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The Politics of the diffusion of Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America

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Abstract

Is the emergence and rapid expansion of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) in Latin America associated with the turn to the left in Latin American politics? The paper applies a modified version of the Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) Policy Transfer Framework to successive waves of policy diffusion in nineteen countries in the region. The analysis did not find a “New Left” footprint in the motivations, actors, and lesson-drawing processes that characterised the expansion of CCTs. It concludes that social assistance is at the top of the agenda of governments in Latin America regardless of the ideological leaning of ruling coalitions.

Keywords

conditional cash transfers, social assistance, politics in Latin America, policy diffusion, left-wing and right-wing governments.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Two important transformations have changed the political and social scenarios of Latin America (LAC). The political landscape of the region has been marked by an unprecedented wave of electoral victories by Leftist presidential candidates (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). Similarly, the region has experienced the emergence and rapid expansion of a new form of social assistance programmes or anti-poverty transfer programmes that are commonly known as Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs).

The coincidence in time between the diffusion of CCTs throughout the region and the coming to power of Left governments in many Latin American countries raises important questions about their relation. The literature on the diffusion of CCTs in Latin America is limited. The causal relation between these two transformations has been discussed by Sugiyama (2011) who states that domestic conditions do not explain the spread of CCTs in LAC. Barrientos (2012) also argues that the relation between CCTs and Left governments is important but should not be overrated since CCTs have not been adopted by countries whose presidents share the same ideological leaning. However, these studies have limitations derived from only applying quantitative methods failing to provide an in depth qualitative description through specific case studies that can demonstrate that the diffusion of CCTs devoid ideological leaning.

Similar characteristics have been identified to relate the diffusion of CCTs and the emergence of Left governments in LAC. First, they were both originated in the second half of the 1990's. The wave of Leftists governments began with the election of Hugo Chavez as president of Venezuela in 1998. On the other hand, it is recorded that CCTs programmes were originated as a municipal level programme named *Bolsa Escola* in Brazil in 1995 and at the national level with the Mexican programme *Progresa* created in 1997 (Sewall, 2008). Second, these transformations are deeply embedded in the inequality of the region. The coming to power of populist leaders has been led by the widespread popular support of the masses for these leaders that seem to advocate for the poor (Fukuyama, 2008). "The region suffers from extreme inequalities, which are partly due to highly stratified welfare entitlements" (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2008:621). Inequality has come to the limelight since it has been demonstrated that it can be an obstacle to economic growth while it also has the capacity to drive the critical role of public opinion toward the structural adjustment policies (Huber and Stephens, 2012). CCTs emerge as social programmes intended to directly address the problem of poverty and inequality given the fiscal incapacity of Latin American countries to establish welfare systems due to the high level of informality on the labour markets.

Finally, a third characteristic is that the popularity of CCTs has coincided with the notorious "turn to the left" of Latin America. Researchers have used terms such as "New-Left", "Leftist Populism" or "Pink tide" to refer to the political shift towards left governments in LAC. The election of Chavez was followed by Ricardo Lagos in Chile (2000), Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in Brazil (2002), Nestor Kirchner in Argentina (2003), Tabare Vasquez in Uruguay (2004), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2005) Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (2006), Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2006), Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (2008) and Mauricio Funes in El Salvador (2009)

(Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). The diffusion of CCTs has been remarkable. Nineteen out of twenty-three countries in Latin America has adopted a CCTs in the last fifteen years (Sugiyama, 2011).

This paper discusses if the diffusion of CCTs was shaped by the emergence of "New Left" governments in Latin America? This question aims to analyse the adoption of CCTs by Latin American presidents and relate them to their ideological leaning. The paper undertakes an analysis by doing a mapping for identifying policy diffusion waves. As a result of the analysis, three different waves have been identified. The first wave of CCTs adoption in Latin America, from 1995 to 2000 was mainly led by Centre and Centre- Right ideological leaning presidents. The Second Wave represents the "turn to the left" of CCTs adoption, from 2001-2004 Centre-left and Left governments adopted CCT's. Finally, the Third wave from 2005-2008 represents the diffusion of CCTs through the entire ideological spectrum. Also, an analysis of policy diffusion was made using a modified version of the Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) framework.¹ Data from Sugiyama's (2011) study on CCTs adoption, along with the features of the domestic conditions at the time CCTs were adopted, was used in the qualitative analysis.

This paper is divided into four sections. The second section will describe how the emergence of Left governments and social assistance programmes took place. The third section will describe the waves identified in the adoption of CCTs based on the ideological leaning of the presidents who adopt them, and will analyze the diffusion of CCTs in Latin America. Finally, the last section will present some concluding remarks.

2. THE EMERGENCE OF LEFT GOVERNMENTS AND CCTs IN LAC

To understand the emergence of the Latin American Left it is necessary to go back in time to identify the origin of the ideological spectrum. The Left and Right ideological spectrum has its origin in the French National Assembly after the Revolution of 1789. It was based on the seating arrangement at the sides of the Assembly's president, to the right "sat the supporters of the King and the Church while to the left sat their opponents. Their unique point of agreement was the need for institutional reform" (Fuller, 2012:157). More recently, the Left-Right distinction became hegemonic during the Cold War. The Left was characterised for their anti-capitalist position mainly represented by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The Right, were the pro-systematic forces inspired in a neoliberal ideology and conservative authoritarianisms (Rivarola Puntigliano, 2008).

The difference between the Right and the Left has been traditionally based on socioeconomic and political change. The Right seeks to maintain the status quo, preserving existing structures, while the Left works for improvements and structural transformations. The Right defends the pursuit of self-interest and competition in the market with a state that

¹ For more details on this framework, see Dolowitz and Marsh (2000). Given the space limit and the regional view of Latin America, only three of the questions of the framework were considered to identify: why actors got involved in the transfers, who these actors were and from where are these policy lessons drawn.

guarantees the market's smooth functioning. On the other hand, the Left works for the collective, majoritarian and democratic decision making and the use of social and political criteria for the allocation of economic value (Weyland, 2009). The Right in Latin America was legitimated by the success of neoliberal policies to counterattack the debt crisis in the region in the 1990s.

The Latin American 'shift to the Left'

In understanding what triggered the coming to power of Left governments in Latin America researchers have developed different explanations. The most common argument for the revival of the Left in Latin America have been the adverse effects of the called "*lost decade*" of the 1980s and, more importantly, the similar consequences of the neoliberal's reforms that made markets underperform in terms of growth and employment generation (Bowen, 2011; Weyland, 2009). The neoliberal reforms of the 1990s were characterised by privatization, trade liberalization, deregulation and the reduction of state interventionism (Bowen, 2011). Also, Levitsky and Roberts (2011) argue that the 1998-2002 economic crises in Latin America determined the rise of the Left.

Remmer (2011) dismisses the argument that the rise of the Left in Latin America was a consequence of exogenous shocks, particularly the debt crisis of the 1980s and the resulting effects of the neoliberal market-oriented model. He offers an alternative explanation arguing that at the beginning of the 21st century Latin America's economy boomed. On the one hand, these economic "good times" were favourable to statist, nationalist, redistributive political projects, and to threatening the hegemony of the United States in the region. On the other hand, they raised the support for more Leftist political options, as citizens were more optimists for social changes.

Other authors argue that the emergence of the Latin-American Left is based on the high levels of poverty and inequality that characterised the region. Levitsky and Roberts (2011:9) claim that "persistent inequality created a large potential constituency for the Left that could be mobilized around claims for redistribution and expanded social citizenship". Fukuyama, (2008) also agrees for inequality as the trigger of the rising of the Left in Latin America, describing the Left as a political crisis that has hit the region by bringing into power populist leaders. Remmer (2011:953) argues that the expansion of the economy during the beginning of the 21st century gave these political leaders an opportunity "to offer voters programmes of poverty reduction, improved social equity, economic nationalism, and increased government spending and enhances the credibility of those commitments."

Other causes for the rising of the Left are the political-institutional characteristics of party systems and the natural resources bonanzas and windfall rents (Weyland, 2009). Levitsky and Roberts (2011) argue that the institutionalization of electoral competition facilitated the Left's ascendance. Latin American's Leftists movements "were denied an opportunity to contest power legally, first via restricted suffrage and later through mechanisms such as military intervention, proscription and repression" (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011:8). Also, some authors argue that the election of Left political leaders have been possible given the public pressure to address the social deficit that is reflected in the support received from civil society organizations (Teichman, 2008).

As researchers have identified, the rising of the Left in Latin America is a combination of different factors. The region was the scenario of economic transformations with the imposition of neoliberal policies that had profound effects on the wellbeing of the population by increasing inequality and poverty. The political landscape was also marked by changes in the political participation of Left-wing movements that had suffered isolation and repression. And finally, the role of civil society and their quest to be represented and heard made possible the rapid increase of supporters for Left leaders. All these factors explain the rapid expansion of the Left in Latin America in the beginning of the 21st century.

CCTs in social policy

Since policy debates have focused on Conditional Cash transfers, it is generally observed in the literature that this term is commonly used to describe the new forms of social assistance programmes (Barrientos and Santibáñez, 2009). It is necessary to understand where these programmes are in the context of social policy. Social policy is the provision of basic services and of social protection. These basic services include education, health, water and sanitation. Social protection includes social insurance, social assistance and labour market interventions (Barrientos and Pellissery, 2013). Social assistance consists of tax-financed programmes target to benefit poor people (Barrientos, 2007).

Social assistance programmes in developing countries can be *pure income transfers* as non-contributory pensions or child grants and allowances; or *income transfers combined with asset accumulation and protection*, here human development conditional transfer programmes and guaranteed employment schemes can be found; and finally they can be *integrated antipoverty programmes* that cover a range of poverty dimension and address social exclusion (Barrientos and Pellissery, 2013). This three different types of social assistance programmes differ in their vision of the causes of poverty: "*poverty as a lack of income, poverty as deficiencies in income and assets; and poverty as multidimensional deprivation*" (Barrientos, 2013a:7). However they all have in common that they are tax-financed interventions oriented to fight poverty and vulnerability, led by public organisms and framed in social assistance (Barrientos, 2012).

Conditional Cash Transfers are *income transfers combined with asset accumulation and protection*. They are one type of social assistance programmes or anti-poverty transfer programmes, which along with social insurance and labour market interventions are the components of social protection. "*As their name suggests, CCTs provide cash grants to poor families on the condition they meet behavioural requirements thought to address the intergenerational transmission of poverty and improve human development*" (Sugiyama, 2011:250). The cash transfers are commonly delivered to women, not only because they are seen as taking more care and responsibility for children, but also for transforming the gender relation in the family (Jones et al., 2007).

Having clarified where CCTs stand in the context of social policy it is important to clarify that in the narrative of this paper it refers to anti-poverty programmes as CCTs. Besides for a matter of simplicity, this nomination is commonly found in the literature.

A side event: adopting CCTs in Latin America

The politicisation of poverty is reflected in the rapid spread of anti-poverty programmes. Teichman (2008) argue that CCTS in Latin America have their origins among technocrats and others that aim to maintain the fiscal equilibrium. The fiscal constraints, combined with the attempt to avoid social mobilisations and the incapacity to achieve redistributive goals shaped the context for the adoption of CCTs in Latin America (Teichman, 2008). Other authors identify the influence of universal global ideas as the reason for the adoption and expansion of CCTs in Latin America. Leisering (2009) argue that it did not matter the particular domestic conditions of the countries, the pressure of universal global ideas make it necessary for the countries to adopt these programmes. Cecchini and Martinez (2011) do not precise what caused the rapid expansion of CCTs in Latin America but they give three main reasons that could have make this rapid diffusion possible. They argue that the exchange of experiences between countries, a coincidence between Latin American countries in the formulation of strategies to fight against poverty and the role of multilateral institutions can explain the rapid diffusion of CCTs in the region (Cecchini and Martinez, 2011).

These two factors, domestic preconditions and foreign pressures were evaluated by Sugiyama (2011) in her attempt to explain the diffusion of CCTs in Latin America. Sugiyama's (2011) study found that domestic conditions do not explain the spread of CCTs in Latin America. International pressure is more likely to have influenced the diffusion, mainly by professional norm creation and the inducements by international financial institutions. Instead, she proposes that the diffusion of CCTs have been based on the research productivity surrounding CCT programmes that have raised the legitimacy of the programmes that have been translated into direct policy learning.

Are CCTs from the Left or from the Right?

Researchers have intended to locate social assistance programmes in the ideological political spectrum. Teichman (2008) argues that social assistance programmes are approved by the Right and supported by the business community because of their rational nature, their technocratic efficiency and their refusal to encourage social mobilization or populism; and they also have the support of the Centre-left and NGOs, because they target the poor and aim to have effects in the development of the human capital in the long-term.

CCTs have been attributed an ideological leaning through identifying the nature of social assistance programmes. Levitsky and Roberts (2011) stated that targeted programmes are not intrinsically neoliberal in inspiration and that they can be compatible with redistributive goals. The redistributive character of transfer programmes is given by the expenditure level, the scope of benefits and the funding sources and tax structures (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011). On the other hand, Castañeda (2006:5) refers to anti-poverty programmes as "successful, innovative welfare programmes, purely neoliberal and scantily revolutionary." Leisering (2009:257) highlights that the way these programmes "have spread seems to confirm that this type of scheme has western origins." However, the political origin of these

programmes depends on their effectiveness and the analysis of the different steps to make them happen such as the political organization, economic power, political institutions and public administration (Huber and Stephens, 2012).

As reviewed the attempts to position CCTs in the ideological spectrum have not been based on specific studies, but on inferences from academics. This study attempts to find patterns that allow the identification of characteristics in the adoption of CCTs by the ideological leaning of the president who adopted it. A policy transfer or policy diffusion framework will help to conduct the analysis.

3. ANALYSING THE DIFFUSION OF CCTs IN LATIN AMERICA

Inequality and poverty are social problems that all Latin American countries have had to deal with. The adoption of anti-poverty programmes, more importantly of CCTs, has been uniformly observed in the region. States learn from the experiences of other countries to solve common problems. In this paper the policy diffusion process will be analyzed based on the ideological leaning of the president who adopted the program. Partisan politics are represented by ideologies that are translated into ideas that influence political actors to adopt policies.

Using data from Sugiyama (2011:256, 258)² a table has been created to combine data of adopted CCTs programmes and the ideological leaning of the president in power at the time of their adoption. As a result of the analysis three waves have been identified (see Table 1). The first wave of CCTs adoption in Latin America was mainly led by Centre and Centre-right ideological leaning presidents. The Second Wave represents the “turn to the left” of CCTs adoption from 2001-2004 when Centre-left and Left governments adopted CCT’s. Finally, the Third wave from 2005-2008 represents diffusion of CCTs through the entire ideological spectrum.

[Continued on next page]

² The ideological leaning of the Uruguayan President Tabare Vasquez (Frente Amplio) classified by Borges-Sugiyama (2011) as Centre has been reclassified as Left, based on the guidelines of the party (available at: <http://www.frenteamplo.org.uy/frenteamplo/lineamientos>). As well, the Guatemalan programme of Mi Familia Progresiva was adopted under Alvaro Colom’s administration (Maldonado et al., 2011).

Table 1. Political waves of CCT adoption in Latin America

Waves	Year	Left	Centre-left	Centre	Centre-right	Right
First Wave: 1995-2000	1995 (2001)			Brazil: Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Brazilian Social Democratic Party) Bolsa Escola		
	1995 (1997)				Mexico: Ernesto Zedillo (Institutional Revolutionary Party) Progres a	
	1998			Honduras: Carlos Roberto Flores Facusse (Liberal Party of Honduras) Programa de Asignacion Familiar		
	1999					
	2000				Colombia: Andres Pastrana Arango (Colombian Conservative Party) Familias en Accion Costa Rica: Miguel Angel Rodriguez Echeverria (Social Christian Unity Party) Superemonos	Nicaragua: Arnoldo Aleman (Constitutionalist Liberal Party) Red de Proteccion Social/Atencion a Crisis)
Second Wave: 2001-2005	2001	Jamaica: Percival James Patterson (People's National Party) Program of Advancement through Health and Education				
	2002		Chile: Ricardo Lagos (Socialist Party and Party for Democracy) Chile Solidario			
	2003		Ecuador: Lucio Edwin Gutierrez Borbua (Patriotic Society Party) Bono de Desarrollo Humano			
	2004		Argentina: Nestor Carlos Kirchner (Justicialista Party) Programa Familias			
Third Wave: 2005- 2008	2005	Bolivia: Evo Morales (Movement for Socialism) Bono Juancito Pinto			Dominican Republic: Leonel Fernandez Reyna (Dominican Liberation Party) Solidaridad	Peru: Alejandro Toledo (Peru Possible) Juntos Paraguay: Nicano r Duarte Frutos (Colorado Party) Teokopora- Red de Promocion y Proteccion Social El Salvador: Antonio Saca (Nationalist Republican Alliance) Red Solidaria
		Uruguay: Tabare Vasquez (Frente Amplio) Plan de Asistencia Nacional a la Emergencia Social				
	2006		Trinidad and Tobago: Patrick Manning (People's Nationalist Movement) Targeted Conditional Cash Transfer Program Panama: Martin Torrijos (Democratic Revolutionary Party) Red de Oportunidades			
	2007					
	2008		Guatemala: Alvaro Colom (National Unity of Hope) Mi Familia PROGRESA			

Source: Author based on Sugiyama (2011:256,258). Format of cells: Country: name of president, (ruling party), name of programme.

A temporary ideological leaning distinction has showed the distribution in time of the adoption of CCTs based on the ideological leaning of the presidents who adopted the programme. It was possible to identify that in the Second Wave the adoption of CCTs gave a turn to the Left, considering that in the first year they were adopted by Centre and Centre-Right governments as seen in Table 1. However, this coincidence in time does not give a substantial explanation of the characteristics of the adoption of CCTs. In order to determine if there are differences in the motivations and actors involved in the policy process attributed to the ideology of the president that adopted the CCTs, further analysis need to be made.

The Dolowitz and Marsh Policy Transfer Framework: CCTs in Latin America

CCTs differ greatly between the countries. They adopt design and implementation features that depend on each country. There are various important programmes in each country; however, given the restriction of space in this paper the discussion is limited to programmes with similar characteristics³: a cash transfer conditioned to the fulfilling of health and education requirements. It is necessary to clarify that the programmes considered in the analysis do not only include *income transfers combined with asset accumulation and protection* (known also as income transfer plus) a cash transfer can also be found in *pure income transfers* and in *integrated antipoverty programmes* (Barrientos and Pellissery, 2013).

First Wave of CCTs: From Centre to Right

The Founding Fathers of CCTs: Brazil and Mexico

The programmes known today as *Bolsa Familia* in Brazil and *Oportunidades* in Mexico where the first large-scale programmes adopted in the region. Given the recognition they have, these two programmes can be considered to be the founding fathers of CCTs in Latin America. *Bolsa Familia* and *Oportunidades* originated in voluntarily initiatives inside these countries, resulting from the discontent towards the social situation of families in poverty.

The intellectual origins of *Bolsa Familia* in Brazil was the voluntary realization of policy makers that anti-poverty strategies should consider the multidimensional and persistent dynamic of poverty. This realization lead to a discussion around the need of establishing a guaranteed income (Barrientos, 2013b). In a programmatic view, *Bolsa Familia* has its origin on multiple social assistance programmes. The Brazilian constitution (1988) established a significant fiscal and administrative decentralisation within the three levels of government: national, state and municipal (Hall, 2012). Brazil's institutional decentralization gives room for experimentation of different public policies by local governments (Barrientos, 2013b). In 1995, the Minimum Family Income Programme (*Programa de Garantia de Renda Minima Familiar*) was established in the city of Campinas in the state of Sao Paulo. In the same year, in the federal district of Brasilia another cash transfer, known as *Bolsa Escola* was

³ Even though some of the programmes included in Sugiyama's (2011) data are no longer operating, the analysis in this section will describe what the changes implied. However, the data for the analysis was not changed in order to keep its consistency.

established. In 1996, the first social assistance programme at the federal level, The Programme to Eradicate Child Labour (PETI) was adopted. By 1997, CCTs had become very popular and they received the support of the parliament by authorizing the federal government to cover up to 50% of the costs of CCTs at the municipal level (Fried, 2012).

Bolsa Escola became extremely popular and in 2001 the Brazilian Centrist president Fernando Henrique Cardoso from the Social Democratic Party adopted the programme nationally transforming it into *Bolsa Escola* Federal. Other CCTs were launched at the national level: The *Bolsa Alimentacao* and the *Auxilio Gas* (Sánchez-Ancochea and Mattei, 2011). The upcoming to power of the Leftist candidate for the Workers Party Luis Inacio Lula da Silva (henceforth Lula) in 2002 marked a turning point in the social assistance scheme of Brazil. Lula's social priority during his campaign was to promote the fight against hunger. With this objective he created the Zero Hunger (*Fome Zero*) scheme in which, among other interventions, the *Carta Alimentação* was established providing in-kind and cash transfers. . In 2003 Lula transformed *Bolsa Escola* into *Bolsa Familia* integrating all the existing subsidy programmes (Barrientos, 2013b; Sugiyama, 2011).

The other flagship programme in Latin America is the Mexican *Progresas*, known today as *Oportunidades*. The Mexican CCT programme *Oportunidades* originated at the national level in 1997 under the name *Progresas (Programa de Educacion, Salud y Alimentacion)*. In 1995 President Ernesto Zedillo from the Centre-right Institutional Revolutionary Party appointed Santiago Levy, an undersecretary in Mexico's finance Ministry to design a plan to address extreme poverty given the social impact of the Tequila Crisis (the programme was first known as *Pronasol* in 1995) (Bate, 2004; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2008). The programme was launched in the state of Campeche benefiting women, lactating mothers and infants using databases of two existing programmes that delivered milk and tortilla subsidies. Initially the programme did not include an education component and was limited to the rural areas. To overcome the different issues that arose during the pilot phase Levy invited Jose Gomez de Leon who directed CONAPO (*Consejo Nacional de Poblacion*) the Mexican federal agency in charge of population policies. The technical advice of Gomez de Leon and the use of data on poverty and marginality he had gathered determined the final design of *Progresas*. The programme also had to overcome opposition from political parties that did not agree with the design to hand out cash. Even though it was designed in 1995, it was not until 1997 that the programme could be launched nationally under the name *Progresas* (Bate, 2004).

The party of president Zedillo, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost elections after 71 years in power, giving way to the candidate of the National Action Party (PAN) Vicente Fox (Rocha Menocal, 2005). President Vicente Fox continued expanding the programme and increasing its budget. He changed the name from *Progresas* to *Oportunidades* in 2002 (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2008; Sugiyama, 2011). The *Oportunidades* programme has maintained the cash transfer with its three main components: a household nutrition component, a school subsidy and an annual transfer to cover school costs (Sugiyama, 2011).

As identified in the cases of Brazil and Mexico, these programmes were the result of a voluntary initiative where lessons were drawn within the countries from the local and state levels. The actors involved in the creation of these two programmes were mainly internal

actors and institutions. *Bolsa Familia/ Bolsa Escola* and *Progresar/ Oportunidades* became the flagship CCT programmes of Latin America.

The direct coercive policy diffusion: The Case of PRAF-BID II in Honduras

The *Programa de Asignacion Familiar* (henceforth PRAF) programme in Honduras has a long history. It began in 1990 as a short-term unconditional transfer programme financed by the national government. It was intended to help poor families to cope with economic shocks from the structural adjustment period (Moore, 2008). This first PRAF known as National PRAF coexisted with two other pilot programmes implemented by the Inter-American Development Bank (henceforth IADB), the PRAF II and the PRAF III⁴ that included conditionalities. PRAF II operated from 1998 to 2005, it introduced investments in the offer of services in the social sector. The PRAF III that began in 2007 was designed to tune up changes that would be introduced to the National PRAF to transform it into a CCT that invested in human capital. The Solidarity Network was created simultaneously with the PRAF III (CEPAL, 2009). For the purpose of the discussion on policy diffusion in this paper the programme that is being considered is the PRAF II, since it was the first one introduced with conditionalities in Honduras.

PRAF II was a pilot programme financed by the IADB. The implementation of the programme had to be done in accordance with the IADB loan specifications. The IADB had criticised the National PRAF “for its poor targeting and leakages, as well as for its failure to address supply side weaknesses” (Moore, 2008:7). The design of PRAF II was originated by representatives of the IADB and the International Food and Policy Research Institute (IPFRI). During meetings, officials of the IADB and IPFRI explained to PRAF II representatives and members of the Secretary of Education and Secretary of Health how the programme should work (Moore, 2008).

The PRAF II is a hybrid programme that was inspired both from within the country and from the international level. PRAF II was an attempt from the International Organizations (IO) to modify the programme created at the national level (National PRAF or PRAF) by including conditionalities and increasing the supply side through investments in infrastructure and services. The later establishment of PRAF III and the Solidarity Network evidenced direct and indirect coercive role of IO in social assistance programmes in Honduras by determining how the programmes should work and promoting the need to shape social assistance programmes to include conditionalities.

The *Red de Proteccion Social* in Nicaragua, *Familias en Accion* in Colombia and *Supermonos* in Costa Rica

Nicaragua's *Red de Protección Social* started to be designed in 1999 by the Nicaraguan government encouraged by the IADB. The context in which *Red de Protección* emerged is characterised by the strong effects of the pro-market policies implemented during the 1990s. The *Red de Protección Social* was inspired in the CCTs of Mexico and Honduras. *Red de*

⁴ Also known as PRAF-BID II and III (acronym in Spanish of the IADB)

Protección Social was part of Nicaragua's Strengthened Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (*Estrategia Reforzada de Crecimiento Economico y de Reduccion de la Pobreza*) and it was first under the control of the Emergency Social Investment Fund (*Fondo de Inversion Social de Emergencia-FISE*) and later under the Ministry of Family. *The Red de Protección Social* was finally implemented in 2000 once the loan from the IADB was approved. President Arnoldo Aleman from the Right-wing Constitutionalist Liberal Party implemented the *Red de Protección Social*, which is well known as a successful CCT programme. However, in July 2005 the programme was technically discontinued. The then Minister of Family failed to make a formal approach to Congress to request for funds for another phase of the programme. Even though the IADB had the resources ready for the programme this procedural failure made it impossible for the programme to continue (Moore, 2009). The termination of the *Red de Protección Social* programme in Nicaragua coincided with the coming to power of Left-wing president Daniel Ortega from the Sandinista National Liberation Front. Instead of re-launching *Red de Protección Social* or adopting a similar scheme Ortega's administration created a new in-kind programme named Hunger Zero (*Hambre Cero*) (Moore, 2009).

The Colombian CCT *Familias en Accion* was also inspired by the Mexican *Progresas/Oportunidades* programme (Attanasio et al., 2008; Baez et al., 2012). The idea of adopting a CCT in Colombia began to be discussed in 2000, given the adverse macroeconomic shocks of the structural adjustment affecting the country towards the end of the 1990s. The programme was adopted by the Centre-right president from the Colombian Conservative Party Andres Pastrana. *Familias en Accion* emerged as a counter-cycle programme of the social component of the "Plan Colombia"⁵ to support vulnerable households with children (El Tiempo, 2001a). The programme was a component of a broader Social Support Network (*Red de Apoyo Social*) created to alleviate the effects of the structural adjustment policies. This Network had three components "an employment generation (public works) programmes, work training for the young, and a conditional cash transfer programme" (Ayala, 2006a:2). The CCT component became known as the *Familias en Accion* programme. *Familias en Accion* is aimed at alleviating poverty by investing in human capital accumulation of children. In 2001 *Familias en Accion* received a loan for 150 million dollars in its initial stage from the World Bank (El Tiempo, 2001b). Besides the support from the World Bank and the United States government, the programme has been financed by the IADB and the Colombian government (Ayala, 2006a).

In Costa Rica the *Superemonos* programme was a national voluntary initiative of the *Instituto Mixto de Apoyo (IMAS)*. The Programme was created under the National Solidarity Plan (*Plan Nacional de Solidaridad*), an initiative of President Miguel Rodriguez Echeverria, a Centre-right president from the Social Christian Unity Party. The National Solidarity Plan implemented different initiatives to guarantee the attendance and permanence of children in schools (Viquez, 2011). The *Superemonos* programme was created with the aim of complementing other scholarship programmes to help families in poverty. The programme

⁵ The Plan Colombia was a plan developed by the Colombian president Andres Pastrana (1998-2002) and the U.S government to support Colombia in its fight against drug trafficking and to help the country maintain peace and economic stability. See (Veillette, 2005)

consisted of the provision of a monthly food coupon to poor households (for the 10 months of school year conditioned to the attendance to school of children between 6 and 18 years) (Duryea and Morrison, 2004). It differs from *Progresas/Oportunidades* and *Bosla Familia* in that it was an in-kind programme. *Superemonos* programme had not financial support from IO (Sugiyama, 2011). In 2006 the Centre-left president Oscar Arias was elected and he replaced *Superemonos* for a new programme called *Avancemos*.

Overall, Table 2 shows that the first political wave of adoption of CCTs in Latin America presents different dynamics. First, the CCTs in Brazil and Mexico have a local and national origin respectively. International Organizations did not play an important role in the creation of these programmes. On the contrary, a coercive influence of International Organizations can be identified in the adoption of the PRAF II in Honduras. The programmes *Red de Protección Social* in Nicaragua and the *Familias en Accion* in Colombia were largely influenced by the lessons drawn mainly from the Mexican programme. On the other hand, the Costa Rican programme *Superemonos* is a voluntary initiative. It was created with the aim of complementing other scholarship programmes. However, given the characteristics of the programme it may be fair to suggest that it was influenced by the CCT trend that was beginning to emerge in Latin America.

This first wave of CCTs is dynamic and patterns are difficult to identify. It goes from the creation of CCTs from the local and national context to the coercive implementation by International Organizations, to the Lesson Drawing from regional trends and finally to the voluntary adoption of a policy trend that was beginning to develop in the region.

Table 2. Policy transfer of CCTs in Latin America (first wave)

Country	Program Name	Type of Programme	Why do actors engage in policy transfer process?			Who are the key actors involved in the policy transfer process?	From where are lessons drawn?	
			Voluntary	Mixtures	Coercive		Within-a-nation	Cross National
Brazil	Bolsa Escola (Bolsa Família)	Income transfer plus-transfer for human development	Local governments experimented with different anti-poverty programmes			Local authorities President Fernando Cardoso Policymakers	Local authorities	
Mexico	Progreso/Oportunidades	Income transfer plus-transfer for human development	President Zedillo's initiative to address the social impacts of the Tequila Crisis.			President Ernesto Zedillo Ministry of Finance (Santiago Levy) CONAPO (Jose Gomez de Leon)	State Government	
Honduras	Programa de Asignación Familiar- (PRAF II)	Income transfer plus-transfer for human development			Implemented by the IADB and IFPRI to include conditionality in a program previously created by the National government	IADB and IFPRI Members of the Secretary of Health and Education President Carlos Flores Office	State government	International Organizations: IADB and IFPRI
Nicaragua	Red de Protección Social	Income transfer plus-transfer for human development		Originated from the government (encouraged by IO) aim to have a poverty reduction plan to cope with the strong effects of pro-market policies.		National government IADB Emergency Social Investment Fund (<i>Fondo de Inversión Social de Emergencia-FISE</i>)		International Organizations: IADB Regional: Oportunidades in Mexico and PRAF II in Honduras.
Colombia	Familias en Acción	Income transfer plus-transfer for human development		Emerged as the social component of the Plan Colombia to cope with the social effects of structural adjustment.		National government United States: Plan Colombia World Bank IADB		International Organizations: IADB and World Bank Regional: Oportunidades in Mexico
Costa Rica	Supermonos	Income transfer plus-transfer for human development	Motivated to complement the scholarships programs implemented by the National Solidarity Plan			National Government <i>Instituto Mixto de Apoyo Social (IMAS)</i>	No information	No information

Source: modified framework from of Dolowitz and Marsh (2000). Notes: (1) Type of Programme based on (Barrientos et al., 2010). (2) Content of table based on multiple authors (see text).

Second Wave: The Left and Centre-left government adopt CCTs

The second wave identified in Table 3 have been considered as representing the “turn to the Left” of CCT diffusion on the analysis. During this period 2001-2004 the countries that adopted CCTs had Leftist forces in power.

The PATH in Jamaica

The *Programme of Advancement through Health and Education (PATH)* is a nationwide programme in Jamaica created to improve the delivering of social assistance programmes. The Prime Minister Percival James Patterson from the Left-leaning People’s National Party adopted the PATH in 2001. The PATH was intended to improve the effectiveness of the delivery of social assistance programmes. The Prime Minister’s Cabinet appointed the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) and the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) to reform the existing social assistance schemes and merge them into one single agency. In 2001 the PIOJ proposal was ready and was presented to the Prime Minister's Cabinet. The PATH unified three main existing income support programmes: the Food Stamps Programme, the Poor Relief Programme, and the Public Assistance Programme (Levy and Ohls, 2010). The Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MLSS) was the institution in charge of developing, designing, implementing and operating the PATH (Ayala, 2006b). The reform of safety nets in Jamaica was supported by multilateral organizations. The World Bank assisted in the research for the design and the IADB participated in the implementation of the programme (Ayala, 2006b; Sugiyama, 2011).

Chile Solidario: The ‘avant garde’ programme in Latin America

The *Sistema de Proteccion y Promocion Social Chile Solidario* (henceforth *Chile Solidario*) is described by Martorano and Sanfilippo (2012) as an ‘avant garde’ programme in the Latin American context given its innovative features that address the multidimensional nature of poverty. Even though, *Chile Solidario* is an integrated anti-poverty programme it has a cash transfer component that makes it possible to include it as a CCT. Since its return to democracy in 1990 Chile was governed by the Centre-left government Coalition of Parties for Democracy (*Concertacion de Partidos para la Democracia*) until 2010 when the Centre-right government of the Coalition got into power with Sebastian Piñera (Cecchini et al., 2012).

The origins of *Chile Solidario* can be traced back to 2002 when President Ricardo Lagos, recently elected, entrusted his Planning Ministry to design a policy in favour of families in extreme poverty. Researchers have identified the birth of *Chile Solidario* as the fusion of an integrated strategy targeting families in extreme poverty, designed by the Planning Ministry with the participation of different state agents; and a social protection system designed by the Ministry of Finance (Franzoni and Voorend, 2011). The formulation of *Chile Solidario* in 2002 was a joint effort of multiple actors that included government officials, NGOs, scholars and local governments. Different views that arose during the process were brought together

by a well-respected NGO named Consultations for Development (*Asesorias para el Desarrollo*) (Franzoni and Voorend, 2011).

The innovations in *Chile Solidario* are still considered revealing. No other social assistance programme in Chile had targeted individuals instead of families. Similarly, services had been delivered without an emphasis that would match supply and demand (Franzoni and Voorend, 2011). *Chile Solidario* is a five year programme that consists of two main phases: the intensive phase (2 years) and the follow-up phase (3 years). During the intensive phase psychosocial support is given to the families to identify the better intervention that suits the family and prioritize the access to services in different areas. Also, the families receive a cash transfer known as *bono de proteccion* that is given to women. During the follow-up phase an unconditional cash transfer called *bono de egreso* is given to the families along with some other monetary subsidies (Martorano and Sanfilippo, 2012). The receipt of benefits do not depend on an specific behaviour, it is based on the respect of the contract signed with the social worker (Martorano and Sanfilippo, 2012).

In *Chile Solidario* the World Bank played a consulting role, specifically in designing the cash transfer. The Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has also advised the government after evaluating the pilot of *Chile Solidario* (Franzoni and Voorend, 2011). *Chile Solidario* has not received funding from IO (Sugiyama, 2011). The coming to power of the Centre-right government coalition under President Sebastian Piñera brought modifications to the Chilean social protection system. Among the most important measures taken was the launching of the programme Ethical Family Income (*Ingreso Etico Familiar*) to gradually replace *Chile Solidario* (Cecchini et al., 2012).

The *Bono de Desarrollo Humano* in Ecuador and the *Programa Familias* in Argentina: Making social assistance programmes more effective

In Ecuador the *Bono de Desarrollo Humano* (henceforth *BDH*) has its origin in two different programmes launched at the end of the 1990s, the *Beca Escolar* and the school meal programme *Programa de Alimentacion Escolar*. At the same time, in 1998 the programme called *Bono Solidario* was launched to compensate families for the elimination of gas and electricity subsidies during an economic crisis. *Bono Solidario* became a CCT in 2003 and was renamed *BDH*. The *BDH* was established through a presidential Decree under the administration of the Centre-left president Lucio Gutierrez of the Patriotic Society Party. The *BDH* new programme brought together the *Beca Escolar* and the *Bono Solidario* (Ponce and Bedi, 2008). Gutierrez used propaganda in the socialization of the *BDH*. The registration phase of the CCT was done under great events such as concerts and mass concentrations (Recalde, 2007). The difference between the *BDH* and its predecessor, the *Bono Solidario*, was the inclusion of conditionalities (Recalde, 2007). However, the Ecuadorian government has failed to monitor the compliance of conditions given their lack of technical capacity (Edmonds and Schady, 2009). Nowadays the *BDH* is financed only by the Ecuadorian government. However it has been financed by the IADB and the World Bank in the past (Maldonado et al., 2011; Sugiyama, 2011).

In Argentina, the *Plan Familias* is a programme established as an exit plan from the Unemployed Heads-of Household Programme (henceforth UHHP) (*Jefes y Jefas de Hogar*). The UHHP provided a direct income to families with dependants in which the head of the households became unemployed during the crisis the country suffered at the end of 2001 (Etchemendy and Garay, 2011; Giovagnoli, 2005). Once the Argentinian economy began to recover two programmes were created as a strategy to phase out the UHHP programme. These two programmes were the *Seguro de Capacitacion y Empleo* and the *Programas Familias por la Inclusion Social*, known as *Plan Familias* (Gasparini and Cruces, 2010).

The *Plan Familias* was created in 2004 by the Centre-left president from the Justicialista Party Nestor Kirchner. The beneficiaries of *Plan Familias* are people included in the UNHHP programme that were considered vulnerable (women, the elderly and inactive beneficiaries) (Tabbush, 2009). It includes conditionalities based on child and maternal health but do not include any employment condition. The benefits of the cash transfer are supported by the formal employment (Gasparini and Cruces, 2010). The *Plan Familias* is funded 70% by the IADB and 30% by the Argentinian government (Tabbush, 2009). In 2009, new demands from unemployed groups to expand social benefits led President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (Nestor Kirchner's wife) to create a new programme known as the Universal Child Allowance (Etchemendy and Garay, 2011). The Universal Child Allowance is nowadays Argentina's most important CCT.

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Table 3. Policy transfer of CCTs in Latin America (second wave)

Country	Program Name	Type of Programme	Why do actors engage in policy transfer process?			Who are the key actors involved in the policy transfer process?	From where are lessons drawn?	
			Voluntary	Mixtures	Coercive		Within-a-nation	Cross National
Jamaica	PATH	Income transfer plus-transfer for human development		Conceived with the goal of knitting different programs into a more efficient social assistance system with the support of International Organizations.		Prime Minister's Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MLSS) IADB World Bank		IADB and World Bank
Chile	Chile Solidario	Integrated anti-poverty programme	Presidential initiative to address the multidimensional nature of poverty by targeting families instead of individuals.			President: Ricardo Lagos Planning Ministry Finance Ministry NGOs : Consultations for Scholars Local governments World Bank ECLAC	State governments Local authorities	
Ecuador	Bono de Desarrollo Humano	Income transfer plus-transfer for human development		A consolidation of prior social assistance programs to transform it into a Conditional Cash Transfer Program.		President Lucio Gutierrez International Organizations	No information	No information
Argentina	Programa Familias	Integrated anti-poverty programme		Created as part of an Exit Plan of the UNHHP programme.		National Government IADB		IADB

Source: modified framework from of Dolowitz and Marsh (2000). Notes: (1) Type of Programme based on (Barrientos et al., 2010). (2) Content of table based on multiple authors (see text).

As seen in Table 3 almost all the programmes adopted during this wave were created with the aim of merging other programmes that already existed. The innovation during this wave is led by *Chile Solidario* an integrated anti-poverty programme originated at the national level and where the IO played a consultant role. The other programme classified by Barrientos et al. (2010) as an integrated anti-poverty programme is *Plan Familias* of Argentina. Even though, both programmes were adopted by Centre-left governments and are the same kind of programmes their features differ greatly. There is no pattern identified in the characteristics analysed in this Second wave, other than that all the programmes result from a merging process of other programmes (with the exception of *Chile Solidario*). This is different from the first wave where motivations were mainly centred in providing benefits to the poor population to cope with the effects of structural adjustment policies and economic crisis; the second wave may be interpreted as an attempt to make social assistance programmes more effective.

Third Wave: From Left to Right: the entire ideological continuum in Latin America adopting CCTs

2005 the year of CCTs

The year 2005 was an unprecedented year for the introduction of CCTs in many countries. Six CCTs were adopted during 2005 by presidents that represent different forces in the ideological spectrum.

The *Solidaridad* programme was established in the Dominican Republic with the aim of tackling poverty by raising the human capital of families in poverty. *Solidaridad* was an initiative of the Presidency of Leonel Fernandez from the centrist Dominican Liberation Party. The programme was conceived after the economic crisis that the country suffered in 2003. It is under the control of the Cabinet of Coordination of Social Policies (*Gabinete de Coordinación de Políticas Sociales*) (Maldonado et al., 2011). The two main components of the *Solidaridad* programme are the health and the education component. Households must meet specific health and nutrition protocols to receive a transfer called *Comer es Primero*. The education component is called the *School Attendance Incentive* and it consists of an in-kind transfer that could only be used to purchase school supplies (Canavire and Vasquez, 2013).

In Bolivia, the *Bono Juancito Pinto* programme was created in 2006 by the leftist president from the Movement for Socialism Evo Morales with the objective of eradicating extreme poverty and social exclusion. The *Bono Juancito Pinto* gives financial incentives for children that attend school (Durana, 2012). Since 2006 the *Bono Juancito Pinto* has been funded by resources received by the Bolivian government through the nationalization of hydrocarbons. However, in 2009 multilateral organizations began to provide financial and technical support (Durana, 2012). The cash transfer is given by personnel from the armed forces under the direction of the Ministry of Education of Bolivia (Marco Navarro, 2012).

In El Salvador the main CCT programme is *Red Solidaria*, designed in 2005. It emerged from a campaign promise of the Right-wing president Antonio Saca from the Nationalist

Republican Alliance. The conceptual design of the programme began in 2004, but it was not until 2005 that it was established through a Decree (Soares and Britto, 2007). The initial design of *Red Solidaria* had the support of the IADB and the World Bank (Soares and Britto, 2007; Sugiyama, 2011). The actors involved in setting it up were mainly technocrats that remained in their jobs even when Leftist forces came to power with the election of Mauricio Funes from the Left-wing party Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. The participation of academics and NGOs was limited (Franzoni and Voorend, 2011). The objectives of the programme are to alleviate poverty in the short-term and invest in human capital of the poor population (Soares, 2012). The components of the *Red Solidaria* are the cash transfer, plus improvements in social service supplies and infrastructure, as well as increased income sources for poor families (Britto, 2007). In 2009 the *Red Solidaria* was renamed *Comunidades Solidarias Rurales* and *Comunidades Solidarias Urbanas* (Soares, 2012).

Peruvian CCT programme *Juntos* was created in 2005 through a Presidential Decree of Alejandro Toledo from the Centre-right party *Peru Posible* (Díaz et al., 2009). The government was motivated by the success of the international experiences and the evidence that showed the effectiveness of the cash transfers and their lower operational costs (Jones et al., 2007). *Juntos* had an important participation of civil society and communities and is aimed at redressing the legacy of political violence among impoverished communities (Jones and Holmes, 2010; Lavigne, 2013). The political urgency that triggered the launching of the programme has notorious effects in the design and implementation process (the programme was set up in a pre-electoral year). Rules regarding the target mechanisms and the identification of the beneficiaries were not clearly established. Neither were the mechanisms for verification of conditions, the monitoring system or the coordination with other sectors such as the health and education sector (Alcázar, 2010).

In Uruguay, the rising to power of the Left-wing government of the Broad Front President Tabaré Vasquez brought social policy to the top of the political agenda. The Vasquez administration made important improvements towards the consolidation of a social democratic welfare state (Lanzaro, 2011). In this context the *Social Emergency National Assistance Plan (PANES)* became relevant. The PANES was under the coordination of the Ministry of Social Development (MIDES) (Lanzaro, 2011); and was established to operate between 2005-2007 as an emergency programme to fight against poverty (Midaglia, 2009). The cash transfer of the PANES received the name of Citizen Income (Ingreso Ciudadano) and was accompanied by complementary services (food, health, housing, and citizen instruction) (Filgueira and Hernández, 2012; Lanzaro, 2011). PANES' integral approach to poverty allows it to classify as an integrated anti-poverty programme (Barrientos et al., 2010). The continuation of the PANES was the *Equity Plan (Plan de Equidad)* that was conceived with a more long-term view to create and institutionalise a social protection framework (Lanzaro, 2011; Midaglia, 2009). PANES did not receive financial support from International Organizations (Sugiyama, 2011).

After the signing of the Millennium Declaration in 2000 the Paraguayan government designed a National Strategy for Fighting Poverty. Under this framework members of the technical team collected knowledge from different experiences of CCTs in Latin America (Soares and Britto, 2007). Following this strategy in 2005 the *Tekoporã* CCT was created through a

presidential Decree from the president from the Right-wing Colorado Party Nicanor Duarte, along with other social assistance programmes such as *Abrazo y Ñopytyvo* (Lavigne, 2012). The main objective of the programme is to prevent the intergenerational transmission of poverty and to support the vulnerable population in an attempt to achieve the MDGs (Lavigne, 2012; Perez Ribas et al., 2008).

Motivations, actors and lesson-drawing along with the ideological position of presidents varied during the adoption of CCTs in 2005. However, this Third wave includes the adoption of other programmes in Trinidad and Tobago, Panama and Guatemala.

The TCCTP in Trinidad and Tobago, *Red de Oportunidades* in Panama and *Mi Familia Progres*a in Guatemala: CCTs adopted under Centre-left governments

The *Targeted Conditional Cash Transfer Programme* (henceforth TCCTP) in Trinidad and Tobago was created in 2005 as a continuation of various social protection initiatives. Its predecessor programme was the Social Help and Rehabilitative Efforts (SHARE) programme that delivered in kind transfers of food to poor households. However, the discontent of beneficiaries with the type and quantity of products led the SHARE to be redesigned. The Government, led by Patrick Manning from the Centre-left People's Nationalist Movement, appointed a Ministerial sub-committee (Ministry of Social Development) to make recommendations to help the poor population to cope with the effects of the rise in inflation that affected food prices. TCCTP also aims to provide a safety net for the unemployed population. With the TCCTP the government provides beneficiaries a debit card to purchase food. The card can only be used to purchase food but any money not used in a month will be accumulated for the next month (Hailu and Pemberton, 2007).

The *Red de Oportunidades* in Panama started in 2006 in an attempt of the Panamanian government to reorganise social spending and to focalize social policies to achieve reduction in poverty (Rodríguez Mojica, 2010). It was adopted under the presidency of Martin Torrijos a Centre-left president from the Democratic Revolutionary Party. The design of the *Red de Oportunidades* was supported by the World Bank and IADB (Arráiz and Rozo, 2010). The *Red de Oportunidades* include a former program known as *Bonos Familiares*. The *Red de Oportunidades* is financed by the Panamanian government and the World Bank and is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Development (Maldonado et al., 2011; Sugiyama, 2011) .

The programme *Mi Familia Progres*a in Guatemala began in 2008 as a result of a strong political will to undertake actions to fight poverty, under the presidency of Alvaro Colom from the Centre-left party National Unity of Hope. *Mi Familia Progres*a is targeted to benefit families in extreme poverty that live in rural areas by providing cash so they can invest in health, education and nutrition. The programme expects that with the cash transfer children will invest in finishing at least their primary school. *Mi Familia Progres*a has two main components: a cash transfer for health and nutrition and cash transfer for education. Since its creation, the programme has been funded by national resources. In February 2009 the government signed a loan for 200 million dollars with the IADB to fund the programme. The

support of the IADB is also focused on the improvement of the offer of public services (CEPAL, 2009). In 2012 *Mi Familia Progres*a was renamed *Mi Bono Seguro*. Under *Mi Bono Seguro* the cash transfer will be assigned per family and not per child as it was in *Mi Familia Progres*a (Arevalo, 2012).

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Table 4. Policy transfer of CCTs in Latin America (third wave)

Country	Program Name	Type of Programme	Why do actors engage in policy transfer process?			Who are the key actors involved in the policy transfer process?	From where are lessons drawn?	
			Voluntary	Mixtures	Coercive		Within-a-nation	Cross National
Jamaica	PATH	Income transfer plus-transfer for human development		Conceived with the goal of knitting different programs into a more efficient social assistance system with the support of International Organizations.		Prime Minister's Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MLSS) IADB World Bank		IADB and World Bank
Ecuador	Bono de Desarrollo Humano	Income transfer plus-transfer for human development		A consolidation of prior social assistance programs to transform it into a Conditional Cash Transfer Program		President Lucio Gutierrez International Organizations	No information	No information
Bolivia	Bono Juancito Pinto	Income transfer plus-transfer for human development	Motivated by the aim to improve educational achievement and literacy; and redistribute natural resources rents.			National government Ministry of Education of Bolivia	No information	No information
Uruguay	PANES	Integrated anti-poverty programme	An emergency program to fight against poverty.			President Tabare Vasquez Minsitry of Social Development (MIDES)	No information	No information
Chile	Chile Solidario	Integrated anti-poverty programme	Presidential initiative to address the multidimensional nature of poverty by targeting families instead of individuals.			President: Ricardo Lagos Planning Ministry Finance Ministry NGOs : Consultations for Development Scholars Local governments World Bank ECLAC	State Local authorities	

Trinidad and Tobago	TCCTP	Pure income transfer - Social assistance (for general subsidies to poor households)	A rise in inflation was affecting food prices.			National Government Ministry of Social Development sub-committee	No information	No information
Panama	Red de Oportunidades	Integrated anti-poverty programme		Panamanian government wanted to reorganize social spending and the focalization of social policies to achieve reduction in poverty. The main component is Bono Familiares program.		National Government World Bank IADB		International Organizations: IADB and World Bank
Guatemala	Mi Familia PROGRESA	Income transfer plus-transfer for human development		A strong political will to carry out action against poverty.		Guatemalan Government: <i>Consejo de Cohesión Social</i> Ministry of Education World Bank		International Organizations: World Bank
Argentina	Programa Familias	Integrated anti-poverty programme		Created as part of an Exit Plan of the UNHHP programme.		National Government IADB		IADB

Source: modified framework from of Dolowitz and Marsh (2000). Notes: (1) Type of Programme based on (Barrientos et al., 2010). (2) Content of table based on multiple authors (see text).

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Overall, Table 4 summarizes the main features of the diffusion of CCTs in the Third Wave. As in the two previous waves the presidents have had an important role in the adoption of the program. The Third Wave is characterized by the whole ideological spectrum in Latin America adopting CCTs. The motivations vary between countries; CCTs were adopted voluntarily in Bolivia, Uruguay, Dominican Republic, Peru and Trinidad y Tobago. While in Paraguay, El Salvador Panama and Guatemala International Organizations played an important role.

Main findings: Was the diffusion of CCTs shaped by the emergence of “New Left” governments in Latin America?

In the analysis the “New Left” is comprised of the Centre-Left and Left governments. In analysing the adoption of CCTs by Leftist forces in Jamaica, Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Panama and Guatemala no substantial features will lead to demonstrating that the diffusion of CCTs were shaped by the rising of Leftist government to power. However, in the analysis done in the policy transfer framework it is perceived that they might be a difference in the understanding of poverty between the Left and Right ideological leaning.

The main findings from the analysis were the following: First, the analysis of policy diffusion waves clearly demonstrates that if the adoption of CCTs as a successful social policy innovation need to be recognized under an ideological leaning, this will definitely not be the Leftist forces. The First Wave of CCTs is characterized by the adoption of the programmes by Centre to the Right in the ideological spectrum. Secondly, the Second Wave showed that there was a timing coincidence in the adoption of CCTs with the Leftist governments that were emerging in the region. However, the Third Wave brings to an end the “Left Turn” and demonstrates that all the countries in Latin America are placing poverty and inequality at the top of the agenda by adopting CCTs. Thirdly, when analysing specifically countries who adopted CCTs governed by Leftist forces it can be perceived a difference in the understanding of poverty.

In this analysis it was identified that most of the Leftists governments (Chile, Panama, Argentina and Uruguay) included social assistance programmes identified as integrated anti-poverty programmes. In the case of the Centre to Right governments as seen in Tables 2 and 4, they are all income transfer programmes. Based on Barrientos (2013a) definition reviewed previously, these characteristics of the type of programmes governments are adopting demonstrate Leftist governments define poverty as multidimensional deprivation and Right governments define it as deficiencies in income and assets. This definition of poverty as multidimensional deprivation may explain why Leftists governments were all characterised by adopting programmes that merge programmes that already exist into a new scheme. It might be understood as an attempt to unify different programmes that tackle different dimensions of poverty into one multidimensional scheme. They also share a mixed motivation can be identified by the fact that they all implemented programmes assisted by International Organisations. However, given the limited programmes considered by country, it will be wrong to validate this finding without including other social assistance programmes. Consequently, the perceived differentiation in the definition of poverty do not have incidence in the shaping of the diffusion of CCTs.

The political dynamic which with the diffusion of CCTs took place was not shape by Leftists forces in government. Also, the analysis shows that International Organizations have been present all along the

adoption of CCTs in Latin America without distinguishing the ideology of the presidents. The lesson-drawing have been commonly from the international level with the exception of the “Founding Fathers” and *Chile Solidario* whose processes of adoption refer to the local and national level. Finally, the actors involved in the policy diffusion process clearly reflect the important participation of the Executive along all the programmes in the region.

More than a coincidence in time, there is no other substantial evidence that shows characteristics that can be labelled under and specific ideological leaning of the president that adopted the CCT. Therefore, from the analysis it is inferred that the programmatic centrality of redistributive policies is not exclusively of Left leaning countries. Overall, The findings proposes that (as previously suggested by Sugiyama (2011:265) “It is possible that the programmes are devoid of ideological constraints and the technical merits of these programmes simply neutralise ideological debate.” This demonstrates that these programmes have been able to face the strong political changes in the region during the last decade, becoming a successful development trend.

4. CONCLUSION

This paper has reviewed the adoption of CCTs in Latin America in order to identify if "New Left" governments have shaped the diffusion of CCTs in the region. An analysis of the diffusion of CCTs was made. First a mapping was generated in order to identify policy diffusion waves over the last two decades. As a result of the analysis, three different waves were identified. The first wave of CCTs adoption in Latin America, from 1995 to 2000 was mainly led by Centre and Centre-right ideological leaned presidents. The Second Wave represents the “turn to the left” of CCTs adoption, from 2001-2004 when Centre-left and Left governments adopted CCT's. Finally, the Third wave from 2005-2008 represents the diffusion of CCTs through the entire ideological spectrum. In analysing the adopting of CCTs by Leftist forces in Jamaica, Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Panama and Guatemala no substantial features will lead to demonstrating that the diffusion of CCTs were shaped by the emergence of Leftist government to power. However, a difference can be perceived in the understanding of poverty between the Left and Right ideological leaning.

Overall, no traits where identified in the motivations, actors and lesson-drawing process among the countries that evidence that the diffusion of CCTs was shaped by the rising of the “New Left” in Latin America. Once the importance of the ideological leaning in shaping the diffusion of CCTs has been dismissed, it is suggested that further research should focus in identifying the political use of CCTs. Much more research should be done for identifying whether CCTs where adopted in Latin-America as a political and clientelistic tool. One step forward could be the assessment of the changes that these interventions have suffered during their implementation that obey to electoral motives. In this sense, there are still more questions to be answered: were CCTs scaled-up more abruptly by Left or Right leaned governments? Which political traits made CCTs more flexible with soft conditionalities and which made them more restricted? Which properties or political leaning do opponents to CCTs have in the region? In the meantime, the findings from the analysis in this paper confirms that social assistance is at the top of the agenda of governments in Latin America regardless of their ideological constraints.

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