

# **MANAGING THE NEO-LIBERALIZATION OF THE THIRD WORLD: THE CASE OF DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT**

## **ABSTRACT**

This paper is about the relationship between management, a First World discipline, and the Third World. Evidence is that management is assumed to apply in organizations in modern, or post-modern societies. There is however a distinctive form of management, Development Administration and Management (DAM) applied to Third World nation-states that are deemed in the First World to require neo-liberal modernization. This essential difference is concealed by a certain level of crossover with generic management. This article sets out this institutional and conceptual separation and crossover. It then goes on to demonstrate how DAM, with particular help from participatory ideas associated with the management of organizational change (for example action learning) is complicit in the World Bank's neo-liberalizing "poverty reduction" agenda. It concludes by reviewing the implications of DAM/management's status as a direct instrument of neo-liberalism for both management generally and for Critical Management Studies.

# MANAGING THE NEO-LIBERALIZATION OF THE THIRD WORLD

## INTRODUCTION

This article is about the relationship between management and the Third World. Its significance however is for understandings of management in and of both First and Third Worlds. It builds from an agreement with Diana Wongji and Ali Mir (1999) that what is taken as “management” in the First World, in the field of management and organization studies (MOS), its associated journals and texts, and business and management schools which train its academics and practitioners has ignored, with few significant exceptions, the Third World. But this is only a beginning: the purpose of this article is to identify the existence and implications of a largely separated set of First World managerial theories and practices, which takes and indeed helps constitute the Third World as its subject. This separated discipline was once known as “development administration”, and now more typically as “development management” or “development administration and management” (henceforth DAM, considered in comparison with the “management” of business schools, MOS etc.)

DAM, despite this separation, has connections to “management”. It uses some of its techniques and language, and claims to be subset of public administration. Although these connections appear to be strengthening, DAM maintains its distinctive self-identity through its “developing country” orientation. This in turn points to the two

fundamentals of DAM which identify it as separate. First, “management” has historically taken “the organization” as its basic unit of analysis and action. This is often a tacit assumption, or if not, one which passes unremarked, as in the very conflation of MOS. Ferguson’s statement, however, that “the development paradigm insists on taking *the country* as the basic unit of analysis” (1990:60) and, it can be added, action, is also true for its subfield, DAM. Second, whereas management assumes that its primary subjects (organizations being managed) are situated within modernity (or for some, beyond it, in post-modernity), DAM assumes that its primary subjects (countries being managed) have yet to achieve modernity, which is why they are deemed to need “development”.

Formal definitions provide some insights into the distinctiveness claimed by the DAM orthodoxy, and in this article. Thus Schaffer (1973: 245) defines development administration as:

development programmes, policies and projects in those conditions in which there are unusually wide and new demands and in which there are peculiarly low capacities and severe obstacles to meeting them.

The specification of a particular set of conditions (i.e. wide and new demands, low capacities, severe obstacles) and the particular task of development is a tacit distinction from generic public administration. It is also another way of saying “Third World

countries” requiring modernization. Making this point explicit, Luke argues (1986: 74) that ‘the context of the struggle for development in the Third World gives the subject ... [its] peculiar status’, going on to quote Swerdlow (1975: 347) that development administration ‘... must be limited to the administration of those countries that are seeking development and are starting at low levels of economic productivity’.

How this separation/connection between DAM and “management” manifests itself in practice is illustrated in a job advertisement in *The Economist* (April 8<sup>th</sup>, 2000: 137). It sought a ‘Chief, Office of Democracy and Governance’ in Kenya to provide ‘intellectual leadership in the design, implementation, management and evaluation of programs needed to support democratic local governance ...’. Required qualifications included:

1. “Experience in providing leadership in the following areas: rule of law, elections and political processes, civil society and governance
2. Ability to carry out analyses of Kenyan democratic development and formulate appropriate Mission’s objectives, targets and strategies for achieving them
3. Ability to design and manage the implementation of programs and projects through which the strategies are implemented
4. Ability to evaluate the results of projects and their effect on the related objectives in the democracy and governance sector in Kenya ...”

The job is only open to “a US citizen or US resident alien”. For this post with US AID (Agency for International Development) the selected individual “will be required to

obtain a US government secret security clearance". While she or he will have to have "excellent communication skills in English ...", "fluency in Swahili ..." is only "recommended".

What is going on here, then, is a First World intervention in the political processes of another nation-state. The post-holder will not manage a modern (or beyond) organization, which is what "management" has assumed managing is all about. Yet this is an advert for a manager, as the use of the managerialist terminology of leadership, objectives, strategy and strategies, program and project, implementation and evaluation (not to mention 'manage') makes clear.

So, despite their differences "management" and "DAM" are both at the same time versions of management in its most broad and generic sense (perhaps it is clearer to say that they are both versions of managerialism). They are both cases of "a common sense and taken for granted reality of management..." in which "management is what managers do" (Grey 1999:569). That is, management as a conflation of a certain set of distinctive managerial activities ("what managers do") with an occupational category possessing a distinct managerial identity (ie "managers"). This is more than a parallel between different sets of technocrats and technocracies; as the illustration shows, "management" language and practices are used in DAM. Ironically this helps conceal the fundamental differences that there nonetheless are. In turn, this paper will show, this combination of similarity and difference hides the contemporary complicity of both

DAM, and “management” when used in DAM, in a neo-liberalising global modernization project.

In the next section this paper will set out the presence and absence of relationships between DAM and “management”, in terms of the institutional settings in which DAM is produced, and its claimed theoretical underpinning. The section following that looks at DAM in practice in the case of the largest and most influential development agency, the World Bank, and its current intervention strategies. Again, the concern is the separation and connection between DAM and management. The conclusion explores the implications of the preceding sections for understandings of the various versions of management encountered thus far – IM, “management”, and DAM. Most attention, however, is paid to the significance of my analysis for Critical Management (CM). In that this article challenges representations of different managements as neutral, technocratic, means to ends, but instead reveals them as establishing and reinforcing particular ideologies and power relations, it falls within the CM genre (Grey and Fournier 2000). Yet, it is argued in the conclusion, it also indicates problems and gaps in CM theorizing thus far.

## **AN OVERVIEW OF DAM**

Esman’s account of DAM begins as follows:

While the field's pioneers confronted the dilemmas of the declining colonial era with its hesitant and post-World War II commitment to development, the subject was transformed by the precipitous expansion of US imperium into terra incognita in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. These encounters through technical assistance with the realities of Third World governments revealed that the conceptual equipment of Western, particularly American, public administration was inadequate to the task at hand. This challenge produced several nodes of activity among them ... Indiana ... Michigan State ... Syracuse ... Southern California ... Harvard ... Pittsburgh (1991:1)

Elsewhere (Cooke 2001) it was argued that this statement ignores the continuance of formal imperialism well past the end of the second world war, underplays the extent of US imperialism pre- and post- 1945, and fails to recognize the old imperial power of Great Britain's contribution to DAM. Relevant to this paper, it was pointed out the common term 'technical assistance' (and elsewhere 'technical cooperation') helps DAM represent itself as technocratically neutral, with the words 'assistance' or 'cooperation' implying a non-existent parity of power between the technical helpers and helped. In specifying new "nodes of activity", and inadequate public administration conceptual frameworks, Esman also points to an institutional separation. This, it is argued here sustains the conceptual separation, which is at once claimed and concealed in Esman's alignment to an inadequate public administration.

## **DAM Institutions**

Evidence of the institutional separation of “management” and DAM is provided by contemporary calls for its diminution by senior staff in international development agencies. The vision for United Nations’ Development Program (UNDP), of its head, ex-World Bank Vice-President Malloch-Brown, is that it must become like the archetypal management consultancy: “[w]e need to become a kind of McKinsey for the developing world....” (in Morgan, 2000:5). The former head of Social Development at the UK Department for International Development (DfID) argues that: “as orthodox development loses its dominant position, so we can take advantage of recent postmodernist organizational theory which has been developed in business management faculties to explain the success of certain transnational corporations” (2000:10). Eyben does not subsequently discuss this theory; but institutionally she implies a turn away from the 13 or so non-management/business school University departments in the UK, as well as those listed by Esman in the US, where DAM or some aspect thereof is taught (CDSC 2000).

As the introduction noted this institutional separation has been confirmed empirically, in relation to 16 leading management journals, by Wong-Mingji and Mir (1997). Their concern was the global spread of International Management (IM), but their methodology means that their research is equally about “management” generally. Wong-Mingji and Mir analyzed every article in these journals<sup>1</sup> (3,649 articles in total)



according to the country of authors' institutional affiliation, and the nations represented in articles besides those where a given journal was published. All the journals are published in the First World, and within them Third World countries were overwhelmingly underrepresented. 37.41% of articles originated from the US, and 15.68% each from Canada and the UK, while the highest percentage from a Third World nation was 2.25% from India. Ninety-eight countries had no representation amongst contributors, and 89 countries were not represented as subjects. Among those which featured neither among contributors or subjects were Barbados, Bolivia, Botswana, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kenya, Mozambique, Oman, Sri Lanka, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago and Zimbabwe. The highest representation as subject in percentage terms was the 1.73% of articles that featured India, 1.51% the Third World per se, and 0.36% Nigeria.

There are however other First World journals which claim countries engaged in modernization as their subject. Of these, generic development journals include *World Development* ("a multidisciplinary monthly journal of development studies. It seeks to explore ways of improving standards of living and the human condition generally..."), *Development and Change* ("an interdisciplinary journal devoted to the critical analysis and discussion of current issues of development"), and *Journal of International Development* ("... wishes to publicise any work which shows promise in confronting the problems of poverty and underdevelopment in low income countries"). All have published articles

about DAM as part of their broader development remit (see for example Brinkerhoff 2000, Hirschmann 1999, Thomas 1998).

Some are more directly development management oriented, for example *Development in Practice* (“a multi-disciplinary journal of practice-based analysis and research concerning the social dimensions of development”), which has recently published a collection of its articles under the title *Management and Development* (Eades, 2000), and *Public Administration and Development (PAD)* (“reports and reviews the practice of public administration.... where this is directed to development in less industrialized and transitional economies. It gives special attention to the management of all phases of public policy formulation and implementation which have an interest and importance beyond a particular government and state. *PAD* also publishes articles on the experiences of development management in the NGO sector...” (all statements from journals’ aims, 2001).

At the same time, the institutional separation between management and DAM has never been absolute. What for some are separate identities are for others merged. Thus, from Tanzania, Malloch-Brown’s aspiration for the UNDP might appear pointless, because McKinsey is the “McKinsey for the Developing World”. Max, on the ruinous decentralization of Tanzanian local government in 1973, notes the central role of “McKinsey and Co Inc, an international capitalist consultancy firm specialised in development management” (1990:84). Some development institutes (for example my

own) teach “management” topics such as HRM (but segregated from similar business/management school classes). *Organization* was not included in Wong-Mingji and Mir’s analysis, but has, particularly in its early years addressed the failure of development (Escobar 1995a), global organization (Gergen 1995), feminist international development (Ferguson 1996), and a sub-field of management (OD) read from the Third World (Holvino 1996). This article supports some parts of these earlier contributions, for example Ferguson’s concerns for the hegemonic nature of the IMF/World Bank, and for the role of practitioners acting at their behest. However, it does so in meeting a remit hitherto unaddressed, in acknowledging the existence of DAM per se, and in exploring the DAM/ “management” nexus, and results in different, and more current, findings. Elsewhere, public administration journals do from time to time publish articles on DAM (eg *Public Administration Review* of Brinkerhoff and Coston 2000); also Blunt, Jones and Richards (1992) and Kiggundu (1989)), have applied management OB/OD theories in the Third World, but still with organizations primarily understood as instrumentalities of the development process.

There is nonetheless much else in DAM journals and books which readers from a “management” background would not recognize as management as they understand it. This is partly because of DAM domain specific techniques and methods which do not occur elsewhere, for example institutional development, the logical framework, and participatory rural appraisal (PRA) (Cooke 1998, Chambers 1997). But mutual understanding is also constrained because DAM and “management” work from

different sets of paradigms. Accordingly, Cooke (1997) recognizes that a development practitioner adopting a MOS Burrell and Morgan multi-paradigm approach would still be working within the development paradigm. The same applies to a “management” practitioner working in DAM. The difficulties of cross paradigmatic understanding on one hand, and the “management” in common both sustain the obliviousness of management practitioners and theorists to the switch from modernity to modernization, from organization to nation-state, and even from “management” to DAM, as the former is applied in the latter.

### **The ideas of DAM**

In addressing the paradigmatic situation of DAM a transition has been made from its institutions to its ideas. To continue in this vein, but at the sub-paradigmatic level of DAM’s representations of itself, it should be noted that that there is continuity between development administration and development management is not disputed.

Hirschmann’s historical survey notes that for its internal disputes “.... the theory and practice of Development Administration (or Management as it came to be known) have continued, and with some vibrancy’ (1999: 288). From the US, Brinkerhoff and Coston’s 1999 assessment of development management also acknowledges this continuity, tracking its history back to the 1950s. In the DAM tradition, they identify development management as an applied discipline, and locate it within a parent field of public

administration. But they also say that it has changed, particularly in its emphasis on the state as a vehicle of development. Thus:

The trend has been away from a technocratic, universalist, public-sector administrative model toward a context-specific, politically infused, multisectoral, multi-organizational model. From its initial focus on institution building for central level bureaucracies and capacity building for economic and project planning, development management has gradually expanded to encompass bureaucratic reorientation and restructuring, the integration of politics and culture into management improvement, participatory and performance-based service delivery and program management, community and NGO capacity building, and policy reform and implementation (1999: 348-9).

This inclusion of community and NGO capacity building, which elsewhere Brinkerhoff (2000) suggests should also include the private sector shifts DAM further still from public administration. More generally, the shift of emphasis away from state bureaucracy to a variety of organizational forms and processes might be taken as suggesting notice has been taken of Eyben's call for post-modern organization, along the lines perhaps of that proposed by Clegg (1990). This is far from the case, as the following section will show. DAM is still very much about the attempt to achieve modernity, albeit the "neo-liberal modernity" Fotopoulous (2001:33) identifies as succeeding its "statist" version.

Although they are DAM insiders Brinkerhoff and Coston's assessment is nuanced. It does for example recognize DAM is about First World interventions in the Third World, identifying: "*Development management as a means to foreign assistance agendas* [their italics]... most often sponsored by international aid agencies, all of which have their own ... agendas; [t]ypically development management professionals enter the scene upon the request from a donor agency for a predetermined task ...". In describing "*development management as values*" they recognise explicitly that DAM requires political interventions in the status quo, but for the best of reasons, because it "takes a normative stance on empowerment and supporting groups, particularly the poor and the marginalised, to take an active role in determining and fulfilling their own needs" (1999:349).

There are according to Brinkerhoff and Coston two additional "facets" of development management. Both contain substantial components recognisable as "management" but at the same time differentiations which point to country as the unit of analysis and action. "*Development management as toolkit*... promotes the application of a range of management and analytical tools adapted from a variety of disciplines, including strategic management, public policy, public administration, psychology, anthropology and political science ... "; (1999:350) whereas:

*“Development management as process operates at three levels – [first] in terms of the individual actors involved it builds on process consultation and organization development ... starting with the client’s priorities needs and values ... [second] at the organizational level, whether ... individual agency or multiple organizations ...concerned with the organizational structures and processes through which plans are implemented ...[third] at the sector level – public, civil society, and private... [it] addresses broader governance issues, such as participation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness and the role of the state ... this brings in empowerment in its societal and political dimensions” (1999:350).*

The relationship between “management” and DAM is also explored from the UK by Alan Thomas, for whom a development management training curriculum should cover (1996:108):

- “1a Development studies
- 1b Conventional management theory in a development context
- 2 New areas arising from viewing development management as the management of intervention aimed at ‘progress’ in a context of conflicts over goals and values.
- 3 Radical participative management methods aimed at enabling and empowering, arising from cases where development management may be viewed as the management of interventions on behalf of the relatively powerless.”

In sum, besides the extension of remit from the state alone to incorporate civil society and the private sector there are three other changes evident in the transition from development administration to development management. First, according to both Thomas and Brinkerhoff and Coston, development management incorporates more of “management”. The relationship between Brinkerhoff and Coston’s four “facets” is however better conceived as hierarchical, than as they have it in “tension” (Brinkerhoff and Coston 1999:349), with “foreign [ie First World] assistance agendas” informed by particular “values” determining what is permitted in the “management” orientated “process” and “toolkit”.

Second, there is an emphasis on the use of participatory “management” approaches (e.g. process consultation), as well as those developed separately in DAM, and their associated language of empowerment. Third, both recognize that development in theory and practice are contested. This is evident in Brinkerhoff and Coston’s “development management as values” facet, and in Thomas’s argument (1996: 102) that development’s goals for social change are ‘strongly subject to value based conflicts, derived from different conceptions of ‘progress’ and development, and differences of interests’.

In relation to this last point Brinkerhoff and Coston, and Thomas suggest DAM takes a particular side, that of the powerless and the poor. Brinkerhoff and Coston present a version of development management where, implicitly this is what actually happens,



although their acknowledgement of 'tensions' suggests that this is not always the case. Thomas is even more cautious, and makes the distinction between the 'management of development', the generic management of 'deliberate efforts at progress, ie 'development interventions', and 'management *for* development', where development is seen 'as an orientation towards progressive social change' (2000:46). For Thomas, authentic development management is the progressive management *for* development but he is ultimately uncertain about whether or how this progressive orientation is maintained in practice: '... the majority of cases will be ... ambiguous, with value based conflicts, contestations over the definition of development and power struggles. Development management will often remain an ideal rather than a description of what takes place' (2000: 51).

Thomas claims, accurately, that this alignment of participation with a radical, pro-poor agenda takes development management beyond mainstream "management" versions of empowerment. This might offer hope to some of those focused on "management" but at the same time outside it in Critical Management, seeking "more humane" forms of management which are "less irrational and socially divisive" (Grey and Fournier 2000:23). DAM does offer techniques unknown in "management" and CM for working with and organizing the poor and the marginalized (notably associated with Chambers' (1997) PRA). Yet at the same time neither Thomas nor Brinkerhoff and Coston recognize the managerial orthodoxy's capacity to appropriate radical ideas (Burrell and Morgan 1979, Willmott and Alvesson (1996)). Also not acknowledged in DAM are CM

claims that participation and empowerment are used in the workplace as means of control (Cooke 1999), although similar analyses are now finding their way into critiques of participatory development (Cooke and Kothari 2001). In both cases the argument is that participation and empowerment at the micro level (of say, work teams, or individual “communities”) can sustain, through co-optation and undermining resistance, macro-level inequalities and exploitation.

Sadly, this appropriation and co-optation is what appears to be happening. The following section reveals how claims for pro-poor interventions, which it is claimed distinguishes DAM, mask interventions which have the opposite effect. It also shows how, at the level of practice, “management’s” participatory processes, and those associated with organizational culture change more generally have, via DAM, become implicated in management of change at the most macro levels possible, that is in the global, neo-liberal, transformation of nation-states.

## **DAM IN PRACTICE**

In “management”, the ideas of participation and empowerment are associated with the idea of collective psychological ownership by employees of the policies, processes and activities to which an organization is committed. This is particularly the case in relation to the management of organizational change (eg Schein 1987). Psychological ownership does not translate into literal ownership however, nor control beyond the most micro

levels of organizational processes; broader managerial goals are always taken as given and immutable, and, moreover the desire and strategies for the achievement of such 'ownership' are always externally, ie managerially, impelled (Willmott, 1993).

### **"Ownership" at the Country Level**

The difference in DAM is that countries are required to show "ownership", that is it is prescribed in the First World for Third World nation-states. As in "management" the desire and strategies for ownership are managerially impelled, but in this case as a means to achieve DAM's "foreign assistance agendas" facet.

This is demonstrated with greatest significance by the World Bank, and its implementation of Comprehensive Development Frameworks (CDFs) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (the latter shared with the IMF). The largest development agency, the Bank has 8,000 staff, and lends and guarantees around \$25 billion a year to 177 member countries. Headquartered in Washington DC, its Executive Board is dominated by representatives of First World nations. Its President, currently James Wolfensohn, is always chosen by the US government (Bretton Woods Project, 2001). The Bank is not merely a financial institution however; its lending is often tied to specific projects which it directly or indirectly manages. As the following section will also show, it increasingly sees itself (with the IMF) as the architect of global financial and political systems and processes, and the global coordinator of First World

development interventions in the Third). Important in relation to the distinctiveness of contemporary development management, all this is done in the name of the World's poor. Bank web pages are tagged "A World Free of Poverty", and its stated purpose is to help "developing countries fight poverty and establish economic growth that is stable, sustainable, and equitable" (World Bank 2001a).

The Bank's claim for world-wide authority in this realm is evident, for example, in its Global Development Gateway, aimed at becoming 'the premier web entry point on poverty and sustainable development' (cited in Bretton Woods Project 2001). It is also evident in the term "comprehensive" in CDF, one aspect of which signifies the Bank's intention that there should be a single, overarching development strategy (in Brinkerhoff and Coston's terms, "foreign assistance agenda") for a given Third World country, to which individual First World nation development agencies (eg USAID, DfID) contribute. Within CDFs, poverty alleviation is a key goal, and addressed through country PRSPs, which are a joint Bank/IMF initiative. In the implementation of CDFs and PRSPs, there has also been a heavy incorporation of "management" ideas and practices, as this section will go on to show. CDFs and PRSPs therefore show how DAM, embodying all Brinkerhoff and Coston's four facets (in the hierarchy I have suggested), and an apparent pro-poor management *for* development on Thomas's lines (and containing his three components) is practiced by the most powerful development agency in the world (see George and Sabelli 1994).

The other aspect of CDF comprehensiveness, where comprehensive means thorough, and the centrality of ownership therein is stated by the Bank thus:

“The CDF suggests a long term holistic approach to development that recognizes the importance of macroeconomic fundamentals but give equal weight to the institutional, structural, structural underpinnings of a robust market economy. It emphasizes strong partnership among governments, donors, civil society, the private sector and other development actors. Perhaps most importantly, the country is in the driver’s seat, both “owning” and directing the developing agenda with the Bank and the country’s other partners... (World Bank 2001b).

According to the latest figures, 46 countries are involved in the CDF/PRSP processes (CDF Secretariat, 2001). The conceptual and practical link between CDFs and PRSPs is not clear. Figure one is what is seen, in toto, when following the link on the World Bank’s CDF “Background and Overview” web page (in December 2001) entitled “To learn more about the relationship between CDF and PRSPs” (World Bank 2001b). There is no accompanying text, so explanations of the underlying logic have to be read into the diagram. The official line is that the PRSP is “an operational vehicle which can be a specific output of a CDF or of processes based on CDF principles. Its intent is to integrate countries’ strategies for poverty reduction into coherent, growth oriented macroeconomic frameworks and to translate these strategies into time bound action plans...” (World Bank 2000:32). Again, ownership is required. The IMF states “[c]ountry-ownership of a poverty reduction strategy is paramount. Broad based

participation of civil society in the adoption and monitoring of poverty reduction strategy tailored to country circumstances will enhance its sustained implementation' (IMF/IDA, 1999b: 6). At the time of writing there is much more publicly available information (to a writer based in Britain) about the content of PRSPs as opposed to CDFs.

Figure 1 reduces individual nations' political, social, and economic processes, internal relationships between and within state, market, and civil society, and external relationships with other states, and global organizations and processes to a single diagram. It also is intended to provide the basis for the management of nation states, helped by "management" ideas and processes. At its heart is the 4 by 7 matrix which comprises the CDF, which each country is required to complete. This is to be accompanied by a series of annexes. As Paul Cammack (forthcoming) points out a CDF requires a detailed – indeed comprehensive – specification of government policy to the Bank's satisfaction if Bank/IMF support (which includes some relief of existing debts) is to be given. Cammack quotes Wolfensohn (1999: 24) that "the matrix will be a summary management tool", behind each of its headings being annexes, which "set forth where the country stands in terms of achievement, and where they want to go...." followed by "a strategy for implementation with a timeline." This is to be followed with "a more detailed listing of projects achieved, projects underway, and projects planned, together with a listing of those institutions providing assistance, and a detailed description of the projects planned and undertaken with their results."

What Wolfensohn proposes is very close to a standard description of a strategic or a business plan. However, as the matrix headings make clear what is being managed is not a work organization, but a nation-state, which is required to prioritize and taxonomize its activities according to the Bank's matrix to its satisfaction. In achieving ownership of CDFs the Bank also clearly sees a need to buttress hard systems change embodied in the matrix with that in so called softer systems, mimicking, for example, Saithe's (1985) approach to organizational culture change. Hence: "[f]undamentally the CDF approach calls for a change in internal culture and mindset and it is evident from the pilot countries that this is beginning to happen" (World Bank 2001d).

The Bank itself produces examples of how this culture change is to be achieved globally in table 1, reproduced verbatim (World Bank 2000:37). To repeat a belabored point, the headings of each column – leadership, organizational environment, learning approach and so on, and the “culturalist” (in the sense described by Kunda 1992) language in the boxes is evidently from “management”, but the application is to countries. The names in the first column are supposed to represent nation-states, not the regional offices of a transnational organization.

**Table 1: Promising Changes in the Bank's Way of Working**

<i>Examples from Bank's way of working with pilot countries that facilitated incorporation of CDF principles (one country per region shown).</i>			
	<b>Leadership Behaviour (roles, skills, attitudes)</b>	<b>Organizational Environment (structure, processes, culture)</b>	<b>Learning Approach (learning, context, content, process)</b>
<b>Bolivia</b>	<i>Empowering teams incl. ACS [staff and infusing passion inspired a higher level of effort and forged more committed internal and external relationships.</i>	<i>Decentralization of decision making facilitated receptiveness to emerging opportunities.</i>	<i>Using a results- and decision-oriented learning approach promoted a results- and decision oriented work culture together with the government.</i>
<b>Ghana</b>	<i>Giving priority to national experience and capacity encouraged government to take stronger leadership role.</i>	<i>Building a culture of mutual respect and trust gave the government the opportunity to present their long-term country strategy directly to the Board.</i>	<i>Building upon lessons learned in Bolivia and applying an action-learning approach sped the process of joint learning.</i>
<b>Morocco</b>	<i>Adapting our CAS [Country Assistance Strategy] practices to the dynamics in the country and to the timing of the national process for developing country strategy improved the relationship between government and Bank.</i>	<i>Developing cross-sectoral working practices promoted movement towards a more holistic approach.</i>	<i>Facilitation of country team retreat by process expert enhanced team process skills and effectiveness.</i>
<b>Romania</b>	<i>Being more innovative and working within the broader context together with the government is helping to create a network for change inside the country and to open up dialogue between the government and the private sector and other members of civil society.</i>	<i>Leveraging the matrix structure facilitated inter-sectoral teams, both within the Bank and within the government.</i>	<i>Leveraging external change process expertise into a joint learning experience supported vigorous national dialogue, including with civil society.</i>
<b>Vietnam</b>	<i>Performing a networking role and ceding leadership to others facilitated synergies among development partners.</i>	<i>Modelling more open and transparent work culture and processes encouraged government to take a more open and inclusive approach with civil society and private sector.</i>	<i>Sharing of knowledge and joint learning supported the institutionalizing of bi-annual mini-CG-meetings, bringing together internal and external stakeholders.</i>

source: World Bank (2000: 37)



Claims are also made for action learning, recognizing “that people learn better by using a "hands-on" approach than the traditional classroom setting” and which for the Bank helps focus on the “need to deliver real country products in real time”. The US Society for Organizational Learning was commissioned by the Bank to evaluate its action-learning program in the CDF pilot phase, and concluded that “the approach catalyzed innovative institutional change, enhanced leadership competencies consistent with the CDF requirements, and led to enthusiastic support for the new way of doing business” (note, in passing, SOL’s extension of its mandate from organizations to institutions). According to the World Bank Country Director for Bolivia, action learning “was essential in producing effective stakeholders discussions. I have never seen this in the Bank before - where you go through the process of discussion, have so many perspectives at once, but you have action, but you have action at the end. And there was not just a unilateral decision, but everyone was involved...” (all quotes from World Bank: 2001d).

There is an unspoken consequent implication that what happened before, when decisions were unilateral, lacked legitimacy. The debt which PRSPs are a stipulated prerequisite to relieving does include that accrued through First World loans (many of which were from the private banking sector and subsequently nationalized) to dictatorial regimes (eg Thieu of South Vietnam, Smith of Zimbabwe, Mobutu of DR Congo, the South African apartheid state (Chossudovsky, 1997; Ransom, 1999; Hanlon, 1999)). Problems with the pre 1999 action-learning CDF/PRSP strategy of Structural

Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) (known as austerity programs), were also attributed to by the Bank to a lack of ownership. Others saw the civil unrest that resulted in many countries as a consequence of the social harshness of reform that they required, for example the removal of subsidy for essential goods and services, privatizing and downsizing, which had a disproportionately damaging effect on the poor, on women, on children, on people with disabilities and on the elderly (Cornia et al 1987; Bernstein 1990, Elson 1991).

Accountability and remedy for harmful past Bank/IMF practice are not issues which are able to be addressed in the Bank's participative, mindset changing, ownership engendering learning processes. This is not surprising given the control that is exerted over them. No contradiction is recognized in calling for participation and PRSP ownership on the one hand, and the initial prescription of 'Factors Governments may wish to consider in Drawing Up their Participatory Process' on the other (IDA/IMF1999b:12). This in turn has developed into hundreds of pages of analysis and recommendations on the conduct of PRSP participation which can be downloaded from the World Bank PRSP website, including a 69 page report by Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2001) titled *Macro-economic Policy, PRSPs and Participation*.

Throughout, though, there has been no Bank departure from the understanding that '[m]ajor multi-lateral institutions - including the bank and the fund - would need to be available to support the process, as would other donors ...' (IDA/IMF 1999b: 13). This

“support” is extensive. Bank/IMF ‘teams will need to cooperate closely’ (with one another) ‘and seek to present the authorities with a coherent overall view, focusing on their traditional areas of expertise ...’:

[For IMF staff] this would include prudent macroeconomic policies; structural reforms in related areas such as exchange rate, and tax policy; and issues related to fiscal management, budget execution, fiscal transparency and tax and customs administration. The Bank staff will take the lead in advising the authorities in the design of poverty reduction strategies ... the design of sectoral strategies, reforms that ensure more efficient and responsive institutions, and the provision of social safety nets; and in helping the authorities to cost the priority poverty reducing expenditure through Public Expenditure Reviews and the like and in other structural reforms such as privatization and regulatory reform. Many areas will need to be shared between the two staffs, such as the establishment of an environment conducive to private sector growth, trade liberalization, and financial sector development (1999b: 13-14).

The implication is that sovereign governments’ ownership is therefore supposed to derive from their responsibility for everything else; though what else remains is not specified. A detailed World Development Movement (WDM) review (Marshall and Woodroffe 2001) of 16 country PRSPs/Interim-PRSPs (I-PRSPs) demonstrates an absence of ownership and participation in both process and content. Globally, trades

unions have been excluded from participation (another parallel with “management”). More generally negotiations over PRSPs have been conducted in private between Bank and government officials, with evidence that the latter have tried to second guess what the Bank wants in order to gain debt relief. In Cambodia, PSRP documentation was not available in the Khmer language by the time the final draft was put before cabinet. “Foreign technical consultants of major donor institutions [are] setting the parameters of Cambodia’s poverty reduction strategy” (Marshall and Woodroffe 2001: 36). Ghanaian women’s organizations argued that the requirement that civil society speak “with a single voice...would mean subordinating women’s gender interests to men’s”. In Tanzania, there are 157 policies attached to the I-PRSP which “pressure the Government of Tanzania [GOT] to carry out political, economic and social reforms designated by the IMF and World Bank and acceded to by the GOT. Such excessive conditionality amounts to micromanagement of the GOT by its creditors.” (Global Challenge Initiative 2000, in Marshall and Woodroffe 2001:39).

The WDM review identifies the compilation of a PRSP as an intensively political process, provides examples of manipulation of consultation processes by governments and oppositions, and highlights the exclusion of civil society organizations (CSOs). It does not however quite go so far as to raise the broader questions of the legitimacy and accountability of CSOs and their right to participate. However, according to the Bank itself those who are elected but outside government have little involvement. For both CDFs and PRSPs “parliaments are mostly absent from the debate” (CDF Secretariat

2001: 4). That there is therefore a divergence between espoused and actual practice when it comes to participation and empowerment is only part of the case. CDFs and PRSPs have been produced and adopted, so what the Bank proudly claims for action learning, teambuilding, changing leadership behaviors and so on seems to have had some effect. That effect may have been the co-optation and ideological conversion of technocratic/political elites achievable through participative culture change processes (Cooke 1999, 2001) or to engineer their knowing yet unwilling capitulation to the realities of Bank/IMF power. Bond (2000) suggests the former in the case of South Africa and the World Bank generally; Marshall and Woodroffe (2001) provide evidence of the latter. Either way the result is a highly homogenous set of PRSP outputs which belie the claims made for participation. Marshall and Woodroffe state “the consistency of policies put forward is remarkable given the different histories, characteristics and drafting processes of the... countries surveyed” (2001: 14).

Marshall and Woodroffe’s tabulation of components of individual nations’ PRSP/I-PRSPs demonstrates conclusively that each one amounts to an extensive neo-liberal reform package, the assumption being that economic growth leads to poverty reduction, although the logic behind this trickle down approach is never explained or justified. All sixteen countries proposed macro-economic policy based on “economic growth..., macro-economic stability... prudent monetary/fiscal/budgetary policies”; and private sector development. Central are liberalization and privatization. The former includes the removal of price controls (“eg gas, cotton, petroleum, transport, electricity, water,

telecommunications, seeds), the removal of trade barriers and tariffs, and the promotion of foreign trade and direct investment. Core privatization policies “across all countries” include privatization of telecommunications, ports, energy, railways, posts, public enterprises, and making the private sector the engine of growth (Marshall and Woodroffe 2001:14). Central to PRSP social policy is the idea of cost recovery, that is that users of services such as education, health, and clean water should pay for that service at the point of delivery and that the private sector should deliver such services (how Brinkerhoff and Coston’s enabling “the poor and the marginalized... to take an active role in determining and fulfilling their own needs...” is realized). This is the face of detailed evidence that user fees exclude the poor from the receipt of such essential services.

There are at the same time common absences from PRSP’s and I-PRSP’s of policies which would directly help the poor. In the few places land reform is considered it is terms of clarifying ownership, not redistribution. Labor laws, in terms of a minimum wage and safety and employment legislation are barely mentioned, except in relation to the states’ role in deregulation. No strategies mention children’s rights, and other vulnerable groups receive little attention (again, Marshall and Woodroffe 2001:22). Neither is income redistribution, despite the Bank’s own earlier acknowledgment that “...the greater the improvement in income inequality over time, the greater the impact of growth on poverty reduction” (World Bank 1996: 46), which is also reiterated on the current Bank PRSP website. Marshall and Woodroffe go on to comment in detail on the

likely negative consequences for the poor not just of user fees but the other detail of PRSP policies. That they are able to do so is because these policies so closely resemble those of SAPs. If there is any difference it is that PRSPs extended privatization further – into public sector services – than was the case with SAPs; and that national economies are deliberately further exposed to global markets than had previously been the case. So much, then, for “innovative” organizational (or is it institutional?) learning.

Moving to CDF, given there is little CDF content in the public domain, the focus can only be on the mechanics of and plans for the CDF process. Cammack (forthcoming, 1) addresses the “hard” dimension of the CDF matrix alone, but despite this methodological difference, and a classical Marxist philosophical and political position not shared by the WDM his analysis of CDF’s parallels that of the WDM on PRSP’s: namely that the rhetoric of ownership and the managerialist practices of conditional participation conceals and facilitates a neo-liberal agenda. Hence:

The CDF is absolutely rigid in the set of fundamental macroeconomic disciplines it imposes. It prescribes on top of these a range of economic and social policies without parallel in their scope and in the depth and intensity of intervention they represent in the affairs of supposedly sovereign states. Presented as a vehicle for incorporating social and structural policies into an agenda previously dominated by macroeconomic policy alone, it is in fact a means of shaping social and

structural policies so that they reinforce and extend macroeconomic discipline, and subordinating them to imperatives of capitalist accumulation.

Cammack goes on to summarise Bank/IMF plans for the extension of the CDF/PRSP framework to middle income countries, concluding that it has be “trialled with the most heavily indebted countries, prior to being extended to the remaining clients of the Bank and the Fund as a generalised means of intervention in economic and social policy and political governance.” For Cammack the Bank, via the CDF/PRSP initiative and matrix, is becoming the “mother of all governments” (2001). The evidence suggests that this version of DAM is becoming the mother of all managements.

## **DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS, PESSIMISM**

The preceding sections have set out the nature of the similarity and simultaneous difference between DAM and “management” - institutionally, conceptually, and in practice. They have demonstrated how this paradoxical mix results in a managerialism absorbing and applying the ideas of organizational change management, but which seeks to change not organizations but nation-states, and does so to establish a particular, neo-liberal political economic order. This statement is sweeping, yet it is believed, it is accurate. Nonetheless, it is accepted some nuance and detail is lost in producing this big picture; and there may be criticisms which ostensibly arise as a consequence. Two of



these can be anticipated before the implications of my analysis are explored for the various versions of management that have appeared in this article.

First, if the World Bank is taken a case study of DAM, there is the possibility of the usual question of generalizing from cases. The Bank is not the only institution through which DAM is operationalized, and other development agencies might have agendas which allow for a DAM different in process and output. There are however no such agencies of remotely comparable significance; moreover, the Bank's policy of sub-, and sub- sub-contracting its work directly and via other donors means that apparently independent agencies are drawn within the Bank's sphere of influence. This is as true of academic institutions where DAM is taught, which rely on development agency payment of student fees and commissioned research and consultancy income, as it is other NGOs. The World Bank has also not been selected as a representative case study, but precisely because it is the World Bank, with power that derives from that status.

This leads to a second potential criticism, that to accept the World Bank as a centre of global power is to reinforce that power. It might be argued that the World Bank's political position is not as unprecarious or unchallenged as previous section implies. There is also difference and debate within the Bank – it is not a homogeneous organization (see Kanbur 2001, Wade 2001 on internal difference and income redistribution). Bank agendas are challenged and negotiated by First World governments and CSOs Kanbur 2001 and Wade 2001 on this regarding income

redistribution). Some Third World states, which are not homogeneous, reified, entities either (so perhaps ruling elites is more accurate) have also historically subverted Bank agendas, for social as well as individual gain (see Storey (2000)). By the World Bank's own account, things are not going absolutely smoothly in the implementation of CDFs/PRPs; for example new national governments have not automatically accepted their predecessors CDF/PRSP commitments. (The Bank response is to include opposition parties in the participatory process, making the unitarist assumption that consensus is possible and natural.) (CDF Secretariat 2001). Kothari's (2001) Foucauldian analysis of the dynamics of power in participatory development points to a need to understand its micro-circulations and manifestations as well as its national and institutional operation, and again to recognize the opportunities for subversion therein.

It has to be accepted, in the face of all this, that the terrain is contested; but it is still terrain of the Bank's choosing. In the end, the outcomes of the CDF/PRSP processes are much as the Bank would want; or if we acknowledge debate within the Bank, as the victorious anti-redistribution, neo-liberals in the Bank would want (again, see Kanbur 2001, Wade 2001). Participatory processes may open up some space for resistance and to reshape Bank strategy; yet at the same time the imbalance of power relations means that it only occurs within First World boundaries which proscribe genuinely empowering options. One such would be unconditional debt relief: nations are still paying back huge proportions of GNP to First World creditors, which the Bank is using

to leverage “management” practices which substitute for government and politics to result in neo-liberal policy change.

This article has tried to demonstrate how this leveraging has been aided by the differentiation of DAM from management, where the former tries to engineer the neo-liberal modernization of nation-states, while simultaneously using and cloaking itself in, “management” language and practices. This is not good news for the various versions of management that this article has covered namely, International Management, DAM, “management”, and Critical Management. Briefly, for IM, Wong-Mingji and Mir’s finding that it has ignored the Third World is even more problematic for its claims to authority, given the extent to which “management” does pervade those parts of the globe within DAM. For DAM, the explicit and actioned desire to intervene on the side of the poor and the oppressed does not preclude its sustaining, through co-optation or choice, interventions which have the opposite effect. More, a commitment to participation and empowerment has not stopped, but facilitated, this. Saving DAM might begin, therefore, by stipulating which of the contested versions of development (which hitherto have only been acknowledged) it will and will not engage with. Second, the potential for manipulation and cooptation in “participation” and “empowerment” noted within CMS should be acknowledged, and might form the basis for a move towards a Critical Development Management.

To a great extent this article thus far is an example of the critique associated with CM in that it has sought to reveal management as a political, in this case perhaps geo-political, rather than a technocratic, instrument. Alvesson and Willmott's discussion of CMS offers DAM the possibility of more than critique in at least two cases. First, in terms of practice they set out a version of action learning, ie critical action learning, which goes beyond its apparent practice in the Bank, in that it deliberately sets out to enable learners to confront social and political phenomena posing as "givens". More profound, perhaps, is their proposition of a version of management grounded in Critical Theory, which among many, many, things, explores the opportunities for a genuinely emancipatory management, not "a gift to be bestowed..." through managerialist empowerment "but rather is an existentially painful process of confronting and overcoming socially and psychologically unnecessary restrictions." But none of this is unproblematic.

Not least, the idea of a Critical DAM assumes that the idea of development in itself is worth preserving. As CM is to management, so are a range of critics - sometimes collectivized as "post-Development" thinkers but heterogeneous and conflicting in outlook - who identify the development paradigm as intellectually and practically problematic, if not bankrupt (see for example Escobar (1995b), and others in Crush (1995), Rahnema and Bawtree (1997), and Williams (2000)). The development paradigm and/or the development discourse (distinctions between the two not being clearly drawn) are seen as an interweaving body of knowledge and practice which enable the

management (in the most general sense) of the Third World. Not least, the development paradigm provides a false logic to and legitimation of processes like, inter alia, the infliction of debt and of structural adjustment. Ironically these analyses draw on much the same social theory that one finds in CM, for example Foucault in the case of Ferguson (1990), whose critique, like that of CM, is of the idea of a technocratic neutrality. In his analysis of the activities of international development agencies in Lesotho, Ferguson describes their operation as a technocratic 'anti-politics machine'. He notes 'by uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promising technical solutions to the sufferings of the powerless, and oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of "development" is the principal means through which the question of poverty is de-politicized' (1990: 256).

As the argument of this article leads one to expect, despite the commonalities of theory and analysis, these considerations of management on the one hand, and development on the other barely touch. One exception is Banerjee (2000) who has used post-development and post-colonialist theorising to reveal the exploitative nature of a stakeholderism, and to critique the post-modernist tendency within CM. Agreeing with Radhakrishnan (1994), Banerjee points to the Euro-centrism of post-modernism in the assumptions it makes about the global universality of its ontology and epistemology, and its exclusionary consequences for those in struggle with the forces of self proclaimed modernization in the Third World. What can be added here is that the very same problem exists with the other parts of CM, and indeed "management" that assume

a state of modernity or beyond and stick with modernist understandings. That is, that parts of the World are deemed to yet require modernization, that modernization interventions are theorized and take place, are ignored. This is not to accept the categorization of “requiring modernization (or pre-modern) / modern/ post-modern”. Instead it is to recognize that it has an existence (explicit or tacit), in the work of development agencies, in the separations and linkages between DAM and “management”, and in the construction of the latter and its critique in CM.

This article has shown that the failure to address this categorization means that “management’s” role instrument of modernization is lost. More than the spawn of capitalist development, as the grand narratives have it (classically in Chandler 1977, but also Braverman 1974) management thus becomes the virus creating the conditions for its own reproduction. It is not always successful; going back to McKinsey in Tanzania, sometimes the virus overpowers its host. In a revised narrative, though, “management’s” engagement with public institutions, particularly those of nation-states, might usefully be reassessed as more than public sector mimesis of the private, and a symptom of market extension. This article demonstrates that it is also helping create the institutional circumstances that enable that extension, and at the same time more opportunities for itself. Certainly this is the case for its involvement with DAM, illustrated in the practices of the World Bank.

Missing also from CM hitherto, then, is an understanding of this role of management as an institutional (rather than organizational) change agent. Here management is a facilitator of the global hegemony of neo-liberalism, whether this is ultimately in the cause of Hardt and Negri's (2000) de-nationed Empire or as Govan's analysis suggests (2000), US business interests. Either or neither of these two positions may be accepted. What this article suggests nonetheless is that, along with its relation to development, there is a need to understand the function of management in the international (or some would have it, global) political economy, in which neo-liberal economic conditions are increasingly taken for granted as a natural condition (Cerny 2000). Overlapping with development (Hoogvelt 2001), international (or global) political economy is another discipline, with its own paradigm debates (again some of which draws on the same social theory eg Cerny (2001) on Giddens) with which Critical Management has yet to engage. Until it does both its critique, and where it has them, its proposals for emancipation can only be partial, focusing as they do on the micro-organizational and sub-organizational level to the exclusion of all else. It is perhaps stating the too obvious, but nonetheless, for all the supposed difference between MOS paradigms, and now discourses, and the debates on (in)commensurability, one transcendent, common factor is taken for granted. To go back to the start of this article, all privilege organization as the most important category of social activity and arrangement, and idealize that activity and arrangements accordingly. That they might be alternatively, and better, understood, as for example, institutions or nation-states is ignored. So, as a consequence, is the managing of the Third World.

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
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# FIGURE ONE COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK

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- CAS:** World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy
- MTEF:** Medium-Term Expenditure Framework, prepared by government
- PRGF:** International Monetary Fund's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
- RDB:** Regional Development Bank(s)
- UNDAF:** United Nations system's Development Assistance Framework
- PRSP:** Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, prepared by government (Required for IDA, HIPC, and PRGF countries only)

## End Note

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<sup>1</sup> The sixteen journals and the years of their first issue are: Academy of Management Journal (1958); Academy of Management Review (1976); Administrative Science Quarterly (1956); California Management Review (1958); International Studies of Management and Organisation (1971); Journal of International Business Studies (1969); Journal of Business Studies (1980); Journal of General Management (1974); Journal of Management (1965); Journal of Management Studies (1961); Long Range Planning (1968); Management International Review (1961); Management Science (1954); Organization Studies (1980); Sloan Management Review (1960); Strategic Management Journal (1980) (WongJi and Mir, 1997, 344-345).