

# **The *glocalization* of environmental governance: relations of scale in socio-environmental movements and their implications for rural territorial development in Peru and Ecuador<sup>1</sup>**

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## Acronym Glossary

AACRI – Asociación Agro-Artesanal de Caficultores Rio Intag [Río Intag Coffee Growers' Association]  
ADEA – Asociación de Defensa y Educación Ambiental [Association for Environmental Education and Defense]  
AE – Acción Ecológica [Ecological Action]  
APCI – Agencia Peruana de Cooperación Internacional [Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation]  
AUC – Asamblea Unidad Cantonal (Cotacachi) [Assembly for Cantonal Unity]  
CAO – Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (International Finance Corporation)  
CLWR – Canadian Lutheran World Relief  
CEM – Committee for Environmental Management  
CONACAMI – Coordinadora/Confederación Nacional de Comunidades Afectadas por la Minería [Coordinator/Confederation of Communities Affected by Mining]  
CONAIE – Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador [Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador]  
COPAMI – Coordinadora de Pueblos Afectados por la Minería [Coordinator of Peoples Affected by Mining]  
CORECAMI – Coordinadora Regional de Cuencas Afectadas por la Minería [Regional Coordinator of Watersheds Affected by Mining]  
CTAR – Consejo Transitorio de Administración Regional [Ad Hoc Council for Regional Administration]  
DECOIN – Defensa y Conservación de Intag [Ecological Defense and Conservation of Intag]  
EG – Environmental Governance  
EIA – Environmental Impact Assessment  
ECLAC – Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean  
FENOCIN – Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras [National Ecuadorian Federation of Indigenous, Black and Campesino Organizations]  
FEROCAFENOP – Federación de Rondas Campesinas Femeninas del Norte del Perú [Federation Of Women's Self-Defense Committees of Northern Peru]  
FICI – Federación Indígena Campesina de Imbabura [Indigenous Peasant Federation of Imbabura]  
FOEI – Friends of the Earth International  
GGF- Global Greengrants Fund  
GRUFIDES – Grupo de Formación e Intervención para el Desarrollo Sostenible [Group for Training and Intervention for Sustainable Development]  
IEE – Instituto de Estudios Ecuatorianos [Institute of Ecuadorian Studies]  
IFC – International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group)  
IPO – Initial Public Offering  
JICA – Agencia Internacional de Japón [Japan International Cooperation Agency]  
LABOR – Asociación Civil Labor [LABOR Civil Association]  
MEM – Ministry of Energy and Mines (Peru)

MMAJ - Metal Mining Agency of Japan  
OA – Oxfam América  
OLCA – Observatorio Latinoamericano de Conflictos Ambientales [Latin American Observatory of Environmental Conflicts]  
NGO – Nongovernmental Organization  
PU – Project Underground  
RAN – Rainforest Action Network  
SEDACAJ – Servicio de Agua Potable de Cajamarca [Potable Water Service of Cajamarca]  
SM – Social Movement  
SMO – Social Movement Organization  
SNMPE - Sociedad Nacional de Minería, Petróleo y Energía [National Society of Mining, Petroleum and Energy]  
SPDA - Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental [Peruvian Society for Environmental Law]  
RTD – Territorial Rural Development  
UNORCAC – Unión de Organizaciones Campesinas Indígenas de Cotacachi [Union of Indigenous Peasant Organizations of Cotacachi]

## A. Introduction

In his “Seven Theses on Latin American Social Movements and Political Change,” a tribute to the recently deceased Andre Gunder Frank, Kees Biekart (2005) suggests an important part of the contemporary force of these movements is due to transnational relations. Keck and Sikkink (1998) suggest something similar in their analysis of transnational advocacy networks, when they claim that the campaigns of local and national activists are strengthened by the advocacy work of their allies in the North. Other studies of advocacy in multilateral agencies lead us to not very different conclusions (e.g., Clark et al. 2003; Fox and Brown 1998).

Interpretations of this kind underlie the strategies of many activists, foundations and philanthropists, who in one way or another support and promote transnational linkages between organizations and activists. They also contribute to the intellectual enthusiasm for “the transnational”. On the other hand, in contrast to these interpretations, there are descriptions of sometimes very difficult discussions in global meetings of extensive networks like Friends of the Earth International or smaller foundations like Global Greengrants Fund. These discussions suggest, for the case of activist organizations and networks, the existence of tensions already known in the relations that unite development NGOs in Latin America and Europe (Bebbington 2005; Valderrama 1999).

Anna Tsing (2004) uses the word “friction” to capture this simultaneity of cooperation and tension. In her ethnographic study of activists and environmentalists in Indonesia, Tsing suggests that the relations between Indonesia and transnational circuits—of capital as well as of activists—are always characterized by the existence of “friction”, the co-presence of movement and resistance, of solidarity and rejection, of autonomy and absorption. These frictions are of different types. On the one hand, frictions exist within environmentalist movements—the actors involved always influence the actions of others in some ways, and the relations at play are of solidarity as well as tension and power games.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand—and to a large extent, suggests Tsing, the consequence of transnational relations—environmental movements present some level (variable, of course) of resistance to extractive industries with the effect that investors cannot do exactly what they want. Capital flows thus also suffer friction.

Like the archipelago of Indonesia, Latin America in the post-neoliberal period has been an important frontier for extractive industries. One of the sectors of the economy which has seen the most growth since 1990 has been the mining sector. The neoliberalization process has generated new geographies of mining investment, and of the ten countries of the world that have been favored objects of mining investment between 1990 and 2001, four are found in Latin America (Bridge 2005).<sup>3</sup> Mining investment in Peru quintupled during the 1990s and—according to Bridge (2005: 418)—Peru and Chile (together with Indonesia) have been the countries in which neo-liberal have had the most positive effect in attracting new mining investments. Such data do not seem to suggest that mining investment is encountering greater friction— rather they suggest the relative

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<sup>2</sup> See also Eguren (2004) in *Debate Agrario*.

<sup>3</sup> Chile, Peru, Argentina and Mexico, in that order (Bridge 2005).

absence, or at least the chronic weakness, of socio-environmental movements against these capital flows. Nevertheless, supporting socio-environmental movements and activists and promoting links with activists in North America, Europe and Australia continues to be one of the main strategies of transnational networks who work on the theme of extractive industries. The organizations of the North have focused a large part of their work on the support of local and national social movements and organizations that resist the forms in which investment is occurring in extractive industries. These forms of resistance range from a complete and open rejection of mining to efforts that press for mineral development that contributes not only to capital accumulation, but also to forms of local and national development that: generate benefits for the broad spectrum of society; ensure that the integrity of the environment is preserved; and give rise to institutions through which differences of opinion and conflicts might be managed.

This study examines the effects that such strategies have on relations between mining companies, environmental governance and rural territorial development. The study begins with the hypothesis (rejectable, of course) that transnational relations are key resources for local activists but are inevitably characterized by the existence of the frictions Tsing intuites. The work looks at transnational relations within social movements that question and resist the current practices of mining companies operating in the high Andes of Peru and Ecuador. More specifically, the study explores the effects of such relations of scale on the forms taken by movements (their structure, their discourses, etc.) as well as on the movements' level of influence on mining company practices and (therefore) their effects on the development of the regions where they operate. The study asks: (i) how do social movements that are concerned about environmental themes arise in areas of mining activity? (ii) if, and to what extent, these social movements have been able to participate in and influence the establishment of norms, regulations and practices (formal as well as nonformal) that govern mining extraction in a determined space? (iii) if, and to what extent, these social movements have influenced the process of territorial rural development in the areas affected by mining? For each question, one has to focus on the influence and role played by transnational relations within socio-environmental movements. This said, it is important to note that the study's focus on transnational relations should not be understood as an argument for the greater influence of international actors relative to national or local actors—it is simply the approach of the study.

This document discusses the results of this analysis. First, in order to frame the empirical discussion, we present the conceptual formulations that underlie the study. Then we explain the selection of the cases and the research methodology employed. The sections that follow describe the two cases in more detail, and then proceed to a presentation and discussion of the main findings. The final section returns to conceptual themes to discuss the extent to which the findings help reformulate conceptual debates on social movements, environmental governance and rural territorial development.

## **B. Movement, governance and development: conceptual clarifications**

This study is located within the field of research known as “political ecology”.<sup>4</sup> Although it is not a body of theory in itself, “political ecology” can be understood as a sort of umbrella (Blaikie 1999) which brings together several traditions and lines of political and ecological enquiry that share certain ethical-political and intellectual concerns. Among these shared concerns and conviction are the following:

- Modern capitalisms (and socialisms) undervalue the environment and show trends toward the destruction and over-exploitation of certain natural resources (Martinez-Alier 2002)
- These natural resources are oftentimes highly valued by less powerful actors who therefore see the security of their livelihood strategies threatened (Peet and Watts 2004)
- Distributional conflicts generated by these capitalisms are simultaneously conflicts over environmental justice (Peet and Watts 2004; Martinez-Alier 2002)
- In no case should these conflicts be understood simply as local conflicts (Swyngedouw 1997). Although many conflicts become visible at a local level (block X of eastern Ecuador, municipality Y of the Bolivian altiplano, province Z of the Peruvian highlands), many of the factors that generate them -and many of the resources that are mobilized to respond to these conflicts- cannot be understood as entirely local phenomena.

In its early years, political ecology worked through more structuralist and materialist lenses, with clear influences from Marxism and dependency theory (e.g., Blaikie 1985). However, over time it has incorporated a deeper analysis of actors and their different environmental interests (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Bury 2004), locating these environmental interests within a political economy analysis. For analytical as well as normative reasons, political ecology grew more interested in the role of social movements in environmental conflicts, and there is a certain consensus within this field that the governance of the relationship between capitalism and environment will only produce just and sustainable forms of development (rural and urban) when strong propositional social movements are present (e.g., Peet and Watts 2004; Martinez-Alier 2002; Escobar 2001, 1996).

Another trend in political ecology relevant to this work is the convergence of interests around environmental justice and political economy with another current of thinking present in social theory as well as in human geography: the production of space. In this second current, spatial structures, localities and territories are all understood as contingent, socially-produced processes. That is to say, localities and territories do not exist all by themselves, rather, they are products of capitalist dynamics, local histories and the forms in which local populations work, negotiate and give sense to these processes. In this sense many environmental conflicts are also conflicts over the production of space: over what type of relation between society and environment should predominate in that space, over how these spaces should be governed and by whom, over the *meaning* given to these spaces, and over the kinds of linkages these spaces should

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<sup>4</sup> An intellectual field where geographers, anthropologists, (certain) economists, politologists and sociologists meet.

have with other spaces. This last point is particularly relevant for this work because it is assumed that these spaces are “glocales”—that is, that they have to be understood as globalized and localized at the same time. What is under debate is the form that this globalization of space should take. Once again social movements assume importance because they constitute important actors in this process of the negotiation and construction of space and of localities. In fact, in many cases social movements can be understood as actors who attempt to defend a certain concept of what is local against external forces seeking to transform it (Escobar 1995). In these negotiations, both the external forces and the social movements are *glocal*—they combine global as well as locally specific actors, references, resources and meanings.

To bring these conceptual approaches down to earth—and for the aims of this work, in order to understand *how* social movements influence the forms of environmental governance and RTD, *how they arise*, the forms and discourses they assume and in what way they can be supported by other actors—it is important to analyze the history, structure and strategies of social movements. How one embraces this analytical task depends to a large extent on the theory and definition of social movements one works with (Crossley 2002; McAdam et al. 1988). In the following sections, rather than offer a discussion of the range of different theoretical options, we attempt to identify what seem to us to be key elements in any appropriate *and useful* explanation. In a certain sense, these elements also constitute the basis of our definition of “social movement”. And again, without losing ourselves in definitions, this task is important because if the concept to which one attributes causality does not remain well defined, it is impossible to explain the mechanisms of causality that link social movements, environmental governance and RTD.

### ***Social movements, social networks and social organizations***

In the analysis of social movements, an important but difficult distinction is that between social network, social movement and social movement organization. For the purposes of this work, we understand a network as a structure of social relations between identifiable actors.<sup>5</sup> A network can be traced, by following the building and maintenance of relations between actors, flows of resources and exchanges of ideas that circulate through these networks. Social networks—between organizations and in many cases, between individuals—play a key role in articulating protests over the environment (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and in the rise of social movements (Crossley 2002).

Nevertheless, to understand the phenomena of socio-environmental mobilization, the concept of social network has limitations. In the case of social mobilizations around mining, these processes include relationships and actors that range from peasant farmers, students, ordinary citizens, activists and organizations protesting mining in Cajamarca, to the distant sympathizers in countries of the North and the South who take part in letter-writing campaigns protesting the social and environmental damage produced by mining

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<sup>5</sup> It is worth noting that, in this sense, we do not follow the conceptualization of “actor-network theory (or ANT)”, which allows that the network include things, ideas, concepts, etc., and that these “things” also be actors (cf., Braun and Castree 2000).

and to NGO program officials and human rights organizations who also question current forms of mining development. It seems forced to suggest that the concept of social network offers the best way to understand phenomena that are so complex, noncontiguous and dispersed. While it is clear that global connections exist (Tsing 2004) among all these actors and that they are part of a common phenomenon, when waves of mobilizations occur -like the anti-mining protests in Peru over the last two years- the concept of social network alone seems inadequate to grasp the phenomenon at play.<sup>6</sup>

We suggest that it is phenomena such as these that are better understood by the concept of social movement. In this work we take the notion of social movement to refer to processes of spatially and temporally diffuse collective action that—withstanding their diffuse nature and their ebbs and flows—are sustained over time. Although the actors involved do not necessarily share exactly the same vision, there is an important degree of overlap between their respective goals and concerns and it is this overlap that sustains the movement and gives it a certain coherence. In this sense a social movement is a form of collective action but it is not itself an actor: rather it is a process, sustained by a set of actions and actors, in which what prevails is an action motivated by shared grievances and senses of injustice, and therefore by a vision—perhaps not specified—of the need to find another way of organizing society and thinking about development (Alvarez and Escobar 1992; Escobar 1995).

It is at this point—the emphasis on alternative visions<sup>7</sup>—that reflections on social movements frequently become normative. Often it is argued that social movements necessarily look for something “*better*”. It seems to us important to avoid this step—but we do insist that social movements reflect discomfort and disagreement with the status quo and reflect demands for something *different*. Social movements make visible alternative ideas and concepts about the forms that development should take. In this sense discursive (post-structural) analyses of social movements are useful because they insist on the notion that culture is a battlefield of great political importance (Alvarez et al. 1998). That is, politics (and therefore governance) not only happens through formal, organized practices, but also on battlefields where the fight is over the legitimacy of different ideas and different forms of knowledge (cf., Long and Long 1992; Alvarez et al. 1998; Dagnino 2005). Following these interpretations, social movements are vectors of certain discourses and questionings and the extent to which a movement manages to change dominant discourse in a society, it has been successful (in its own terms).<sup>8</sup>

With these clarifications in mind, the following observations are important. First, this definition of social movements does little to help us understand how they arise or how they persist over time. For this reason the concepts of social network and social movement organization continue to be important. Crossley (2002: 93) notes there is much

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<sup>6</sup> One could possibly speak of “chains” for describing these relations, such as one speaks of “aid chains” to characterize relations between actors of different levels/parts of the system of international cooperation.

<sup>7</sup> “Alternatives” to hegemonic/orthodox visions (which in the present context means broadly “neoliberal”).

<sup>8</sup> Indeed we have the impression that in contemporary Peru and Ecuador, one can perceive a process in which movements are constructing a new hybrid discourse combining elements of other discourses grounded in indigenous revindications, universal human rights and environmental rights discourse: this discourse is, in essence, “glocal”.



evidence that social movements—understood as these wider phenomena—emerge from preexisting social, informal and organizational networks. To a certain extent these networks serve to transmit concerns and dissatisfaction to larger groups—in effect they “cultivate” the movement. This diffuse collective action also depends heavily on social movement organizations. This is so because many of the activities and processes that help bind and sustain movement processes require financial, informational, human, social and other resources that more localized and/or informal social networks are unable to mobilize (Crossley 2002; McAdam 1982). These resources are provided to a large extent by social movement organizations (SMOs) such as: NGOs, church groups, student organizations, etc. (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). These networks and organizations also play an important part in keeping movements moving, by maintaining debates, supporting events, nurturing leaders and maintaining social energy during periods of less activity.

The continuing survival of social movements also depends on the extent to which overlap between the concerns and convictions of the different actors involved is sustained over time. Maintaining this overlap is not always easy. Os and other movement actors may have differing agendas and visions about how social movements ought to evolve and as a result can pull the movements in different directions (cf. McCarthy and Zald, 1977). In this sense, fragility is inherent to social movements and holding a movement together requires work and negotiation among the actors and organizations that constitute it. A fundamental task in analyzing social movements — how they are created, the ways in which they organize, how they are maintained, and the strategies that they follow— consists of tracing the rise of network activity among the actors and local, national and international organizations that constitute the infrastructure of social movements; and to document their role in developing agendas and discourses. Our analysis therefore focuses on this aspect of the movements we study.

Notwithstanding all the above —and, as Melucci comments (1985)—such analysis only helps explain “the supply” of social movements: *how* they are constructed. It does not explain “the demand” that nourishes movements, and which leads to the emergence of particular concerns that end up having resonance in a larger population. To understand this “demand side” another type of analysis is required, one that has implications for the way that this study conceptualizes RTD.

### ***Rural Territorial Development (RTD)***

Rural Territorial development is also a concept where the normative and the positive are often merged. This blurring reflects a wider “confusion” in the literature on development, a confusion in which the same term can be used with two quite distinct meanings (Cowen and Shenton, 1996). On the one hand “development” is often used to refer to the process inherent in capitalist transformations in a determined space and/or society; on the other hand, the term “development” is also used to refer to projects of intervention implemented by actors with normative intentions (Cowen and Shenton 1996; 1997). This confounding of meanings seems also to be present in one of the framing documents for contemporary discussions of RTD (Schejtman and Berdegué 2003). Defining RTD as a

process of productive and institutional transformation, Schejtman and Berdegué appear to be defining RTD as a particular, territorially defined process of capitalist transformation. However, they then slip from the positive into the normative when they apportion an intent to this process: “the purpose of which is to reduce rural poverty” (2003:32–33). The problem with this definition is that it is difficult to see how a “process” can have a “purpose”: it is actors who have objectives and pursue them via their actions and their projects. In the end, for Schejtman and Berdegué, RTD appears to be understood as a project of intervention.

While this definition of RTD offers certain variables that can be used to describe rural development processes and to discuss dimensions of change within these processes,<sup>9</sup> it needs to be complemented with a concept of RTD that explains the underlying processes of political economy, for several reasons. First, it helps us to understand the origins of “the demand” for social movements to emerge (Melucci 1985). Here Habermas' (1984, 1987) interpretations of new social movements are useful for, which they do not explain *how social movements* arise, they can contribute to understanding *why* they arise (and therefore complement the focus on networks and social movement organizations that help understand the *how* question). Although the work of Habermas focuses on the experiences of industrialized countries, several of his interpretations turn out to be very relevant to understanding the relationships between the processes of neo-liberal reform and social movements in Latin America. According to Habermas, one tendency in the political economy of global capitalism is that it begins to “colonize” people’s lifeworlds. In this process, centralized bureaucracies exert more and more control and supervision over people’s daily routines while the market colonizes and commodifies those spheres of everyday life and social interaction that have traditionally given sense and meaning to life. For Habermas, the rise of social movements must be understood as a response to and in terms of these contexts. He suggests that movements emerge in order to defend and recover lifeworlds threatened by these processes of colonization (an interpretation not so different from that of Escobar, 1995:222–226). Moreover, Habermas suggests that the relations between economic and political institutions in a world dominated by capitalism leads to political institutions with ever less capacity and fewer channels to respond to the demands of social movements. This in turn creates a context which fuels an increasing trend toward forms of protests that favor direct action (Crossley 2002: 162).

While this analysis may seem overly focused on industrialized societies, one can discern different elements of these trends in rural areas affected by new forms of mining in Latin America. The new rural economic policies that have promoted the mining sector have the effect of transforming communities and their landscapes, commodifying ancestral lands, threatening natural resources and traditional livelihoods that depend upon these resources, and ultimately of transforming a whole tradition of cultural and productive

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<sup>9</sup> Specifically, a process of rural development approaches his definition as soon as: (i) it generates forms of agreement among different actors who also generate territorial identity; (ii) generates institutions that promote agreement between different levels and public agencies, and between the state and civil society; (iii) generates not only agricultural but also non-agricultural economic opportunities; (iv) promotes urban-rural bonds; and (v) promotes inclusive forms of productive transformation that reduces poverty and inequality.

practices. In addition—as will be seen in the following section—these policies tend to close off certain political channels through which protests might otherwise have been expressed.<sup>10</sup>

Such an analysis views movements more as "reactive" rather than propositional phenomena—that is, as a response to and product of political economic trends. But Habermas also allows—in fact, hopes—that social movements can resist the advance of the same processes that help produce them. By the same token, this study will ask: (i) to what extent the emergence of social movements in Cajamarca and Cotacachi should be read as a response to the new dynamics in the political economy of RTD in the two regions; (ii) if, and how, they have influenced underlying forms of capitalist development in these two regions in such a way as to render these forms of development more poverty reducing and social inclusive (and thus more aligned with the normative interpretation of RTD as outlined by Schejtman and Berdegué, 2003); and (iii) what implications these changes have for rural peoples' quality of life.

This last question presents us with the problem of how to address changes in quality of life. As we shall see from the cases, here the problem is even more acute because key actors have differing visions of what constitutes a “positive” change in the quality of life. In some readings, the prevailing notion is that quality of life is rooted in income, and levels of education and health. In other readings, changes in the environment, landscape, social cohesion and the sense of security (vulnerability) are considered to be more important. That is, different actors talk about changes in different “assets” as indicators of changes in the quality of life: some measure development more in economic terms, others in social and environmental terms. Moreover while some actors perceive that one asset can be substituted for another (e.g., if income and education improve significantly, it matters less that this comes at the cost of changes in the environment and the landscape), other actors see less possibility of substitution among assets (and therefore would question any development strategy that would harm, for example, the quality of the water, no matter what the economic benefits of such a strategy). In the case studies we therefore assess change in terms of social capital, human capital, natural capital and tangible economic capital (that combines income and physical assets) without trying to translate them into a single indicator.

### *Environmental governance*

In this work environmental governance is understood as the process through which the rules that determine access to, control and use of natural resources are defined, regulated and implemented (cf., Leach, Mearns and Scoones 1999). Although governance is often defined as a process in which there is wide participation of traditionally excluded actors, we prefer to keep a positive definition of the concept. Seen this way governance can be good or bad, inclusive or exclusive. There can also be (and very probably are) both visible and hidden forms of governance. It is very possible that social movements manage to influence those forms of governance that exist in the public sphere and that are

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<sup>10</sup> At the same time, other channels simply do not work.

more visible to the population, while "real" forms of government continue more or less untouched.<sup>11</sup>

Indeed, although the concept "governance" makes one think of "government", an important theme in this study is that many processes of environmental governance occur in private spaces, between private actors. This is for different reasons. In both Peru and Ecuador both legislation and government practice transfer significant power and leadership<sup>12</sup> to the mining companies themselves, with the public sector assuming more of a facilitating and regulatory role. Also, in each country government institutions (the Ministries of Energy and Mines) are perceived to be aligned with private enterprise,<sup>13</sup> and social actors have little trust in public institutions' honesty and transparency. For these different reasons, the most important spaces of environmental governance are found within companies and in the relations between the companies and private actors (social actors and investors).

If one consequence of neoliberal policy in Latin America has been that a large part of environmental governance (formal as well as non-formal) now occurs inside companies, another effect has been that the processes through which both environment and development are governed do not occur only in the country and much less in the territory in question. Indeed, company decisions over environmental management are as likely to be taken or moulded in North America as they are in Ecuador and Peru. Furthermore, these decision-making processes occur not only in company offices but also in the financial markets and institutions that are the sources of investment capital for mining firms. In our cases, these decision-making spaces include the stock exchanges of New York and Toronto, and the entities that regulate the participation of mining companies in these markets. They also include the International Finance Corporation, the World Bank and the markets in which the gold coming from Cajamarca is sold. That is, as in the case of social movements, the relations underlying environmental governance are also transnational, and these processes take place in spaces that go beyond the technical, logistical and financial capacities (not to say understanding) of social movement organizations operating alone or in local spheres.

### *Glocalized processes and research questions*

These conceptualizations of social movements, environmental governance and RTD suggest that it is impossible to think of the three concepts without at the same time thinking of the transnational relations at stake in the phenomena to which these concepts

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<sup>11</sup> An extreme indicator of this was made apparent in the case of the "Vladivideos" which showed the direct influence of Vladimiro Montesinos on legal decisions affecting a series of economic activities with environmental implications in Peru—among them the Minera Yanacocha case, one of our examples (New York Times 2005).

<sup>12</sup> For the case of Peru see, for instance, Supreme Decree 042-2003 EM (December 2003) on social responsibility of mining companies; and in Ecuador see the new 1999 mining legislation.

<sup>13</sup> The closeness of these relations is palpable when one is present in ministry offices or in meetings where both companies and ministry officials are present. It is apparent in the ways in which the persons interact, their exchanges on the telephone, and the movement of people back and forth between jobs in mining companies and jobs in the ministries, etc.

refer. This does not negate the importance of local processes and local histories (indeed, the significance of such local histories will be very visible in the case studies), but it does imply that the analysis in both cases cannot be purely local or national. It is in this sense, then, that mining conflicts and forms of environmental governance produced in the process of negotiating these conflicts are “glocalized” (cf., Swyngedouw 1997).<sup>14</sup> The global is almost always present in the industrialized extraction of natural resources—in the form of investment capital, the markets for the extracted products or the resource extraction companies themselves. Likewise, the global is present in the social movements that arise in response to extractive activity—whether it be through the flow of solidarity funds from Northern based individuals or organizations to local groups, or in the form of links between local movements and international actors, or through ideas that circulate concerning possible alternatives to the forms of environmental governance that accompany extractive industry.

At the same time these disputes over environmental governance and the control of resources and territories are also part of local processes. Their forms and languages, the internal dynamics of social movements, the “meanings” of mining in a determined place, the alliances that are possible, and those that are inconceivable—all these reflect locally specific histories, identities, inequalities, alliances, discourses and class, gender, generational and ethnic relations. And, to close the circle, via the international advocacy campaigns shared by local and transnational movements, these local nuances and concerns can end up affecting global discourses of international actors and transnational environmental networks.

With this background, the central question of this research was:

- How do interactions between local and international organizations and activists influence the consolidation of environmental social movements in the Andes, and how do these interactions build capacities for forms of environmental and territorial governance that are more favorable to excluded populations in the areas affected by extractive industries?

From this, several following more specific questions arise:

- How do relations emerge between local movements, international actors and cross-border networks, and what factors determine the characteristics of these relations?
- What has been the influence of these relations on the strategies of different social movements regarding the mining industry in two regions of the Andes: Cotacachi, Ecuador and Cajamarca, Peru?
- In what way have these relations influenced the forms of environmental governance that evolved in the two regions, and to what extent have they

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<sup>14</sup> The concept of “glocalization” sought to grasp the notion that localities are almost always produced both by local histories and processes and by global processes (Swyngedouw 1997).

contributed to forms of territorial rural development that have reduced rural poverty and inequality and reflected the wishes of the local population?

### **C. Methodology, cases and their national contexts**

#### *Case selection*

While this study is an attempt to answer these research questions, it also originated as a result of strategic concerns and internal discussions of a particular “transnational” organization—Global Greengrants Fund (GGF),<sup>15</sup> a foundation with headquarters in the U.S.A.<sup>16</sup> We therefore sought cases that would not only help us address our research questions about local and international activists, but would also allow us to analyze specific relationships between GGF and other local and national actors. GGF—through its Andean Advisory Board as well as through its Global Advisory Board—has supported various local actors in Cajamarca as well as in Cotacachi-Intag.

At the same time we looked for cases whose comparison made analytic sense. The analytical value of the Cajamarca-Cotacachi comparison lies in the fact that the two cases share a similar time line, but have evolved in very different ways. In both places, the basic geological exploration occurred during the 1980s, and the first attempts to consolidate exploration and establish mines occurred at the end of the 1980s and early years of the ‘90s. In each case, exploration suggested the presence of important mineral deposits. Yet their present condition could hardly be more different. Cajamarca has the largest gold mine in Latin America and the second largest in the world—Yanacocha – while in Intag there is still no mine, although all the indications suggest the existence of a very large copper deposit. Given these differences, comparing the two experiences would help to identify the factors that explain why the social movements have exerted so much influence in Cotacachi, and so little in Cajamarca. The time lines for the two cases are found in Graphics 1 and 2.

*Insert graphics 1 and 2 here*

#### *Methodological approaches*

The nature of the research questions led to the mainly qualitative character of this study. Meanwhile, the political ecology approach—with the explicit attempt to work at different

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<sup>15</sup> GGF gives small grants to groups of activists around themes of environmental justice and sustainable development. These groups are identified by “sub-regional advisory boards” whose members are selected based on their existing contacts with organizations and actors who work on themes of social justice, environment and sustainable development. Currently five advisory boards exist in Latin America, including that of the Andes. At the same time there are advisory boards in other parts of the world, and a “global advisory board” made up of entities friends of GGF. For more information see [www.greengrants.org](http://www.greengrants.org).

<sup>16</sup> There are five institutions that form part of the Global Advisory Board: Friends of the Earth International, Pesticide Action Network, Rainforest Action Network, International Rivers Network and Earth Island Institute.

points along transnational chains and within local processes—implied multi-local work with different types of actors.

Reconstruction of the processes through which social movements had arisen, interacted with state and company actors and participated in forms of public debate, required in-depth interviews with a range of actors. By the same token, to understand how the state and mining actors interpreted and responded to the movements also implied in-depth as well as open-ended interviews.<sup>17</sup> This information was combined with written and/or electronic materials to reconstruct the histories of both regions to interpret and integrate these materials.

A large part of this material was gathered in Cajamarca and Cotacachi, in the urban centers as well as in a selection of rural communities and hamlets. Also rounds of interviews were carried out in Lima and Quito and we participated in various events related to the theme of the study. In some cases electronic correspondence was maintained with individuals to complement interview information. Interviews with actors linked to international organizations were the most logistically challenging. Interviews in person were combined with conversations by telephone and email. We also took advantage of other trips (to Amsterdam, Boulder, London) to complete certain interviews. However, the budget did not permit interviews in Canada or other places in the United States.

At the level of rural communities, interviews with key informants were carried out as well as interviews with focus groups. In Cajamarca it was also possible to implement a modest survey in four communities, although this material has not been used in this report.

The only exception to the qualitative rule was the analysis of statistical material on Cajamarca. This analysis (which was not possible in the Ecuador case) sought to cross several data bases in order to construct Gini coefficients at different historical moments and thus trace changes in levels of inequality through time.

### *Timing*

The empirical research for this paper was conducted during 2005, up until December of that year, with some additional work conducted during 2004 and at earlier points in time. This is the material reported on here, and is – we feel – an adequate basis from which to answer our research questions. However, even though the research came to an end, the conflicts studied did not and each has evolved in important ways since early 2006. In Cotacachi the standoff continues, and in Cajamarca there have been more violent confrontations and deaths over water and mining issues. It has also become apparent that some actor – it is not clear who – has supported an organized and detailed campaign to try and delegitimise social movement organizations, in particular Grufides. We don't discuss these issues here. However, having followed the continued evolution of the two

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<sup>17</sup> To obtain some of these interviews cost time, but at the end we managed to interview not only the anti-mining activists but also the owners and high level officials of mining companies.

cases, we believe that the conclusions we come to on the basis of the work in 2005 are today at least as valid as they were then.

### *National contexts*

A risk with the "glocal" approach is that the global is emphasized at the cost of the national. Yet, for the comparative analysis of this study, the national context is of great importance: it influences the dynamics of each case, as well as accounting for some of the differences between them. Ignoring this national context would lead us to lose sight of the fact that the weight of mining in the national economy differs significantly between the two countries,<sup>18</sup> and that (related to this first point) forms of social mobilization around mining also differ. These differences influence the types of actors that arise, the power relations among these actors and therefore the nature of the relations that occur between social movements, environmental governance and rural development.

Socioenvironmental movements often criticize the assertion that "Peru is a mining country", and counter that it is, instead, a mega-diverse, pluricultural, etc., country. They insist—with certain reason—that the very assertion that Peru is a mining country strengthens the position of mining interests and suggests that socioenvironmental movements are acting against what is naturally and historically inevitable. This said, there is no doubt that Peru is a country with a long mining history and that this history—at least during the second half of the twentieth century—explains the rise of certain actors and the concentration of political power in the sector. For example, one of the proprietary companies of MYSA, Compañía de Minas Buenaventura, began to operate in 1953. Today the company is directed by the sons of the founder and various family members have played key roles in the National Society of Mining, Petroleum and Energy (SNMPE, the organization representing the interests of extractive industries in Peru) and are today political figures of considerable importance in the country. The history of the political economy of mining also helps to explain the rise and subsequent fortunes of different social actors who have questioned the mining industry. Ilo, one of the historical centers of mining and smelting in Peru, gave rise to the Asociación Civil LABOR [LABOR Civil Association] in 1981, an NGO that in its early days worked with the (today weakened) mining unions and soon afterward began also to address questions of environmental deterioration caused by mining. While LABOR has never had the sort of power at the national level that mining interests have had, its successes in influencing the policies of (then) Southern Peru Copper and of the local government, have given it a certain national and international recognition. Eventually LABOR became the Peruvian affiliate of Friends of the Earth International and opened offices and established a presence in different parts of the south of Peru. Other organizations—which we can understand as social movement organizations (SMOs) as identified by McCarthy and Zald (1977)—also emerged in response to (and as part of) the national political economy of the mining sector. Examples include Cooperación (which arose out of another group,

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<sup>18</sup> In Peru (Barrantes et al. 2005: 22), in 2003 mining contributed something less than 6% of the GDP, 3% of national employment, 40% of total exports and the taxes it pays cover about 50% of the public budget (there are different estimates). In Ecuador the amounts are much less: in 2002 the mining sector contributed less 1% of the GDP and only US\$12m in exports (EIU).



IPEMIN) and the Grupo Andes (which arose out of ECO). Unlike LABOR, these last two came about as a consequence of the expansion of mining investment in the '90s and tend to be more identified with certain individuals (in comparison with LABOR). At the same time, other organizations, such as the Peruvian Society for Environmental Law (SPDA), founded in 1986 with more generic environmental interests, have also become involved with mining issues at certain times.

These SMOs also played important roles in two other phenomena that are central to the Peruvian context: the formation of the Coordinator/Confederation of Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI) and the creation of the Grupo de Diálogo sobre Minería y Desarrollo Sostenible [the Dialogue on Mining and Sustainable Development]. Unlike miners' unions (which were of workers), CONACAMI is an organization that represented territories (peasant communities) within areas of mining influence. Its roots lay in a particular conflict between one peasant community (Vicco, Pasco) and a mining company. This conflict gave rise to forms of local leadership that, several years later, and through relationships with SPDA, Cooperación, ECO, Oxfam América and others, ended up leading the process that culminated in the creation of CONACAMI, a social organization that seeks to represent at the national level, communities affected by mining. Since 1999, CONACAMI has gained more and more visibility in the country's mining conflicts. In a certain sense, its position has also become more radical with time and—above all—has incorporated increasingly indigenist discourses (Paredes 2005). This indigenization of discourse of a formerly peasant organization has its own explanation (an explanation in which certain international actors and Ecuadorian indigenous organizations also play a part: Paredes 2005). Without commenting on the legitimacy of such a discourse, there is no doubt that it has helped to create ties with other national indigenous organizations, and to “territorialize” the argument against mining. It has also helped link these arguments around mining to other transnational processes, especially those around the ILO 169 convention. The visibility, activism and growing radicalization of CONACAMI led to its “delisting” as an officially registered NGO by the government agency APCI in 2005 as a result of pressure from the Office of the President, the SNMPE and certain mining firms.

The growing visibility of CONACAMI cannot be understood independently of the proliferation and worsening of social conflicts involving communities and mining companies since 2000<sup>19</sup> - a wave of disputes throughout the country that must be understood in terms of the growing number of companies and increasing flows of foreign investments into the mining sector in Peru. The rise in private investment has also induced another phenomenon, the Dialogue on Mining and Sustainable Development, which—as is reflected in its name—has attempted to create negotiating space between companies and other social actors. Initially promoted by Canadian cooperation (a country whose investment in the mining sector is significant), the Dialogue was initially a space dominated by NGOs and social movement organizations. Over time, however, and under the leadership of a professional from LABOR, the Dialogue managed to incorporate greater participation from the business sector and from the State (although neither

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<sup>19</sup> Especially as a result of the experience in Tambogrande where the local campaign's success (with national support) led Manhattan Metals to abandon its mining development plans in the region.

CONACAMI nor SNMPE participated). After an attack occurred against the camp of another Buenaventura investment in the Department of Cajamarca, one of the companies' directors began to participate and (encouraged by LABOR facilitator) during the course of 2005 assumed greater protagonism and influence in the Dialogue. This process culminated in a declaration by the Dialogue that described the bases for a sustainable mining future in Peru. The document was presented publicly by a panel on which the Director of Buenaventura, the person from LABOR, a representative of Oxfam América, a leader of mining executives in Peru, a peasant leader and a representative of an international mining company were present. During 2005 the Dialogue began organizing a series of meetings in Cajamarca to promote a similar experience there.

When compared with this level of activity, debate and national conflict, the Ecuadorian context is very different. Given the still very limited advance of the mining sector in the country, there are neither large, powerful national economic actors related to the sector, nor many social organizations or SMOs specialized in the subject. In fact, it was only in 2005 when confederations such as CEDENMA (Ecuadorian Committee for the Defense of Nature and the Environment) and the PLASA (Platform for Socioenvironmental Agreements) proposed creating working groups on mining—to a large extent as a result of the Cotacachi case. In contrast to these general quiescence around the topic, however, the NGO Acción Ecológica, headquartered in Quito, opened a mining program during the '90s.

As in the case of LABOR, Acción Ecológica (AE) explicitly sought relationships with social movement organizations—and, in this sense, operated as a sort of SMO within a very incipient national socioenvironmental movement. Also like LABOR, it was, until recently, the affiliate organization of Friends of the Earth in Ecuador. Acción Ecológica eventually opted to leave the FOEI network over ideological differences—Acción Ecológica wanted FOEI to assume more radical positions than it was comfortable with. This more radical posture marks a key difference between Acción Ecológica and LABOR, for AE neither seeks nor maintains dialogue or relations with companies and the government. Its principle working relationships are with social movement organizations and, in recent years, with CONAIE, the national indigenous confederation. In this sense, AE's role at the national level is much more comparable to that of CONACAMI than of LABOR, and Ecuador really has no group of NGOs/SMOs comparable to LABOR, Cooperación, Grupo Andes or Red Muquí.<sup>20</sup> Acción Ecológica is comparable to CONACAMI also because of its visibility in socioenvironmental conflicts in Ecuador. In this sense, although mining conflicts in Ecuador are much less visible than in Peru, the very participation of Acción Ecológica generates more attention in the public eye. Indeed, the anti-mining campaign of Cotacachi has been *the* mining action of greatest importance for the AE mining program. Moreover, activists from the Cotacachi-Intag conflict, participate in the Latin America wide campaigns promoted by AE such as the Mining Network and the Latin American Network of Women Resisting Mining. In this and other supranational actions, AE coordinates with CONACAMI – coordination that has also included the facilitation of direct contacts between Cotacachi and Cajamarca.

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<sup>20</sup> A network of civil society organizations -promoting debate and pursuing advocacy on mining issues—including this and other organizations.

These national contexts are relevant for the case studies in several senses. They help understand the interactions between the local cases studied here, and national debates about mining. Some of the national actors, apart from setting the tone of national debates, influence the dynamics of local conflicts. At the same time, the local cases, at varying moments, become not only emblematic within, but have also come to constitute parts of national debates. Indeed what finally happens in Cotacachi—whether the mine enters or not—could determine the subsequent trajectory of mining in Ecuador. Second, the national political economic context goes a long way in determining the relative power of mining interests in local conflicts and consequently in defining the political spaces that are available to social actors. Third, history provides different memories and reference points in these debates. In Peru, the chronic problem of unresolved environmental damage (open mine tailings, water and soil contamination) caused by old mining projects certainly contributes to resistance to new mining while at the same time making mining more understandable and more familiar for the population. In Ecuador, such reference points do not exist. This creates uncertainty for local populations who find it hard to imagine what social and ecological landscapes might look like during and after mineral development – and so therefore find it difficult to form a political opinion regarding mining. As we will see, it is precisely for this reason—and because of the existence of environmental contamination caused by mining in Peru—that one strategy of SMOs has been to bring community leaders and members from Ecuador to see firsthand the most disastrous consequences of Peru's history of mining.

#### **D. *Glocal* Cajamarca and *Glocal* Cotacachi: transnational relations, socioenvironmental movements and mining companies**


##### **Cajamarca and the determining effects of political economy**

The Yanacocha mine, located 35 km north of the city of Cajamarca in the Andes of northern Peru (Map1) is the largest gold mine in Latin America. The mine – which we refer to as MYSA - is jointly owned by the Newmont Mining Corporation (a multinational mining company based in Denver, Colorado) which owns 51.35%, the Compañía de Minas Buenaventura (a Peruvian company which owns 43.65%) and the International Finance Corporation (the financial arm of the World Bank, with a 5% stake). The mine currently employs some 8000 workers (only 2,243 of whom are regular staff) and covers an area that exceeds 10,000 ha (an area larger than the city of Cajamarca), although the mineral rights owned by the company cover a far larger area, fully 1386 km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>21</sup>

*Map 1. MYSA and Cajamarca*

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<sup>21</sup> The data comes from: Bury 2005; Yanacocha 2005; and [www.yanacocha.com.pe](http://www.yanacocha.com.pe)



Source: Bury 2004

### *In search of a social movement*

The first rumblings of discontent with MYSA were heard shortly after initiating its operations in Cajamarca. Interestingly the complaints were not environmental but rather about the conditions under which land was being acquired. As the Yanacocha mine is an open cast mine, it has had to purchase huge tracts of land in order to operate (Bury 2004; Bury 2002). Between the years 1992 and 1996, MYSA bought land from 41 families— for a total area of 4,068.95 hectares. Complaints began to emerge about prices paid, undue pressure exercised on families to sell their lands, and some less than transparent dealings with local families involving purchasing and obtaining title to land. To the extent that MYSA discovered new deposits and expanded (in spatial and temporal terms) its operations, these conflicts also expanded.

The first complaints emerged in the area of Porcón, adjacent to the mine and the area most affected by the early activities of the mine. The local church played an important role in voicing community concerns about MYSA's operations, facilitating contacts with congregations in Germany but also with the Vicariate of Solidarity of the Diocese of Cajamarca and the National Coordinator of Human Rights (based in Lima) which in turn supported and advised the affected families and transmitted their complaints to key individuals and organizations including MYSA management and Newmont company officials in Denver? An appeal was filed with the Senior Prosecutor of Cajamarca and after some months of investigations and pressure on the board of directors of Newmont - through writing letters of solidarity from Germany<sup>22</sup> to the offices of the World Bank, the president of Peru, the management of Newmont in the U.S.A., the German ambassador and others - MYSA agreed to negotiate and to provide compensation to the affected families.

<sup>22</sup> The parish of Porcón has a solidarity pact with the Saint Gallus Parish of Tettwang, Germany.

In this sense, everyday local faith-based networks combined with larger church networks to constitute the first articulated support for families directly affected by MYSA's operations as well as communities concerned with the impacts of the mine. However, these networks were not stable. The Church, in particular the new Bishop of Cajamarca began to distance itself from the work of the parish priest of Porcón and eventually the priest was sent to Rome.<sup>23</sup> While these church networks were growing weaker, however, another actor began to assume more protagonism in the emerging conflict. The *rondas campesinas*, peasant vigilante groups whose primary purpose arose from the need to control cattle rustling in indigenous communities and who later came to play an important role in controlling Shining Path's entry into the zone (Starn 1997)<sup>24</sup> were also important vehicles for resolving local disputes among community members. Among the people affected by the expansion of the mine there were persons active in the *rondas campesinas* (Bury 2002) and this *ronda* network became another vehicle for contesting the mine's adverse impacts. As the decade progressed, the second tier organization of the *rondas campesinas*—the Federation of the Provinces South of Cajamarca, later the Federation of Women's Self-Defense Committees in Northern Peru (FEROCAFENOP)—began to take shape as the leading organization in open resistance to the mine (Project Underground 1999).

Soon FEROCAFENOP made contact with the activist NGO Project Underground, headquartered in Berkeley, California, and the NGO soon became the Federation's main international contact. Project Underground supported the Federation with technical staff and volunteers, facilitated trips for the president of the Federation to address Newmont's annual shareholders' meeting in Denver, and also to meet with representatives of the IFC in Washington, D.C. Project Underground also influenced the thinking of the communities in an important way, especially when the position of the Federation's leaders began to radicalize and a plan emerged to take over the installations of the mine by force and burn the camp. Project Underground dissuaded them from this plan, the Federation did not take over the mine and ever since their leaders have favored a non-violent strategy.<sup>25</sup> From that time on—and here it is useful to make the comparison with Cotacachi, where the mining camp was attacked around the same date—it was inevitable that Cajamarca was going to be a region transformed by mining. This very transformation would come to influence the dynamics and strategies of social movements in Cajamarca.

### ***From land to environment: a rural movement urbanizes***

Although there were already indications of adverse environmental impacts in 1993 (Arana 2002), the main complaints of farmers during the '90s had to do with opaque land acquisitions, human rights issues and the arrogance and aggressiveness of MYSA. However, toward the end of the decade, two (related) processes took the conflict to the urban population. First, evidence of the existence of environmental impacts affecting the

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<sup>23</sup> As we shall see further ahead, the parallels with the Cotacachi case are striking.

<sup>24</sup> Over time the *rondas campesinas* have assumed a more general role in the exercise of justice and, in certain cases (such as FEROCAFENOP), the management of small productive and social projects.

<sup>25</sup> This fact also negates the claim (promoted by certain mining interests today) that external actors promote violence.

city of Cajamarca had been accumulating and this information came into the public sphere. The municipal water authority, SEDACAJ, concluded that the municipal drinking water contained concentrations of cyanide, chromium, iron and manganese much higher than normal levels. Soon Project Underground obtained and circulated a document, produced by the Ministry of Mines and Energy indicating that MYSA had been dumping acid waters and heavy metals since 1993. Then, on June 2, 2000, a truck contracted by MYSA suffered an accident while passing through the village of Choropampa, spilling its load of mercury onto the road and into streams. Within days health problems appeared among residents and, although there were delays, news of the accident began to circulate in the city.<sup>26</sup>

In parallel, a group of urban-based SMOs began to emerge, producing and disseminating information and opinions critical of MYSA's operations. First, a group of environmental NGOs appeared (ADEA, ECOVIDA and GRUFIDES) all with significant involvement of young people. GRUFIDES was created by the parish priest of Porcón, Marco Arana. After returning from Rome, he began working with students from the National University of Cajamarca (where he was University chaplain)—some of whom had previous experience in liberation theology. Over time the group incorporated environmental and social justice themes in their discussions, and a student group was formed to provide training and socio-legal advice -within a framework of sustainable development- to rural communities seeking help. Another SMO emerged in the form of a network of local activists with a more sociopolitical trajectory and with a certain background in development. Members of this group became known for their analytical work and dedicated significant effort to publishing and disseminating information (in print and electronic form) about MYSA's operations (Seifert 2003; Salas, several authors; 2004; 2006).

This slow "urbanizing" of the emerging social movement in Cajamarca did little to improve relations with peasant communities and FEROCAFENOP. The rising visibility of urban leaders led to increased tensions with FEROCAFENOP. Moreover, the political parties present in the urban organizations were different from the parties present in the Federation.<sup>27</sup> Between 1999 and 2001 tensions between these actors ultimately led to a total rupture of relations, the delegitimization of FEROCAFENOP's leadership and eventually its severe weakening. This final rupture—complex and obscured by gossip and mutual accusation—occurred as a result of the tense interactions between the Federation's leaders and leaders of anti-mining mobilizations at the national level. The leader of FEROCAFENOP also served as a member of the coordinating commission that organized the (national) Congress of Rural Communities Affected by Mining in which the National Coordinating Committee of Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI) was created in October 1999.<sup>28</sup> The president of FEROCAFENOP,

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<sup>26</sup> The accident, its effects and the subsequent conflict and negotiations between Choropampa and MYSA are analyzed and documented in the video *Choropampa: The Price of Gold*, whose production was supported by Oxfam América, Global Greengrants Fund and a group of national and international organizations. See <http://www.guarango.org/>.

<sup>27</sup> See Chacon (2002, 2004) for more information on the relations between parties and peasant farmer self-defense committees in Cajamarca.

<sup>28</sup> A process supported especially by national NGOs and Oxfam America.

Segunda Castrejón, was elected Secretary of Institutional Development of CONACAMI in this first congress and also led its Steering Committee for Environment.

When CONACAMI sought to form a regional arm (CORECAMI) in Cajamarca, it invited Castrejón as well as Rheinart Seifert (a member of the micro-network of urban activists) to organize the Regional Coordinator of Communities Affected by Mining CORECAMI-Cajamarca—two leaders with different party orientations, one a peasant farmer by origin, the other an urban professional. Soon Seifert resigned from CORECAMI over differences with Castrejón (Chacon 2002). In the same year, and not long after Castrejón traveled to Denver (supported by Project Underground) to protest MYSA's practices at Newmont annual stockholders,<sup>29</sup> FEROCAFENOP accepted a US\$10,000 donation from MYSA to support a microfinance program. When the donation became publicly known the legitimacy and power of FEROCAFENOP weakened. Castrejón was expelled from CONACAMI and the process of forming a CORECAMI-Cajamarca with strong links to CONACAMI was aborted (until today).

### *The diversification of transnational linkages*

At the same time the social movement—or at least the group of SMOs that served as its infrastructure—urbanized and relationships between the social movement and different international actors expanded and grew more complex.

This expansion reflected, on the one hand, growing advocacy worldwide around extractive industry activity and in particular around mining. Put another way, many transnational advocacy actors came to Cajamarca, attracted by the importance and scale of MYSA's operations as the largest and most profitable gold mine on the continent. (Project Underground played a key role in raising the visibility of the Yanacocha mine). That was how both FOEI and Oxfam America became more involved in supporting the social movement process there. In fact, although Oxfam America (OA) worked on mining themes in Peru, supporting, among others, LABOR and CONACAMI, its involvement in Cajamarca originated not so much from its office in Lima, but rather from its Washington D.C. office where, in 1999, an individual was hired to work on advocacy and extractive industries. Together with CONACAMI (whom OA began to support in 1999), MYSA was selected as a case to work on, in part because it was thought that the presence of the IFC as a partner in MYSA offered greater possibility for effective advocacy. As the OA advocacy staff member was based in Washington DC, had prior knowledge of the World Bank and of the process by which the IFC's Ombudsman's Office (the CAO) was created,<sup>30</sup> MYSA seemed to be a promising case. The following year the Choropampa mercury spill occurred and from that time on OA devoted significant attention to following MYSA and the conflict both in Peru as well as in the U.S.A. In subsequent years OA began to be an important partner for a number of SMOs in Cajamarca, and contributing funding to the production of a documentary on the Choropampa case, a video which ended up being a very powerful instrument in the

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<sup>29</sup> It is impossible for us to understand *why* the Federation accepted this money, even if we can intuit why the company wanted to offer it.

<sup>30</sup> The CAO was created as a sort of public defender with respect to the IFC.

international campaigns not just on MYSA but also other mines.<sup>31, 32</sup> Incorporating the representative of OA in Lima into the GGF Andean Advisory Board sustained GGF's attention to Cajamarca.

In addition to relationships with OA, the SMOs had other transnational ties. As a result of the conflicts within CORECAMI and its acceptance of funds from MYSA, FEROCAFENOP lost most of its transnational allies and thus its visibility. To a large extent these relationships were transferred to the urban-based SMOs. Project Underground—for whom MYSA and Newmont were *the* campaign of 2001—cut relations with FEROCAFENOP and began supporting other urban actors and organizations. Friends of the Earth International followed suit. At the same time these urban-based actors—some more than others—successfully mobilized new relationships. Among them, the previously existing sister city ties between Cajamarca and various towns in Germany began to take on greater importance. The ties served to channel funds and to organize visits of local activists to Germany (taking with them the Choropampa video). Although these visits produced no direct effects on MYSA practice (given that the company has no ties with Germany), they certainly were useful for continuing to generate solidarity and financial resources for Cajamarcan SMOs.

### *Dialogue, direct action and mining practices*

The increasing urbanization of the social movement as well as of the conflict, together with specific disasters such as that of Choropampa were accompanied by another phenomenon in the post 1999 period: the call for dialogue and the conformation of roundtables to mediate conflicts in response to the wave of massive social mobilizations.<sup>33</sup> The call for dialogue and the constitution of participatory roundtables has become a sort of automatic response to socio-environmental conflicts in Peru, with the result that roundtables have proliferated. This phenomenon seems to be not only an artifact of the way public entities respond to conflict and social mobilization, but also of a certain trend among and inability of civil society actors to agree on the existence of a single roundtable. In fact, although the dialogues and roundtables were created as a consequence of the protagonism of social movements and social movement organizations, these actors have exerted relatively little influence over their evolution.

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<sup>31</sup> Among others, the activists in Cotacachi have a copy of the video, and activists in the Philippines use it in their organizing work (Racelis, pers. com., 2005).

<sup>32</sup> OA's support for the video also has an interesting history. OA-Perú had supported videos on other themes, but always with modest grants. When Guarango requested funds to make the video, they asked for much more money than OA had given for the other videos as Guarango sought to produce a professional, not amateur, video. The case catalyzed a debate within OA-Perú—the conclusion was that amateur videos had had very little effect, and that if one was going to have an effect with a video, it was important for it to be well made. The project was financed as a test. The video ended up having repercussions in Peru, the U.S.A. and many other countries, and has been one of the most important actions of advocacy in the whole Cajamarca conflict.

<sup>33</sup> It should be said that dialogue and roundtables were a legacy from an earlier experience in Cajamarca with participatory and consensus-based planning mechanisms, led by the mayor Luís Guerrero during the first half of the '90s.



One of these roundtables was created in response to two complaints presented to the CAO (one by FEROCAFENOP) in early 2001.<sup>34</sup> Because of its close ties to the IFC, and its origins in the discredited FEROCAFENOP, the CAO roundtable was never seen as legitimate space for dialogue. The CAO roundtable was perceived as pro-mining, pro-MYSA and resistant to dealing with central issues raised by movement leaders (Project Underground 2003). Its main achievement was to contract a monitoring system for water quality in the region. Nevertheless, an external evaluation concluded that the lack of participation by environmental NGOs, local government and the more representative *rondas campesinas* undermined its effectiveness (CAO-IFC-MIGA 2005). The report recommended that the IFC withdraw from the roundtable.

Parallel to the CAO dialogue and roundtable, another roundtable was quickly organized by the CTAR (the transitional agency for regional administration) following a series of convulsive urban protests over water quality that ended with an attack on the offices of MYSA and SEDACAJ. The CTAR dialogue enjoyed broader participation. However, the actors involved in this roundtable and the CAO roundtable refused to merge the two conversations, and it seems that MYSA felt more secure attending the CAO roundtable. Indeed, when the CTAR dialogue began to touch on the more sensitive themes, both MYSA and the MEM withdrew from the roundtable. Like the CAO roundtable, the main accomplishment of the CTAR roundtable was to contract another study that ended up criticizing MYSA for a series of errors and weaknesses with respect to the management of their operations and environmental protection. And while the response of MYSA's managers was to question the study, it is perhaps the only product of these roundtables that has eventually influenced the environmental practices of MYSA.

One of the many and perhaps most notable indicator of the roundtables' weakness as instruments of good environmental governance was the impossibility of debating the most conflictive issue between the population and MYSA: the expansion of the mine onto the mountainside known as Cerro Quilish.<sup>35</sup> For MYSA, Cerro Quilish contains important deposits of gold;<sup>36</sup> for the City of Cajamarca, Cerro Quilish is the primary source of its drinking water. When the subject of MYSA's proposed expansion onto Cerro Quilish was raised at the CTAR roundtable, the Ministry as well as MYSA representatives withdrew their participation.

On October 5, 2000, in response to a wave of growing social mobilization, the Provincial Municipality of Cajamarca declared Cerro Quilish a Municipal Protected Area (Zona Reservada Municipal), implying that MYSA could not develop it. In response, MYSA opened legal proceedings against the Municipal government, and although it lost in the first two legal rounds, it won the appeal in Lima. On July 16, the MEM authorized MYSA to resume explorations at Cerro Quilish (RD Num. 361-2004-MEM). Parallel to these legal proceedings, demonstrations and social protests –often turning violent- had

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<sup>34</sup> In at least one of these cases, the complaint was filed by OA-Washington.

<sup>35</sup> We did field work in one of the communities of Quilish.

<sup>36</sup> Cerro Quilish would contain a gold mining prospectus, the declared reserves of which at this time reach 3.7 million ounces of gold, close to 10% of the Yanacocha reserves (*Gestión* newspaper, September 13, 2002).

continued in Cajamarca. However the MEM's decision unleashed another kind of mobilization. Between September 2 and 16, 2004, massive mobilizations occurred—rural as well as urban—protesting the expansion onto Cerro Quilish. The mayor of Cajamarca, Emilio Horna, participated actively in the protest calling for an indefinite strike. In the face of massive region-wide paralysis, the Provincial Council of Cajamarca lifted the strike on September 16<sup>th</sup>, upon learning that the Ministry of Energy and Mines had committed itself to cancel its earlier resolution via the publication of Directive Resolution 427 in the official daily newspaper *El Peruano*. In the end, on November 3, 2004, MYSA took out a full page advertisement in the Peruvian daily newspapers to announce publicly its decision not to initiate explorations on Cerro Quilish. In addition, the statement conveyed the company's acceptance of its mishandling of the relationship with the people of Cajamarca and recognizing—at least implicitly—that MYSA did not have social license in order to proceed with operations at Cerro Quilish. MYSA made a formal request to MEM to revoke its permission, which was granted on November 5, 2004.

In response to a petition brought forward by Ivan Salas, Coordinator of the United Civic Committee for the Struggle for the Defense of Life and Environment of Cajamarca, who assumed leadership of the protests,<sup>37</sup> another roundtable was created. However, several months passed before the roundtable convened its first meeting. This was followed by bickering among leaders over who would participate in the roundtable and who would lead it. Once again, the social movement organizations and the movement as a whole lost the initiative.

The mobilization around Cerro Quilish is illustrative in another sense: it suggests that direct action, not negotiation, resulted in greater influence over the environmental and social practices—the domain of *real* environmental governance—of MYSA. There are other indications of this relationship too, reflected in the levels of spending by MYSA on environmental and social programs, expenditures that began to rise significantly after 1999/2000 (Morel 2005). Importantly, increased spending seems to be related to the participation of FEROCAFENOP leader at the Newmont shareholders meeting and the subsequent mercury spill in Choropampa. Another indication is the change in the way MYSA handles information. Although it remains an elusive company to penetrate, MYSA provides more information about its activities than ever before. The company runs an information center in the city of Cajamarca and began producing an annual report a sort of self reported social audit (*Balance Social*) in which MYSA attempts to document expenditures and contributions on social, cultural and environmental themes related to its operations (Yanacocha 2005). Finally, the massive mobilization to save Cerro Quilish impacted the internal structure of MYSA's operations in Cajamarca. The external affairs unit was reorganized and a new team brought in, and (for the first time) direct lines of communication were opened between those working on social programs and staff in other units (such as environment, exploration, etc.) in order for social concerns to be vetted before initiating explorations.

That said, the depth of these reforms is in doubt. A few days after the MYSA declared it would not exploit Cerro Quilish, (of November 3, 2004) Alberto Benavides, Director of

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<sup>37</sup> See his book on these mobilizations (Salas. 2006).

Minera Buenaventura indicated in a public interview in Miami that it was highly likely that MYSA would reinitiate explorations at Cerro Quilish at some point in the future.

### *Mining and rural territorial development in Cajamarca*

Over the last decade Cajamarca has seen a significant jump in mining concessions, investment and exploration; in levels of social mobilization and organization around mining issues; and in the creation of public spaces for debating and discussing the role of mining in the region. In a certain sense these social mobilizations as well as the newly created spaces for debating and negotiating how mining ought to be governed can be seen as *effects* of regional development, a development understood as the underlying process of politico-economic transformation that results from the expansion of capitalism. In this section we explore the question: what have been the effects of the interactions between these three processes at the level of rural territories?

There is no doubt that mining investment has generated economic growth in Cajamarca. In the last 10 years, the gross national product (GNP) of Cajamarca has steadily increased at a rate of 9.3%, almost triple the national average (3.5%). The increase is driven by the mining sector, which has grown at an annual rate of 18.9% (the national rate for the sector was 7.5%), which makes mining the main activity of the Department of Cajamarca, accounting for 38.7% of the total GNP for 2004 (from a figure of 18.1% in 1995). However—because mining is largely an enclave economy, growth per se does not readily translate into improved quality of life for the population. This is a general problem in the mining sector (Barrantes et al. 2005; Dirven 2006) and significant in the case of the Yanacocha mine where ECLAC researchers concluded that the enclave nature of the mine's operations are particularly pronounced (Dirven 2006).

There are a number of channels that could transform this mining investment into RTD: direct hiring of labor, local purchase of materials and services; company investment in social responsibility programs to carry out development programs in the region; payment of taxes to the Peruvian state with mechanisms that assure that a significant percentage of these taxes return to the areas affected by mining (this mechanism is the so-called *Canon Minero* or mining canon<sup>38</sup>); and payment of royalties, as an additional payment in recognition that mining extracts a region's finite/nonrenewable resources. Except in the latter case of royalties, there is evidence that social movements both in Cajamarca and nationally have influenced each of these channels. However, there is much less evidence that these efforts have translated into RTD (understood in the normative sense of Shejtman and Berdegué 2003); in fact, in several senses (related to social capital) the effect has been perverse. This also seems to be the conclusion shared by some SMOs and activists (Salas, and various others) who criticize the fact that economic growth and mineral extraction have not been translated into RTD that reduces either poverty or

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<sup>38</sup> The mining canon is a percentage of the income flow perceived by the national government from the exploitation of mining resources (both metallic and non-metallic) and channeled to local government (provincial and district municipal governments) under Canon Law Num. 27506 of 2001.

exclusion. Popular perceptions in Cajamarca are similar (Zarate and Dunand 2005; field notes).

Minera Yanacocha has been harshly criticized for doing so little to provide more employment opportunities for the local population. To be sure the company has responded to this criticism, although the best paid positions still tend to be filled by people from outside Cajamarca for reasons of technical skill and professional preparation. However, the very process of hiring local people seems, on the one hand to have a certain urban bias. On the other hand, when persons are hired from rural communities, envy, gossip and tensions are created among community members. Something similar happens with the purchase of local services. Again, in response to criticisms made by ordinary citizens, MYSA increased the amount of good and services purchased from local firms (Yanacocha 2005; Morel 2005). Here, also, there is an urban bias, due to the simple fact that the ability to provide such services is found in the city, not in the countryside. In the few instances where communities can provide services, the problem of factionalism arises once again, because those who benefit are the few and favored. In fact, oftentimes the ripple effects are worse still—in one community studied, the leader of the *ronda campesina* had a small company with a services contract with MYSA. One result of this relationship was that both the legitimacy of his leadership and the *ronda campesina* was questioned. “It’s not been possible to talk to the current president ever since his company gained a contract with the mine.” (GV, HB) This case reflects another ripple effect of the purchase of services locally: a certain demobilization of protest. The contracts create incentives for people to not criticize the mine and—beyond whether this is true or not—the perception exists that contracts are used for this purpose. “The mine buys the most vocal men, now they are quiet” (group of women HB).

Another of MYSA’s responses to social protest and mobilization has been the creation and expansion of social and environmental responsibility programs and investment for rural as well as urban sectors. Nevertheless, although the budget of these programs has grown, the social movement and movement organizations have not negotiated a role in the direct and formal governance of these programs—up to now, the urban program, whose operations are somewhat independent of MYSA, remains governed by a Board of Directors composed of MYSA employees; and the rural program continues to be run from within the company.

Finally, protest and mobilization at the national level did successfully alter the equation for assessing the distribution of the mining canon. In this case, influence was not exercised on the mining company, but on the State that in the end reformed the canon system so that a much larger percentage of the income flow would benefit areas of mining activity. However, it has only been since July 2004, when new legislation went into effect, that the mining *canon* is distributed to the municipalities directly affected by mining.

In these different senses, protest and mobilization, at the local and national level, have influenced the relation between mining and RTD. Nevertheless, the final effects of RTD for the rural poor continue to be limited and not always positive. At a general level, the

political economy of mining has generated urban bias and greater inequality. The levels of inequality—measured by the Gini indices for 2001 and 2002—are slightly higher than those of Lima (which in turn are similar to those for the rest of the country). The top 10% of the population concentrates almost 40% of the income and reveals an average income of almost 25 times more than the lowest 10%.<sup>39</sup> Such inequality accompanies chronic poverty. The human development index of Cajamarca is found among the lowest of the country, somewhere between 22nd to 25th place, and its variation has been minimal even after the MYSA started operations. At the national level, Cajamarca is at the bottom in terms of educational achievement.

In the areas influenced by MYSA, inequalities are more marked. While in the (urban) district of Cajamarca the values associated with the human development index are high, in the neighboring districts of Baños del Inca and La Encañada, the situation is more precarious (Instituto Cuanto 2005, Table 1). Furthermore, while the district of Cajamarca ranks 8th out of 116 in terms of educational levels (department-wide) Baños del Inca ranks number 84th and La Encañada 89th. This difference is even more accentuated when examining per capita income: in the district of Cajamarca income is 19% to 29% greater than in neighboring districts. The district of La Encañada ranks 1,696 out of 1,828 districts in the country. The implication here is that while the district of Cajamarca might have derived important benefits from the presence of the mine, the rural districts -where MYSA operates- continue to exhibit very low HDIs. And although Barrantes (2005) concludes that—at the national level—families that live near mine operations are slightly less poor in terms of income, the positive impacts that mining might bring continue to be limited, and at least in the case of Cajamarca they do not seem to translate into significant advances in other dimensions of development.

**Table 1. Human Development Index for districts directly influenced by Yanacocha**

Department	Human Development Index		Life expectancy at birth		Literacy		Secondary enrollment		Educational attainment		Per capita family income	
	HDI	Rank*	Years	Rank*	(%)	Rank*	(%)	Rank*	(%)	Rank*	New Soles month	Rank*
Cajamarca	0.569	5	71.6	9	86.8	100	81.1	7	83.0	8	239.9	4
Baños del Inca	0.446	77	69.6	38	69.0	16	42.6	77	51.4	84	201.2	42
Encañada	0.415	97	65.2	102	62.8	6	44.1	74	50.3	89	185.4	97

Source: Instituto Cuanto

\* ranking based on 116 districts of the Department of Cajamarca

In one study of three communities all within an area of mining influence, Bury (2002, 2004) concluded that, although improvements were seen in community members' physical and human capital, their stocks of natural and social capital had deteriorated. For

<sup>39</sup> Our calculations based on data from INEI, 2005.

Bury, the deterioration in natural capital was particularly reflected in families' reduced access to land and in the diminished quality and quantity of water. As noted previously, water continues to be a highly controversial issue and while social movement organizations insist that it is a principle concern of the population, the response of MYSA and government authorities has been to delegitimize the concern: "the engineers tell us that everything is fine, that there is plenty of water and water quality is fine, but that is not what we see, there is less and less water" (group HB). The communities included in this study insisted that the quality and availability of water has deteriorated—a problem especially recognized by women villagers. They refer to various indicators of this change: the disappearance of frogs, fish (trout) and other aquatic life, and changes in color and greater turbidity of the water. Moreover, changes in water affect agricultural production, "...there isn't any production because there is less water and the contamination has ruined the land" (group of women HB).

In his in-depth study of MYSA and its impacts on rural communities, Bury (2004) identifies unequal treatment and lack of transparency between the mining company and the population as the most important factor in the weakening of social capital: "This has led to an increase in distrust, social differentiation and conflict among households" (Bury 2004: 88). In counterbalance to this weakening of social capital, around 2000 (the period when he conducted his field work in Cajamarca) Bury found that the presence of MYSA had induced the emergence of other forms of supracommunal social capital, such as the rise of FEROCAFENOP. Today, however the Federation is weakened: "the women's *rondas campesinas* no longer do much of anything" (group of women HB). Meanwhile the trends at the community level identified by Bury were also found in the communities included in this study. In each community, the legitimacy of leaders and community members who collaborated with MYSA was cast into doubt; there were comments that the traditional practice of *minga*<sup>40</sup> was disappearing; and that—with the exception of the period of protest and mobilization (the Cerro Quilish campaign)<sup>41</sup>—everyday forms of collective action and the social relationships and norms sustaining them were weakening. "Now people don't meet as we did before because our leaders work for the mine" (Group of Women).

A weakening of social capital is also found in the relationship between citizen and local government, a perverse result of the mining *canon* (Barrantes et al. 2005). Given that MYSA emphasizes the *canon*'s contribution to local development, citizens expect important infrastructure projects from their municipal authorities. However, the bureaucratic rules that determine how the *canon* can be used make it very difficult for local governments to bring forward projects that satisfy these rules. Thus, local governments encounter significant difficulties in using the *canon* and as a consequence a climate of distrust and tension is created between citizens and their elected authorities (Zarate and Durand 2005).

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<sup>40</sup> Minga (or minka) is a form of communal work.

<sup>41</sup> "In 2000 people didn't meet except for the *rondas campesinas*. When we found out they wanted to remove the mountains that gave us our water, we rebelled" (group HB).

Although it is a much less tangible indicator, interviews with community members also give the sense that the very experience of living in rural territory has changed since the arrival of the mine, and that this in itself reflects a negative trend in the quality of life and RTD. “We were poor, but we lived peacefully” (women, MB). In fact the mine is seen by some as a thief, invading and stealing, “the mine is worse than a cattle rustler” (UCV, AB). As a result of these changes, the relationship between family livelihood strategy, environment and space becomes much less secure and predictable as community members look to the future. Indeed, the theme of uncertainty was present both in individual interviews as well as in focus group discussions: “those who didn’t sell [their land to the mine] and stayed in the community are ruined, sooner or later we will all be worse off because the majority of us are farmers, we have a few animals, we sell milk, and with this we cover our needs but after when everything is contaminated, and there isn’t anything left, what will we do then?” (MYS, AB). In some sense, it is this very concern and uncertainty about a mining future that underlies the social mobilization that occurred in Cotacachi.

Faced with uncertainty, there is neither much evidence to indicate that social movement organizations have developed new discourses on RTD that have influenced how the population imagines development in the region. While general ideas exist—Salas and the Front (Frente Único en Defensa de la Vida, el Medio Ambiente y los Intereses de Cajamarca-Perú [United Front for the Protection of Life and the Environment of Cajamarca]) propose nationalizing MYSA, and GRUFIDES talks about sustainable development with an agricultural base—these visions are undeveloped ideas that are unable to induce a more generalized society-wide process for imagining another rural territorial development. In this sense it seems certain that the mining sector will continue to dominate debates on development.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, it is a defensible hypothesis that social protest in Cajamarca does not reflect a feeling that the region demands another type of non-mining development, but rather anger with the behavior of the mine as a social actor (cf., Gorriti 2004). Still, it is important to remember that within a social movement there are different, often competing visions of what development is. Implicit in the proposals of Salas and others is the notion that a process of development based on mining -assuming certain environmental costs- is justifiable when and only when the distribution of benefits and the governance of the sector are modified: a vision that accepts reductions in natural capital if they are compensated with other forms of social capital that will result in different ways of managing tangible economic capital. In the proposals of other SMOs (e.g., GRUFIDES, ECOVIDA) the notion seems to be that development that generates certain losses of natural capital is simply not acceptable because it cannot qualify as sustainable development.<sup>43</sup>

### **Cotacachi-Intag: how to resist mining**

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<sup>42</sup> For example, the Association Los Andes de Cajamarca [the Andes Association of Cajamarca] (Yanacocha’s NGO) and the Grupo Norte (a group composed mostly of mining firms led by Buenaventura) exert greater influence over the debates about regional development than do SMOs.

<sup>43</sup> These distinctions are not insignificant: at the margin they lead you to different negotiation strategies—and in this sense they reflect another internal weakness of the social movement in Cajamarca. They reflect local versions of other more global debates on the nature of sustainability and the kinds of trade-offs that are, and are not, acceptable in sustainable RTD. See Serageldin and Steer (1994) on types of sustainability.

The county (canton) of Cotacachi, located an hour and a half north of Quito, extends from high altitude grasslands to humid tropical valleys on the northwestern slopes of the Andes. This humid sector of the county is known as Intag. In Intag—specifically in the area called Junín—is the site of a copper deposit (Map 2) first identified in the 1980s during work conducted under the auspices of a geological exploration agreement between the governments of Ecuador and Belgium. In 1990, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) financed a large-scale exploration, carried out by Metal Mining Agency of Japan (MMAJ) that concluded the existence of a large and potentially profitable deposit. In 1993 the exploration of the deposit passed to the Japanese firm, Bishi Metals, a subsidiary of Mitsubishi Corporation. Bishi metals eventually left the zone in 1997 as a result of escalating conflicts with the local population (see below). In 2002 the government of Ecuador sold the concession to an individual, Roque Bustamante, who later (in 2004) sold the concession on to the Ascendant Copper Corporation, a company incorporated in Canada (British Columbia) but having its main headquarters in Lakewood, Colorado.<sup>44</sup> In 2005, Ascendant transferred ownership of this property to its subsidiary Ascendant Ecuador.<sup>45</sup> Though still not developed, this will - like Yanacocha - be an open cast mine. Moreover, given that Ascendant is a junior company, it is highly likely that after preparing the ground for the mine, it will proceed to sell the concession (in its entirety or a significant percentage) to another company with the capacity to bring the mine into production.


*Map 2: Junín, Intag and Cotacachi*

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
<sup>44</sup> Lakewood is, ironically, a suburb of Denver, home to Newmont's headquarters.

<sup>45</sup>The data come from Ascendant Copper Corporation, 2005.





Source: Ascendant Copper Corporation 2005



### *The beginnings: social organizations in motion*

“My eyes were opened.”

A peasant farmer woman, speaking about her participation in an Acción Ecológica workshop.

In 1991, a member of the US-based NGO, Rainforest Action Network,<sup>46</sup> visited the anti-mining NGO Acción Ecológica (AE) and, among other things, asked staff what it knew about a company operating in Junín. Replying it had no knowledge of any company presence in the region, AE staff then visited Junín and initiated a series of community workshops about mining. Without doubt the workshops influenced villagers’ thinking and discourse, especially—it would seem—women’s views. During this time contact was also made with a local priest who began to be concerned about the effects that mining could have on the region. Meanwhile, AE organized visits to other mining sites in Ecuador (to Cuenca and Salinas) so that community members could hear how villagers in Salinas had forced a transnational mining company to depart from their territory. The parish priest began to speak of the implications of extractive mining activity while giving mass and also organized a youth group in the neighboring parish of Peñaherrera. This group initiated several production projects, incorporating agro-ecological concepts which reflected the university training of some of the youths.

Parallel to (but independent from) this process, a Cuban-North American ecologist and entrepreneur residing in the neighboring parish was running a small ecotourism business. He began having run-ins with poachers who killed a pair of (endangered) spectacled bears in his forest. Faced with a lack of response from State authorities, independently he decided to organize the protection of the forest. He approached a group of local youth who played sports in the parish and crafted an agreement with them: they would patrol the forest as “rangers” and he would give them environmental training.

Toward the end of 1994, these different processes merged. The parish priest took his youth group to learn about the experience of the forest rangers, and took advantage of the visit to talk about the mining problem in Junín (about which the ecotourism entrepreneur knew nothing about). A proposal emerged to join the two groups and form an environmentalist group to confront the mining problem and in 1995, the NGO Defensa y Conservación de Intag [Defense and Conservation of Intag] (DECOIN) was born. Given the parish priest’s links to AE staff, AE began to provide training and certain financial support to DECOIN. In addition, via AE’s own networks—especially those related to FOEI—AE initiated a campaign to raise the visibility of the Intag case.

In these processes ties were woven and strengthened among an array of local groups: an environmental consciousness was forming and radicalizing. Still, this radicalization was also driven by three other factors. First, AE organized a trip to Peru so that local residents

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<sup>46</sup> Rainforest Action Network is a member of the Global Advisory Board of Global Greengrants Fund, although at that time GGF did not yet exist.

from Junín (mostly women)<sup>47</sup> could learn firsthand about the effects of mining in the country. The experience of seeing landscapes such as those of La Oroya and Cerro de Pasco, (a historical mining region of Peru) and hear their *huaynos*<sup>48</sup>, impacted the women enormously: "with such sad *huaynos*, how could mining be a positive force for the local population?" they asked.<sup>49</sup> Second, the relationship between Bishi Metals engineers and the communities continued to deteriorate. Several communities had supported the presence of Bishi Metals because of the jobs the company provided, and because (under certain pressure) it offered social projects. However, over time Bishi Metals failed to fulfill its promises, and relations with local workers worsened. Third, Bishi Metals prepared an environmental impact study (EIA) stating that several communities would need to be relocated in order to develop the mine. Local leaders obtained a copy of the EIA and used it to wage a campaign to mobilize community opposition to the mine. Indeed, the EIA marks an important landmark in this struggle because from that time on the SMOs and movement more generally use it to justify their ferocious resistance to mining.<sup>50</sup>

These processes—in part consequences of the attempts of some actors to manage the conflict, in part the results of company behavior—culminated in the decision of the Committee for the Defense of Communities Affected by the Mining Project -previously organized by the communities with support from DECOIN- to attack the camp, an act which occurred on May 12, 1997. The motives were several: resentment with respect to the company's treatment of residents, and a fierce determination to protect livelihoods: "I don't care if they send me to jail for ten years if this protects my children's future." In the words of one of the geologists who worked in the camp,<sup>51</sup> "the main driver of this attack was not ecological but ecological politics." The attack induced Bishi Metals departure from Ecuador and the concession returned to the Ecuadorian government until it was sold again in 2002.

### ***Towards local government: a rural movement becomes regional***

The attack on the mining camp occurred shortly after a political change in the municipal government of Cotacachi that created a favorable environment for the expansion and consolidation of the social movement. The current mayor of Cotacachi, Auki Tituaña, began his first term in office in 1996 with an agenda to promote popular participation in local management and—related to this—cross cultural communication. Tituaña's agenda translated into the creation of an Assembly for Cantonal Unity (AUC) as an instrument for promoting social mobilization and popular participation in the drafting of municipal plans and budgets. It also served to sponsor various intersectorial committees to address

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<sup>47</sup> This was not a deliberate strategy. The men had problems with their *libretas militares* (military registration cards) and thus could not obtain passports to travel.

<sup>48</sup> The *huayno* is a genre of popular Andean music, a combination of traditional, rural ballads blended with popular urban dance music.

<sup>49</sup> This is a paraphrase.

<sup>50</sup> Those interviewed from the mining sector argue that the EIA was badly handled by Mitsubishi—not realizing the full implications of the mine Bishi Metals used (according to those interviewed) an experience in Japan as a point of reference.

<sup>51</sup> Now a MEM official.

key themes in the Canton, among them the Committee for Environmental Management (CEM).

The peasant farmers, or *colonos* (settlers) of the subtropical zone of Intag, particularly the sectors organized around DECOIN, assumed leadership roles in this process. At the same time, they managed—especially via DECOIN—to position the issue of environment on the municipal agenda. They also took to steps to adopt a municipal ordinance to declare Cotacachi an "ecological canton" that, although it does not reject mining *de jure*, does so *de facto*. Furthermore, DECOIN occupied the Chair of the CEM from the moment of the Committee's creation, and it has always fulfilled a key role within the Committee: it is, one person said, "almost as though Intag has appropriated the CEM."<sup>52</sup> Thus, it permits the social movement to utilize the apparatus of the AUC and of the local government to communicate their concerns regarding mining, and to raise the visibility of the mining threat among urban and rural families in the Canton. Two years ago, a member of DECOIN was elected to one of the seven councillor positions in the Canton.

To be clear, the mayor was not elected on an environmental agenda or even an anti-mining agenda. In fact, it is conceivable that at certain times the mayor's office might have wanted to explore the possibility of pursuing mining as a possible means of generating additional income for the municipal budget. The success of the SMOs was that they seized the moment and the process and thus created an atmosphere that effectively obliged the mayor to assume the position of the environmentalists. With time, the very behavior of Ascendant, when it launched a personal attack on the mayor, only served to further consolidate the position of the environmentalists in municipal management. Today the mayor is another actor in the movement process.

While this process took place within the Canton, other relationships were consolidating both inside and outside the Canton, and yet another process was going on in Intag itself. As part of DECOIN's strategy to look for viable production alternatives (see below), a series of new organizations were created among them: the Women's Coordinator, the Río Intag Coffee Growers' Association (AACRI); Ecotourism Groups, the Intag Youth Coordinator. In one way or another, these organizations allowed for the "unDECOINizing" of the social movement's public face.<sup>53</sup> Meanwhile some groups began weaving their own networks with groups from other sectors of the Canton: the Women's Coordinator played a key role in the organization of the first assembly of women's organizations of the Canton Cotacachi—placing the discussion of mining squarely in the assembly's agenda.

### ***Consolidation and environmental education***

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<sup>52</sup> It is worth noting that some observe that this very fact has led to this theme dominating the cantonal environmental debate with the effect of marginalizing other serious environmental problems. Also, it should be noted that the mining company is not on the CEM—however, in recent times flower exporting companies, the other actors with big capital in the canton occupy a place on the committee.

<sup>53</sup> Nevertheless, it continues to be the case that leadership and some administrative positions within these organizations are occupied by persons who were present during the initial years of DECOIN.



Beyond serving as a period of greater articulation and expansion, the years following Bishi Metals withdrawal also allowed for the consolidation of SMOs as well as of the movement more generally. The new organizations began to occupy spaces of everyday life: gender and generation relations, coffee production, handicraft activities, etc. The thread underlying this consolidation process is environmental education (or perhaps, remembering the words of the geologist, an education in *ecological politics*), and in this sense it is fitting to remember that DECOIN was founded as an organization to promote environmental education. Since 1995, DECOIN has mobilized funds for explicitly educational activities as well as for related activities—e.g., the purchase of protection forests for water sources—that have educational effects.

One of the consequences of creating and colonizing the Committee for Environmental Management has been the expansion of environmental educational activity through a vehicle that gives it the local government's seal of legitimacy. With municipal as well as external funds, the CEM, acting with the AUC, has taken environmental education to schools and communities in and outside of Intag. These actions have served as instruments to communicate environmental concerns to a larger number of people and likewise to gain their support—an affirmation supported by a survey (AUC/IEE 2005) that shows around 70% of the population is anti-mining (Figure 1).<sup>54</sup> These shared concerns strengthen the ties between SMOs and a wider, cantonal social movement.

*Figure 1: Survey based results on attitudes towards mining in Cotacachi (n=602)*

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<sup>54</sup> Another piece of data consistent with this survey is that in 2005, the Federation of Urban Neighborhoods discussed the subject of mining, and of the 16 member neighborhoods, only 4 ended up in favor of the mine entering Cotacachi.



Source: IEE, 2005, survey conducted during 2005

In this process of expanding environmental education, the local Intag newspaper has also played an innovative role. The newspaper, which was started in 2000 in order to provide more local news and to widen the range of voices in local debates about development (previously, the voices appearing in print were mostly limited to DECOIN, the AUC and the local government) and covers development topics, giving particular attention to mining issues. Three or four hundred copies of each number are sold regularly,<sup>55</sup> and their own data suggest that 3–4 persons read each copy. While the paper is not an instrument of the SMOs, it is positioned within the social movement process.

### ***Rural territorial development without mining***

“We are convinced that in order to curb mining we have to offer alternatives ... [that are] practical, productive .... that offer work.”

After the withdrawal of Bishi Metals, the local population began to demand economic alternatives and during the following years a group of organizations emerged—almost all with roots in DECOIN—that reflected a response to this challenge. Although these organizations had launched various production activities, there were two main ideas underlying the alternative proposal: organic coffee production and tourism (both

<sup>55</sup> Published monthly or bimonthly.

ecological and solidarity based).<sup>56</sup> The coffee-growing proposal is based on the Río Intag Coffee Growers' Association, created in 1998 and which now has 270 members, scattered among 39 communities in three cantons (adjacent to Intag). The proposal aims to promote new techniques, organic certification, coffee processing, and new national and international markets for the Association's products. Its production also creates a significant demand for hemp bags (for packaging the coffee) which are produced by 30–40 women of the women's organization in Intag.

Although several ecotourism initiatives have been promoted at the community level, the largest project is a collaborative effort between the municipal government and the Intag Youth Coordinator in which the community (with support from a Spanish donor) co-financed the remodeling of a tourist center, Las Piscinas de Nangulvi. The municipal government transferred the center to the Coordinator in order for them to manage the center and provide economic opportunities for Intag youth.

There is no doubt that these activities are intended to promote more inclusive forms of RTD—in the sense that they create new social organizations and initiatives offering new economic options to women, young adults and peasant farmers. Nonetheless, the scale of these initiatives is relatively limited and their financial viability uncertain. AACRI depends on subsidies (through project support and donations) in order to be able to operate and the viability of the ecotourism project in Nangulvi is highly dependent on events organized by the municipality and of the various social organizations in the area (and therefore highly dependent on outside funders).<sup>57</sup> More significant, however, is that these initiatives, while providing opportunity, do not compensate for the structural limitations of RTD in Intag that ultimately force a good number of young adults to leave Intag and not return.<sup>58, 59</sup> To the extent that families perceive more income, they tend to invest additional income in education. However, some residents interviewed for this study (including one of the most visible leaders in the struggle against mining) commented ironically that once community children leave to be educated, they become urbanized and do not return.<sup>60</sup>

### *Transnational relationships and resistance to mining*

“What we value most in this struggle are the alliances with international organizations”  
“If you don't apply force, nothing happens”<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> This perhaps reflects the fact that the entrepreneur, co-founder of DECOIN, already ran an ecotourism initiative and planted organic coffee.

<sup>57</sup> That said, many luxury hotels and hostels in Quito are not so different— they too depend on international funding and public expenditure for their viability.

<sup>58</sup> Neither is there any evidence—if we use Yanacocha for comparison—that the mining company would change the situation.

<sup>59</sup> We did not do detailed fieldwork at the community level: these operations are based on interviews with key informants from different communities in the parishes.

<sup>60</sup> A phenomenon that has been seen in other cases: e.g., Bebbington, Rojas and Hinojosa 2002; Bebbington, Quisbert and Trujillo 1996.

<sup>61</sup> The quotations are from SM leaders in Cotacachi-Intag.

In ethnographic—and personal— terms what attracts one’s attention upon entering the Intag region for the first time is the number of foreigners living, visiting, working or residing there: Catalan, Spanish, Italian, Cuban, Japanese, North American and British. Their presence is an indicator, and a consequence, of the role that transnational links have played both in the emergence of the movement in Intag, as well as with Cotacachi’s experiment with participatory municipal management. Although we have seen that in Cotacachi, as in Cajamarca, the social movement emerges, to a large extent from the everyday networks and organizations of certain local residents, transnational relationships have assumed a much more formative role here than in Cajamarca.

Transnational relationships contributed to establishing some of the bases that gave rise to the social movement in Cotacachi. The links between RAN and Acción Ecológica led—in an almost accidental way—to AE’s visiting Intag in 1991-1992. During the first five years of social mobilization, the movement’s transnational networks were almost completely those of AE. These networks had a certain ideological coherence,<sup>62</sup> were strongly opposed to mining, and in general favored the use of direct action as an instrument of resistance. They played a key role not only in creating capacities but even more in creating a certain consciousness and local discourse about mining—in a way that melded with the strategies of local activists who were equally opposed to negotiations. And it is also RAN who made GGF aware of the case.

To the extent that DECOIN consolidated its work, the reference point for these transnational relationships began to shift from AE to DECOIN. Various factors are at play here. First, a certain tension over who should lead the process (DECOIN sought a more visible role) and second, the linguistic competency of the Cuban-North American. There is no doubt that his dominance of English helped Intag establish a range of relationships with organizations and individuals in the U.S.A., U.K. and Canada.

After the attack on the mining camp in 1997, and AE’s subsequent lower profile, other networks were also woven that were less dependent on FOEI and AE. Several “accidents” helped this process. A relationship with Rainforest Concern, an environmental NGO based in the U.K., came about when a member of the organization saw a television program on the spectacled bears of Intag. Rainforest Concern then mobilized funds from a philanthropist to support DECOIN’s work in environmental education and to purchase tracts of land (now about 600 ha) to ensure the protection of the forests and water courses. The links with Japanese groups<sup>63</sup> came about after the visit of an Australian conservationist who previously lived in Japan. She facilitated a contact with a Japanese entrepreneur who then visited Intag and later committed to purchase coffee from AACRI (he continues purchasing until the present time). Over time this same individual has also played a key role in facilitating visits of leaders from Intag-Cotacachi to Japan, and in promoting ecotourism in Intag within Japan.

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<sup>62</sup> Although not as much today since AE distanced itself from FOEI. However its tie with OLCA continues.

<sup>63</sup> Because Bishi Metals was a Japanese company.



At the same time a web of personal transnational relationships has also played an important role in support of the movement. DECOIN's Web page is managed by a friend in California, and the initial financing for the Intag newspaper (and its Web page) can also be traced to personal and cultural-linguistic ties of its North American founder (currently residing in Intag). Another example are the relationships forged with businessmen and teachers in the U.S.A., which have served as the base for a volunteer program of "witnesses"—young people who work and live in the mining zone.<sup>64</sup>

These transnational ties depend to a large extent on the networks and personal contacts of a single person, which introduces a structural weakness in the social movement in Intag and Cotacachi. Thus certain transnational—and local—actors have sought to diversify the bases of leadership within the movement (e.g., by providing direct support to the CEM and the AUC). The lesson from Cajamarca is that this also has its risks given that different leaderships can pull the social movement in different directions. Up till now, however, this has not happened in Intag.

These various relationships have, at different times in recent years, proven to be strategically important. When Ascendant Cooper purchased the concession in 2004, it initiated a community development program that aimed to build support for the mine and which in the end increased tensions and social division in Intag. The initiative also tried to delegitimize a set of actors and SMOs, resulting in a spate of violent incidents, death threats and threats of legal action (e.g., against the Intag newspaper). At the same time, the mining company attempted to purchase tracts of land in the area where it held the concession. These actions in turn generated social discontent, uncertainty and fear among the population, and the process of defensive mobilization was renewed once again.

In this struggle, the major limiting factor for Ascendant was its weak financial base. At least initially its financial base was limited to its partners' capital. In order to expand the social development program, to purchase lands, and to support exploratory activities, the company needed to go public and sell shares. Ascendant began this process in 2004/5 and prepared a prospectus for an IPO on the Toronto Stock Exchange. In light of this development, some leaders in Cotacachi decided that the fight needed to be taken to Canada (where the company is registered) and the U.S.A. (where it has its main office). The philanthropist who had supported DECOIN in environmental education and the purchase of protective forests contacted Friends of the Earth in the U.K. Although they replied that they didn't work on mining, they put him in contact with Friends of the Earth Canada who were indeed interested in mining but had neither funds nor personnel to work on the issue. The philanthropist decided to support the group, in conjunction with Mining Watch Canada and the Canadian Environmental Legal Association, to follow the activities of Canadian mining companies, including Ascendant. In the U.S.A., DECOIN pursued another legal action in which other ties—this time with GGF—played a key role. In 2005, GGF put DECOIN in contact with an organization that identifies pro-bono legal advice for environmental activists and their organizations. The organization located a law firm that agreed to represent DECOIN in the U.S.A.

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<sup>64</sup> This initiative is a mix between solidarity tourism and social vigilance. The young people visit and report on their experiences, especially when they are witnesses of any violation of rights of local people.

This collaboration between Canada, the U.K., and Cotacachi sought to convince the regulatory and supervisory body of the Toronto Stock Exchange that the prospectus submitted by Ascendant was incorrect, and that it underestimated the level of local opposition to the mine and therefore the risks inherent in the project. The campaign impacted the public declarations made by the company.<sup>65</sup> Nevertheless, the strategy failed to convince, and after the superintendency of the Stock Exchange accepted an amended prospectus, Ascendant began selling shares on November 22, 2005.

The next step was, perhaps, inevitable. On December 10, 2005, after a meeting of the Community Development Council of communities of Junín, between 70 and 300 community members<sup>66</sup> decided to return to the strategy that had been successful for them in 1997. They occupied and burned a facility of Ascendant's social development program. Ascendant (2005b) insisted that the attack would not affect its plans, although during the first months of 2006 a series of tense meetings between Ascendant, its public relations company and the communities were held.

## **E. Interpretations and results: Cotacachi and Cajamarca compared**

### *On socioenvironmental movements*

#### *Emergence*

Returning to Melucci's distinction, one must understand the rise of social movements – in both cases - in terms of supply and demand. In both instances, the movements originate from the networks and practices of everyday life: networks for controlling cattle-rustling, faith-based networks, solidarity and recreation networks among young people, networks around the local church, university networks and others. In general, these were not networks where environment was a priority theme, nor were they networks or individuals with radical or activist ideologies. They were everyday networks that for one reason or another became radicalized and began to focus on the environment. In time, various networks consolidated and formed SMOs, almost always with some transnational tie or connection that supported the creation of the organization and provided funding.

The “radicalization” of these networks had to do with the “demand” for them. There is no doubt that in both cases this radicalization occurred when people found their everyday lives colonized by mining projects that not only brought (or promised to bring) environmental transformation and other alterations of the landscape, but also failed to respect certain social practices and senses of fairness and “good behavior”. Some social movement actors became radicalized because they either were or would have been directly harmed (for example the first leaders of FEROCAFENOP), others because they saw others being attacked (for example the parish priests), others because the environment was (or would be) harmed and there was no public debate about it (e.g.,

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<sup>65</sup> This is noted in the differences between the prospectus for the shareholders prepared June 24, 2005, and that prepared on August 29, 2005 see: <http://www.sedar.com/DisplayCompanyDocuments.do?lang=EN&issuerNo=00022376>.

<sup>66</sup> The interpretations and analyses of the event vary between DECOIN (2005) and Ascendant (2005b).

ECOVIDA); and finally others because they saw their access to natural resources (especially water) and thus their wellbeing threatened (e.g., the people of Cajamarca). All power produces resistance, and in these cases the arrival of mining has generated uncertainty and discontent among the population who, frustrated in their struggle to be heard, have grown increasingly radicalized and come to form part of the movement to resist mining.

In both cases the evolution of the social movements involved the weaving of links between these initial networks and other wider networks. The Cotacachi case was particularly striking in this sense, including in spatial terms. The parish priest of García Moreno's visits the entrepreneur ecologist in Santa Rosa, and Junín becomes visible to another part of the Canton. Later on the two youth groups unite and together they worked to strengthen relationships among communities within Intag. In 1996, when the local government of Auki Tituaña assumes power, the movement leaders in Intag took advantage of the opportunity to continue building and strengthening networks, and to promote greater awareness of proposed mining initiatives among highland communities and groups from the urban center. These groups also became part of the movement because, although the proposed mine would not affect them directly, the practices and behavior of Ascendant showed so little respect for the experiment in alternative, participatory territorial management in which so many of them were investing so much effort.

Then, over time, the social movements wove even larger transnational networks, in part because the local SMOs wanted these relationships, in part because the struggles attracted the attention of transnational actors. In both cases, the social movement was transnationalized over time. Nevertheless, it would be an error to understand this transnationalization as a process led by global actors, looking for local actors, supporting and giving them the resources they needed. In both cases it seems clear that it is equally likely that local actors sought, and captured, the attention of international actors, drawing them into their localities and struggles, and made them accomplices in the production of space and environmental governance. *Glocalization* can be produced starting from the local as well as starting from the global.

In addition, both cases show us that national actors exerted a great deal of influence in the ways in which these *glocalizations* of environmental governance occurred. National capital (e.g., Buenaventura) as well as national SMOs (e.g., Acción Ecológica) played key roles. National SMOs have, at different times, provided training, information and resources to SMOs, in turn facilitating links with other external actors. Indeed, in the transnationalization of movements, these actors have played key linking roles. National SMOs have also influenced the political environment in a way which has opened up (or further narrowed) the possibilities for more inclusive forms of environmental governance. At the same time the gains of local SMOs are of extreme importance in the strategies of national (and international) SMOs. They serve as emblematic cases and thus are powerful tools for non-local actors as they legitimize and motivate the work of networks operating at higher scales. In fact this can also be a source of tension between the local and other, higher levels—such as occurred in the relationship between the social

movement and CONACAMI in Cajamarca, and the relationship between DECOIN and Acción Ecológica in Cotacachi.

### *Forms and discourses*

The social movement in Cajamarca is characterized by various processes operating in parallel, a range of SMOs of different origins (social, political, etc.), a certain distancing between the rural population and the SMOs, and a weak urban-rural articulation. The experience of Cotacachi was quite different. There, the movement process was more integrated, involved a close relationship between SMOs and the local population, and built articulated actions and discourses between urban and rural groups. Also, and perhaps most importantly, while there are several SMOs taking part in the process, almost all have their roots in DECOIN, in the local government of Auki Tituaña or in the communities of Junín (three spheres which are, moreover, related). This has allowed for a more synergy and convergence among the SMOs sustaining movement processes in Cotacachi.

Perhaps the most significant difference between the two cases can be found in the relationship between social movement and local government. The Cotacachi case is distinguished by a high level of articulation with the local government. From this a synergy developed between the social movement process and the participatory process of the local government in which the movement was able to colonize certain spaces opened up by the municipality. In this process, the Mayor also assumed the struggle of the social movement, ties were created between Intag and other parts of Cotacachi, and a canton-wide social organization (the Assembly for Cantonal Unity) created by the Mayor's office as its civil counterpart, itself became an SMO. The municipal government thus served to anchor the Intag process as a cantonal process.

In Cajamarca, the relationship social movement-municipal government was entirely different. The municipal government never assumed the struggle in a sustained way and its discourse constantly shifted. At times the municipality sought to focus debate on how to optimize the mining *canon*; at other times they openly criticized the mine; and after assessing the level of social discontent they passed a municipal ordinance declaring Cerro Quilish off limits to mining. Put another way, the mayor's office has been sometimes with with mine, sometimes with the movement, and sometimes vacillating between the two. At no time did it work closely with the social movement or any of the SMOs, and it certainly never assumed an articulating role inside the movement.

Just as there is broad scattering of actors, there is also a broad scattering of discourses and political projects within the social movement of Cajamarca, much more so than in the case of Cotacachi. In Cajamarca various discourses coexist: some promote the nationalization of MYSA, others insist on the general undesirability of mining in the region, and others emphasize the need to seek more collaborative relations with the company. Thus, as in the mayor's office so in the movement one sees discourses that are pro, con, or ambivalent with respect to mining. This in itself weakens the movement, in addition to making it easier for it to be weakened by others. However, in Cotacachi the

discourse is for the most part anti-mining. It is a discourse that was consciously constructed by a small group of SMOs and leaders who were able to convince the local population of their case.<sup>67</sup> Once they were able to occupy certain positions of environmental governance inside the municipality, the movement and discourse building process was made easier.

This notion of constructing discourse stresses the importance of environmental education and the role that it has played in both cases. To a large extent, environmental education served both as the main link between SMOs and the wider movement, and as the instrument through which concerns about mining were raised and disseminated more broadly in the canton. This education has taken many forms: countless community workshops, videos, internet and written publications, work with teachers and students, public fora, fliers, etc.<sup>68</sup> The effect has been the creation of a local public sphere in which certain ideas remain visible and that—at given times—nourish the process of more massive mobilization.

Finally, it is worth noting that the discourses of the movements—and the weight of different “sub-discourses” within them—have evolved over time in a way that mirrors the evolution of the environmental conflicts themselves. This evolution has been more notable—or perhaps just more coherent—in Cotacachi. It is important to remember that prior to the arrival of Bishi Metals in Junín the surrounding parishes were colonization zones populated by colonist farmers whose discourses and practices were extremely modernizing and far from being environmentalist. These were colonists who cut down, burned and occupied the forest to sow their crops and pasture their animals. These discourses generated the first expectations of the local population with regard to the arrival of mining in the region (expectations that revolved around local market growth and employment opportunities). To the extent to which their expectations were not satisfied the conflict deepened, and the presence of external actors intensified (the ecologist entrepreneur, the priest, Acción Ecológica, international environmental and development NGOs). In this process the discourse of local residents and of the proto-social movement began to change, first toward a conservationist and sustainable development discourse and then toward an ecological political discourse of resistance. This shift—from conservation to ecological politics—also occurred in some of the SMOs as a result of internal debate as well as interactions with external actors. The next step in this evolution was a migration from a discourse of pure resistance to a discourse of propositive resistance—a discourse that put forward alternative visions of RTD, alternative projects, other sources of income, etc. In conjunction with this process, the discourse also became territorialized (and in this sense, as in theory, the discourse on environmental justice and that on the production of space, merged). This territorialization of the discourse also had its *glocal* explanation. It reflected the influence of local participatory development discourse that—in Cotacachi—came from the municipality’s

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<sup>67</sup> We use the term “built” in an analytical not pejorative sense. The discourse did not spring from nothing—it was cultivated.

<sup>68</sup> Although it is to be noted that the mass media have not been an important instrument, to a large extent because their editorial line is no longer pro-mining or because they depend too much on the companies and subcontractors of the moment to sell space to make announcements and advertisements.

cantonal initiative which drew its reference points from the proposals of the national indigenous movement as well as NGOs specializing in local development. Inside Ecuador these NGOs had political ties with the indigenous movement and outside the country they had ties with the Latin America wide movement for local development and democracy that had been so influenced by the Brazilian experiences, among others. This discursive evolution reflects how the construction of discourse was also a *glocal* process, influenced by actors and ideas at different levels as well as by the very dynamic of the local conflict.

### *Transnational links*

Although the "demand" for social movements is a response to a certain transnationalization of RTD in both cases, transnational relationships within civil society did not play determining roles in the emergence of the movements. Rather, their contributions have been different. They have helped keep SMOs alive during periods of relatively low social mobilization. Above all they have contributed to the *strategies* of the movements and SMOs, and made important financial and substantive contributions. They shared ideas and experiences on possible strategies (e.g., OA suggested that the actors in Cajamarca take their case to the CAO), they facilitated contacts with other actors who in turn offered support (e.g., GGF has facilitated contacts with environmental lawyers and local support groups in the U.S.A.), and they have fulfilled specific roles within these strategies (e.g., OA has maintained relationships for dialogue with Newmont and [less] with the IFC; Friends of the Earth Canada supports the Cotacachi advocacy campaign with respect to the Toronto Stock Exchange).

Another role has been to raise the visibility of these struggles at the international level. The FOEI network was key in making the Cotacachi-Intag case visible; OA has brought public attention to the issue of mining in the Andes in more general terms and—together with GGF (among others)—supported a video about Yanacocha that now has a life of its own in the activist and alternative documentary world; GGF participated in the (successful) naming of activists from Cajamarca for international awards; Global Response has disseminated information about both struggles among its membership who write letters, as well as to students in Colorado who have protested outside Newmont shareholder meetings. This visibility generates greater pressure on the companies and attracts more support for the movements.

These roles require working relationships with local and national actors—and in several senses the transnational actors need local actors as much as local actors need their international allies. However, they are relations where power differences and the “frictions” described by Tsing also exist. Although the subject of tensions is not very present in the cases, tensions indeed exist, generally when local SMO leaders perceive that the transnationals assume too much visibility and responsibility for activities that have been led by the SMOs. There are also cases—limited but real—where the local SMOs perceive they lack the power to influence the strategies of the transnationals—FOEI defined its mining campaign to focus on multilateral banking when various Latin American affiliates wanted instead to focus on the companies themselves; the activists in Cotacachi wanted more discussion with GGF about strategy; and so on. In other cases,

the SMOs simply accept the influence of their transnational allies. FEROCAFENOP, for instance, accepted the suggestions of Project Underground not to take the mine by force, and the suggestion of OA-Washington to file a complaint against MYSA with the CAO.

Regardless of whether these strategic suggestions from international allies were the most appropriate, they have had determining effects for both wider movements processes and specific SMOs. Among other things, the decision to transnationalize advocacy campaigns implied a certain redistribution of resources on the part of the SMOs. These campaigns imply investment of time, effort, attention and the designation of funds for activities oriented toward actors located outside the country: The International Finance Corporation, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Toronto Stock Exchange, etc. In some instances, much energy was invested with poor results—especially, perhaps, in the case of the IFC where very little change can be seen, notwithstanding all the effort invested. Also, effort invested in international advocacy comes at the cost of activities that seek to strengthen the relationship between SMOs and the base. The fact that leaders often have to travel to advocate and raise awareness about the struggle generates criticisms from the base that these leaders “spend all their time traveling”. In this sense the transnationalization of the SMOs and their agenda does not always have positive effects for the movements as a whole.

### *Social movements and environmental governance*

The context in which mining activity develops makes evident that, before thinking of governance, one must necessarily consider power dynamics. These are cases—especially that of Cajamarca—where enormous inequalities of power, money and other resources exist between the actors. This power distorts the institutions of governance, not only because—as in the case of Cajamarca—the mining companies end up covering the operational costs of public offices, police forces, special studies, and roundtables. It also corrodes institutions and norms by creating incentive systems in which many of the actors involved end up losing sight of wider political and development projects, and end up focusing their attention on the possibility of obtaining donations, contracts and jobs working for the companies. MYSA has several employees who previously worked for NGOs, SMOs, and public entities. In such a context, the possibility that movements can influence governance seems remote. Nevertheless, even in the face of such unequal relations of power, the cases show that there have been impacts.

Distinguishing between the three levels—local, national and international—at which regulations structuring environmental governance in Cotacachi and Cajamarca exist, we can say that in both cases social movements have achieved some influence at the local and international level but much less at the national level. In both cases, the movements accomplished municipal ordinances that restricted certain mining activities. The ordinances were achieved through distinct routes—one via social mobilization and protest, the other via colonization of the municipal government on the part of activist groups. Although the legal power of both ordinances remains to be seen, their symbolic power is significant.

Also in both cases public spaces for debate and consensus-building were created. In Cajamarca these spaces have been weak. Some of the attempts at dialogue through the creation of roundtables lacked legitimacy, others almost never meet, and it is difficult to argue that these spaces have had much effect on the social and environmental practices of MYSA although it is conceivable that the water monitoring system mounted by the CAO roundtable induces greater care on the part of the company. In several cases, the roundtables have provoked disagreement among SMOs. In fact, it is entirely legitimate to suggest that the creation of roundtables has served (whether on purpose or not) as a sort of smokescreen for the mine, an instrument that allows the company to postpone any change in practices because the roundtable gives the impression of a change in environmental governance without really delivering it.

In Cotacachi the situation is different. Here new consensus building mechanisms were created, and after nine years in operation the Assembly for Cantonal Unity and its various commissions can now be called institutions. Although these spaces have not had any direct effect on the company's practices either, they have allowed for greater convergence among social actors who question the mine, and have given more weight and legitimacy to their complaints and their advocacy strategies. That is, looking for consensus has strengthened the social movement, which results in its other advocacy strategies having greater effect on environmental governance and RTD.

While mining companies—which, as we have suggested, constitute the privileged space of environmental governance—have not responded directly to these consensus building processes, both cases suggests that they *have* changed when confronted with massive forms of direct action and social mobilization.<sup>69</sup> In the case of Cajamarca, MYSA modified its behavior following the protests over Choropampa and above all Cerro Quilish. This would appear to be because it was concerned that such massive movements might adversely influence its image with investors (especially its institutional investors). In order to maintain the trust of its investors, MYSA modified part of the way in which it operates.<sup>70</sup> In Cotacachi, the response was to leave—a dramatic change in environmental governance.

At the national level, movements have had much less effect on environmental governance. In both cases, policies have not changed substantially and continue to favor the companies. The Ministries of Energy and Mines in both countries are characterized by strong ties with the mining sector, offering little possibility that national movements could successfully advocate for legal or policy reform. Furthermore, in both countries—although in different ways—the environmental legislation is divided up among different sectors of social and economic activity and it is the sectoral ministries who make environmental legislation effective. Although in November 2005 the Peruvian government adopted a new General Environmental Law, the proposed legislation lost many of its teeth in the final reading when Congress rejected the

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<sup>69</sup> And with pressure from the (central) State because that is who has to carry the political costs of mobilizations (repression, image of stability and authority, etc.).

<sup>70</sup> As noted earlier, during 2006 it became apparent that somebody had been financing (quite substantially) a spying campaign against SMOs in Cajamarca. If this turns out to be linked to the mine company, the observation that direct action induced some change in MYSA's behavior would have to be qualified.



article that would have meant Peru adopted WHO standards in the absence of national standards. Meanwhile, in neither country have attempts to pursue judicial processes generated results for SMOs—neither nationally nor locally.<sup>71</sup> It could be said that in Peru, one success at the national level was the creation of the National Mining Dialogue, and its presentation in 2006 of a new agenda for mining in Peru. Although neither the Dialogue nor its agenda have formal power, its existence can be seen as a change in national environmental governance in the sense that it allows conversations to take place between certain actors that were not possible before. Only time will indicate if this results in real change in environmental governance.

At the transnational level the two main channels through which there exists the possibility of influencing environmental governance have to do, on the one hand, with the World Bank Group (where the Bank is pressured to force companies it supports to adhere to its own standards of “good” practice), and, on the other, with companies (where pressure is exercised directly on companies to adhere to high standards).

The nexus of relationships surrounding the World Bank are both important and ambiguous in each case. On the one hand the Bank has promoted mining investment—both directly, in the case of IFC investment in MYSA, and indirectly in the case of Intag via Bank support to the Mining Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project (PRODEMINCA) which extended geological exploration (including in Cotacachi) and promoted a set of normative and legislative changes that made mining investment more attractive in Ecuador. In both cases the SMOs have tried to influence the Bank, but with little success. As a result of the protests of SMOs in Intag, an "Inspection Panel" on PRODEMINCA was opened but it concluded that the communities' complaints were exaggerated. In the case of MYSA, OA does not find much willingness within the IFC to discuss problems and in fact perceives that the IFC has little influence over the actions of its partners in MYSA (Newmont and Buenaventura).<sup>72</sup>

In the case of the companies, there is only indirect evidence that transnational campaigns have led to modified environmental practices. Nevertheless, on making the environmental problems much more visible (in Canada and in the USA) in both cases, several of these transnational actions have created a climate that pressured the companies to pay increasingly more attention to environmental issues.

### ***The social movement and rural territorial development***

"we have different visions of what development is."

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<sup>71</sup> The conflict commissioner for the Public Defender in the City of Cajamarca commented that, although she recommends to communities that they pursue legal action, she knows that they are not going to prosper because they will be ignored.

<sup>72</sup> This in spite of the fact that the Bank initially argued that its presence in MYSA would allow it to insist on and promote high standard of corporate behavior.

Conflicts between the mining companies and other social actors are to a great extent, conflicts between different visions of territorial development. They are conflicts over (i) what the productive base of RTD should be, (ii) what types of space and nature-society relations should be produced in the RTD process, (iii) the desirability of substituting different types of assets in the RTD process, and (iv) who should control this process. In each case, the social movement questions the visions set out by the companies and ministries, and makes visible the notion that alternative (although, as we commented in section B, not necessarily “better”) visions exist. In addition, in Cotacachi the movement has begun to give both organizational and productive substance to its alternative vision.

These conflicts over RTD as a normative project have their origins in RTD understood as a political economic process. The sustained, and in some cases explosive, increase in mineral prices make possible new productive (or “extractive”) chains that install themselves in rural areas where the minerals exist, drawing these areas into new markets. These same economic processes also induce actors whose goal is to make these potential chains real. These actors—companies, consultants, the state—will all benefit from the extractive process (with income, rent, taxes, currency) and therefore help move the process along, promoting certain forms of rural transformation. These processes, driven by external actors and international markets, globalize RTD in these territories. The responses of local actors, with their different visions, histories, imaginaries, etc. then glocalize this RTD.

Modern mining challenges and threatens to disarticulate existing production practices and traditional forms of occupation of rural space. It “colonizes” the everyday lifeworlds of people (cf. Habermas). The expansion of the mining frontier—directly, via the purchase, use and control of the land, and indirectly, via its effects on natural resources (e.g., water) outside the area of immediate influence—implies conflicts with existing forms of land use. In this process, in Cotacachi as well as in Cajamarca, agricultural, peasant and family visions of territorial development and mining/entrepreneurial visions of territorial development are juxtaposed. Social movements in both cases insist that the governance of this territorial development must be an inclusive and negotiated process where local democracy takes priority. The companies and ministries however, argue that national ownership of the subsoil, and private concessions to develop this subsoil, give both the state and concessionaire the liberty to decide how these spaces are to be developed. At play, then, are conflicts between the relative power of citizenship and of property in processes of RTD.

That said, in our two cases the nature of the disagreements over RTD is not exactly the same. In Cotacachi, social movement actors insist that an agriculture-livestock-peasant farmer-conservationist vision must take priority for the whole of the territory. In addition, there is broad consensus within the movement about this vision. In Cajamarca, however, there is a greater diversity of visions within the movement (some allowing for mining, others not). However the most common vision among the SMOs seems to be one that combines mining and agriculture, but that envisages far less mining than does MYSA’s and the Ministries’ vision (the emblematic case of this difference is the conflict over Cerro Quilish).

Another difference between the visions held by the social movements and those of the companies pertains to the level of social and environmental risk that a process of RTD ought to permit. The movements propose visions that reduce the level of risk in terms of the potential harm to the environment and public health; the companies permit higher risk, to a large extent because they argue that the risk is manageable.<sup>73</sup> In a related vein, while the companies and the State promote visions of RTD that allow for more (although not infinite) substitutability between different forms of capital in this process, the social movements (the SMOs as well as the rural and urban population) manage visions that generally accept fewer substitutions. They insist on maintaining intact certain levels of natural and social capital, especially on the subject of water quality and quantity, but also on maintaining livelihoods. They also work with different time horizons—they emphasize the long term much more than the companies do. In emphasizing the long term they question and reject those forms of RTD that risk the integrity of the resource bases upon which local development would have to be sustained.

Finally, there are differences over the concept of territory itself. The movement in Cotacachi insists on the integrity of a territory with the name Cotacachi, which extends from Intag to the high Andes and includes the urban center. Indeed, to a certain extent, the movement and the local government have helped to create this image of Cotacachi. As a result, movement actors insist that any decision on mining must involve inhabitants from all of the territory, and no one else. In Cajamarca, the territorial vision of the social movement is much less articulated and coherent, and there is no apparent strategy among movement actors that might help create such coherence. To the extent to which a territorial vision exists within the movement, it seems to combine a concept of river basin with one of the provinces of Cajamarca, La Encañada and Baños del Inca. On the one hand, movement actors argue that any decision about mining must be based on an analysis of its effects at a watershed level; on the other hand, they argue that mining only makes sense if these three provinces enjoy significant economic benefits from this extraction.

As these visions of RTD confront those of the companies, a key argument revolves around the economic potential of each. Companies and Ministries of Energy and Mines alike insist that a farming future for Cotacachi and Cajamarca will bring perpetual poverty for the region as well as for the country. “We live with so much poverty ... if we don’t exploit the only thing we have what will the country do with an economy so bankrupt?” This is a discourse that appeared in every interview with these actors. On the other hand social movement actors insist that there is no evidence that mining has ever had a significant impact on poverty in areas of direct mining influence, and that therefore an agrarian and diversified rural economy is the better option. The data from our two cases seem to suggest that each of these visions is at once correct and wrong. Thus, in Cajamarca there is little evidence that mining has had any significant effect on poverty and inequality in Cajamarca; meanwhile in Cotacachi there is not yet much evidence that

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<sup>73</sup> Senior company staff, managers and owner may also accept higher levels of risk because in the end neither they nor their children will have to live in these territories.

non-mineral visions of RTD (revolving around agriculture, organic coffee, ecotourism and handicrafts) have had any greater effect on poverty nor that their economic viability is guaranteed.

And finally, movement and company visions or RTD are divided by a fundamental difference of opinion on how to assess the risks inherent in mining. A large part of the debate on risks revolves around “what the data say,” especially the data on the quality and quantity of water. In this there is much disagreement not only with respect to the interpretation and validity of the different sources of quantitative data, but also on the types of data and indicators that should be employed. In many of the conflicts in Cajamarca, the mine presents interpretations based on positivist protocols to argue one position, while the communities and SMOs present data based on their own vernacular knowledge (e.g., the disappearance of toads) to argue the opposing position. A large part of the conflict and disenchantment in Cajamarca is rooted in profound disagreements over what type of knowledge counts, and in the sense in which some citizens are worth less than other citizens because their knowledge does not count.

### **Conclusions: *glocalization* and the public sphere**

The experience in Cotacachi differs significantly from that of Cajamarca and the comparison gives us elements for understanding the conditions under which social movements influence environmental governance and RTD. Much depends on the extent to which political economy determines the dynamics of RTD, and the level of autonomy that SMOs enjoy in relation to this political economy. Although it is a (serious) joke among SMOs in Cotacachi that they ought to be grateful to the threat of mining because the resistance that it has induced in them has demanded levels of creativity, organization, and unity that would otherwise not have existed, they continue to be quite autonomous of mining's own political economy. This is far less the case in Cajamarca where, to a very considerable extent, the dynamic of the mine determines the dynamics of SMOs and the nature of any spaces of dialogue that might emerge – this because the mine itself finances local organizations as well as several of the activities of the roundtables. The omnipresence of the mine in the regional economy has created a broad base of local interests (workers, local businesses ...) that favor mining. This means that it will always be a great challenge for Cajamarca's movements to have as broad a base as that enjoyed by the movement in Cotacachi. Meanwhile, the mine has the financial and intellectual capability to know how to divide and weaken its opponents, and to put pressure on those agencies that finance SMOs.<sup>74</sup>

This said, another set of factors explaining the differences between the two movements pertain to the movements' own internal dynamics. In Cajamarca, the social movement suffers from several weaknesses—different leaderships, different visions for development, different visions of the problems associated with mining and the options for Cajamarca, poor relations between the SMOs and the rural population, etc. Partly as a result of this, the movement has not been able to take advantage of new spaces of

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<sup>74</sup> In 2005, the Canadian government demanded—for reasons of foreign policy it said—that Canadian Lutheran World Relief stop supporting ADEA, ECOVIDA and GRUFIDES.

environmental governance that have emerged, or that might have emerged had the movement known how to demand them. In Cotacachi, the movement is more uniform, clearer in its vision and enjoys a local government that is not merely committed to the movement's vision but that also creates an environment favoring the further consolidation of the movement.

However, perhaps the main explanation of the difference between the two cases is that in Cotacachi the resistance began before the mine was installed. This has given it many advantages in its relationships with Ascendant. The key contributing factor in the early emergence of the movement in Cotacachi has to do with information. When MYSA in 1992, the local population did not have access to the EIA, there was little local debate and there was no knowledge about Newmont operations elsewhere in the world. In addition, all this occurred in an authoritarian national context where information was scarce, and social organization restricted. Conversely in Cotacachi, RAN, Acción Ecológica and later DECOIN had access to the EIA and spread this and other information in a more democratic political environment that permitted both public debate and social organization. In this sense, history and initial conditions have had significant influence on the trajectory of the two cases. The implication is that in the relationships among social movements, environmental governance and RTD there is much path dependence.

But one must not be too deterministic. Beyond these observations, it is also definitely the case that in both instances, the existence and the actions of the social movements have had significant effects on processes of RTD. In large part this has been because the existence of the movements has made possible and necessary an argument over rural development that would otherwise not have occurred. In this sense the movements in both cases have politicized “development” (Escobar 1995; Alvarez et al. 1998; Dagnino 2005)—or, more precisely, they have shown that all types of development and RTD are political. Maybe this is the most important contribution of social movements—and perhaps we lose sight of this importance when we insist on looking for movements' material effects on poverty, social inclusion or equity. Perhaps social movements' key contribution is that they have created a public sphere where development becomes a topic of public debate, a debate in which a greater number of voices are listened to than would have been the case in the absence of the movement. Neither the companies nor state agencies concern themselves with creating such debate—in fact, they would rather it not exist, and in both cases (although much more in Cajamarca), it is evident that these actors have attempted to close the possibility of local debate through “buying” the media (cf. Zarate and Durand 2005 also). One of the contributions of movements has been that they have opened and sustained other spaces that permit a public debate about the significance of RTD in the context of large scale mining.

Where are these public spheres? They exist in the SMOs' web pages, in their publications, in the material they distribute, in the meetings they organize and in the everyday conversations that stem from these. They also exist in peasant communities, in the Mining Dialogue, in the publications of Oxfam America, and in the campaigns of Friends of the Earth International. They exist in the physical spaces where Segunda Castrejón protested in Denver, and in the streets of Cajamarca during the protest over

Cerro Quilish. They exist in the networks promoted by Acción Ecológica, and in the classroom discussions that use the materials produced by these actors. They exist in the publications of the New York Times on the case of Yanacocha. Just like the movements and SMOs that produce them, these spheres are also in every sense *glocal*.

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