“Conflicts over the countryside: Civil society and the political ecology of rural development in the Andean region”

Introduction of a Research Programme

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Abstract

This paper presents the methodological approach and background to the new Programme on Political Ecology and Rural Development in the Andes at the University of Manchester. It argues that to understand conflicts and development effects produced by the expansion of extractive industries, research requires a multidisciplinary approach centred on understanding the political economy of neo-liberal development strategies and the geographies that they produce. Analysis of the role played by civil society actors in challenging these political economies requires local and global network analysis. The paper illustrates its arguments with findings from initial research in Peru (Cajamarca and Piura) and Ecuador (Cotacachi).

Key words: Political ecology, Andes, research methods, political economy, rural development
**Introduction**

In the Latin American economic history, extractive industries – and particularly mining – have always had something to say. Since the Spanish colonization in 1542, mining has represented a privileged sector from which foreign governments and private investors have derived enormous benefits, many times at the detriment of the localities and countries in which the resources exist, either due to the environmental damage produced (resource depletion, contamination, species extinction and, overall, the reduction or exclusion of local population’s means of livelihoods) or to the social and economic costs involved (forced labor, introduction and dissemination of diseases in local communities, enclave economies, prostitution, etc.).

After independence and along the centuries, national governments have continue to develop national growth strategies relying basically on primary sectors where mining has been the key sector. Indeed, for the Peruvian case,

Under a macroeconomic and sectorial analysis this has not changed over the years, however, the ways in which mining and extractive industries are developed since the 1990s are quite different in many respects. First, the macroeconomic context is different. Second the nature and behaviour of the private sector investing in the sector qualitatively diverge from previous investments. Third, the local and global responses to mining are definitively different, not only in dimension but also in nature and scope. Seen all these elements together, they draw a scenario where policies, actors, institutions and organizations from diverse strands – the central government and the corporative sector on one side, and the local and international civil society on another side – appear to be opposed to each other.

This paper aims to present a new research programme – Territory, Conflicts and Development in the Andes (TCD Andes) – set at the Institute of Development Policy and Management in the University of Manchester to understand the dynamics and rationale of that process. Based on findings of previous research in the area and framed within a political ecology approach, we argue that to understand conflicts and development effects produced by the expansion of extractive industries, deep analysis of the political economy of neo-liberal development strategies, the geographies that they produce and the
role played by civil society actors in challenging these political economies need to be done.

In the first section we elaborate on each one of the elements mentioned above, illustrating our argument with two cases in Peru (Cajamarca and Piura) and one in Ecuador (Cotacachi). The second section presents the new research programme.

The new mining boom in context

Neoliberal policies and mining as a funding national strategy

That the 1990s are the years when neoliberal policies have been spread all over Latin America and since then they have produced unexpected effects is already a consensus among Latin American and Latin Americanists contributors.

In what regards to Andean countries, after a short-lived period of optimism during that decade when Peru, Ecuador y Bolivia grew consistently at the high average rates of 4.66 %, 4.16 % and 3.11 % respectively, poverty – and in particular, rural poverty – has also shown no significant improvement. The irony is that much of that economic growth has been based on the extraction and export of minerals and hydrocarbons, high-value resources located precisely in some of the poorest areas of the Andean countryside. Interestingly, when the situation of the two countries are compared in terms of economic growth and its effects on human development, Ranis and Stewart (2002) concludes that Peru is in a ‘virtuous cycle’ where good human development enhances growth, which in turn promotes human development. In contrast, Ecuador would be a case of lopsided development with strong human development but weak economic growth. How much of this can be corroborated at the level of sub-national territories is an open question.

But the point in this section is that no investments of such importance and their effects on national economies growth would have been possible if a specific set of policies aiming to incorporate the national economies into growing global markets (Gwyne and Kay, 2004) would not have been put in place. In what concerns to the mining sector, these policies have had the purpose of attracting and facilitating the entrance of large companies which would be capable of transforming the sector bringing fresh capitals and modern technology for exploration and exploitation.
In the Peruvian case, in 1991 the Fujimori’s government guarantied full advantages to firms willing to invest in the country – equal treatment as for national investors, removal of all barriers to profits repatriation, no fiscal obligations other than a cannon, long-term fiscal stability, and facilities to inputs and technology imports – (Bury, 2007). Similar policies were established in Ecuador, although at a slower pace, with less enforcement mechanisms and mostly emphasizing the hydrocarbons sector (Anderson, 2004). In the external front, all these domestic policies were given additional support by the Peruvian government who signed and ratified international agreements on private investments such as those with the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (from the World Bank Group) and the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation, plus 28 other bilateral agreements that guarantied favourable conditions to private investments in the Peruvian territory (CONITE, 2001; cited in Bury, 2007).

As a result of these policies, mining investment increased five-fold between 1990 and 2000, involving additional 12 million hectares that have been incorporated into the concessions areas (Bebbington et.al., 2007) and producing an increase of US$ 3107 millions of the mineral exports over the period 1990-2003 (Cooperacción, 2006; cited in Bebbington et al. 2007). In Ecuador, where exploration still dominated the nonfuel minerals sector, by 2004 many mining projects were still unable to achieve significant levels of mineral production, accounting for only 0.2% of the total value of the country’s exports (Anderson, 2004). Table 1 presents the composition of FDI in both countries – as noted before, the Primary sector refers basically to hydrocarbons in Ecuador and to mining in Peru.

Table 1: FDI in Peru and Ecuador 1989-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Average annual growth of Total FDI</th>
<th>FDI in Primary Sectors (percentage of GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>84.73</td>
<td>-11.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>55.60</td>
<td>11.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andean countries</td>
<td>30.38</td>
<td>14.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; the Caribbean</td>
<td>18.11</td>
<td>21.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Shatz (2001) and Vial (2001).
Those macroeconomic investment policies were somehow accompanied by a package of institutional reforms modifying land tenure laws, the legal mechanisms to change the preferred uses of land (through the new National Mineral Cadastre Law). Again, these reforms were meant to ease the establishment of private capitals and individual property; however, they did not keep the same pace in implementation as investment policies did, mainly due to superposition of formal laws and contradictions between the formal legal system and the consuetudinary norms that govern the access and control to land in the Peruvian Andes (Bebbington and Hinojosa, 2007). In spite of all incoherencies and as Bury (2007) remarks quoting the Ministry of Energy and Mining and the Peru Monitor Monthly, institutional reforms allowed national and transnational companies an exclusive access to the territories containing mineral resources. Capital investment in natural resource extraction has grown in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia (cf. Bridge, 2004). As shown below, maps of mineral and hydrocarbon concessions in Peru show immense areas potentially subject to the influences of such investments, with similar if less dramatic tendencies in Ecuador\(^1\).

**MAPS 1a, 1b & 2 HERE**

**Why it does provoke conflicts: The territories involved, Areas of and Actors in conflict**

Within the macroeconomic and institutional context drawn above, the dynamics of neoliberalism have threatened the viability of much small and medium farm agriculture mainly located in the highlands. As a result, social conflicts inside the localities and regions dominated now by the *gran minería* (large scale mining) have become increasingly polarized, recurrent and violent. At the heart of many of these regionalized conflicts appears to be – and this is a hypothesis underlying the TCD Andes programme – the confrontation between the economic dynamics of neo-liberalism and the political dynamics of a rural population that seems determined to insist on a right to be heard and deepen its claims to citizenship to one that goes beyond voting and embraces people's ability to control the conditions of their everyday existence and defend livelihoods of their choice. Given that those regionalized and sectoral conflicts fuels the bases of national conflict, concerns have returned that the Andean countries are "fragile"; such fragility may constitute a potential fault line in Latin American and hemispheric

\(^{1}\) Map for Bolivia not available.
politics, particularly if the ways and the conditions under which the mining sector is expanding are repeated in all other energy-related sectors (e.g. the efforts to establish transcontinental systems to supply California with natural gas, to develop east-west roads cutting across the continent, and develop a Latin American “energy ring” through the IIRSA programme).²

These dynamics – and their legal and policy bases – challenge the ability of rural people to control patterns of change in their lived environments. Furthermore, given that mining investments do not occur in empty territories, but in lands currently occupied by peasants and small farmers, conflicts arise as a dispute over those territories, each party with a different purpose of occupation. With this in mind, two areas of conflict underlie the TCD Andes programme: Debates over the expansion of investment in extractive industries (mining, hydrocarbons) in rural areas; and debates over agricultural liberalization and its implications for small scale agriculture. Arguments over whether – and what sort of – free trade agreement will be signed between Peru, Ecuador and the USA hinge on how the agreements handle debates on the future of agriculture and rural economies, as well as investment conditions of direct relevance to extractive industries. The surge of conflict in areas affected by mining and hydrocarbons reflects the pre-eminence given to export oriented resource extraction over the last decade and a half of economic liberalization and the efforts of civil society groups and social movements to exercise some form of control over these activities and their impacts. These conflicts are as much struggles over whose rights and voices count most in political economic decision making as they are arguments over the effects of different types of development.

Since 2005, this motivated efforts of CONVEAGRO – a Peruvian national farmer organization – to influence negotiations through debate, lobby and direct pressure. In Ecuador the Mesa Agraria – a coalition of several rural organizations – has attempted the same.³ At a more mundane, but equally important level these debates on the viability of peasant agriculture inform (and profoundly challenge) a range of NGO and producer organization interventions that aim to find new ways of revitalizing the rural economy. Meanwhile conflicts over mining and resource extraction intensify in all countries,

² IIRSA is the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America. It is a bold effort by the governments of South America to construct a new infrastructure network for the continent, including roads, waterways, ports, and energy and communications interconnections as a way to overcoming South America’s geographic barriers – the Amazon rainforest, Pantanal wetlands, Andes mountains, and Chaco savannas. (http://www.iirsa.org)
³ Cepes provides substantial technical support to Conveagro, and Terranueva to the Mesa Agraria.
eliciting (albeit uneven) patterns of organized response and the militarization of some of these conflicts. These responses involve a range of social movement organizations (CONACAMI – the National Confederation of Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining, CONAIE – the Ecuadorian Confederation of indigenous Nations), NGOs (Acción Ecológica, Grufides, Fobomade) and international networks.⁴

Mining and social conflicts: The challenges to a mining-based development strategy in practice

In this section we present three cases to illustrate our argument on the linkages between neoliberalism, the expansion of extractive industries and the surge of economic and social conflicts drawn above. Each case – two in Peru and one in Ecuador – exemplifies: The ways in which mining expansion can or cannot happen, despite fairly similar macroeconomic conditions; and the relationships between actors that one established and reworked have produced dissimilar responses and results.⁵

The Cajamarca-Yanacocha case

Minera Yanacocha – a joint-venture between the US based Newmont Mining Corporation with 51.35%, the Peruvian Compañía de Minas Buenaventura with 43.65% and the International Finance Corporation from the World Bank Group with 5% – is the biggest gold mine in Latin America and the 5⁰ largest in the world. Its levels of production reached more than 14 million oz between 1993 and 2003 (MEM, 2005; quoted in Bury, 2007), which produced at an average cost of US$ 115 by oz. due to the mineral richness and purity, represented almost half of the total production cost registered for the same company in its global operations (US$ 229 as total/oz cost and US$ 189 as cash/oz, as quoted in Financial Sense, 2004).

⁴ The demands to re-regulate extractive industries have underlain the World Bank's global Extractive Industries Review, Friends of the Earth's mining initiative and Oxfam's No Dirty Gold Campaign and initiatives on extractive industries; the debate on peasant viability under neo-liberalism motivates global initiatives such as Via Campesina.
⁵ The Cajamarca and Cotacachi cases summarise findings presented in Bebbington et.al. (2007a). The Majaz case is based on Bebbington et.al. (2007b)
The mine expands over 10000 hectares in the Cajamarca region (Northern Peruvian Andes), an area larger than the Cajamarca city (see Map 3).

Map 3: Minera Yanacocha in Cajamarca, Peru

From Bury, 2004
Notes: Approximate altitude: 3500-4000 m. Distance from the capital city: 35 Km

Given that the land market is quite underdeveloped in the area, the 1386 km2 of mineral rights were acquired from peasant households through imperfect and hardly transparent mechanisms in terms of the prices fixed, speeded processes of land titling and pressure over individuals to sell their land.

According to Bury (2007) the mine brought significant resources to the Cajamarca region (see table 1) and that has impacted positively the regional economy. Nevertheless, such injection of fresh capital has also produced criticism by those who argue that an enclave economy has been reproduced and that it has affected negatively the dynamics of the domestic markets.
Table 1: Minera Yanachocha economic impacts in Cajamarca  
(thousands of US$ dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actividades de la mina</th>
<th>Subtotals</th>
<th>Total investments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investments in mining installations (1992-2000)</td>
<td>85,542</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploration (1992-2000)</td>
<td>770,158</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>153,573</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenses in goods and services</td>
<td>1,720,497</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods and services from Cajamarca (1993-2000)</td>
<td>127,248</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods and services purchased in national and international markets (1992-2000)</td>
<td>1,593,249</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural development programmes (1993-2000)</td>
<td>11,898</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,741,668</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Beyond the economic impacts on the transformation of the local and micro economies of Cajamarca, Bury also suggests that Minera Yanacocha has had significant environmental impacts due to the technology used, based on open-pit mining and lixiviation with cyanide, which has drastically changed vegetation patterns and has deviated the course of waters. It is precisely this last move which has implied the expansion of social conflicts towards the urban population of Cajamarca. Indeed, as Bebbington et.al. (2007) propose, although initially registered social conflicts were fully localized in the communities directly affected by land purchasing, when Minera Yanacocha attempted to include Cerro Quillish – the mountain that contains the main water reserves for domestic use in the region – in its expansion, the whole population reacted against the expansionist project.

Precedents of environmental problems endorsed to the mine helped to attract national and international attention into the area. By the end of the 1990s three local environmentalist NGOs (ADEA, ECODIVA y GRUFIDES) had been surged motivated by the negative impacts that Minera Yanacocha was producing in the region, all with severe consequences to rural groups – such as the Choropampa accident where mercury was spilled – but also with implications for urban population. Their initial work concerned the production of information about the mine activities, sensibilization and awareness, and latter on the establishment of international contacts with organizations such as Project Underground (PU), Oxfam America (OA) and Global Greengrants Fund (GGF).
In parallel, rural organizations such as the National Confederation of Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI) and the Federation of Women Peasant Watch of Northern Peru (FEROCAFENOP) were also actively advocating for their rights, mobilizing rural people, and connecting to international organizations to get funding and additional support. The trajectory of these organizations, however, has not been free of tensions. Instead, internal disputes and controversial agreements between some of their leaders and Minera Yanacocha implied that by the early 2000s efforts to conform a regional basis of CONACAMI failed and the whole movement weakened.

At international levels, Yanacocha-Cajamarca was instituted as an emblematic case from which global organizations from the civil society – such as PU, OA and GGF – were able to show what and how they can contribute to environmental justice trough campaigning, lobbying and advocacy strategies. But their relationships with local organizations were not either free of friction. By the contrary, as Bebbington (2007) suggests those relationships have been in permanent negotiation and even implied some ruptures – for instance, in their interactions with local organizations and after the instability observed in their prior rural partners, they moved their support from rural to urban organizations.

Finally, in regard to the role played by local governments on the evolution of social conflicts arising from mining expansion, it can be said that in the Cajamarca case the formation of ‘mesas de concertación’ (public spaces opened to produce broad participation and agreed forms for conflicts resolution) have had limited effects. One of the mesas failed to function after some months of being created under the initiative of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman and only produced a study for monitoring water quality in the region. The main reason of that failure would have been a lack of legitimacy and a pro-company position. The second mesa created under the regional government initiative was not either a success – in the sense of allowing the conflict resolution mechanisms needed at the time – but had broader participation and eventually higher impact on affecting the company – and the central government – actions and behaviour.

*The Piura-Majaz (Rio Blanco) case*

The Rio Blanco site in Majaz contains copper deposit. Located in the Crest Andes and in primary cloud forest at the west of the Piura region (Northern Peru – border with Ecuador) the project includes
between 400 and 1000 Ha. of lands belonging to two campesino communities (Segunda Cajas and Yanta) mostly used for extensive pasturing and as a ‘reserve’ for community purposes (see map 4).

The Rio Blanco project, given in concession in 2001 to Monterrico Metals plc. (a London based company), includes an open-pit mine with froth-flotation extraction process, piping of slurry to the port on the Piura coast, and dry-filtered storage of tailings and waste on-site. Monterrico Metals initiated its operations in 2003 via its wholly-owned Peruvian subsidiary Minera Majaz SA. Once approved the environmental evaluation (EIA) presented to the Ministry of Energy and Mines – which was strongly questioned by local organizations and the Piura Ombudsman – exploration began in 2002 and to 2007 it is foreseen that a reformulated EIA should allow to convert the exploration project into a mineral development one.

Reaction and mobilization against Minera Majaz started in the early period of the exploration process, basically questioning the illegality of the MEM’s resolutions allowing the occupation of community lands without prior permission from the communities – although illegitimate agreements between the community leaders and the company/MEM would have been registered and used as legal
instruments – and the validity of the EIA presented by the company. Protests from the two affected communities were backed up by the Piura Ronderos organization (Campesino Watch) and later on by other communities from Cajamarca, which downstream would be potentially impacted with the project. Mobilization took usually the form of protest (non-violent) marches, however, in 2004 and in 2005 confrontation with the local police ended up with two casualties – one campesino each time march on the mine site.

That incident induced the Regional Government of Piura to form a Mesa de concertación, to be coordinated by the Centre for Conflict Analysis and Resolution of the Catholic University (based in Lima). However, this initiative failed being accused of a position far too pro-company. It did also fail the initiative to set a negotiation mission composed by representatives of the province catholic bishop, Oxfam America and CONACAMI. In this later case, however, the mission failed mainly by interference of the local police and the MEM itself, and a local and national ‘media war’ trying to produce public distrust of the commission members, accusing them of anti-mine and terrorists.

Finally, in the period after the second march, a new organisation of broader scope was born involving the local governments of the fourth provinces to be most likely affected by the mine the project. That coordinating body took short after the form of a forefront organization (the Front for the Sustainable Development of the Northern Frontier of Peru) and brought together the provinces mayors, leaders of peasant communities and campesino rondas and other local defence fronts. A technical group supporting this new organisation was also formed at that time. This new body, however, could make little progress on the conflict resolution given its negative to accept the participation of Minera Majaz into the dialogue space as it was advocated by the MEM. Additionally, public support from a group of pro-mine campesinos had come to play a diluting role for the strength of a unified local-regional space propitious to negotiate with large companies and the central government.

The Cotacachi-Intag case

The canton Cotacachi is located in the North-West Ecuadorian Andes. It includes the Intag sector where copper reserves were found in the 1980s by an exploratory mission funded by the Belgian and Ecuadorian governments. In the 1990s after a larger scale phase of exploration financed by the
Japanese International Cooperation Agency, the project passed to Bishi Metals (a subsidiary company of Mitsubishi), latter on sold to Roque Bustamante who, in turn, sold the concession to Ascendant Copper Corporation (Canadian company based in Colorado) and this one transferred the property to its subsidiary Ascendant Ecuador in 2005 (Bebbington et.al. 2007).

Map 5: Cotacachi-Intag

After more than 20 years of initiated the exploration phase and despite the significant reserves found in a period when there is a boom of copper production responding to high international prices and increasing demand coming from emergent economies such as China, Intag is still an unachieved project in exploration. The following elements can explain this result.

First, from the beginning there has been a strong – at some points violent – movement of opposition coming from the local communities, assisted by the Catholic church, an environmental NGO (Acción Ecológica - AE) and DECOIN (a local NGO formed in the process with broad participation of the campesino colonos) in response to misconduct of Bishi Metals. Second, AE, the priest and an ecological-tourism entrepreneur worked directly on environmental education with local – mainly youth
and women – population, facilitating and financing visits to areas already affected by mining. Third, given the existing connections between AE and large international/networks NGOs (such as River Action Network and GGF), similarly between some inteños and foreign nationals, and the innate connections among the catholic church, the Intag case quickly acquired visibility and international support. Fourth, the early involvement of the local government and the leadership of its Major (Auki Tituaña) – who in response to DECOIN declared Intag as an ‘ecological canton’, and as such rejected de facto mining activities – meant a broad platform from which the possibility of a mine was challenged. Fifth, although precarious, at the same time mining (in such a ‘development strategy’) was rejected efforts from much of the organisations and actors involved have been deployed to think and create new economic alternatives for the local population.

The three cases compared

While there are some common elements that we can observe in the three cases described above, there are also some disparate factors that may help to explain the uneven chances for mining expansion and opportunities for citizenship and governance practices. These are summarized in Table 2.

The case-based suggestions derived from this comparison allows us to highlight our interest in raising questions for further research which concerns broader issues linking extractive industries expansion, social conflicts and strategies of territorial development in Andean countries. That is developed in the following section.

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6 Groups from Intag went to La Oroya in Peru – a large scale mine in exploitation since 1922, owned by the Peruvian government from 1974 until 1997, and then privatized and purchased by the Doe Run company of Missouri. The plant gives off a list of toxins that includes high levels of lead, arsenic, cadmium, and zinc. A 1999 study of school children in La Oroya found that 99 percent of them were suffering from lead poisoning and 20 percent were so contaminated that they should have been hospitalized.
Table 2: Outcomes and factors intervening on mining expansion, citizenship and environmental governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes and factors</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Ecuador</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yanacocha-Cajamarca</td>
<td>Piura-Majaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining expansion</td>
<td>Yes (?)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social mobilization</td>
<td>Yes but divided</td>
<td>Yes but divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship exercise</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental governance</td>
<td>Private sector based</td>
<td>(not clearly determined)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining-based opportunities for territorial development</td>
<td>Not in the current conditions</td>
<td>Not in the current conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-mining-based opportunities for territorial development</td>
<td>Identified in paper but not in practice</td>
<td>Partially identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive regional development strategies</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive national development strategies</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local leadership (campesino communities)</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local leadership (local governments)</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local leadership (private sector)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local church representatives</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic church participation</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community level GROs strength</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campesino federations strength</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local NGOs</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National NGOs involvement</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGOs &amp; Watchdogs support</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government intervention</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (√) suggests a significant determining factor (e.g. strong leadership and significant institutional support); (W) means the factor is present, but is weak; (N) is a null or insignificant factor; (?) To be explored in further research.
Our research agenda on political ecology in the Andes

Conflicts over the countryside: Civil society and the political ecology of rural development in the Andean region (TCD-Andes) is a Research Programme aiming to produce knowledge on the political ecology of social conflicts in the rural area, the factors driving the geography of NGOs and social movements as they relate to these conflicts, the relationships between civil society and political economy under conditions of neoliberalism, the implications for the future of rural environments and societies and the emergence of diverse development alternatives across space. Financially supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) it is a collaborative enterprise with non-governmental and social organizations from Latin America, Europe and North America, constitutes a space for research networking. Convinced that the link between research and policy making provides significant advantages for improving the ability of societies to foster equitable and fair economic, social and political change, the Programme also collaborates with non-governmental and social organizations supporting them in analysis and debate of rural development policies and processes.

Not only will these debates weigh heavily in the future stability of Andean countries, they also raise core theoretical questions about the relationships between civil society and political economy, about how to explain the different forms taken by neo-liberalization in different contexts (Peck, 2004), and about the nature of a critical development geography committed to exploring the conditions under which certain forms of (political, development) intervention can produce more human and inclusive political economies (c.f. Gwynne and Kay, 2004). This is the larger aim of this project – to develop conceptual frameworks for a development geography whose aim is to understand the conditions under which neo-liberal economies are reworked and alternative economies produced, to explore why this varies across space, and to ask these questions about core economic activities (as opposed to focusing on small scale, sui generis alternatives). By the same token, given that struggles over control of, access to and use of the environment lie at the core of the themes that will be addressed in this research, the

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7 This research draws in part on ongoing and earlier research exploring: the social movements that have emerged in areas affected by mining in Peru and Ecuador; the factors driving the geographies of NGO intervention and their effects on rural livelihoods and economies in Peru and Bolivia; the relationships between European NGOs and selected indigenous organisations in the Amazonian lowlands of Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia.

8 As a space for research networking, it will host a permanent seminar, based at the University of Manchester, and will work in collaboration with research centres such as RIMISP, CEPES and PRISMA, non-governmental and other organizations in Latin America.

9 See, for instance, the report on the Rio Blanco project (available in the Programme website).
programme will advance debates in political ecology regarding the role of social movements and civil society in fashioning the relations between environment and development and making possible more liberatory forms of political economy (Peet and Watts, 2004). In that sense, the programme constitutes an explicit exploration of the conceptual interfaces between political ecology and development geography. In particular it will look at:

- The structure and dynamics of social conflicts around the relationships between natural resource extraction, agriculture and development strategies in the Andean Region
- The factors driving the geography of NGOs and social movements as they relate to these conflicts

It also looks to develop theoretical and empirical understandings of:

- The relationships between civil society and political economy under conditions of neoliberalism
- The implications for the future of rural environments and societies
- The emergence of development alternatives and why these vary across space

**Research questions**

Based on a multidisciplinary approach we seek for answers to the following questions:

1. To what extent and under what conditions do civil society actors challenge and contribute to the geographies of neo-liberal development?
2. Under what conditions are civil society actors able to change the terms of national and local debate on the types of rural economy that ought to be promoted in the region?
3. What factors drive the geography of civil society?
4. What are the relations (of cause and effect) between this geography and the geographies of neoliberalization?

We want to contribute to debates asking: What is and could be the role of the countryside in national development strategies, and what is its role in countries that are trying to negotiate new relationships with the global economy? Also, how can rural citizenship contribute to the consolidation of still fragile
and imperfect democracies and the creation of fairer rural economies?

These questions have wide relevance and lie at the core of contemporary political debate and policy choice in each country as well as at a continental level (Economist, 2005). As shown in the case studies developed in the previous section, these debates – increasingly conflictive, occasionally violent – revolve around the extent to and ways in which market liberalizing reforms should be defended, deepened or resisted, the roles of civil society and the state in regulating economic development, and the ways in which economic wealth generated by such reforms should be distributed.

Methodological approach

Much of the work done within Political Ecology and Development Geography is case study based and explores apparent successes in quite localized circumstances (Bebbington, 2003). Though qualitatively rich, this approach means that resulting theoretical claims are not well substantiated, and gives little sense of how exceptional or characteristic those case studies are of wider trends and relationships. Nor does it facilitate exploration of wider geographies: the relationships between processes in one locality and those occurring in others. While it may allow an exploration of relationships across scales – as in the work on "jumping scales" – it allows far less appreciation of how local processes relate to wider national processes. It is quite possible that this work overstates the likelihood that civil society initiatives can re-work economic processes and fails to capture many of the reasons why this re-working may happen in some locations but not in many others. Furthermore, if such work leads to conclusions that are overly localized in their significance, and excessively optimistic in their claims, then it also drives conceptual and theory building that is misperceived and – under growing pressure to be policy relevant – may lead to policy suggestions that are "programmed to fail" (c.f. Corbridge and Kumar, 2002).

With this in mind, TCD Andes proposes to develop a programme of work analyzing the factor driving the geographies of civil society organizations, and the ways in which they affect political economies of development in two types of region: those characterized by palpably stagnant rural economies, and those whose rural economies are being transformed by the practice (or possibility of) external investment in extractive industries. At the same time the research will link regional analysis with national and international dynamics and actors. In particular, the research will consider how far civil
society actors have influenced national debates and policy formation on the roles of extractive industries and the small farm economy in national development strategies in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia.

To this purpose, the following methods will be used:

1. **Qualitative field based research** involving key informant interviews, focus groups and household interviews as a means of analyzing the emergence, strategies and interactions between civil society, government and business actors in each of the regions to be studied. This work will be complemented with archival research (newspapers, internet based reports, organizational documents etc.). This is case study work where the case is constituted by a particular set of interactions. It allows in depth understanding of actors, and – in this case – of the strategies used, and the extent to which business and government dynamics are affected by civil society actors, and vice versa (our research shows evidence of business and state actions disarticulating civil society groups). As this work is aimed at deepening and broadening existing data sets, the methods will be based on those used in this earlier research.

2. **Quantitative analysis** of existing data sets on the regional economies of the regions to be studied. These data sets exist in the form of national survey data, base line studies of projects and organizations, and tax registers. Much of this work will involve assembling these data bases, in order to then use them for analysis of regional economic dynamics.

3. Combining these two data sets, the research will trace the extent to which forms of negotiation and civil society intervention have effects in regional economic dynamics.

The method is one that works primarily at the case study level – using very similar protocols - in order to then conduct comparative case analysis. The ability to analyse relations between regional/case-based dynamics and national debates and contexts also allows the research to disentangle the local and national contexts (and international influences) that influence the nature of civil society-political economy interactions.
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Map 1: Mining concessions in Peru in 2001


Map 1a: Peru, Mining inventory in 2001


Map 2: Ecuador, Mining Inventory

From: Ministry of Energy and Mines Ecuador

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