Chapter 15

GENTRIFICATION IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH?

Loretta Lees

Introduction

Over the past two decades a significant transformation has taken place in the global economy caused by the rapid economic growth of developing countries like China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. The economic centre of gravity in the world seems to be moving towards the ‘developing’ South. Coincident with this transformation have been reports about gentrification emerging in the global south from academics and the media alike. There were academic references to gentrification in the global south in the 1990s (eg. Garside, 1993; Jones and Varley, 1999), but the literature on gentrification in the global south, in countries such as China, Singapore, South Korea, India, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Mexico and South Africa, really began to take off in the 2000s (for examples see Visser, 2002; He, 2007; Harris, 2008; Shin, 2009; Lopez-Morales, 2010). While some highlight the similarities of their findings with gentrification in the global north, others point to exacerbated social and economic cleavages in gentrifying areas of the global south when compared to the north (see Grant and Nijman 2002). Harris (2008: 2423) argues that rather than exporting Euro-centric understandings of gentrification to the global south we need to learn from the ‘new sharp-edged forms’ of gentrification emerging in the previously peripheral cities of the global south.
In this chapter, following Roy (2005), I discuss gentrification in the global south as a ‘mode’ or type of urbanization and in so doing I reveal some of its trends. Like Roy (2005; also Parnell, 1997) I want to keep in mind that Euro-American ideas on gentrification may be inappropriate but they may also be appropriate as planners and policy makers borrow and replicate across borders. In the chapter I use a simple definition of the defining characteristics of contemporary gentrification as, ‘in the widest sense’: (1) reinvestment of capital; (2) social upgrading of locale by incoming high-income groups; (3) landscape change; and (4) direct or indirect displacement of low-income groups (Davidson and Lees 2005: 1170). This definitional simplicity encompasses the vast diversity of processes and types of gentrifications we might find around the globe. Of course suburbanization is also a significant process in the new (re)urbanization processes playing out in the global south. The global south is experiencing what Neil Smith (2002) has called ‘gentrification generalized’ and what might also be called ‘generalized suburbanization’ at the same time. ‘Planetary urbanization’ = ‘global gentrification’ + ‘global suburbanization’ (compare this to Mike Davis’s, 2006, take on the global south city - ‘planetary urbanization as slum’). Their relationship, however, is not the same at it was in the global north. In Lees, Slater and Wyly (2008) we were clear about this when we argued that gentrification had become a state-led, global urban strategy in the global north involving ‘an innovative race to create attractive, novel, and interesting-but also safe and sanitized-playgrounds for the wealthy residents and visitors who work for (or receive interest and dividends from) the institutions of global capital’ (p.166), but in the global south it is playing out in more diverse ways:

Although urban thinking in much of Europe and North America is obsessed with the contours of postindustrial society, urbanization in the Global South is driven by the simultaneous expansion of ‘old’ and ‘new’ spatial economic shifts; cities are being reshaped by the expansion of manufacturing and heavy industrial activities, as well as
the growth of high-tech off-shoring and outsourcing activities and smaller pockets of service sector innovation.

(Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008: 166)

This is new and different to in the global north where post-war gentrification was a reaction to suburbanization and the rent gaps caused by it. But in the face of those who are now, *ironically*, rehearsing the old rhetoric that suburbanization is dominant and gentrification marginal in the global south, I would argue that first, you cannot discuss one without the other, they go hand in hand (if in a different way in the global south); indeed I (Lees 2003) and others (Butler 2007) have argued that more recent processes of inner city gentrification in the global north are in fact quite suburban in nature; and second, because gentrification is occurring on high value land in and around the central city in the global south, the processes have been more visceral than those associated with suburbanization - in some inner cities of the global south there have been mega gentrifications and mega displacements of poor urban citizens to city peripheries. Gentrification, not suburbanization, is the leading residential edge of a much larger endeavour: the class remake of the *central* urban landscape world-wide (see Lees, Shin and López-Morales, forthcoming a and b). This is an upward class transformation of urban space. But is there a distinctive form of gentrification in the global north and south?

The gentrification literature has long been at the forefront of opening up and moving beyond the traditional dichotomies of urban studies (Lees 2012) - from its rejection of the ecological urban models of the Chicago School of Sociology to discussions of rural and suburban gentrification which have demonstrated the extension of ‘the urban world’ beyond the city and the inner city at that. As such gentrification researchers are well positioned not just to dispense with the old binaries of city and suburb, urban and rural, but also between North and
South, developed and developing worlds. In this chapter then, following on from Phillips’ (2004) earlier agenda about incorporating ‘gentrification’s others’ into gentrification studies, I seek to do the same with processes of gentrification in the global south. Gentrification in inner cities and in rural areas is part of the overall process of planetary urbanization (the urbanization of societies worldwide).

When referring to the global south, loosely I refer to places outside of the ‘usual suspects’ in the gentrification literature - that is cities in North America and Western Europe. In so doing I recognize that the global south is present in the global north and vice versa - after all there are slums being gentrified in West European cities like Lisbon in Portugal (see Ascensao, forthcoming) as there are in Latin American cities. But Lisbon, like other Southern European cities such as Athens and Rome, despite having slums and poverty types like those of the global south, see themselves as located in a political union that is very much of the global north. Nevertheless theory and practice from the south may well be useful for investigating urban conditions in northern cities, for poverty and informality are not the preserve of the south. But my focus in this chapter, for the most part, is on gentrification in cities of the geographical south - in East Asia, South Asia, Latin America and South Africa. The overall aim of this chapter is to promote a better understanding of those gentrifications (note the plural) happening outside of the West/global north/English speaking world, for these are processes that blur urban and developmental categories.

**The process (singular) of gentrification?**

The process of gentrification was first coined in London, England (Glass 1964) and since then the gentrification literature has been dominated by studies from, and on, the global north. The bulk of the Anglo-American literature on gentrification has investigated post-war
(World War II) processes of gentrification, the theorizations and conceptualizations therein are temporally and contextually bound to North American and West European post-war cities and urban processes (see Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008). Gentrification, however, began before the term itself was coined. As Clark (2005: 260) points out: ‘Ruth Glass did indeed coin the term in 1964, but it is careless to turn this into an assumption that we have here the origin of the phenomenon’ (see also Clark 1994). Smith (1996: 34-40) argued that the Hausmannisation of Paris was a precursor to gentrification, as were the gentrifications happening in parts of New York City, New Orleans, Charleston, and Washington DC, in the late 1930s (Gale 1984). A discussion of gentrification in the global south enables us to return to these debates over what gentrification is and it may be we can learn as much from comparative precursors such as the Hausmannization of Paris as we can from classic gentrification in Anglo-American post-war cities. Gentrification is ‘no longer about a narrow and quixotic oddity in the housing market’ (Smith 1996: 39); it was happening before and has departed well beyond Ruth Glass’s (1964) definition. Drawing on Clark (2005), in this chapter, as in Lees (2012), I want to see some dispute over the ‘conventional truth’, the time-space delineations of gentrification. As Clark argues: ‘confident proclamations ring out: Gentrification is now global! The problem with this is not if gentrification can be observed in places around the world, but it is again an issue of time: it is now global...The extent of occurrence of the phenomenon from a global historical perspective remains however largely uncharted’ (p.260). Drawing on both post-colonial theory and new ideas on comparative urbanism I am now involved in such a project (see Lees, Shin and López-Morales, forthcoming b).

It is important to note that the geographies of a global gentrification that were presented at the turn of the 21st century (see Urban Studies 2003; Atkinson and Bridge 2005) barely
touched on the global south. Of the 14 empirical chapters on global gentrification in Atkinson and Bridge’s (2005) edited collection, only three were from outside of the ‘usual suspects’ of North America, Australia and Europe. A good part of their introduction talked about gentrification as a form of neo-colonialism - the White Anglo appropriation of the central city - but there was no discussion about the appropriateness of this theory for analyzing processes of gentrification in the predominantly non-white cities of the global south (like Japan and Brazil - which featured in the book). In addition, given that a colonial experience is barely present in some countries in the Global South, like China, or regarded as in the distant past as in some Latin American countries - what is the value of discussing global gentrification as a form of neo-colonialism? In the subsequent edited collection by Porter and Shaw (2008) we find a much broader collection of ‘global’ case studies, including ones from the global south - from Asia, South Africa, and the Middle East. The collection is a great start in getting gentrification researchers to develop a comparative analysis of regeneration/gentrification strategies, their effects, and efforts to resist them, but the comparisons are not explicit enough and they do not pay sufficient attention to the issues of developmentalism, universalism and categorisation that contemporary advocates of comparative urbanism (such as Robinson 2006) field. Other recent journal special issues on gentrification can also be criticized for their lack of global coverage and their global north viewpoint (see, for instance, Environment and Planning A 2007; Urban Studies 2008; Population, Space and Place 2010). As I have recently argued:

What is now required of the gentrification literature is a comparative imagination that can respond to the post-colonial challenge of ‘decentering the reference points for international scholarship’ (Robinson 2006: 169), and this will have implications for how gentrification is conceived (questioning the usefulness and applicability of the term ‘gentrification’ in the Global South) and how research is to be conducted (this
will push us to learn new kinds of urbanism and involve multiple translations throughout the world). Importantly, it entails unlearning (drawing on Spivak 1993) existing dominant literatures that continue to structure how we think about gentrification, its practices and ideologies. 

(Lees 2012: 156)

The key to understanding gentrification in the global south is to recognize the importance of the different timings and geographical and historical specificities of urbanization. The fact is, irrespective of whether we can trace earlier examples of gentrification in the global south, most of the big gentrifications we see today began at the turn of the 21st century and are associated with the developmental trajectories of those countries in terms of modernization, economic growth and global competition. Unlike gentrification in the global north which is associated with post-industrial cities and society and a turn away from industrial society and modernity (and especially the modern suburbs as a reflection of that), gentrification in the global south is associated with industrialization, modernization, and modernity; indeed it is happening in tandem with, not in opposition to, suburbanization. It is also happening in parallel with the increase in slums in the global south, another factor that differentiates gentrification in the global south from the north. The bulk of the gentrifications emerging in the global south are of the ‘new urban renewal’ type, often high-rise new build developments with limited concern for architectural preservation (see Figure 15.1). Increasingly these are the dominant types in the global north too, with the processes that are emerging sharing many similarities with third and fourth wave gentrifications in the global north in terms of scale, the involvement of the state, and the fact that capitalism has rendered parts of the population disposable - accumulation by dispossession (see Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008). But there are important differences too.
A key reference point: the post-industrial city

One of the key reference points for international scholarship in both Anglo-American urban studies and gentrification studies is the post-industrial city. Post-industrial cities are cities whose growth took off due to the industrial revolution in the late 18th century and into the 19th and 20th centuries, cities that then deindustrialized in the post Second World War years and transitioned to post-industrial economies in the 1980s and 1990s. The post-industrial city is rooted in an era following industrialization and the economy of the post-industrial city is based on the provision of services rather than on the manufacturing of goods. Gentrification in the global south, for the most part, is not happening in deindustrialized, post-industrial cities. Rather it is happening in rapidly developing cities where as Amin and Thrift (2002) state pre-industrialization, industrialization and post-industrialization are all in progress simultaneously, making the context much more hybrid and complicated. Post-industrial societies and cultures developed in post-industrial cities and economies and these were linked by key gentrification authors like David Ley (1996) to the emergence of gentrification as a
socio-cultural reaction to, and critique of, industrial modernity - of its mass productions and standardizations, and sterile homogeneous suburban landscapes. But gentrification in the global south does not usually have these same landscapes to react to, industrialization and post-industrialization are happening simultaneously, as such Northern theory’s conceptual relationship between post-industrial society, culture and gentrification would seem to have limited use.

In China, for example, the ‘new’ middle classes are looking back to traditional architecture - expressing a yearning for traditional Chinese culture as a means through which to express their ‘cultural taste’. Gentrification processes in China began by imitating Western modern architecture in the form of downtown skyscrapers and high rises (as seen in Figure 15.1), but have moved on somewhat and now show an interest in social responsibility through environmentally sustainable design and technologies, and in traditional architecture (see http://urbachina.hypotheses.org/1719). It has seemingly progressed the opposite way round from gentrification in the global north - large scale and new to small scale and old. Take the gentrification of ‘hutongs’, of ‘lilongs’ in inner city Beijing and Shanghai. A hutong is a narrow street that has small single-storey houses coming off it, the houses are normally made up of four buildings facing into a central courtyard. A lilong is a traditional urban alley community, the community is tightly interlinked - not just physically but also socially - because the residents also run the local shops and restaurants in the street. In the first wave of gentrification many hutongs were knocked down to make way for new, dense, Western style housing developments; now they are more likely to be gentrified by rehabilitation rather than demolition and reused as new trendy cafes and shops, their market well-off young Chinese who want to feel cool (see Figure 15.2a and 15.2b). The distinct temporal waves of Northern
gentrification are all happening at once in China, and in a back to front way, underlain by the growth of a new middle class and a new consumerism.

Figure 15.2a and 15.2b Shikumen lilong, Shanghai: pre-gentrification in Jing’anli and post-gentrification in the neighbouring Xintiandi (photographs courtesy of Shenjing He)

A key related imaginary for international scholars of gentrification has been a post-industrial, white middle-class pioneer gentrifier moving into, for instance, a predominantly African American neighbourhood (a northern inner city neighbourhood that was very much part of the industrial city and subsequently related to post-war public housing policies) in inner-city America (see Figure 15.3 – a copy of the image from the NYC artist Stevenson Estime on the front cover of Lees, Slater and Wyly 2010, signifying the revanchist, racialized process of gentrification in the US - whites moving into the black ghetto/’hood’, cr. Smith 1996). But how useful is such a description and analysis outside of inner cities in the United States? It
certainly has limited purchase in London where the inner city was not very black and the racial politics were quite different. In the context of the global south, in African, Asian or Latin American cities - does this ‘colonial imaginary’ (which is what it is) have any purchase? In a number of these countries pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial contexts are all co-present and relate directly to any analysis of gentrification and race. Indeed, I am interested in the ‘race-work’ of postcolonial studies in the global north and global south in relation to processes of gentrification, in “African nationalism” as expressed through urban redevelopment projects, in the fact that ‘whiteness’ in Kenya is not the same as ‘whiteness’ in the US, and so on.

**Figure 15.3 The white anglo appropriation of the central city in the global south?**

Take South African cities –they experienced late post-colonialism in the context of the ‘late world order’ of the Cold War. They suffered insidious forms of neo-colonialism and economic dependencies were breaking down. As such the theoretical links between post-colonial, post-apartheid, and post-communist cultural formations were important in the goal of a functional democracy. The corollary is that the racial dimensions of gentrification (the
white Anglo appropriation of the central city – see Atkinson and Bridge, 2005) in South African cities, which have barely been touched on, are surely more complicated than those of the post-war US city. Indeed, the recreation of Johannesburg as a ‘World Class African City’ demonstrates how gentrification in the global south is playing out a little differently. The break from South Africa as a colonial outpost of the UK has moved on significantly as the country’s reintegration with Africa as a whole is prioritised (Mbembe and Nuttall 2008). The city is seeking to recreate Johannesburg as a ‘World Class African City’ (which of course is problematic - see Bremner 2000; Lipietz 2008; Robinson 2008). So on the one hand the recreation of Johannesburg is a form of neo-colonialism - the White Anglo appropriation of the central city - for it is led by private investors who are mostly white, an example of Northern Imagineering with its high tech, smart city ideas that seek to attract international investors, international tourists and the wealthy into the new downtown (Murray 2008). But on the other hand it is spatially more complex than this – the inner city has been racially desegregated from a white segregated space under apartheid to, through disinvestment and low income reinvestment, a racially black, even Pan-African space. This does not fit the gentrification story of the white Anglo appropriation of the inner city! The spaces that Murray (2008) describes have been built alongside these Pan-African spaces, they have not displaced them! Indeed Johannesburg demonstrates both the embracing of the African city - its disorderliness, riskiness, its low income groups, etc. (Robinson 2006) and the embracing of Western city ideas of development. They are inter-twined but the whole is more than the sum of western and non-western, formal and informal. And unlike in most other southern world cities state-funded developers are also providing low income housing for low income groups. As such the redevelopment (form of gentrification) includes both the formal, sanitized Western, white city and the informal, dysfunctional African City and thus embraces
Johannesburg as a key place for the emergence of specifically African forms of modernity and urbanism (see Mbembe and Nuttall 2008).

The questions we need to tackle are: How important are varied colonial legacies in gentrification processes in the global south? But also in the global north, for example, the gentrification of slums in Lisbon, Portugal, is displacing those inhabitants originally from Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau - Portugal’s colonial past is itself being gentrified and sanitized. Thinking about the relationship between gentrification and colonialism in the global south and north throws up the question of a specific ‘Latino gentrification’ (see Inzulza-Contardo 2012) that could link Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Argentina, due to the colonial legacy of Spain and Portugal. Are their gentrifications more similar to those in Madrid or Lisbon? Other questions emerge too: Is resistance to gentrification stronger in post-colonial nations, like South Africa? Do resistance movements even feel the same need to use the term ‘gentrification’ for political purposes as they do in the global north? Abahlali baseMjondolo, the Durban shack dwellers movement fighting ‘gentrification’, thought hard about this and concluded that the idea of ‘gentrification’ is not one that can really be said to be part of the living politics of Abahlali baseMjondolo (see http://www.abahlali.org/). Indeed they have suggested that it might be more important to clarify some of the ways in which their struggle is not about ‘gentrification’ - rather than trying to fit their story to match theories and ideas developed elsewhere:

‘We have concluded that the idea of 'gentrification' is not one that can really be said to be part of the living politics of Abahlali baseMjondolo. It is not a word that you will hear shackdwellers in South Africa using a lot (or at all really!) to describe their lives or to analyse their situation. This is not surprising since the term was developed in the 1960s by Northern analysts trying to explain certain patterns in the historical
development of mostly Northern cities. We know that the word continues to be used, and that it is used quite widely by now. We know that the patterns and issues it deals with are definitely important for all of us who are thinking about cities and who are committed to people's struggles for justice in cities all over the world. We are very clear that we fully support the struggle of the poor against the rich everywhere in the world – in Zimbabwe, in Haiti and also in England. But, from the perspective of the living politics of the shackdwellers of South Africa, we want to suggest that it might be more important to clarify some of the ways in which our struggle is not about gentrification – rather than trying to fit our story to match the theories and ideas developed elsewhere by others who do not know our story’ (http://abahlali.org/node/5657).

Here we see quite clearly the question and challenge of shacks/slums and their interplay in a global south politics about the remaking of the city and its (post)colonial legacies. Those fighting gentrification in Latin America, e.g. Santiago in Chile, have by way of contrast strategically used the term gentrification and are trying hard to educate the public about the urban social injustices that come with this process (see Janoschka and Casgrain, 2011, and López-Morales, 2013).

Finally, in the global north the post-industrial city had a post-war welfare state to mediate the worst injustices of capitalist processes (even if the welfare state is now being destroyed, see Lees 2013 on the relationship between this and gentrification). Most cities of the global south were/are not so lucky (cr. Shaw 2011). However, there were/are what we might term ‘peripheral’ welfare states in Brazil, South Africa, and in a number of Asian contexts, many of which developed modern welfare state policies and structures at the same time as most
European countries or more recently. To date no gentrification research has really investigated in any great depth the relationship between processes of gentrification and the welfare state, its political and social power relations as embedded in formal and informal political institutions and state structures. There are also what we might term ‘semi-peripheral’ welfare projects (after the semi-peripheral countries in world systems theory) emerging, demonstrating the considerable expansion of redistributive policies which can be both patronizing and empowering at the same time to excluded urban groups. Little research has explored non-state providers of social welfare, particularly in the global south, this is an area ripe for investigation by gentrification researchers especially given the mega displacements and rehousings in some cities there, be it Karachi or Mumbai. It may even be that new types of welfare states or welfare activities emerge in the global south in response to pushes for a better (e)quality of life for those populations in countries pushing forward developmentally.

Although worldwide gentrifications are diverse they are associated with local economies and cultural ensembles connected in many complicated ways to wider national, regional and global political economies. And pivotal in any conceptualization of global gentrification are the interrelated processes of urbanization, globalization, and neoliberalization. As Neil Smith’s (2002) thesis on ‘gentrification generalized’ argued: the rapidly urbanizing metropolitan economies of Asia, Latin America, and (to a lesser extent) Africa, are becoming significant in the global order, neoliberalism has become a consummate agent of—rather than a regulator of—the market, and globalization bespeaks a rescaling of the global and a recasting of the scale of the urban.
Different reference points: urbanization, globalization and neoliberalization

Gentrification in the global south is associated with rapid urbanization. Yet, the theories and models used to respond to the impacts of this rapid urbanization remain bound to the European and North American experience. And the gentrification theory from the North cannot accommodate cities which are currently urbanizing and moreover urbanizing differently. By 2015, half of China’s population will live in urban areas, second only to India. But unlike urban growth in other countries, like say India, the expansion of cities is being aggressively pursued by the Chinese government on a national scale, resulting in the explosion of growth that has taken China to its present level of urbanization in a very short period of time. Unlike in the United States where first wave gentrification was seen as the opposite to urban renewal, in Chinese cities gentrification and (re)urbanization take the form of urban renewal! By way of contrast Latin America has a smaller population and is already more urbanized than Asia or Africa, their rates of urbanization are predicted to be less rapid and more like those of Europe and North America - as such gentrification in Latin America is not connected to rapid development and urbanization as it is in say China. Rather, as I show later, it is connected to processes of neoliberalization.

In 2003 UN Habitat argued that there had been little gentrification in developing countries and that slum housing remained the preserve of the poor:

This process of the physical deterioration of central city housing stock can be reversed through processes of gentrification, as has been frequently seen in ex-slum neighbourhoods in northern cities, where (usually young) professionals, themselves marginalized by the rising cost of ‘acceptable’ housing are willing to move into a traditional slum, attracted by the architecture and cheap housing prices, and, perhaps
encouraged by official renovation programmes. Gentrification can lead to a rapid shift in population, with poor tenants being pushed out to make way for wealthier occupants and new commercial and service developments - for example, in Morocco’s development of medina areas in response to tourism and a conservation agenda. However, gentrification in the cities of developing countries has been limited and traditional slum housing remains very much the domain of the poor.

(The Challenge of Slums: global report on human settlements, UN-Habitat 2003)

But since this report was written gentrification has taken off in the cities of developing countries and slum gentrification in particular (see Figure 15.4 which compares slum policy in the first and third world). In some cases slum gentrification simply means slum removal; in other cases it means the gentrification of slums in situ by wealthier in-movers. Slum gentrification is a significant part of the urbanization processes going on in the global south (and indeed the global north - see Lees 2013 on the gentrification of council estates imagineered as slums in inner London).
Figure 15.4 A comparison of slum policy in the First and Third World (source: Table 1, Roy 2005:151)

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<th>Key terms</th>
<th>Third World informality policy</th>
<th>American poverty policy</th>
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<td>Congruences:</td>
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<td>Focus on spatial concentration of poverty using human ecology or enclave models. The ghetto or slum becomes the culprit rather than the structural forces of racism and poverty that lead to segregation (for more see Wacquant, 1997).</td>
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<td>Argument about culture of poverty, whether in the negative sense of an American ‘tangle of pathologies’ or in the upbeat sense of Third World ‘heroic entrepreneurship’</td>
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<td>Emphasis on ‘integrating’ the poor by improving their environment, such as HOPE VI-style projects in the US or slum upgrading in the Third World</td>
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<td>Key policies</td>
<td>Urban renewal/development</td>
<td>Urban renewal/redevelopment</td>
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<td>Congruences:</td>
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<td>These policies were popular in the 1950s. They become popular once again in the 1980s, in the context of entrepreneurial city policies</td>
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<td>Modernization of city fabric through large-scale ‘Hausmannization’ projects.</td>
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<td>Gentrification of ‘blighted’ neighborhoods causing displacement. There are, however, different policy approaches to dealing with this displacement. In America, the public housing/urban renewal nexus proved quite disastrous for overall housing supply and quality for the urban poor. However, in settings such as Singapore and Hong Kong, urban renewal was immediately followed by public housing with almost a complete transfer of the displaced to subsidized housing (for the state of exception in the Hong Kong case, see Smart, 2003).</td>
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<th>Community-based programmes</th>
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<td>Congruences:</td>
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<td>These policies were popular in the late 1960s and early 1970s. They became popular once again in the 1990s, in the context of poverty alleviation policies that seek to put a ‘kinder and gentler’ face on the dismantling of the welfare state.</td>
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<td>Place-based policies that focus on entire ‘communities’ and their capacity; equity often understood at this scale of the community or neighborhood.</td>
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<td>Important role of civil society organizations in brokering fragile coalitions of interests (see Castells, 1983). But also now in Third World cities where there is an emphasis on transnational and multiscaled coalitions (see Appadurai, 2001; Evans, 2002).</td>
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<td>Seen as grassroots activities but in fact top-down policy efforts led by experts and professionals to enact grassroots change.</td>
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Five years ago, Rio de Janeiro's ‘favela’ hillside slums were virtual no-go zones, controlled by drug lords. Then in 2011 police began to seize control of dozens of favelas from drug gangs, Rio's slum ‘pacification’ programme was/is part of a strategy to make the city safe in the run up to the 2014 soccer World Cup and 2016 Olympics. Murder rates are down, and SecoviRio, an organization representing Rio's real estate professionals, estimated that in the 72 hours after police ‘took’ the first three favelas, property prices there jumped by 50 percent - and are still climbing. A luxury boutique hotel with a rooftop pool is going up in Vidigal, and Italian tyre-maker Pirelli shot part of its 2013 pinup calendar in Dona Marta, which in 2008 was the first favela to be pacified. The similarities between this and Operation Pressure Point (a gentrification induced crack down on street drugs) in the Lower East Side in New York City in the mid-1980s are glaring (see Smith 1996: 206). In the Vidigal slum, middle-class Brazilians and foreigners who cannot afford chic Rio neighbourhoods are snapping up properties wedged between beachfront areas like Copacabana and Ipanema. There is a growing group of wealthy buyers keen on acquiring ocean-view properties in Vidigal that are seen as bargains in a city whose real estate prices are among the highest in the Americas. In another Brazilian city, São Paulo, there has also been speculation that the large number of fires devastating slums in or near the most desirable areas are linked to gentrification projects (see blog by Raquel Rolnik, a professor of architecture and urbanism at the University of São Paulo: http://rioonwatch.org/?source=blog-da-raquel-rolnik).

In 2011 The New York Times ran a feature on the slum neighbourhoods of Mumbai where slum shacks with faulty electric lines, no water or sewage were selling for USD38,000 to USD50,000 (http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/in-mumbai-the-50000-slum-shack/). The selling points were/are: 1. The slums are well-connected and are easily accessible to India’s finance and entertainment hubs (on gentrification and ‘spatial capital’ see Rerat and
Lees 2011); 2. These neighbourhoods are among the few spaces where builders and real estate investors can expand. As I stated in Lees (2012) there is important discussion to be had on the relationship between ‘slum gentrification’, ‘slum consolidation’, ‘informal settlement integration’ and ‘slum upgrading’. The wave of gentrification and slum clearance in Mumbai by developers is pushing many traditional, poorer slum-dwellers out of the city centre and into sprawling new illegal settlements - one of which, Deonar, has now outstripped Dharavi, the neighbourhood made famous by the film Slumdog Millionaire, as the largest slum in Asia. Suburbanization in the global south is occurring adjacent to the fall out from gentrification in the global south on city peripheries, presenting quite different circumstances to those around gentrification in the global north. Also both inner city slums and slums on the periphery of cities in the global south are facing gentrification due to municipalities’ increased interest in using land as assets. This could create new kinds of effects and different results.

As Smith (2002: 431) noted, ‘with globalization the scale of the urban is recast, the old conceptual containers - our 1970s assumptions about what the urban is or was - no-longer hold water’. It is interesting then that he retains the concept of ‘gentrification’ which was properly formulated in the 1970s (when the urban was conceptually and also in reality quite separate from the suburban) in discussions of contemporary planetary urbanization as global gentrification. Was Smith right to retain the concept of gentrification in relation to contemporary urban processes? There are those who outline ‘a single monoculture of globalization’ that has caused urban placelessness around the world, what Sorkin (1992) terms ‘the ageographia’. Castells (2000) likewise argues that globalization has caused the end of the barriers that made places remain different, meaning also the end of place. There does seem to be an ageographic form of global gentrification - ‘the creation of a global inner city
aesthetic that will make cities around the world all look and feel the same’ (Lees 2012: 375).

But does this ‘homogenous imaginary’ mask other processes?

Beijing is one of many cities in the global south that has a blueprint that seeks to remake Beijing into a ‘world city’ by 2050. Beijing has undergone rapid redevelopment, numerous historic buildings have been bulldozed to make way for new high rise towers and until more recently Chinese preservationists were struggling to protect the character of neighbourhoods and indeed whole ways of life. Global architectural styles of building are seen by China’s new middle classes to represent modernity and change. Low rise traditional houses built pre-communism and declining workers villages, factories and warehouses built in the socialist period are considered to be inappropriate by the state for a global city image. Since their re-entry into the World Trade Organization (Wu 2000; 2002) China wants to look and feel like other world cities. Shanghai, the largest city in China, a city that was once called ‘The Paris of the East, The New York of the West’ is seeking to reinvent this global identity through state-sponsored gentrification motivated by the pursuit of economic and urban growth at the cost of large-scale residential displacement (He 2007). Over a million low income households have been relocated to Shanghai’s periphery over the last 15 years and millions of square metres of housing has been demolished. The displaced have been moved away from their employment/livelihoods, their social networks, their everyday lives have been destroyed (He 2010), such processes have heightened the urgent call for ‘the right to the city’ in the global south (see Samara, He and Chen 2012).

The socio-spatial changes taking place in many cities in the global south can be linked to neoliberal economic policies. Neoliberalization is a set of processes and practices, it is not a thing (Hackworth 2006); it is a belief that the market is the guiding mechanism for the
organization of social, political and economic life and that less government is desirable (Marcuse and Kempen 2000). The resultant retreats by governments from earlier policies have been referred to as ‘roll back neoliberalization’, and these were followed by ‘roll-out neoliberalization’, that is the aggressive intervention by governments in crime, policing, urban policies, and surveillance, with the purpose of disciplining, containing, and relocating those marginalized or disposed by the neoliberalization of the 1980s (Peck and Tickell 2002). In the global south the effects of neoliberal policies have been more visceral, in the form of mega gentrifications and mega displacements, than in the global north. There are contingent realities to the way neoliberalization occurs in different countries and cities.

In Latin America neoliberalization has been at the forefront of instigating processes of gentrification. Mexico provides a useful example in that it was Mexico where the neoliberal paradigm was first introduced in 1982. Mexico City has experienced both roll back and roll out neoliberalization causing conflicts over urban space. Walker (2008) shows how at the turn of the 21st century Mexico City enacted a neoliberal municipal gentrification programme called the Programa de Rescate whose aim was to take back (gentrify) the Centro Histórico of Mexico City from ambulantes. Ambulantes are entrepreneurial street vendors who emerged in tandem with neoliberalism in Mexico City. The Programa de Rescate was a global urban strategy that sought to gain Mexico City global city status; the idea was that this state-led policy would attract investment into the historic city centre (the Centro Histórico) and in so doing attract upper/middle class residents to live there and tourists to visit. This is a large scale project - the Programa de Rescate aims to renovate an area three times the size of the historic area of Barcelona. The process of gentrification in this example was/is a three stage process: first, replacing the water and sewage infrastructure and building a commercial corridor; second, building hotels, a visitor centre and skyscraper; third, and most viscerca,
removing and relocating the 30,000 or so ambulantes who live and work in the Centro, adding public amenities and increasing security (including panic buttons at different sites linked to the police). In Mexico City we see here a form of state-led gentrification as a form of roll out neoliberalization in which the state has implemented urban policies to gentrify ‘problem’ areas that were created during an earlier period of roll back neoliberalization (see Hackworth 2006; and Lees 2013, for a London case).

It is important to consider how the rise of neoliberalism in Chile, Mexico and Brazil has affected processes of gentrification in cities there. Their greater integration with global investment capital flows and the growing importance of real estate interests in cities in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and so on, suggests that there exists a stronger degree of (often conflictual) interaction between ‘traditional’ urban space (often characterised by slums and decaying inner-city places) and emerging ‘gentrified’ urban space that caters for the needs of the new rich and international visitors. In Brazil there has been a significant shift towards neo-liberal governance, the state has pulled back significantly in mitigating the excesses and injustices of capital and is supporting private accumulation. The implementation of neo-liberal tactics and practices in Brazil is particularly problematic because of the longstanding weakness of democratic institutions and the historic lack of social welfare programs (the more recent expansion of welfare in Brazil may yet mitigate some of the injustices – but it is not certain, see Nuijten, Koster and de Vries, 2012). Unlike in the global north the global economic crisis of 2008 largely bypassed Brazil enabling Brazil to consolidate its position as an emerging player in the global economy. The rich have got richer, the middle class is growing, the very poor have experienced some limited social uplift, and American style consumerism is growing. Gentrification in Rio de Janeiro must be understood within this context. The Porta Maravilha (Marvelous Port) project which covers five million square metres of downtown
Rio is to redeveloped in the vein of London Docklands (but is twice its size) (see Gaffney in prep). It will host mixed-use buildings as well as high-density mixed-income housing centred on several anchor projects, including two museums and some Olympic sites. This is state-led gentrification that has real echoes of the Haussmannization of Paris.

In Chile both state and private activities have fed the flames of gentrification in downtowns in cities such as Santiago. An ‘urban renewal subsidy’ from the state has been used since 1992 to attract middle income groups into the centre of Santiago, to live in North American style loft apartments setting these residents apart in their consumption of a new urban lifestyle. This state-led housing subsidy and the modification of floor area ratios by municipal governments have both acted to increase the demand for new housing by the middle-class and they have also increased the potential ground rent, which in the end is captured exclusively by large-scale, local, real estate developers. These developers have accumulated land and widened the rent gap creating a privately-led urban renewal market that is causing the social dispossession of low-income residents, through processes of blockbusting and the monopsonic (where one buyer is faced with several sellers) buying of land plots by developers thus reducing the cash value of the land owned by small landowners, and limiting their post-occupancy options (see López–Morales 2010, 2011; and Figure 15.5).
It seems then that in countries which urbanized and neoliberalized early, like Brazil and Chile (where the ‘Chicago Boys’ as they became known studied economics in Chicago and brought ‘neoliberal’ ideas back to Chile to be implemented in Pinochet’s economic reforms in the 1970s; see Peck, 2010), the similarities with gentrification in the global north are much stronger than in other places in the global south.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I am clear that there are ‘gentrifications’ happening in the global south right now and that these are deeply problematic in terms of global urban social justice. Not all of these are new or emerging processes: indeed He (2012) has identified a first wave of gentrification in Guangzhou, in China, in the late 1980s and Kim (2011) discusses a first wave of gentrification in Seoul, South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s - the gentrification of squatter settlements in which 30 per cent of Seoul were living at the time, the precursors to the gentrification Shin (2008; 2009) discusses. What these all share are similar root causes, drawing on Clark (2005), these are: ‘commodification of space, polarized power relations, and a dominance of vision over sight’. These gentrifications have not necessarily ‘gone global’ (Smith 2002) implying some kind of projection from north to south, west to east. Indeed, researchers need to avoid the assumption that gentrification is simply ‘expanding’ towards the global periphery, even if at times it is an imported new phenomenon that builds upon emerging real estate markets (Peck 2010). Much more research is needed on the geography of gentrification globally, on the detail and specifics (temporalities and
spatialities) of processes of gentrification in cities of the global south before we can claim this for all cases.

Contemporary gentrifications in the global north and the global south are a revanchist expression of planetary urbanization. However, the experience of gentrification in the global north over the past 50 years will not necessarily predict the future path of gentrification in the global south. Future research on gentrification needs to try hard not to apply a prescribed set of parameters developed out of the experiences of the global north to interpret what has taken place, and is taking place, in the cities of the global south and east (see Jazeel and McFarlane 2010, on this politics of learning), for as we have seen gentrification in the global south has little to do with western conceptualisations of the post-industrial city. But we must also recognise that there are and will be examples of gentrification in the global south that share a lot in common with gentrification in the global north. A new geography of global gentrification must be open to both differences and similarities. In this regard, the experiences of what ‘smells like gentrification’ in the global south, global east, and other atypical places, deserve careful attention. The term ‘gentrification’ itself, I would argue, is appropriate (cr. Ley and Teo, forthcoming) and politically advantageous, northern theorizations and conceptualizations of the process may not always be appropriate.

References


(http://penalolenvotano.bligoo.cl/media/users/17/863351/files/167929/MPL_Gentrificacion.pdf)


