MANCHESTER
1824

The University of Manchester

Global Urban Research Centre

A multidisciplinary centre focusing on global urbanization poverty, inequality and exclusion

The Accumulation and Transfer of Civic and Political Assets by Argentinean Migrants to Spain: a Theoretical and Empirical Review

Global Urban Research Centre Working Paper #2

By Jorge Ginieniewicz

THE ACCUMULATION AND TRANSFER OF CIVIC AND POLITICAL ASSETS BY ARGENTINEAN MIGRANTS TO SPAIN

A Theoretical and Empirical Review

Global Urban Research Centre Working Paper #2

By Jorge Ginieniewicz

JUNE 2009

THE GLOBAL URBAN RESEARCH CENTRE (GURC)

THE UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER
MANCHESTER, M13 9PL
UNITED KINGDOM

Jorge Ginieniewicz is a Ford Foundation Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in the Global Urban Research Centre at the University of Manchester.

The views expressed in this working paper do not necessarily reflect the official position of GURC.

© The Global Urban Research Centre (GURC)

ISBN: 978-1-907120-01-5

Contents

Executive Summary **4**

1 Introduction **5**

2 Theoretical and Empirical Research on Argentinean Migrants **5**

2.1 Theoretical Approaches to International Migration *5*

2.2. The Empirical Context *7*

3. Theoretical background on the Asset Accumulation Framework **13**

3.1. Review of Existing Capital Assets in the Current Asset Accumulation Framework *13*

3.2 Expanding the Asset Accumulation Framework: Civic and Political Assets *14*

4. Transnational Trends in Latin American migration **16**

4.1. Changing Assets in a Transnational Context *16*

4.2. Transnationalism in Argentinean Migration *18*

5. Conclusion: Towards the Identification of Political and Civic Capital **19**

Acknowledgements **20**

References **21**

Executive Summary

As a result of natural disasters, wars, political persecutions, economic crises, or other personal reasons, people have always been on the move. Nonetheless, over the last half century, international migration has increased dramatically and evolved in ways that were not anticipated by governments, international institutions and academia. In this context, the civic and political learning processes, which migrants undergo as a result of their migratory experience, are of particular interest.

This paper is framed by the Asset Accumulation Framework, which is an original approach towards understanding the multi-dimensionalism of migratory flows in a globalised world. In order to analyse migration, this framework pays particular attention to the accumulation of assets or capital endowments in its diverse forms: financial, social, human, civic and political. So far, most studies that use the Asset Accumulation Framework have principally focused on the effects that remittances have on the individuals and the institutions of Southern countries. However, the transnational impact of the accumulation and transfer of civic and political assets remains understudied.

By differentiating between civic and political assets, this paper seeks to expand the Asset Accumulation Framework and therefore make a contribution to this model. Whilst civic capital refers to those day-to-day practices and attitudes that promote a higher societal quality of life, political capital points to the capacity of the individual to effect changes in his/her power relations.

This paper presents a detailed review of the literature on key migration theories and concepts. By reviewing the migratory patterns of Latin America, particularly those between Argentina and Spain, as well as the general transnational trends in Latin American migration, this paper contributes to the still understudied field of migration studies. The paper also contributes to the Asset Accumulation Framework approach, by expanding it with a particular focus on civic and political capital, and the potential application of these issues to the transnational context.

1 Introduction

A review of the literature on migration studies indicates that researchers have faced serious difficulties in identifying consistently acceptable theoretical migration frameworks. Social scientists tend to approach the study of migration from diverse theoretical perspectives, which are fragmented across disciplines, regions, and ideologies. In general, there is a shortage of frameworks regarding the issue of migration as a dynamic process, which has consequences for both the sending and receiving societies (Castles, 2000; Arango, 2000; Massey et al. 1994).

In this context, the Asset Accumulation Framework becomes an original approach towards understand the multi-dimensionalism of migratory flows in a globalised world. In order to analyse migration, this framework pays particular attention to the accumulation of assets[1] in its diverse forms: financial, social, human, civic and political. So far, most studies that use the Asset Accumulation Framework have principally focused on the effects that remittances have on individuals and institutions in Southern countries. However, the potential contribution of migrants and returnees to the civic and political life of their home countries remains understudied (Moser, 2007; Orozco, 2007).

Although in recent years academic works on trans-nationalism have been abundant, very little is known about the accumulation of assets, other than financial, and the implications of this for both the sending and receiving societies. Migrants tend to develop social relations in the receiving society, whilst also maintaining their links with the sending society. The fusion of new and old assets provides migrants with the opportunity to analyze their home countries through a new lens, with an addition created by distance.

Adult migrants bring into the new country a significant amount of civic and political capital that is re-shaped and transformed by the "migratory experience" as well as by the new assets accumulated in the receiving society. Yet, little attention has been paid to the accumulation of civic and political assets and its transnational impact. Migrants bring a wealth of political and civic experience and knowledge with them, and their contribution to the development of the community in the host country is indeed relevant; migrants also go through processes of learning and change as a result of their interaction with their new social and political environment. In addition, the knowledge and alternative perspectives accumulated by migrants, in any country, has the potential capacity to effect positive changes in both the receiving and sending countries.

As a consequence of the migratory experience, migrants develop a new civic and political identity. The accumulation of civic and political assets has the potential capacity to promote social development and social mobility in a sustainable way. Nevertheless, those studies that address the impact of the accumulated civic and political knowledge on the cities of the Southern hemisphere are, as stated earlier, relatively scarce.

2 Theoretical and Empirical Research on Argentinean Migrants

2.1 Theoretical Approaches to International Migration

a) Explaining Migratory Movements

---

[1] Moser (2007) identifies "assets" as "capital endowments".

Broadly defined, the process or act of international migration means the crossing of the boundary of a political administrative entity for a certain minimum period of time (Boyle, Halfacree, & Robinson, 1998; Castles, 2000; Cohen, 1987). As a result of natural disasters, wars, political persecutions, economic crises, or other personal reasons, people have always been on the move. Nonetheless, over the last half century, international migration has increased dramatically and evolved in ways that were not anticipated by governments and international institutions (Arango, 2000; Castles, 2000; Massey et al., 1994). In 2000, the number of people who were not living in the country in which they were born was close to 190 million (International Organization of Migration, 2005).

According to Castles (2000), in a desperate attempt to gain better control over the migration flows, nation-states have started to label or categorise migrants as follows: “temporary labour migrants”, “highly skilled migrants”, “irregular migrants”, “landed migrants”, “refugees”, and “asylum-seekers”. These are just a few of the categories for people who have decided to, or who have been forced to move from one country to another.

Overall, as in many domains of the social sciences, two principal approaches can be identified which attempt to explain the reasons for or the causes of migration: the neo-classical and the historical-structuralist perspectives (Castles & Miller, 2003).

The neo-classical perspective has its antecedents in the classical liberal approach and suggests that people tend to move from densely populated to sparsely populated countries or from low-income to high-income regions. From this perspective, the causes of migration lie in a combination of “push” (demographic growth, low living standards, lack of economic opportunities, and political repression) and “pull” factors (demand for labour, availability of land, economic opportunities, and political freedom). This individualistic approach serves to encourage and confirm the decision to migrate as being based on a rational comparison of the costs and benefits of remaining in the home country or area, or moving to an alternative place (Borjas, 1989; Massey, Alarcón, Durand, & González, 1987; Ravenstein, 1885, 1889).

The historical-structural approach has its intellectual roots in Marxist theories and posits that the unequal distribution of economic and political power is the main catalyst in the migratory process. Migration is seen as the variable utilized by capitalism to mobilize “cheap labour” from one location in the world to another. This line of thought considers that “labour migration” is one factor, amongst others, which is used by core capitalist economies to dominate peripheral ones. According to this perspective, migration perpetuates unequal development, exploiting the resources of poor countries to make the rich even richer. Inequalities in resources and power between different countries, combined with the entry policies of potential immigration countries place great constraints on migrants’ choices (Castles & Kosack, 1985; Cohen, 1987; Hugo, 1993; Zolberg, 1989).

Strongly linked to the historical-structural tradition, the *World Systems Theory* argues that international migration is a direct consequence of the modern globalisation of the market economy. According to this approach, the dichotomy of capital and labour and the endless focus and ambition of capitalism to accumulate, generates tensions which lead to, or result in, migration. The production process in the global market economy, which is orchestrated by a few global cities, is becoming increasingly decentralized, with labour-intensive operations being located in countries which are running the so-called “race to the bottom”. The globalisation of production lowers wages, working conditions, and employment levels amongst low-skilled workers of limited education. Moreover, this state of affairs elicits a strong demand for experts in specific fields such as electronics, telecommunications, banking, finance, and insurance. This demand also extends to the service industry (restaurants, hotels, construction, maintenance, and

personal services), which is the type of employment native-born workers of developed countries is often reluctant to accept (Massey et al., 1994; Portes & Walton, 1981; Sassen, 1988).

b) Trans-nationalism: Networks beyond National Borders

As previously stated, migration has a significant impact on the major socio-economic variables in both the sending and receiving countries. This perspective points to major national and institutional issues, such as demographic growth, living standards, job markets and social development, all of which are closely related to migration (Castles & Kosack, 1985; Castles & Miller, 2003; Portes, 2001). However, there is also another perspective related to the relationships migrants develop in order to cope with the consequences of migration and settlement. In the context of the global era, sets of interpersonal ties connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in the host and home societies, through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community of origin (Castles & Miller, 2003; Portes, 2001).

Globalisation provides “potential migrants” with the opportunity to acquire information about their destination, organize travel, and even find jobs in advance. Each person represents a “node” (Vertovec, 2003) that is linked with others in order to form a network. Informal networks create bonds, not only between migrants and non-migrant populations, but also between newcomers and earlier migrants, promoting co-operation and integration. These networks represent a dynamic cultural response that encourages and supports ethnic community formation and helps to maintain group ties (Castles & Miller, 2003; Hugo, 1993).

Networks, especially those built on links between the host and home societies, are closely related to the concept of trans-nationalism, which has attracted a great deal of attention in recent years, particularly amongst those interested in researching Latin American communities in North America. Although the concept of trans-national communities has recently gained significance in academic literature, the term is not new (Castles & Miller, 2003; Landolt, Autler, & Baires, 1999; Portes, 1999).

In a broad sense, the idea of “trans-national migrants” is associated with individuals who move across borders and organise their social networks and ties in a way that allows migrants to fix a residence in specific countries whilst simultaneously maintaining an intense relationship with their communities of origin (Glick-Schiller, 1999). Portes (1999:464) defines trans-national activities as: “those that take place on a recurrent basis across national borders and that require a regular and significant commitment of time by participants”. He explains that such activities may be conducted by “relatively powerful actors (national governments or multinational corporations) or by individuals, such as migrants and their home country relations” (Portes 1999:464). Portes also observes that these activities include not only economic enterprises, but also political, cultural, and religious initiatives. It is further worth noting that in these times of globalisation, improvements in transport and communication technologies make it increasingly easier for migrants to maintain close links with their countries of origin (Castles & Miller, 2003).

2.2. The Empirical Context

a) Migratory movements from Latin America: an overview

Since colonial times, the Americas have historically been a region that received migrants. Given the availability of their vast natural resources and their lax, or non -existent, migratory policies, they, therefore, became an attractive destination for Europeans escaping wars and famines. Nevertheless, since the 1950’s, Latin America has become a “sending region” in respect of the migratory map (Novick, 2005; Palomares, et. al.2007).

Around twenty million Latin Americans, and Caribbeans, live outside the countries in which they were born. This figure represents 10 percent of the migrants worldwide. Latin Americans choose, predominantly, the US as their destination (75 percent of those who emigrate). This group, usually labelled as “Latinos”, has been the largest minority in the US since July 2002. It is calculated that more than 47 million Latin Americans live in the US (about 15 percent of the total population) (Pew Hispanic Centre, 2007).

Aside from the US and the domestic migration[2], several European nations, as well as Canada and Australia, have also received migrants from Latin America. In the 1970’s and the 1980’s, many European countries, such as France, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden, o mention but a few, received a large number of Latin Americans who fled their home country on account of political reasons. Additionally, in the last two decades, Europe has recorded a significant influx of Latin American migrants, who have arrived as a result of the economic crises that had, or was continuing to afflict their home country (Bermúdez Torres, 2006; Bureau, 2005; Martínez Pizzarro, 2003; Pellegrino, 2004).

Although most studies highlight the difficulties of finding reliable data, a tentative figure suggests that in 2005 there were 1.4 million Latin Americans living in Europe, 80 percent of whom were resident in either Spain or Italy. Approximately 850,000 Latin Americans are currently living in Spain. Fifty percent of Europe’s Latin American population was born either in Colombia or Ecuador (Martínez Pizzarro, 2003; Padilla, 2007).for figures like these the numbers are appropriate.

Overall, therefore, there has been a steady growth in the number of migrants from Latin America to Europe in recent decades as well as an increased heterogeneity in the composition of the migratory flow. Whilst in the 1970’s, immigration from Latin America to Europe was mainly associated with political reasons, it has, over the last twenty five years, become an “economic” phenomenon, predominantly tied to the dynamics of the labour markets in both the sending and receiving societies. The trend also reveals a visible gap between the educational level of the migrants and their possibilities to satisfactorily insert themselves in the European labour market. In other words, migrants tend to be overqualified for the jobs they usually get (Novick & Murias, 2005; Pellegrino, 2004).

In Latin America, migration is also characterized by a “feminization” of the phenomena. In 1960, 447 out of 1000 Latin American migrants were women. Since then, the proportion of migrant women has slowly, albeit steadily, increased[3] (Martínez Pizzarro, 2003; Novick & Murias, 2005; Zlotnik, 2003). Paying particular attention to this trend in recent migration patterns from Ecuador to Spain, Gratton (2007:582) points out that, “the most distinctive feature [of migration] was that many of the new emigrants were women travelling independently, among them married women who left spouses and children behind”. The author also indicates that the majority of these “purposive and independent” migrant women from Ecuador tend to accept jobs well below their qualifications, particularly within the service or domestic industry (Gratton, 2007).

b) Returning Latin American migrants

There are two definitions of the concept of “return migration”. Whilst this concept sometimes refers to individuals who return to the land of their ancestries, the term is also associated with

---

[2] For the purposes of this paper, I understand domestic migration as the migratory processes that take place within Latin American region.

[3] In 1970, women accounted for 46.9 percent of the Latin Americans who emigrated: in 1980, they represented 48.4 percent, in 1990, 50.2 percent, and in 2000, 50.5 percent.

migrants who return to the countries in which they were born**.** Generally, both conceptualisations relate migration to a dynamic phenomenon that involves multiple generations and a continuous flow and circulation of individuals. As King (2000) suggests, migration should no longer be seen as the final stop of someone who left his/her home country, but rather as another step in the accumulation of life experiences of those individuals and people, who, as migrants, thus acquire and/or develop multilayered identities (King, 2000)

Pointing to Latin America, Takenaka (1999) explores the experiences of second and third generations of Japanese Peruvians who travel to Japan as migrant workers. The author argues that the mass return migration of Japanese Peruvians (Nikkei) to Japan has paradoxically increased the distance between this community and their culture of origin. Yet these high rates of return have helped to strengthen the bonds and ties between the Nikkei in Peru. Takenaka also highlights the economic benefits of return migration, arguing that, in addition to the money remitted to Peru, which is used to boost the Peruvian economy, a significant number of "return migrant-related businesses," such as travel agencies and small Japanese language institutes have flourished in the sending country. On the other hand, return migrants in Japan suffer from a number of disappointing difficulties, "declassing" the gap between expectations and reality (idealisation) and the lack of Japanese proficiency are some of the obstacles faced by these migrants (Takenaka, 1999).

In a different work, Tsuda (1999) analyses the "return migration" of Japanese descendants in Brazil and considers that migration can be "ethnically determined". The author suggests that the ethnic connection and linkages not only boosted the interest of Japanese Brazilians in returning to Japan, but it also turned out to be an extra asset for the Japanese government, which, therefore, accepted them for its own economic reasons. Tsuda also points out that a certain reluctance accompanied the decision to migrate to Japan in the late 1980's although, as the recession in Brazil continued into the 1990's, returnees accepted that the experience of "coming back" to the land of their ancestors turned out to be the best option. Since then, a "culture of migration" has grown amongst Japanese Brazilians and relatively stable and diversified migratory networks have expanded both in the sending and receiving societies (Tsuda, 1999).

The phrase "Return migration" understood as "coming back to the country where the individual was born" is not a massive, widespread phenomenon. Statistics actually indicate that the vast majority of those who leave their home countries tend to remain abroad. This is especially true of Latin America, where the periodic socio-economic crises tend to boost emigration (Martínez Pizzarro, 2003). Studies also indicate that the decision to return is usually taken after having lived for five years in a foreign country (Borjas & Bratsberg, 1996; Dustmann & Weiss, 2007).

In the last twenty years, the massive migration from Latin America has forced the countries in that region to confront and deal with migratory issues. In general, these countries have tried, through a variety of means and with mixed results, to retain the highly skilled and educated individuals who plan to emigrate. Some countries have developed a series of programmes and policies to take advantage of the potential accumulated by those nationals who live abroad (Martínez Pizzarro, 2003).

In general, studies that analyse this type of "return migration" point to a number of economic reasons as the main motivations for returning. Relative prices between the host and home countries, the high purchasing power of the currency of the host country in the migrant's home country and the accumulation of human capital, which ultimately increases the potential capacity to attain upward social mobility, have all been identified as reasons for returning to the homeland (Borjas & Bratsberg, 1996; Dustmann & Weiss, 2007).

c) Migratory Patterns To and From Argentina

For many years, as in many other Latin American countries, the issue of emigration from Argentina was not considered a critical issue. Since its foundation, Argentina was conceived as a country that would receive emigrants, albeit indiscriminately; the Argentinean state historically upheld the value of European migration. At the end of the nineteenth century, many indigenous Argentinean people were massacred and their lands confiscated, which led to the formation of large estates owned by small number of landowners. In addition, and framed by concepts such as "development" and "progress", in the 1880's, Argentina's Liberal reforms promoted and encouraged the arrival of those Europeans willing to live and work in the country (Actis & Esteban, 2007). Between 1857 and 1940, Argentina received three million Italian and two million Spanish migrants. In 1914, the proportion of the foreign-born population reached its highest level in Argentinean history (30 percent) (Novick & Murias, 2005). Since then, this trend has begun to decline. In 2001, only four percent of the population was of foreign-birth[4].

In the last decades, the origins of the migrant population in Argentina have also changed. In 1914, thirty–nine per cent of the total migrant population originated from Italy and thirty-five per cent from Spain. The 1960's became a turning point. Since then, and until the year 2000, the number of European migrants has declined to an average of 400,000 individuals every ten years. On the other hand, during the same time period, the number of migrants arriving from bordering countries steadily increased. In 2001, the composition of the migrant population in Argentina was very much diversified; sixty per cent of the foreign-born population had come from neighbouring countries (Cozzani de Palmada, 2000)[5].

In parallel to the increasing number of migrants coming from neighbouring countries, Argentina has progressively tightened the immigration laws for neighbouring countries (Cozzani de Palmada, 2000). Nonetheless, in 2003, the Argentinean Parliament passed a new piece of legislation which "re-positioned" the country in the context of Latin America and acknowledged the general "right to migrate". For the first time, this new piece of legislation recognised the significant contribution made by migrants from neighbouring countries to Argentinean society. It also guaranteed a number of rights to migrants, including access to several social services, regardless of their migratory status. Yet, this legislation has been, to date, difficult to implement, revealing a limited interest on behalf of some sectors of the society in overcoming embedded prejudice and intolerance towards migrants from neighbouring countries (Novick, 2008).

Emigration has become a relevant issue in recent decades in Argentina, on account of political and economic factors. Most sources concur in respect of the problems of finding reliable data which categorically shows the number of Argentineans living abroad. Diverse migratory statuses have obstructed the possibility of accurately determining this figure, although the these sources consider the figure to be around one million (Margheritis, 2007; Novick & Murias, 2005).

In Argentina, emigration started in the mid or late 1950's and continued to increase up until the aftermath of the 2001 economic crisis, when it reached its peak[6]. Studies suggest that women and

---

[4] It is worth noting that migrants with "non-status" are not included in this figure. I consider "non-status" migrants those who do not have the correct documentation required to permit them to remain in any given country.

[5] The breakdown is as follows: Paraguay, 21 percent; Bolivia, 15 percent; Chile, 14 percent; Uruguay, eight percent; Brazil, two percent; Peru 6 percent.

[6] It is calculated that about 150,000 Argentines emigrated in the last decade alone.

men emigrate from Argentina in equal numbers, with Spain (42 percent) and the US (14 percent) as the preferred destinations (Novara, 2005; Novick & Murias, 2005). The studies also indicate that Argentinean emigrants are mostly young and well educated, especially those who arrived in Spain. In general, these Argentinean emigrants became particularly impoverished during the last socio-economic crisis that began in the mid-1990's. They are usually identified as "middle-class individuals" because they share some particular characteristics, like "upward social mobility expectations", the capacity to access information, having similar personal projects and an interest in civic issues (Novara, 2005; Novick & Murias, 2005).

The relatively recent massive emigration from Argentina to Spain was the result of an acute economic crisis and was mainly composed of urban groups with relatively high educational levels (Novara, 2005; Novick & Murias, 2005). A similar situation, although with other particularities, was documented in the 1990's in respect of the emigration flow from Ecuador to Spain. In many cases, in order to retrieve their financial assets, which had been lost during the recurrent crises in Argentina, migrants had to negotiate their position in the job market, accepting jobs for which they were usually overqualified. As Gratton (2007:593) points out: "as human capital and social origins evidence implies, emigration to Spain offered an ironic solution: in order to go up an income ladder, emigrants had to go down the occupational one".

Arguably, these European descendants, middle class, well educated, although impoverished, migrants from Argentinean urban settings, found it relatively easy to melt into the urban landscape of the Spanish metropolises. Similarities in the architecture of the cities, in cultural consumption and taste might have developed common urban codes. Yet, sharing urban codes and behaviour does not necessarily prevent migrants from perceiving noticeable "structural" differences between "Southern" and "Northern" cities.

d) Argentinean Migration to Spain

Argentina, and particularly the city of Buenos Aires, was the preferred destination for most Spaniards who decided to migrate to their former colonies. Framed by different economic and political contexts, the migration flow from Spain to Argentina was moderately fluid from colonial times until 1850, when a massive trans-oceanic migration began. Between the years 1857 and 1930, according to Argentinean statistics, around two million Spaniards arrived in the country. Later on, Argentina received a number of Spanish political exiles who had fled their home country shortly after the end of the 3-year Civil War in 1939. By 1940, there were about 2,080,000 Spanish-born people living in Argentina (Moya, 1998). By the late 1960's, when *Franquismo* started losing its grip on the political situation in Spain, coincidentally, the political and economic situation in Argentina started to deteriorate.

The Argentinean migration to Spain took place in three major waves. The first wave started in 1976 immediately after the Military Junta took over. This group immigrated to Spain mainly for political reasons. The other two waves (1989-1991 and 2000-2003) were primarily in response to the difficult economic circumstances in their home country (Actis & Esteban, 2007).

Yet the "push-pull" framework described above falls short of explaining the dynamics of the Argentinean migration to Spain. In this case, causality involves more complex mechanisms and situations. Although, in the last two decades Spain's economic performance has been better than that of Argentina, this fact alone does not fully explain the decision to migrate. Certainly, whilst the economic conditions and incentives in both the sending and receiving societies may have played a crucial role in the overall assessment of the situation, socio-cultural, linguistic, familial and even ethnic variables seemed to have also played an important part in the decision to migrate.

As Tsuda (1999:8) notes: “when faced with general economic pressures to migrate, individuals tend to choose countries that have close relationships with their own”.

According to the Statistics National Institute of Spain (INE, Spanish acronym), in January 2008 about 290,000 Argentinean-born people were living in Spain (Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España, 2007). This figure represents an increase of 5.4 percent compared to that of 2007, although this figure is relatively small compared to the 61 percent increase of 2002. The extent of the migratory flow from Argentina to Spain after the 2001 crisis can be better understood by looking at the following figures: according to the Argentinean Interior Ministry, in 2002, 128,312 Argentinean citizens arrived in Spain with a 3-month tourist visa and only 18,742 returned (14.2 percent) (Actis, 2008; Palomares et al., 2007).

It is calculated that almost half of the Argentinean-born people residing in Spain hold European citizenship (mainly Spanish or Italian), 33 percent have some kind of work permit and/or residence permit and 17 percent have an uncertain migratory status (Actis, 2008). Although the proportion of Argentineans with a low educational level has increased since 2001, when compared with other groups, this community still holds the highest educational attainment in Spain. In 2005, about 34 percent of Argentinean migrants had completed high school and 28 percent of those over 16 had attended university (16 percent for all other Latin American migrants; 31.4 percent for those born in the European Union and 15.3 percent for Spaniards) (Actis & Esteban, 2007).

When considering the economically active Argentineans who live in Spain (175,000 people), 36 percent are working in retail and hospitality, 22 percent in diverse industries and 14 percent in finances and real estate. The number of Argentinean migrants working in the construction sector and “other services” (for example, cleaning) is, in fact, very low (Actis, 2007).[7]

There is an even gender distribution amongst Argentinean migrants to Spain, the 20-44 year old age category having the highest number of newcomers (Actis, 2007). The autonomous community of Catalonia is the preferred settlement location for most Argentineans who emigrate to Spain. About 49,000 Argentineans live in the city of Barcelona. Of the 65,000 Argentineans who live in Catalonia, about 50 percent have European nationality status. Another 40,000 Argentineans live in Madrid and a relatively similar number in Andalusia (Actis, 2008; Esteban, 2008).

e) Migration Policies in Spain

In Spain, the period of “Democratic Transition” (1975-1982) was framed by a deep economic crisis. The first signs of recovery from this only began in 1986 when Spain joined the European Union. This crucial political decision was accompanied by an important social and economic reconversion which consequently provided a significant redistribution of resources towards social services and education. Slowly, Spain recovered from years of political ostracism and economic difficulties and became a more important actor within the European Union. As the economic situation improved in their homeland, a significant number of Spaniards, who had lived in other European countries, returned to Spain (Bover & Velilla, 1999).

[7] It should be noted that this categorisation by activity might lead to misinterpretations due to the fact that, for example, working in the hospitality industry includes a wide range of possibilities (from owning a hotel to working in a bar). Yet the data would suggest that Argentineans have managed to avoid the “typical” migrant job (such as working in the fields of construction, cleaning and harvesting).

In parallel, since 1985, when Spain adopted the first *Ley de Extranjería* ("Law of Foreigners"), the entry of non-EU migrant workers to the country has faced different degrees of restrictions, which tended to correspond to the fluctuations of the "Spanish labour market". In general, in Spain, as in the rest of Europe, migration policies have gradually become more restrictive making it very difficult for "non-status" migrants to obtain either residence or work (Aja, 2006).

In a very short period of time (about 10 years), Spain has witnessed an extraordinary change in its demographic composition. Overall, there were three important periods of emigration to Spain. Between 1962 and 1967, the number of foreign residents rose at the annual rate of 12.9 percent; between 1980 and 1996, the increment was 11.5 percent annually. Finally, from 1996 until today the number of foreign residents is growing at an annual average rate of 21.3 percent (Actis & Esteban, 2007; Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España, 2007; Fernández & Ortega, 2008).

According to the Statistical National Institute of Spain (2007, in 1996 barely one percent of its population was foreign-born; the figure climbed to 10 percent in 2007. Whilst the Spanish population expanded by 0.2 percent in 2007, the migrant population increased by nine percent. Moreover, the origins of the foreign born population have dramatically changed. In 1996, about half of the migrant population had arrived from Eastern Europe and about 20 percent from Africa. According to the 2006 data, more than 35 percent of migrants had arrived from a single Latin American country and less than 20 percent from Eastern Europe (Actis & Esteban, 2007; España, 2007; Fernández & Ortega, 2008).

In Spain, the massive immigration from Latin America is sometimes called the *latinoamericanización* ("Latin Americanization") of migration (Izquierdo, López, & Martínez, 2002). It is frequently stated that Spaniards have a preference for Latin Americans and in order to explain this fondness, analysts point to the relatively higher level of qualifications held by Latin Americans compared to other immigrant groups. Although their insertion in the labour market tends to be unstable and fragmented, in the long term, factors such as education, skills and types of networks tend to direct this group towards a more prominent upward social mobility, making jobs in the construction sector, cleaning and sales "entry points" to their ascendant careers in the labour market (Anguiano, 2002; Martínez Buján, 2003; Martínez Pizzarro, 2003).

3. Theoretical background on the Asset Accumulation Framework

3.1. Review of Existing Capital Assets in the Current Asset Accumulation Framework

According to the Ford foundation, an asset is a stock of financial, human, natural or social resources that can be acquired, developed, improved and transferred across generations (Ford Foundation, 2004). Framed by discussions on poverty reduction, the Asset Accumulation Framework analyses the concept of capital beyond financial assets. Instead of relying on the typical model of "income-spending-consumption", this framework looks at poverty not only in relation to financial savings but also in terms of social and human investments (Moser, Sparr, & Pickett, 2007; Shapiro & Wolff, 2001; Sherraden, 1991). As Sherraden (1991:6) points out: "income only maintains consumption but assets change the way people think and interact in the world […] with assets, people begin to think in the long term and pursue long-term goals".

Thus, the accumulation of assets becomes a "stock" that, once adopted, can be transformed and used in different contexts to generate economic, psychological, social and political benefits, which, in turn, promote social mobility. As this approach is focused on creating opportunities for the poor to acquire, keep and pass on wealth to subsequent generations, it also aims to

complement other poverty-alleviation strategies (Bebbington, 1999; Moser, 2008; Moser et al., 2007).

A clear differentiation is required between the so-called “Asset Index Conceptual Framework” and the “Asset Accumulation Policy” (Moser, 2007). The Asset Index Conceptual Framework represents an analytical and diagnostic tool designed to aid the understanding of poverty dynamics and mobility. This is relevant due to the fact that, in the past, the diagnosis of poor communities has usually been carried out by measuring their income and consumption rather than their assets. This approach aims to recognise connections between different assets and build on their potential interaction as a tool to achieve, “effective risk management”. Moreover, of particular importance is the fact that this model relies on both an individual and a collective agency.

The Asset Accumulation Policy is an operational approach which aims to implement and design “sustainable asset accumulation interventions” (Moser, 2007:3). It focuses on generating opportunities for the poor to accumulate and consolidate assets in a “sustainable way”, the accumulation of assets being a key aspect of achieving economic empowerment. Interventions associated with this approach rely heavily on long-term asset accumulation strategies and may be affected by “outside factors” such as government policy, political institutions and non-governmental organisations (Moser, 2007). Asset-based social policies provide a plausible alternative for developing opportunities amongst deprived groups and for the creation of attainable options aimed at the reduction and alleviation of poverty.

Assets can be tangible, like financial, physical and human, or intangible, such as social (Moser, 2007). Financial assets are represented by the monetary resources available to individuals. Physical assets refer to the stock of equipment, infrastructure and other production resources, as well as housing and consumer durables. Human assets point to the investment of individuals in education, health and nutrition. Finally, social capital is understood as the rules, norms, obligations and trust that underpin positive social relations.

Although the importance of other types of intangible assets, such as the psychological and political, has been suggested (Ferguson, Moser, & Norton, 2007; Moser, 2007), these conceptualisations have not been sufficiently articulated. By proposing a definition of civic and political assets, this paper expands the Asset Accumulation Framework.

3.2 Expanding the Asset Accumulation Framework: Civic and Political Assets

According to Bourdieu, the entrance to the professional political field is restricted to only a few people because it demands the possession of knowledge in respect of the “rites of institutions” that confer cultural capital. In so doing, bureaucrats and professionals build the *habitus*, which is a set of dispositions that incline individuals to act in certain ways (Bourdieu, 1991). In this context, it becomes very difficult for ordinary people to manage concepts and references that have no direct connections with their daily lives, and almost impossible to figure out: “distinctions, nuances, subtleties, and niceties that pass unnoticed by the uninitiated” (Bourdieu, 1991:184). However, paradoxically, one of the distinctive features of the political field is that, professionals, in order to succeed, need to appeal to individuals *outside* the field.

In general, later work on political capital (e.g. Blumentritt & Rehbein, 2008; Schugurensky, 2000; Shaffer & Hillman, 2000) analyses the ability of individuals to influence public decisions. For example, Booth and Richard (2007:8) define political capital as: “citizen attitudes and behaviours

that influence or constrain the political system in general, the state, incumbents in government, social groups, and citizens as such”.

Schugurensky (2000) applies the concept of political capital to analyse the connections between learning and power in respect of the deliberation and decision-making processes in local experiments in participatory democracy. He identifies five dimensions to unpack the concept of political capital (namely knowledge, political skills, attitudes, proximity to power, and personal resources), which can be used to approach and develop “emancipatory citizenship education” models. Schugurensky points out that these categories should be understood as “dynamic” and that their categorisation might vary according to different contexts (Schugurensky, 2000).

Ferguson et al. (2007) consider that responsible citizenship, governance and accountability can all be promoted through the implementation of asset-based policies that ease the accumulation of political capital. According to the authors, asymmetrical power relations can, to certain extent, be overcome through the incorporation of knowledge about “rights”, which once accumulated, are presented as political capital.

By differentiating between civic and political capital, this paper expands the Asset Accumulation Framework and therefore makes a contribution to this model. Whilst civic capital refers to those day-to-day practices and attitudes that promote a higher societal quality of life, political capital points to the individual’s capacity to modify power relations. Using an index of categories and components, the concepts of civic and political assets can be “unpacked” (Table 1). As the accumulation of assets represents a dynamic process, the following table is, by no means, definitive and “closed”.

Table 1: Asset Types by Index Categories and Components

Capital Type	Asset Index Category	Index Component
Civic	Deference for community members	Tolerance towards minorities
	Environmental interests	Recycling; saving water and energy
	Awareness of rights	Fighting for human rights
Political	Participation in politics	Cast ballots Engagement in political parties
	Information/Knowledge	Informed about politics Grasp of the political system

4. Transnational Trends in Latin American migration

The dynamism of the activities and practices beyond the borders of nation-states has promoted the reformulation of the term "transnationalism" and a relatively continuous reshaping of the transnational spaces. For more than a decade, the study of "transnationalism" has attracted the attention of scholars, particularly those interested in researching Latin American issues. Several works have recently examined the impact of transnational practices using an asset lens, although most of them have focused on the fields of finances and social relations.

4.1. Changing Assets in a Transnational Context

a) Financial and Physical Capital

Remittances are sometimes presented as a trade-off (i.e. as part of the aid or financial capital) that Northern countries deny to Southern ones. Migrants who remit money are gaining an increasing influence in the economic and social life of their home country. It is important to be prudent with generalizations of any kind because the impact of remittances might vary greatly according to different social, cultural and geographical contexts. For example, the fact that a migrant sends money to a rural area of Mexico or Bolivia to develop the sewage system of his/her hometown, or to build his/her own house, certainly has different implications from that of another migrant who sends money to finance the education of a relative in an urban setting (Martínez Pizzarro, 2003; Tuirán, 2002).

Given its magnitude, in the last years, the topic of remittances has started to attract a great deal of attention amongst scholars, particularly the banking sector, which has detected an important new market to exploit. Since 2000, when the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) started tracking the growing phenomena, the amount of money remitted to Latin America has increased (Inter-American Development Bank, 2008). In 2007, the total amount of money remitted to Latin America was USD 66.5 billion and in countries like Honduras and El Salvador, remittances represented 25 and 18 percent of the GDP, respectively. Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean will probably continue to rise in the near future and it is expected they might pass the barrier of USD 100 billion a year by 2010 (Bate, 2007; Painter, 2008).

Framed by a large body of literature on remittances, Orozco (2007) points out that the money sent to Southern countries does not guarantee *per se* the accumulation of assets. In a different study which also analyses the flow of remittances to the South, Gammage (2007) notes that the process of accumulating assets works differently for men and women. Using data drawn from remittance recipients in El Salvador, the author demonstrates that gender represented a major variable in respect of understanding the type and volume of goods sent to the home country as well as the characteristics of the savings and investments (Gammage, 2007; Orozco, 2007).

Cordero-Guzmán and Quiroz-Becerra (2007:242) also explore the impact of remittances on the development of several Latin American communities, arguing that: "transnational communities cannot be thought of exclusively in geographic terms since their members reside in different nation-states". Analyzing the "collective" effect of remittances, the authors consider that these countries have undoubtedly benefited from various projects that the hometown associations (anchored in the receiving countries) have carried out in Latin America. Indeed, in some cases, these "relatively new expressions" of the civil society have replaced the state as a social service provider (Cordero-Guzmán & Quiroz-Becerra, 2007).

Physical capital points to the machinery, infrastructure and housing which an individual might accumulate. According to a study conducted amongst Ecuadorian migrants to Spain, housing is

the essential asset needed to move out of poverty (Moser, 2007). Migrants also accumulate, either in their home or host countries, a significant amount of other physical durable assets, including a myriad of appliances or technological tools. The accumulation of physical assets might be associated with both the fulfilment of daily necessities and with the accumulation of symbolic capital (e.g. prestige, honour, status) (Bourdieu, 1986)

b) Human Capital

The concept of "brain drain" broadly refers to large-scale emigration of technically qualified individuals from "less developed" economies to "more developed" ones. This type of emigration is understood as an economic "waste" for the sending countries since emigrants usually take with them an important amount of knowledge sponsored by the governments of those countries where the training occurred. The notion of "brain drain" has been recently replaced and complemented by others such as "brain circulation" or "brain exchange". These innovative concepts in the field of human capital studies point to the knowledge transfer in several domains, including business and finances, from Northern to Southern countries. This is occurring as a result of increasing migratory flows, the development of sophisticated technological and communication tools and an expanded presence of transnational corporations worldwide (Kapur & McHale, 2004; Lucas, 2004; Pellegrino, 2004).

As Pellegrino (2004) notes, governments from several Southern countries are considering taking advantage of the mobility and circulation of knowledge as a mechanism for recovering migrants' skills. In the areas of "hard" sciences, advanced technologies, and finances there have been a number of attempts to recover the knowledge of those living abroad. Some specific policies seek to entice migrants to return. In other cases, scientific diasporas spontaneously appear and organize initiatives to affect changes in the home country (Barre, Hernandez, Meyer, & Vinck, 2003; Pellegrino, 2004; Ravenhill, 2005).

"Network density" (Lucas, 2004) has been associated with the capacity of migrant communities to produce and transfer knowledge and to develop business opportunities in the home country. The human capital held by these communities becomes a key element in respect of explaining the increment in the volume of commercial exchange between the diasporic community and its home country, particularly in terms of identifying opportunities for investors in the receiving country (Kapur & McHale, 2004; Lucas, 2004).

The educational level of migrants acquires a substantial significance for both the sending and receiving societies. In 2001, about 10 percent of those adults who achieved a tertiary degree in an underdeveloped country were living in Europe, North America or Australia. This figure is considered to be much higher (between 30 and 50 percent) among those educated in the areas of sciences and technology (Barre et al., 2003; Lindsay Lowell, Findlay, & Stewart, 2004; B Lindsay Lowell & Gerova, 2004; Meyer & Brown, 1999).

In analyzing the increased mobility of highly educated migrants in the "middle income countries" of Asia and Eastern Europe, Mayr and Peri (2008:28) report that there is an average twenty to thirty percent return of this group of migrants who "contribute importantly to the average income and wages of the sending country". Interestingly, the authors also suggest that "freer mobility" in the sending country tends to promote the return of migrants and reverse the "drain effect" and that the prospect of migrating, in general, increases schooling for most individuals (Mayr & Peri, 2008).

In general, migrants attained higher educational levels than those of the native-born population. More than 23 percent of those migrants who arrive in the OECD countries hold a university

degree compared to 19 percent of the native-born population (Sorolla, 2008). Yet for migrant populations, higher education does not necessarily mean a higher income, because limited language skills, discrimination, difficulties in validating foreign credentials, and lack of extended networks in key areas, amongst other factors, can undermine their integration into the labour market.

c) Social Capital

It has been suggested that "structural poverty" prevents people from migrating and that those who migrate less are poorer (Argullol & López-Casasnovas, 2006). Although low income and high unemployment rates in Latin America can certainly boost migration levels, migrants require a certain amount of assets in order to be able to leave their home countries. On the one hand, migrants need financial assets to purchase an air ticket, but on the other hand they also need a minimum amount of cultural capital to deal with the basic logistic issues involved in such an endeavour. Moreover, the majority of migrants rely on extensive social ties and networks (social assets) which function as a guide in several domains, particularly just after their arrival.

In a recent research study conducted by Moser (2007), the author differentiates between community and household social capital. The first points to the trust and cohesion originated in common experiences that lead to the strengthening of relationships. In many cases, individuals develop ties that are underpinned by sharing survival commodities, like food, water and child care. Household social capital can change the structure and composition of the families. Moser (2007) identifies three components of this type of social capital: "jointly headed households", which indicate trust and cohesion within the family; "hidden" female household heads within extended households; and "households on the plot", which refers to children who remain on their parents' plot with families of their own.

4.2. Transnationalism in Argentinean Migration

Studies that focus on Argentina's transnational practices are very sparse. Following Goldring's conceptualisation on state-led transnationalism (Goldring 2002),[8] Margheritis (2007) analyses the role of the Argentinean state in supporting nationals living in a foreign country. The author concludes that although Argentina has recently started developing an incipient transnational space, the motivation, intensity and impact of Argentinean transnational policies currently remain very limited (Margheritis, 2007).

Instead, the Argentinean state demonstrates a series of fragmented attempts to reduce the damage originated in the lost human capital. For example, the programme *R@íces*, which is a Spanish acronym meaning "Network of Argentinean Researchers and Scientists Abroad", was developed by the Ministry of Education and seeks to balance the "brain drain" by promoting the development of networks and "scientific exchange" between researchers residing in Argentina and thoseliving abroad[9]. The programme also aims to disseminate information about potential work opportunities, subsidies and tax exemptions to encourage the return of skilled Argentinean scientists who live abroad.

In 2004, the Ministry of Interior launched the program *Provincia 25* (Province 25), which symbolizes an additional province or state in addition to the actual 24 provinces that comprise the

---

[8] Goldring (2002:64) defines state-led transnationalism as "institutionalized national policies and programmes that attempt to expand the scope of a national state's political, economic, social, and moral regulation to include emigrants and their descendants outside the national territory".

[9] See http://www.raices.mincyt.gov.ar/

country of Argentina[10].The initiative attempts to provide Argentineans living abroad with formal representation in the national parliament, as well as to create a framework to organize and represent, in a broad sense, the interests of the Argentinean diaspora. With more than one million Argentineans living outside Argentina, emigrants would represent the fourth largest province in terms of the country's population. From a "pragmatic" perspective, this population, mainly composed of a highly educated middle-class, becomes an important group from which the country can benefit.

Argentineans living abroad are currently allowed to cast a ballot, although the reality is that electoral participation is very low (Margheritis, 2007). One of the main goals of the programme *Provincia 25* is to increase the level of involvement of Argentineans living overseas in the civic and political life of their home country. This includes a better institutional articulation of the diverse and heterogeneous organisations that "represent" the Argentinean communities abroad. In the long term, this entails providing Argentineans living abroad with the mechanisms required to achieve formal representation, as another recognised and official province, in the National Congress (Ministerio del Interior Argentino, 2007; Margheritis, 2007).

5. Conclusion: Towards the Identification of Political and Civic Capital

The Asset Accumulation Framework represents a dynamic option to analyse the consequences of transnational practices in different dimensions and localities. Yet, whilst most of the research framed by this approach deals with the impact of remittances on the home countries, there is a shortage of studies, which choose to utilise this framework to analyse the accumulation of civic and political assets. In responding to this gap, and by defining the concepts of civic and political capital, this paper expands the Asset Accumulation Framework. It is argued that civic capital refers to the practices and attitudes individuals demonstrate in any given society which encourage a higher quality of social relations. Political capital points to those capacities which individuals may accumulate in order to generate a change in power relations.

This paper shows that, in the receiving country migrants get involved in a process of change and of re-learning the ways in which to validate the civic and political assets acquired in the past. They also incorporate new civic and political capabilities. These changes and accumulative knowledge lead to various modifications in the civic and political attitudes and practices of migrants as well as in their levels of civic engagement.

In addition, the chance to transfer civic and political capital from the North to the South becomes potentially relevant. The transfer of civic and political capital from the North to the South has been hinted at, although its study has never been thoroughly analysed and systematised. Several works report the existence of transnational political practices and indicate that a series of activities, ranging from organising political rallies or solidarity campaigns to active participation in electoral campaigns, have a direct and concrete impact on countries in the Southern hemisphere (e.g. Ginieniewicz, 2007; Landolt et al., 1999; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). These studies suggest that the interaction with a new and different political reality rejuvenates and refreshes the political views that migrants hold regarding their homeland. . In other words, a new perspective may induce them to participate more actively in the political life of their home country by taking advantage of the political knowledge acquired in the host society or country.

This paper illustrates that assets are not accumulated in a vacuum; in fact, as the interaction with the new society develops and progresses, migrants tend to combine and accommodate their early

---

[10] See http://www.mininterior.gov.ar/prov25/inicio.asp

socialization practices and values with those acquired in the new country. This combination can place migrants in the privileged situation of developing a better understanding of their home culture. It may be argued that, as migrants in the receiving societies accumulate assets, their friends, relatives and acquaintances in the sending countries can also receive part of the knowledge accumulated by the sender. Moreover, as migrants return to or temporarily visit their home countries, and by interacting with co-nationals, they transfer and share the accumulated assets. In different ways and contexts, migrants (as so-called "senders of knowledge") and inhabitants of the home countries (being "recipients of knowledge") become involved in a process of "incidental knowledge transfer" in which one or either of the two poles of the communication line transfer and/or accumulate new civic and political assets.

Acknowledgements

This work is based on research from a project funded by the Ford Foundation.

References

Actis, W. (2008). La inmigración procedente desde Argentina volvio a crecer en 2007. Retrieved October 21, 2008, from http://www.casalargentino.org/

Actis, W., & Esteban, F. (2007). Argentinos hacia España ("sudacas" en tierras "gallegas"): el estado de la cuestión. In S. Novick (Ed.), *Sur-Norte: Estudios sobre la Emigración Reciente de Argentinos* (pp. 205-258). Buenos Aires: Catalogos.

Aja, E. 2006. *Veinte anos de inmigracion en Espana: Perspectivas juridica y sociologica 1985-2004*. Barcelona: CIDOB.

Anguiano, M. (2002). Emigración reciente de latinoamericanos a España: trayectorias laborales y movilidad ocupacional. *Revista Gaceta Laboral, 8*(3), 411-424.

Arango, J. (2000). Explaining Migration: A Critical View. *International Social Science Journal, 52*(165), 283-296.

Argullol, E., & López-Casasnovas, G. (2006). *Aspectos jurídicos y socioeconómicos de la inmigración en España*: IEA-Fundación BBVA.

Barre, R., Hernandez, V., Meyer, V., & Vinck, D. (2003). *Scientific diasporas: How can developing countries benefit from their expatriate scientists and engineers?* Paris: (Institut de Recherche pour le Développement).

Bate, P. (2007). Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean to top $100 billion a year by 2010. Retrieved March 20, 2008, from www.caribbeanpressreleases.com

Bebbington, A. (1999). Capitals and Capabilities: A Framework for Analyzing Peasant Viability, Rural Livelihoods and Poverty. *World Development, 27*(12), 2021-2044.

Bermúdez Torres, A. (2006). *Colombian migration to Europe: Political transnationalism in the middle of conflict*. Oxford: University of Oxford.

Blumentritt, T., & Rehbein, K. (2008). The Political Capital of Foreign Subsidiaries: An Exploratory Model. *Business & Society, 47*(2), 242-263.

Booth, J., & Richard, P. (2007). *Social and Political Capital in Latin American Democracies.* Paper presented at the Annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hotel, Chicago, IL.

Borjas, G. (1989). Economic theory and international migration. *International Migration Review, 23*(3).

Borjas, G., & Bratsberg, B. (1996). Who Leaves? The Outmigration of the Foreign-Born. *The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78*(1), 165-176.

Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of Capital. In J. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education* (pp. 241-258). Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1991). Political Representation: Elements for a Theory of the Political Field. In *Language and symbolic power*. Oxford: Polity Press.

Bover, O., and P. Velilla. (1999). Migration in Spain: Historical Background and Current Trends. *IZA Discussion Paper* 88 (pp. 1-28).

Boyle, P., Halfacree, K., & Robinson, V. (1998). *Exploring contemporary migration*. London: Longman.

Castles, S. (2000). Global Trends and Issues. *International Social Science Journal, 52*(165), 269-281.

Castles, S., & Kosack, G. (1985). *Immigrant workers and class structure in Western Europe*. Oxford [Oxfordshire] ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Castles, S., & Miller, M. (2003). *The Age of Migration: International population movements in the modern world*. New York: Guilford Press.

Cohen, R. (1987). *The new helots: migrants in the international division of labour*. Aldershot, Hants, England ; Brookfield, Vt., USA: Gower Pub. Co.

Cordero-Guzmán, H., & Quiroz-Becerra, V. (2007). Transnational Communities of the United States and Latin America. In C. Moser (Ed.), *Reducing Global Poverty: The Case for Asset Accumulation* (pp. 239- 254). Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.

Cozzani de Palmada, M. (2000). Inmigrantes limítrofes en Argentina.¿Tolerancia o rechazo? *Amérique Latine histoire et mémoire.* Retrieved July 31, 2008, from http://alhim.revues.org/index37.html

Dustmann, C., & Weiss, Y. (2007). Return Migration: Theory and Empirical Evidence from the UK. *British Journal of Industrial Relations, 45*(2), 236-256.

Esteban, F. (2008). ¿Cuantos somos? *Argencat,* p. 6.

Ferguson, C., Moser, C., & Norton, A. (2007). Claiming Rights: Citizenship and the Politics of Asset Distribution. In C. Moser (Ed.), *Reducing Global Poverty: The Case for Asset Accumulation* (pp. 273-288). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Fernández, C., & Ortega, C. (2008). Labor market assimilation of immigrants in Spain: employment at the expense of bad job-matches? *Journal Spanish Economic Review, 10*(2), 83-107.

Ford Foundation. (2004). *Building Assets to Reduce Poverty and Injustice*. New York: NY: Ford Foundation.

Gammage, S. (2007). Gender and Transnational Asset Accumulation. In C. Moser (Ed.), *Reducing Global Poverty: The Case for Asset Accumulation* (pp. 255-272). Washington, DC.: Brrokings Institution Press.

Ginieniewicz, J. (2007). The Scope of Political Participation. *Journal of International Migration and Integration, 8*(3), 327-345.

Glick-Schiller, N. (1999). Transmigrants and nation-states: Something old and something new in the US immigrant experience. In C. Hirschman, P. Kasinitzk & J. De Wind (Eds.), *The Handbook of International Migration. The American Experience*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.

Goldring, L. (2002). The Mexican state and transmigrant organizations: negotiating the boundaries of membership and participation. *Latin American Research Review, 37*(3), 55-99.

Gratton, B. (2007). Ecuadorians in the United States and Spain: History, Gender and Niche Formation. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 33*(4), 581-599.

Hugo, G. (1993). *The Economic Implications of Emigration from Australia*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España, (2007). Revisión del Padrón municipal 2007. Datos a nivel nacional, comunidad autónoma y provincia. Retrieved April 10, 2009, from http://www.ine.es/jaxi/tabla.

Interamerican Development Bank, *Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean, slower*. Retrieved May 7, 2009, from www.iadb.org

International Organization of Migration. (2005). *World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of International Migration*. Geneva: International Organization of Migration.

Izquierdo, A., López, D., & Martínez, R. (2002). Los preferidos del siglo XXI: la inmigración latinoamericana en España. Universidad de La Coruña.

Kapur, D., & McHale, J. (2004). The Global War for Talent: Implications and Policy Responses for Developing Countries. Institute for International Economics/Center for Global Development.

King, R. (2000). Generalizations from the History of Return Migration. In B. Gosh (Ed.), *Return migration: journey of hope or despair?* : International Organization for Migration.

Landolt, P., Autler, L., & Baires, S. (1999). From hermano lejano to hermano mayor: The dialectics of Salvadoran transnationalism. *Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies, 22*(2), 290-315.

Lindsay Lowell, B., Findlay, A., & Stewart, E. (2004). Brain Strain: Optimising Highly Skilled Emigration from Developing Countries. Institute for Public Policy Research, Asylum and Migration.

Lindsay Lowell, B., & Gerova, S. (2004). Diaspora and Economic Development: State of Knowledge. Unpublished Working paper. Institute for the Study of International Migration.

Lucas, R. (2004). *International Migration Regimes and Economic Development*. Stockholm, Sweden: The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Margheritis, A. (2007). State-led Transnationalism and Migration: Reaching out to the Argentine Community in Spain. *Global Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs 7*(1), 1-20.

Martínez Buján, R. (2003). *La reciente inmigración latinoamericana a España*. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL.

Martínez Pizzarro, J. (2003). *El mapa migratorio de América Latina y el Caribe, las mujeres y el género*. Santiago de Chile: CELADE/ CEPAL.

Massey, D., Alarcón, R., Durand, J., & González. (1987). *Return to Aztlan: The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico*. Berkeley and Los Angeles.: University of California Press.

Massey, D., Arango, J., Graeme, H., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., & Taylor, E. (1994). An evaluation of international migration theory: the North American case. *Population and Development Review, 20*(4), 699-752.

Mayr, K., & Peri, G. (2008). Return migration as channel of brain gain.

Meyer, J., & Brown, M. (1999, 26 June – 1 July 1999.). *Scientific Diasporas: A New Approach to the Brain Drain.* Paper presented at the World Conference on Science, Budapest, Hungary.

Ministerio del Interior Argentino, (2007). Provincia 25. *Resolución 452/2007*. Retrieved February 15, 2009, from http://www.mininterior.gov.ar

Moser, C. (2008). A Framework for Asset-Based Social Policy. In C. Moser & A. Dani (Eds.), *Assets, Livelihoods and Social Policy: New Frontiers of Social Policy* (pp. 43-81). Washington DC: The World Bank.

Moser, C. (2007). Intergenerational Asset Accumulation and Poverty Reduction in Guayaquil, Ecuador, 1978-2004. In C. Moser (Ed.), *Reducing Global Poverty: The Case for Asset Accumulation* (pp. 15-50). Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Moya, J. (1998). *Cousins and Strangers: Spanish Immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1850-1930*: University of California Press.

Novara, D. (2005). *La emigración argentina actual, en: Migraciones. Claves del intercambio entre Argentina y España*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Siglo XXI de Argentina y España.

Novick, S. (2008). Migración y Políticas en Argentina: Tres Leyes para un País Extenso (1876-2004). In S. Novick (Ed.), *Las Migraciones en América Latina* (pp. 131-151). Buenos Aires: Catálogos.

Novick, S., & Murias, M. (2005). *Dos estudios sobre la emigración reciente en la Argentina.* Buenos Aires, Argentina: Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Buenos Aires.

Orozco, M. (2007). Migrant Foreign Savings and Asset Accumulation. In C. Moser (Ed.), *Reducing Global Poverty: The Case for Asset Accumulation* (pp. 225-238). Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003). The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices. *International Migration Review, 37*(3), 760-786.

Padilla, B. (2007). Latin American Immigration to Southern Europe. Retrieved June 23, 2008, from http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=609

Painter, J. (2008). *US woes slow migrant remittances*. Retrieved April 12, 2009, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7292216.stm

Palomares, M., Novick, S., Aguirre, O., Castiglione, C., Cura, D., & Nejamkis, L. (2007). Emigración reciente de argentinos: la distancia entre las expectativas y las experiencias. In S. Novick (Ed.), *Sur-Norte: Estudios sobre la Emigración Reciente de Argentinos* (pp. 23-61). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Catálogos.

Pellegrino, A. (2004). Migration from Latin America to Europe: Trends and Policy Challenges. *Migration Research Series International Organisation of Migration*, 1-76.

Pew Hispanic Centre (2007), 2007 National Survey of Latinos: As Illegal Immigration Issue Heats Up, Hispanics Feel a Chill. *Reports and Factsheets*. Retrieved November 13, 2008, from http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=84

Portes, A. (1999). Conclusion: Towards a new world - the origins and effects of transnational activities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 22*(2), 463-477.

Portes, A. (2001). Introduction: The debates and significance of immigrant transnationalism. *A Journal of Transnational Affairs, 1*(3), 181-193.

Portes, A., & Walton, J. (1981). *Labor, class and international system*. New York: Academic Press.

Ravenhill, L. (2005). National Research Foundation, South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA).

Ravenstein, E. (1885). The Laws of Migration. *Journal of the Statistical Society, 46*, 167-235.

Ravenstein, E. (1889). The Laws of Migration, Second Paper. *TheJournal of the Royal Statistical Society, 52*, 241-305.

Sassen, S. (1988). *The Mobility of Labour and Capital*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schugurensky, D. (2000, June 2-4, 2000). *Citizenship learning and democratic engagement: Political Capital Revisited.* Paper presented at the 41st Annual Adult Education Research Conference, Vancouver, Canada.

Shaffer, B., & Hillman, A. (2000). The development of business-government strategies by diversified firms. *Strategic Management Journal, 21*, 175-190.

Shapiro, T., & Wolff, E. (Eds.). (2001). *Assets for the poor : the benefits of spreading asset ownership*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.

Sherraden, M. (1991). *Assets and the Poor A New American Welafare Policy*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

Sorolla, J. (2008). La población inmigrante tiene mayor nivel educativo. Retrieved April 4, 2009, from http://www.elperiodicomediterraneo.com

Takenaka, A. (1999). Transnational community and its ethnic consequences: The return migration and the transformation of ethnicity of Japanese Peruvians. *The American Behavioral Scientist., 42*(9), 1459-1475.

Tsuda, T. (1999). The Motivation to Migrate: The Ethnic and Sociocultural Constitution of the Japanese-Brazilian Return-Migration System. *Economic Development and Cultural Change, 48*(1), 1–31.

Tuirán, R. (2002). *Migración, remesas y desarrollo.* Paper presented at the Taller Internacional Migración, Desarrollo Regional y Potencial Productivo de las Remesas, Guadalajara, Jalisco.

US Census Bureau (2005). Annual Estimates of the Population by Age and Sex of White Alone Not Hispanic for the United States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2004 (NC-EST2004-04-WANH). Retrieved June 20, 2005, from http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/

Vertovec, S. (2003). Migration and other modes of transnationalism: Towards conceptual cross-fertilization. *Intenational Migration Review, 37*(3), pg.641.

Zlotnik, H. (2003). *The Global Dimensions of Female Migration*. Washington: Migration Policy Institute.

Zolberg, A. (1989). The next waves: migration theory for a changing world. *International Migration Review, 23*(3).

ISBN: 978-1-907120-01-5

THE GLOBAL URBAN RESEARCH CENTRE (GURC)
The University of Manchester
Manchester, M13 9PL
United Kingdom

Phone: (0161) 275 0419
Fax: (0161) 275 6893
www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/gurc