Glass of Milk organizations). It is not clear whether this situation is a consequence of conscious intentions by administrations or the unintentional product of political styles based on patronage.
As a result of these processes, today we have three Community Kitchen metropolitan central committees with different origins, histories, and orientations, though, in practice, these differences are mostly limited to leadership levels because, according to leaders and specialists we interviewed, among the membership, the objectives, activities and aspirations are virtually the same and among grassroots social organizations, pragmatism has always prevailed over ideological or party identification and this tendency has been reinforced beginning with the return to democracy. It is the leaders who have a greater ideological and party identification, but even among them the intensity of party loyalty has diminished with the weakening of political parties in general, a phenomenon noted in earlier chapters. What has remained among the leadership is a general political orientation and the network of contacts associated with their affiliation to a political party combined with the desire to defend the autonomy of their organizations from political manipulation in order to maintain the loyalty of their bases and maximize their own field of action.

According to comments made in various interviews, in practice there are kitchens without any political affiliation. And there are also kitchens in sectors affiliated to the central committee of other sectors (for example, “Aprista” dining halls affiliated with the “leftist” central committee). This fluidity in affiliations indicates that today pragmatism reigns and the alleged party identification at the community kitchen level is little more than a left-over from another time.

Two of the three community kitchen sectors have a national organization (the CONAMOVIDI and the National Coordinating Committee of Mothers’ Clubs and Community Kitchens) and in Lima there is a certain degree of coordination and consultation between FEMOCCPALM and the dissident organization led by Rosa Castillo. They participated together in meetings with the former viceminister for Women, a fact that has forced them to undertake some coordination. It seems that in Lima there is more organization and institutionalization than in the provinces, a fact that could be due to the centralism that characterizes the country and is also seen in the human rights movement.

As a result of these historical processes, there is a social movement divided among representative organizations with different organizational histories and cultures. This situation tends to generate competition and makes coordination and working together difficult. Through the years, competition for the loyalty of community kitchens based on political affiliation has weakened as a factor and practical benefits have gained ground. Some of these benefits may be the result of political affiliation but if this relation is perceived or felt as subordination of the organization, there is a danger that the loyalty of the bases will be lost. The long struggle of each organization making up the movement to become independent of political party domination has led to greater emphasis on pragmatic solutions to the immediate needs of members, leaving aside, in large part, possible agendas that are more inclusive and possible alliances with other social movement. However, this same struggle for autonomy also gives the organizations greater liberty to define themselves without interference from other influences in their objectives and priorities, and the option to seek common agendas and greater collaboration or not to do so. These are opportunities that have yet to be taken advantage of.

3.2 Glass of Milk Committees
Together with their mutual concern for food and nutritional matters, the Glass of Milk Committees and the Community Kitchens have both experienced internal divisions. In the case of the Glass of Milk, we find two organizations whose leaderships do not work or dialogue with one another (worse, neither recognizes the other). The majority of organizations exist at the metropolitan Lima level. There is still no national organization for Glass of Milk committees, though both organizations in metropolitan Lima state that they intend to create one. There would seem to be much more organization and institutionalization in Lima than in the provinces and, as with the community kitchens, there are very few men involved in this area, either from social organizations or from NGOs. However, an important difference is origin: the Glass of Milk Committees were an initiative of the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima that later was extended to include municipalities throughout the country. Thus, there is no direct relation between the committees and their organizations and the national government, as there is in the case of the Community Kitchens and their organizations. The relationship exists with local governments.

While it is true that the two VL metropolitan organizations work toward the same end, there are differences between the two:

- The group led by the Organization of Glass of Milk Committees of Lima and Callao (president: Pilar Britto) is a representative organization. It is accused of having ties currently with the Leche Gloria company and of having been allied with Fujimorism in the 1990s. It has no work relationship with NGOs nor, it would seem, with the state. It has a pragmatic and entrepreneurial vision: it looks to generate additional income. In addition, it has business knowledge and also knows how to approach companies to establish agreements and receive donations. It knows how to manage political matters and what to do to strengthen the work relationship in co-management with municipalities and how to generate the greatest benefits for itself.

- The group led by the Metropolitan Glass of Milk Coordinating Committee for Lima – Peru (president: Ivonne Tapia) is a smaller organization and is regrouping after a difficult decade. It has no ties with businesses or the state, but maintains significant alliances with NGOs which provide support and advice. It insists on the autonomy of the organization.

With the Glass of Milk Committees, it would seem that the reasons for the division have to do with attempts by Fujimorist congresspersons to subordinate the Glass of Milk Committees through “co-opting” the leadership of the Metropolitan Coordinating Committee (Garcia Naranjo 2001). In large part, the split of the Coordinating Committee into two organizations was the result of a struggle at the end of the 1990s between the Fujimori administration attempting to remain in power and opposition forces seeking a restoration of democracy. Thus, the organization led by Ivonne Tapia presented itself as “independent” and that of Pilar Britto as effective in providing its members with benefits, though through clear informal ties with Fujimorist congresspersons.

The relations observed between the Leche Gloria company and the Glass of Milk central committee headed by Pilar Britto suggest that, beyond the company’s motives, when a powerful external actor
establishes ties with one movement organization and not another, this introduces asymmetries that easily lead to conflicts. That, in turn, weakens the organizations and the movement, both internally and within the public debate, as a result of all the insinuations made in the media and among rivals and potential allies. On the other hand, in spite of the fact that the more direct relationship, at least in Lima, between the Community Kitchen organizations and the national government makes the former potentially more susceptible to political pressure, judging by the number of charges in the media, the Glass of Milk Committees and their organizations are more susceptible to political pressure from municipal government and, together with these, to temptations to corruption from the private sector.

As with other cases, here we see reflected the difficulty the movement has in controlling the discourse. From the movement, a rights discourse is used, but in the end a discourse (and a practice) based on poverty and compensations prevails. As with the other two cases, from the movement rights are spoken of, but from the state, there is a preference to talk about poverty. And that is, finally, what happens. This demonstrates the movement’s inability to control the discourse.

### 3.3 Relations with the state

The two processes discussed share the characteristic of receiving a subsidy to complement the efforts of independent organizations, and not organisms of the state itself. In this sense, both represent a joint effort between the state and grassroots organizations. In the Community Kitchens case, some were created independently of the state and others by the state through promotional activities, while in the Glass of Milk Committees case, these are the product of promotional efforts by city governments. In any event, both programs are carried out through an alliance between the state and grassroots organizations. However, this alliance has not been free of tensions.

The closeness of the relation between grassroots organizations and the state is something that distinguishes these organizations from those of other social movements, which often find themselves at odds with the state, and have converted demand and the defense of autonomy into a constant in the struggle of the grassroots urban women’s movement. Through the years the organizations have been gradually freeing themselves from the control by and dependence on the administration in power, something which was very difficult during the Fujimori administrations. However, within these organizations (though perhaps to a lesser degree in the “leftist” organizations), patronage relations are maintained between leaders and membership through the loyalty and support from the latter in exchange for benefits and services from the former.

The search for the maintenance of autonomy and the rejection of any attempt at state control has also led all the organizations, both the Community Kitchens and the Glass of Milk groups, to adopt a discourse that differentiates the program from the organization, as a way to defend themselves from critics and affirm their autonomy. In this way, while it is true that the government may have a legitimate influence on matters related to the program, it may not as regards the organization: it may not dictate who can be members and who cannot, or how the organizations should be run internally. The differentiation between program and organization indicates a difference in legitimized spheres of
influence, reflecting a discourse that looks to legitimate its functioning using technical and legal tools. This may also be the product of advice from NGOs or other organisms.

During the quarter century of their existence, the CVLs have had to deal with their own differences and internal divisions while being subject to outside influences and pressures, especially from political parties and the administration in power. Both the organizations of the CPs and those of the CVLs have been perceived as channels for access to and control over significant flows of voters and some mayors continue to perceive them as such. During this period, women of both currents of the movement have affirmed their identity as citizens with rights as opposed to poor people with unsatisfied needs, often in opposition to the state discourse which has favored patronage and social welfare practices.

On the other hand, unlike other social movements, that of grassroots urban women is a movement whose relationship with the state is fairly well institutionalized: channels for dialogue have been established, all of the organizations are recognized as spokespersons for their membership, they are familiar with means to present proposals and protests, they administer resources provided by the state, etc. The Community Kitchens are related to MIMDES and PRONAA. The Glass of Milk Committees are related to the municipalities. In both cases there is a struggle for funds assigned by the national government. In the latter case, in addition, there is a demand for co-management. In order to achieve co-management and to legitimate their demands for an increase in the budget assigned by the state, legal status is a key point. Thus, many Glass of Milk committees and Community Kitchens are in the process of obtaining administrative recognition from the municipality (this is true only for the Glass of Milk Committees) and registering the organizations in the Public Registries (in both cases). For that reason, in addition, for all women with leadership positions, familiarity with current legislation is very important.

Both organizations greeted the passage of the OSB law (25307) as a major triumph, and, particularly in the Glass of Milk case, that of law 24059. In addition, all are familiar with and work according to the norm establishing the minimum percentage of representation of OSB (20%) required for recognition by the state. This is one more example of the way the organizations seek to comply with the lay, fulfilling norms and benefitting as a result. This is a movement in which there are greater possibilities for coproduction with the state. Thus, the law is the basis on which the two can more easily come together, a characteristic that distinguishes them from the other two movements studied. And this is related to something that we have also seen in the other movements: the diminishing strength of the movement in follow-up as regards implementation of policies. For example, law 25307 was passed thanks to the movement’s efforts. But more than a decade passed before the regulations were in place and up to the present the state does not provide the 65% of rations required. This is an example of how the movement had the strength to achieve a specific policy, but once that policy entered state and bureaucratic territory, the movement lost the ability to follow up on its (correct) implementation. In this respect, there are similarities with the Amazon indigenous movement in Corrientes River.

This close relationship with the state, and the partial though significant dependence on its financial support, and, above all, on food, have turned the state subsidy into a source of conflict within
Community Kitchens, implying that the program/organization distinction is more a matter of discourse and identity than a reality in practice. The fact that there is a Kitchen group that receives a subsidy is not due to any party affiliation in the present, nor to aprista membership, but it could be that the subsidy has the effect of producing greater loyalty (or less criticism) of the administration in power, in order to defend the subsidy. This was important when organizations first began signing up for the subsidy (in the 1980s), but it is not relevant in the present. For this reason, the subsidy is under discussion today and represents an obstacle to the unification of the movement, demonstrating that political and ideological difference from past decades still have an influence in the current stage of the movement and perhaps suggesting the existence of a weak, insufficiently institutionalized movement.

The relations between OMAs and the state are complex. They differentiate this from other grassroots movements and contribute to questioning of their legitimacy as a movement. Partial dependence on the state for financing of their activities gives rise to doubts about their autonomy, doubts reinforced by the origins of many kitchens and all committees, the political affiliations of some of their leaders and the political manipulation of leaders by national government in the past (especially during the Fujimori administrations) and some municipal governments in the present. For example, according to Portocarrero et al. (2000: 234), during the Fujimori government, the beneficiaries of Community Kitchens “were forced to participate [in marches and demonstrations in support of the regime] in exchange for continuing to receive food aid. What’s more, members indicated that, normally, these activities caused hardship as they did not have the money for their dues and, if they didn’t pay, the kitchen was censured.” It is interesting that currently something similar is happening, but it is not the government or a political party making the demand, but the leadership. For example, it is said that, if the VL Metropolitan Organization decides to take to the streets for a huge march, all members must attend. Those who do not, do not receive food (or receive less). It is the same tool, but the source of pressure has changed, demonstrating that patronage styles of behavior persist in some movement organizations.

Leaders have tried to counteract the tendencies toward political dependence through the search for and strengthening of an institutionalized relationship with the state, expressed in the co-management of social programs through administration committees, in the Glass or Milk Committees case, and management committees, in the Community Kitchen case. For these organizations, supervision of the program is important to avoid corruption in contracting for or delivering food, for which oversight committees exist. It is a way for the movement to deal with the state on an equal footing.

Another way to express its independence as a movement is through demonstrations, especially, but not exclusively, in response to funds assigned to the programs in the annual budget. Women’s organizations organize few demonstrations because they first turn to institutionalized channels for dialogue and negotiation. However, this does not mean that they are not able to get people out (even Pilar Britto’s organization is known for its massive marches). When they have been forced to mobilize, they have done so and, in many cases, with positive results (for example in 2009 the Minister of Health repealed RM 330-2009-MINSA in order to avoid a demonstration). In the words of leaders: “We don’t get mothers out on the streets for nothing.”
Another state sector with which leaders have sought to develop a relationship is Congress. There, relationships have not been with the parties represented in Congress so much as with individual, influential congresspersons, from both the governing party and the opposition. In some cases, these alliances have served to reinforce dependence on the state rather than get free of it or diversify points of support. However, as the state is also relatively fragmented, those contacts have served to get support from state sectors closest to the movement. It is a strategy similar to that used by the other movements discussed. Some organizations have gotten support from specific congresspersons, especially the Glass of Milk Committees organization led by Pilar Britto and the Community Kitchen association directed by Rosa Castillo.

It is interesting to observe that, with the exception of the period of division in the CVLs at the end of the Fujimori government, neither the CP nor the CVL organizations have sought ties with the Public Defenders’ Office, unlike the other two social movements examined. This reflects the fact that, in spite of tensions in their relations with the state, during most of the existence of the Public Defenders’ Office, the movement and its organizations have not felt themselves to be victims of state abuse, as has been the case with the indigenous and human rights movements. It might also reflect the tendencies and preferences within the Public Defenders’ Office.

The study of this movement reinforces the idea that in Peru there are many sectors within the state. In this case, there is no single discourse coming from the state but, rather, different opinions, that might also be in contradiction (for example, differences between MEF and MIMDES). This reflects the existence of a state that includes different tendencies and styles of governing (as we have noted in previous chapters) and also the weakness and limited degree of institutionalization of the state. When functionaries change, so does the opinion of that sector (for example: MIMDES and Vildoso’s replacement of Vilchez as minister). The state is not sufficiently institutionalized to maintain a single discourse regardless of changes in names.

In summary, one can see a give and take relationship between the state and the movement’s grassroots organizations that reflects both its interdependence as well as a desire to either become more independent and autonomous or to subordinate the other party in the relationship. In an interview, the former director of PRONAA characterized this interdependence as “patronage from top to bottom and from bottom to top.” A look at the relationship through time suggests that the movement has experienced periods of dependence on and subordination to the state, but that the tendency has been toward greater autonomy and the gradual construction of a more institutionalized relationship. This reflects recognition both of the women as citizens and of their organizations and movement. But this process remains incomplete.

3.4 Relations with other actors

In spite of its size, in terms of the number of OSBs and individual members, the grassroots urban women’s movement has few relationships with other social movements, grassroots organizations, or
allies. With the exception of periods of demonstrations against the Fujimori government and in defense of democracy, when other organizations participated in marches, the organizations making up the movement do not usually participate in demonstrations of other social movements, though some of its members do as individuals.

However, within both the Community Kitchens and the Glass of Milk Committees there is an organization with ties to the NGOs (the FEMOCOAAALM, in the case of the Kitchens and the organization led by Ivonne Tapia in the Glass of Milk Committees). Both organizations call themselves “autonomous” and reject all state interference. They are also recognized as “leftist.” It would seem that there is a natural relationship among the more leftist organizations and the various NGOs and sectors of the Catholic Church (this is only true for the Community Kitchens that had their beginnings in social issues, the reason for which at the beginning they were supported by the Catholic Church), so that the two have worked together continuously. The NGOs tend to work with these organizations, especially the feminist NGOs, or with researchers concerned with women’s issues and they do not have a significant relationship with other Community Kitchen or Glass of Milk Committee organizations. They work only with those with views similar to their own.

This association seems to be contributing to the institutional strengthening of these organizations whose leaders refer to training and formation activities as a strategy to strengthen internal democracy and assure rotation among leaders. More frequent rotation among leaders and less patronage, which they point to as a characteristic that differentiates FEMOCOAAALM and the Metropolitan Lima-Peru Glass of Milk Coordinating Committee from the movement’s other organizations, seems to be due, in large part, to support from the NGOs. However, there has been little progress in resolving the concerns of the organizations beyond those related to food and nutrition, although this is a subject present in all the organizations, in closer relations of solidarity with other social movements, or in strengthening the feminist identity of members, all of which are desires of the NGOs in their support work with the movement. Currently, they seek to address more subjects, with the presence of health outreach workers, outreach workers in defense of women (against domestic violence), and with small sewing workshops to produce clothing and accessories, which would generate additional income. Today, organizations do not want to concentrate only on the food issue. However, it is not always clear up to what point these activities respond to the movement’s and its organizations’ agenda, and up to what point they are being used as channels for the delivery of services prioritized by others. In other words, it remains to be seen whether they respond to shared agendas or to those of the state and the NGOs.

On the other hand, the role of the Church was important in creating the independent Community Kitchens. Before PRONAA came into being and the Kitchens received food from that institution, most food came from the Church (principally through Cáritas). Today, the kitchens have fluid and cordial relations with some Church sectors, such as CEAS. The Glass of Milk program, on the other hand, was a municipal program from the beginning and never had a significant relationship with the Church.

Another founding institution, of both the Community Kitchens and the Glass of Milk Committees, are the political parties. During their periods in power in the 1980s, the Aprista and the Acción Popular
parties promoted the creation of Community Kitchens. Then, the Izquierda Unida political coalition promoted the Glass of Milk Program and the Glass of Milk Committees from the Municipality of Metropolitan Lima, in the mid-1980s. In the 1990s, the Fujimori government centralized state aid to the Community Kitchens in PRONAA and used the agency, together with key congresspersons, to create parallel organizations and to bribe existing organizations to have their members participate in demonstrations in support of the regime. Today, the relations between movement organizations and political parties have weakened (maybe as a result of the weakening of the parties). While some leaders have party affiliation, it seems that the parties have no desire to co-opt or subordinate the organizations, as was the case in previous decades, and, on the side of the organizations and their leaders, there is a greater interest in defending their autonomy and avoiding institutional party identification. This situation reflects the context of crisis of political parties, which are not the same as they were 20 or 30 years ago and do not have the ability that they had previously to influence social movements and co-opt leadership.

3.5 Discourse on poverty

The Community Kitchens appeared as a response to a crisis situation during the 1970s when thousands of workers were unemployed and with no income. Later, the number of kitchens increased or decreased in accord with the ups and downs of the economy. They represented a spontaneous response to emergencies but their durability indicated the continued existence of poverty among broad sectors of the population which could be understood as a structural, rather than a momentary, situation. The state’s promotion of the creation of Community Kitchens, and the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima’s creation of the Glass of Milk Program (and its subsequent spread through the country), and the state’s contribution of money and food to both programs transformed these initiatives from grassroots responses to passing crisis to a set of commitments between the state and organized grassroots sectors to subsidize that portion of the population trapped in a situation of chronic poverty.

Thus, and in contrast to the other cases studied and to the majority of social movement in the country, the central and explicit objective of the grassroots urban women’s movement has been related to poverty. During most of the movement’s existence, spokespersons have shared with the state a concept of poverty centered on a lack of income. Thus, the need and the obligation to compensate for this situation through the provision of subsidized food to satisfy a basic survival need is affirmed. This basic consensus on the nature of the task has facilitated a joint state-movement effort for almost three decades. During this period, voices have been heard from time to time, both from the state and from civil society (including the movement itself), about the need to move from permanent compensatory social welfare activities associated with emergency situations to development activities designed to create the conditions and capacities so that families experiencing poverty have access to jobs or to a way to generate income in order to satisfy their needs without having to depend on permanent aid. However, in spite of these aspirations and of attempts to put into place programs for the generation of
jobs and income, success has been limited and compensatory food programs have persisted with the same characteristics.\(^{22}\)

In the first decade of the new century, the period of sustained economic growth to the end of 2008 and the strengthening of the sense of citizenship among members and autonomy in organizations created conditions for a debate about the nature and role of social programs. The state participated in this debate (under the influence of the World Bank), on the one hand, and the grassroots urban women’s movement and its allies, on the other. In the debate, there are sectors within the state, especially the Ministry of the Economy and Finance (MEF), that, with support from the World Bank (Stifel and Alderman 2003; Valdivia 2005) and sectors of the national academic community (Vásquez 2006; Vásquez 2008), argue that social programs should be operated by the state in the most efficient way possible and with the specific objective of reducing extreme poverty levels as a first priority, using monetary income as the poverty level indicator. From this perspective, families in situations of poverty are the passive objective of social programs and state functionaries should be the protagonists of interventions to remediate their situation. Thus, programs such as food supplements administered with the participation of the population are “inefficient” and distort objectives. Influenced by the last generation of social programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as Progress/Opportunities in Mexico, Family Exchange in Brazil and Together\(^{23}\) in Peru propose that state aid to lift these families from poverty should include conditions designed to assure that future generations are permanently free from the “curse of poverty.”

On the other hand, the leaders of organizations making up the movement and their allies emphasize that the real “owners” of the food supplement programs are organized members and that the state is an ally that helps with a partial, complementary contribution. Thus, they demand the right to co-manage the programs and to decide who can be a member of their organizations and a recipient of their aid. And this is what differentiates the “program” from the “organization.” They value and emphasize the contributions of the own members, including those who do not receive benefits from the program, both in money and in time and effort and demand the right and the capability to decide who is and who is not “poor” and, thus, who can benefit from the program. Thus, they put clear limits on intervention by state functionaries in program decision-making and actions.

These contrasting visions on the nature of the programs are evident both in discourses on the nature of poverty and its measurement and in opinions about the existence and relevance of filtration and under-coverage of the programs. From the point of view of state functionaries and their allies, the most precise

\(^{22}\) A discussion of the reasons for the limited success of income generating programs by the Mothers’ Clubs, the Glass of Milk Committees and the Grassroots Dining Halls is beyond the scope of this study. The fact is that most of the workshops created no long function and training programs have generated few permanent jobs.

\(^{23}\) In this program, S/.100 is given to focalized homes with pregnant women and/or children from 0 to 14 years of age on the condition that the children from 0 to 5 years are taken to health centers in order to assure their overall health and nutrition, that women of childbearing age and especially pregnant women receive holistic attention and enroll their children from 6 to 14 years of age in school and guarantee their attendance (http://www.juntos.gob.pe/intro.php).
and consistent way to measure poverty is through criteria used by international institutions and
information provided by the National Institute of Statistics and Computerized Data (INEI) in its regular
National Home Census (ENAHO). Thus, they have developed an instrument, the SISFHO (System of
Home Focalization), in order to, in the words of the Minister of Economy and Finance, “reduce to the
maximum filtrations, to identify those who are really the poorest, and to aid to them directly” (Carranza
Ugarte, 2007). In negotiations among the MEF, MIMDES, and the movement on the budget for 2009, the
condition agreed upon to receive money assigned during the second semester was updating the census
of program beneficiaries. The idea was to compare the characteristics of beneficiaries with those from
SISFHO and to use this information to identify benefitting families who do not fulfill SISFHO criteria (the
“infiltrators”) and to replace them with those who do comply but are not beneficiaries (the
“uncovered”).

Though they have been forced to comply with the updating of census data (with the partial exception of
some three hundred Community Kitchens affiliated with the organization led by Rosa Castillo, who
opposed the updating to the end), all leaders are critical of the SISFHO because, in their opinion, they
only take into account some poverty indicators and not others and the surveys are applied by persons
who are not familiar with the neighborhood nor with all aspects of the families’ situations,
characteristics that the leaders of the Kitchens and the Glass of Milk Committees are familiar with.

In part, this discourse is another example of the debate on the validity of scientific versus grassroots
knowledge; and the value of holistic information but with subjective elements versus specific, focused
information. It also reflects differences between state technocrats motivated by a desire to be
“modern,” scientific, and to comply with their objectives in a way that is demonstrably statistical and
objective, and of politicians desirous of showing how their government is lowering the percentage of the
population in situations of poverty and extreme poverty, on the one hand; and grassroots leaders
anxious to legitimate their organizations in the eyes of members and to maintain ties of solidarity and
levels of social organization, on the other. The criteria and mechanisms of inclusions and exclusion used
by grassroots organizations are seen as subjective and anti-technical and conducive to filtration and
under-coverage by technocrats, while in the eyes of leaders, they are seen as just and necessary to
maintain the unity and coherence of their organizations and the loyalty of members. On the other hand,
they fear that the “cold” application of criteria and techniques proposed by functionaries will generate
conflicts, dissent, or the destruction of their organizations and the social capital they represent.

Evidently, this is an inconclusive discussion and one that could heat up when it comes time to decide on
future budgetary assignations. For the moment, according to informants both in the MEF and the
MIMDES (the previous minister was more sympathetic to the movement’s point of view than is the
current minister), the state has opted for collecting information to sustain its point of view with an eye
on the future but has resigned itself to recognizing the political power of the movement on the eve of an
election campaign and, thus, has decided to accept the status quo. Thus, SISFHO will not be applied to
Community Kitchen programs or to the Glass of Milk Committees, and will only be used in programs
implemented by the state. In a recent study, Monge et al. (2009: 10-11) concluded:
“[…] the Community Kitchen has high redistributive potential. The impacts on the individual scale (without taking into account coverage problems) are high when compared with other programs. To be a beneficiary of this program could mean a savings of up to 60% of the family’s per capita spending, among the poorest families. However, the high level of under-coverage by this program (greater than 90%) diminishes its potential: benefits are high, but few receive them […].

“In the case of the Glass of Milk […], under-coverage has also been identified; the infiltration problem tends to condition, in a significant fashion, the distributive results […].”

Infiltration is attributed to “deficient systems of beneficiary graduation along with patterns of impact that encourage the ‘former’ poor (presumably with vulnerability levels still high) to continue benefiting from the program” and to “the rerouting of benefits from the VL to the home” (Monge et al., 2009: 86). To deal with this situation, they recognized the existence of “very high costs in political and social terms” and that “other management problems (such as politicizing and the lack of transparency in executing the program) or that interest groups formed among beneficiaries, lead one to think that these costs could be high” (Monge et al., 2009: 87). Thus, they recommend the creation of graduation systems for social programs that would recognize the ability of beneficiaries to resolve their vulnerabilities and could build bridges between social welfare and human development. To increase coverage, they recommended the creation of an adequate system for identifying beneficiaries and proposed “a single record, defining which social programs the family has the right to and not duplicating identification systems ad hoc” (Monge et al., 2009: 88).

In contrast with the chaos of the indigenous movement, in which the discourse on poverty is centered on a criticism of the very conceptualization of the phenomenon, with the grassroots urban women’s movement there is wider agreement between members of the movement and the state about what it means to be poor. Both focus their discourses on income and unfulfilled needs, especially for food, although women include social and communal aspects not taken into account by state functionaries. The debate in this case centers more on the measurement of poverty and on who has the right to decide who is and who is not poor and who has the right to be a beneficiary. Thus, at bottom, the discourses on poverty of both sides hide a struggle for power and influence regarding who is the real “owner” of the social programs, who makes decisions and how co-management ought to be carried out.

**3.6 Forms of Management**

This debate suggests that there is ambivalence among women’s organizations and, to a certain point, among state functionaries and their advisors regarding the existence and the advantage of what we perceive as three ideal models of how current programs should be managed and which compete for the attention of state functionaries and movement members.

The patronage model is the most traditional and represents a style of politics and relationships based on personal ties and mutual loyalties between the boss and the client. It involves a chain of dependency of
leaders (national, metropolitan, district, and even grassroots) on the state, that was developed during
the 1980s and became a dominant style in the 1990s although it appears that its influence is declining in
the new century. It is a corporativist style that was used by the Fujimori government to offer members
of movement organizations security against political violence and economic (and even political) benefits
in exchange for political support in the form of votes and attendance at political events. It continues to
be powerful among women with lower training and education and leadership experience levels and in
negotiation with the state; it is associated with a perception of poverty as permanent and inevitable;
and it tolerates corruption associated with the distribution of benefits. Some of the more politicized
functionaries and some movement organizations in which leadership is not renewed are adept at this
management model, using political and business contacts to get favors, concessions, and the
distribution of benefits as prizes for loyalty.

A model proposed as the opposite of the former is the technocratic, which puts emphasis on rationality
and efficiency. This focus presents as the objective of social programs and the organizations responsible
for implementing them the reduction and/or elimination of poverty as efficiently as possible and the use
of work methodologies and measurements of the results as objective as possible. Its proponents are
worried about output levels, costs, filtrations, and under-coverage that represent the diversion of
objectives and generate inefficiencies. In this perspective, women are not subjects of programs of whom
one asks initiative and responsibility but, rather, objects who have to be organized, categorized, and
controlled so that they do not divert programs to their own objectives. This model does not believe that
the participation of beneficiaries or their social ties and networks or their organizations is important,
because all of these represent obstacles to the efforts of a modernizing state that seeks to convert
women into productive individuals in society. Thus, greater emphasis is placed on women as producers
and consumers than on their role as citizens.

The third model or tendency present among the programs and organizations is the
participatory/institutional, which is based on a vision of rights and citizenship. From this perspective,
poverty represents a failing by the state to give prevalence to the right to a life with dignity and, thus,
social programs are identified as a measure of respect and protection of this right. The beneficiaries of
these programs are not beggars but citizens selected according to universal criteria. Among the rights
that should be recognized is the right to organize and participate in the making of decisions that will
affect participants. Thus, this focus encourages participation and the co-management of social programs
between the state and organized women through an institutionalized relationship of mutual respect and
recognition between the state and the organization that, at the same time, should be ruled by
universalist and democratic norms.

In both the food supplement programs and the five (or six) OMAs, there are elements of each of these
three ideal models. There are also persons and institutions in the state, the business sector, and civil
society who favor one of them. Within the state, for example, in the MEF, there is a tendency to favor
the technocratic model whereas in some sectors of MIMDES the participatory/institutional model is
favored and, in others, the patronage model, depending on the functionary in charge and the policies of
the moment. At the same time, in the grassroots urban women’s organizations that include the
Community Kitchens and the “autonomous” Glass of Milk Committees, there is a tendency to favor the participatory/institutionalist model whereas the Glass of Milk Committees led by Pilar Britto and the Community Kitchens led by Rosa Castillo and Aurea Carranza tend to favor the patronage model. However, both in the state and in the movement there are shades of difference and a willingness to incorporate elements of more than one model into management styles.

These three models are similar to the three distinct visions of development identified by Copestake (2008: 546) in his analysis of the Glass of Milk Program: one is utilitarian, emphasizing the objective of increasing average income and reducing potential costs of social welfare programs; another prioritizes needs, is more multidimensional and with a more optimistic vision of the state’s capacity to guarantee the satisfaction of basic needs; and a third based on rights, emphasizing injustice as the fundamental cause of poverty and the importance of the struggle of poor, excluded citizens. He found that, from the point of view that prioritizes income, participants in the Glass of Milk Program value the material resources transferred but emphasized the time spent in multiple meetings; from the point of view of those in need, the limited impact of transferred funds on levels of child nutrition stood out; and, from the rights point of view, the program did little to strengthen the ability of participants to undertake transformative public actions (Copestake 2008: 558). He concluded that the Program “is part of a social agreement that reinforces the status quo: it involves sufficient material resources to motivate participation, but not enough to have a permanent impact on the distribution of income and poverty, nor to stimulate more radical public action (Copestake 2008: 557) and “contribute to the national patronage system that allows the government and the national elites to assure social stability and maintain a weak loyalty with a minimal budgetary cost” (Copestake 2008: 558). These effects identified by Copestake may exist, but they do not explain why the programs took the forms that led to these effects.

3.7 Social Movement?

Of the three movements examined in detail, the grassroots urban women’s movement is the one in which we find more questioning of whether or not the qualifications for being considered a “social movement” exist. Ten years ago, Tocón Armas (1999) asked if the organizations together represented a social movement or a grassroots movement, and came to the conclusion that “[…] the OMAs do not make up a social movement, to the extent that they do not demand of the state or donor entities that their needs and interests be fulfilled. Instead, they try to deal with a concrete situation and, for that purpose, adopt vis-à-vis the donor behavior that is dependent and subordinate in nature” (Tocón Armas, 1999: 123), arguing that “in Touraine’s analytical framework, we believe that OMAs, as a grassroots movement, are characterized by the development of social actions that fulfill its precise interests and limited to the objectives of the participating organizations” (Tocón Armas, 1999: 124).

These organizations have different origins and, in almost all cases, they have to do with outside influences. There is nothing organic connecting the three origins. In most cases, with the exception of the independent CPs, they are organizations started by parties or governments, unlike those of the indigenous and human rights movements, whose organizations have social origins. If, together, they
represent a social movement, it would seem that they created a movement without wanting to. One asks whether all the activities of the women together constitute a sufficiently coherent and self-identified whole in order to say that there is a movement, in spite of the lack of an organization to coordinate the process (there is not in any of the three cases in this book, but this case is the one with the least). The response isn’t clear. Nor is it clear if there is a feeling within the organizations that they are part of something larger.

Unlike the other movement, this one does not have greater objectives that tend towards social change, although the organizations are involved with matters beyond food. Concerns such as self-esteem and the formation of women, feminine social self-management in society, training, interest in having a presence in overseeing state activities and in political decision-making, and involvement in participatory budget processes are indicators of interest in a wider range of issues. However, to date these have not been articulated into an explicit change agenda, either by one of the components of the “movement” or by the whole.

What we have called a movement of grassroots urban women represents a process with a more complicated beginning than the two previous cases, with a focus more on direct interaction in immediate problems, but also in search of something more, not much more, but, in any case, more. It has an identity that goes beyond mere administration of food support and the ability to bring members together that indicates their identification with the movement. Thus, we conclude that, in spite of its having existed for almost 30 years, the grassroots urban women’s movement can only be considered an incipient social movement, with some elements of a full movement but with others that are either absent or very weak.

Bibliography


Media

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