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**WHERE DOES DEVELOPMENT
SUCCESS COME FROM?
EXPLANATIONS AND PRACTICAL
IMPLICATIONS**

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(NOTE: This paper is a slightly reworked version of the final chapter of A. Bebbington and W. McCourt (eds) Development success: Statecraft in the South, to be published by Palgrave in early 2007. Chapter references are to the relevant chapters of that collection.)

In this paper we draw lessons from the seven cases that constitute the core of our edited collection, and whose main elements are summarized in Table 1. We discuss what they suggest about the nature and explanation of development policy success in terms of the framework which we developed in Chapter 1 and with reference to broader debates in the literature. As noted in Chapter 1, our research strategy and choice of cases mean that our conclusions will be tentative ones. We will open up avenues for further research at the same time that we close down our present enquiry.

Table 1:   Summary of case findings

CHAPTER	COUNTRY/ REGION	NATURE OF POLICY	DURATION (all policies extant except where stated)	EVIDENCE OF SUCCESS	SUCCESS FACTORS
2: Melo	Brazil	Cash transfer to poor families	First municipal programme started 1994; federal programme started 1997 and survived change of government	95% of municipalities participating; 34 million people benefiting from annual transfer of US$2.2 billion	Functional electoral competition Design and political incentives Early social mobilization and leadership
3. Hofman et al.	Indonesia	Macroeconomic policy	1967-97, coterminous with Soeharto regime	Average GDP growth of 7% p.a. 1967-97; poverty down from 60% to 11% of population	Positive investment climate; competent, insulated technocrats; policy design; pragmatism and flexibility; donors
4. Grindle	Latin America	Industry and education	Mid-1980s onwards (industry); early 1990s onwards (education)	4.4-9% annual growth 1965-80, illiteracy 42→15% 1950-90; success of current policies remains unclear	Policy design Leadership to dislodge vested interests
5. Hulme and Moore	Bangladesh	Microfinance	Government ordinance for Grameen Bank in 1984; survived changes of government	1200+ MFIs, with good repayment rates; 13 million poor households benefiting; gender orientation empowering women	Innovation Policy specification Implementation factors Leadership and social energy
6. Mitlin	Chile, Philippines, South Africa	Housing	Scale operation began in mid-1980s (Chile); 1982-8 (Mexico); programmes survived regime change in Chile and Philippines	Operation at 'scale'; up to 1.4 million beneficiaries (South Africa); enhanced ability of poor people to contest for power	Building a policy alliance without elite capture Empowerment of urban poor groups and allies
7. Shankland & Cornwall	Brazil	Health	SUS enshrined in 1988 constitution; survived changes of government	Universal, publicly funded health provision; dramatic improvement in basic health indicators	Popular participation prevents elite capture of policy alliance Pro-rights based health system policy networks/epistemic communities
8. Jackson	Mozambique	Participatory planning	PPFD started in 1996; survived two elections and key personnel changes	Some economic improvement; increased state legitimacy	Policy coalition

THE NATURE AND DURABILITY OF SUCCESS

What kind of success?

In our introductory chapter we suggested that how we define development success depends on how we define development itself. Our 'normative' definition was 'the enhancement of human capabilities, in particular for the people who have the greatest capability deficits'. Such capability enhancement, we said, could occur through direct investment in financial, physical, social or human capital, or through improvements in the environment in which these assets are developed and used; improvements that could occur through initiatives as diverse as peace-building, macroeconomic reform and good governance programmes. We were interested in both economic and social development, but with the proviso that the development should be (in the jargon current at the time of writing) 'pro-poor'. Although we went on to refer to the traditional and contrasting public policy assumption that development might also be whatever a legitimate public actor said it was, in fact all our contributors have written in the spirit of our normative definition.

That is markedly the case with a chapter like Alex Shankland and Andrea Cornwall's, which contrasts Brazil's health reforms with the 'neoliberal' policies prevalent elsewhere in Latin America, and implicitly also with Hulme and Moore, Mitlin and Jackson's chapters. But it is even true of Merilee Grindle's chapter, which discusses precisely those 'neoliberal' policies in the industry and education spheres. Her critique of the state-centred policies which they challenged is that while they increased access to education in the earlier period, they did so more for the rich than for the poor, and for the rural poor least of all. Likewise, if she ultimately reserves judgement on whether the new policies have been a success, that is largely because we lack evidence that they have led to broad-based growth or improved the schooling of poor children.

The normative view also characterizes the analysis of Bert Hofman, Ella R. Gudwin and Kian Wie Thee, which again at first glance might appear indifferent to the distributional effects of growth. Earlier accounts of good economic performance in East and South-East Asia departed from prevailing free market orthodoxy mainly in stressing the positive role that government and government institutions had played in regulating the market

(Wade, 1990; World Bank, 1993a). Hofman and his colleagues, however, say that what government got right more than anything else in the period before the 'crash' of 1997 was that it secured high growth that was also highly pro-poor.

Thus our normative view of development success seems to have survived the shock of contact with reality as represented by our seven cases. But of course even if our contributors agree roughly on what constitutes success – which might reflect an early twenty-first century consensus on the purpose of development that is no more permanent than the late twentieth century 'Washington consensus' that preceded it – the policies that they have chosen as their examples of success differ widely, as we intended that they would. Let us see whether the evidence that our contributors offer gives us any grounds for comparing explanations for the success of these very different policies.

Evidence of Success

In order to generalize about success, we must first show that success did indeed occur. In Chapter 1 we said that we were looking for cases which had the following features:

- They would target *the enhancement of human capabilities, in particular for the people who have the greatest capability deficits*
- They should do so on a large scale: this might entail *scale-up* from an initial policy experiment
- The policies would have been implemented over at least ten years, and preferably across at least one change of government: *policy duration* was important
- They would preferably have succeeded *against the odds*; that is, at the point of inception a reasonable observer would have predicted that success was unlikely

We list our contributors' evidence in the above order, starting with two forms of evidence of enhancement of human capabilities (readers may want to refer again to Table 1, where most of this evidence is summarized).

1. *Impact on income or other human development indicators*, arguably the most important form of evidence. While we must of course allow for the usual problem of demonstrating a causal relationship between a policy and a particular outcome – something that David Hulme and Karen Moore deal with thoroughly, and that David Jackson also discusses – our authors, experts in their respective policy domains, are confident that some such causal link exists. Some of them may have hoped for greater impacts (Diana Mitlin's discussion comes to mind), but the chapters do suggest that improvements in indicators of health, shelter, income, nutrition and other outcomes can be attributed to the policies they discuss.

2. *Social and political impact*. Although Hulme and Moore present evidence of the economic impact of microfinance, they also say that 'it often seems as if this fundamentally economic approach has performed best in the social domain', particularly in women's empowerment. Similarly, Jackson argues that the most important success of the Nampula experiment has been in the political sphere, in the way in which the experiment has enhanced the legitimacy of the state in a country which is still recovering from a long civil war and in a province which had been bypassed by both the independence struggle and the initial policies of the FRELIMO government. The implicit arguments here are that there are important individual social benefits such as increased confidence and participation which human development indicators fail to capture, and that there are also collective political benefits which are different from the sum of the benefits to individuals.

3. *'Scale-up'*: an indication that initiatives that began life in a policy test tube were 'rolled out' on a large scale. Cash transfers in Brazil existed only in Senator Eduardo Suplicy's fertile imagination in the late 1980s, but by 2002 95 per cent of municipalities had such a scheme (Chapter 2). The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh began as a student action research project in 1976, but by 2002 there were 1200 microfinance institutions, reaching 13 million poor households (Chapter 5). Only Nampula's participatory planning experiment in Mozambique has still not been successfully scaled up to national level, despite donor-

sponsored attempts, and despite its embedding in Nampula province itself (Chapter 8).

4. *Policy duration*. We stipulated in Chapter 1 that a successful policy would be one that survived for at least ten years and, in a competitive democracy, preferably also a change of government. This was the only element of our view of development success to which all our contributors responded. All of their chosen policies had delivered benefits for over a decade. Even Grindle's critique of Latin America's 'exhausted' import substitution policies is premised on the recognition that they generated sustained growth for at least the 1965-1980 period; the policies were 'good' before they went 'bad'. In some of the cases policies also outlasted the government that introduced them (income transfer programmes and health policy in Brazil, housing programmes in Chile and the Philippines).

5. *Success against the odds*. (We could not find an economical way of presenting this evidence in Table 1.) We do not have evidence here in all our cases. Growth in Indonesia up to 1997 was not more impressive than in the other 'Newly Industrializing Countries' of East Asia, and, from the vantage point of the present, less impressive than in South Korea or even neighbouring Malaysia. From the same vantage point, industrial development in Argentina, one of the Latin American countries that Grindle discusses, has proceeded in fits and starts, with the crisis that reached its climax in December 2001 still a recent and painful memory.

But we do have fairly clear evidence in three of our cases. When Henry Kissinger dismissed Bangladesh as a 'basket case' in December 1971, would anyone outside the country have expected that this supposedly supine recipient of rich world handouts would be the source of that burst of 'social energy' which created the microfinance movement only five years later? Similarly, though less dramatically, Brazil's National Health System, the SUS, swam against the neoliberal current in Latin America which saw neighbouring Chile introduce private insurance-based health provision, and it came out of the 'neoliberal

shock' of the Collor government stronger than when it went in. On a smaller scale, participatory planning took root in a relatively remote province of Mozambique which had been neglected by the capital both before and just after independence.

Policy Durability: Rent Seeking or Social Learning?

The way in which our case policies endured is as interesting as the sheer fact of endurance. Our initial naïve assumption was that it would not be possible to have too much of a good thing; that as long as a good policy lasted, it would continue to produce reliable benefits. We did indeed have three fairly unambiguous examples of that, in the continuing development of microfinance in Bangladesh, and the maintenance of public health provision in Brazil and of a participatory planning model in Nampula province, Mozambique (Chapters 5, 7 and 8). Even there, however, we underestimated the effort that goes into maintaining a good policy, and also the potential for good policies to 'go bad'. Microfinance was sustained by innovation in microfinance products, the result of a virtuous circle of social learning in which implementation generated feedback, which was used in turn to refine the policy. In Brazil and Mozambique, policies were sustained by policy coalitions. Even when the Brazilian coalition was placed on a firm institutional footing, it still had to be nurtured in health councils and conferences. In Mozambique, where the coalition's institutional footing was still wobbly at the time of writing, internal bonding activities and cultivating local and national relationships have steadied it.

Thus health policy in Brazil and participatory planning in Nampula are examples of policies that have stayed on course. But that is not true of all our cases. Mitlin (Chapter 6) shows that the nature of the coalitions that assembled around pro-poor housing policy in Chile, the Philippines and South Africa compromised policy objectives from the outset. The private construction companies which it was felt necessary to involve skewed housing policy towards the provision of finished housing units, and away from a 'sites and services' approach which would have served poor people better, because supporting residents' own efforts is far more likely to meet broader needs, including the enhancement of residents' collective capacity, than providing finished units on a plate, as it were. This is not only because of the inherently higher cost of finished units,

sometimes inflated by the construction industry lobbying for rules requiring minimum standards that increase the unit cost. Politicians, for their part, were prone to using housing for political advantage, at the expense of allocation decisions based on need rather than clientelism.

Innovation and social learning through feedback, and the positive and negative roles that policy coalitions might play: these were all envisaged in our original framework, although the case chapters have fleshed out their ramifications in important ways. Jackson's personal account, for example, makes it painfully clear what a tortuous affair assembling and maintaining a coalition can be. But we failed to anticipate Grindle's insight, which Hofman *et al.*'s exposition of Indonesia's macroeconomic policy reinforces, that policies that started out 'good' might end up going 'bad'. This happens when the policy diverges from the policy need it was meant to meet. It is a sure sign that the policy has been captured, whether by the original beneficiaries who are no longer worthy ones (such as industrialists whose 'infant industries' should be well able to stand on their own two feet), or – what Grindle highlights – by interest groups that the policy itself has created (teachers' unions which resist a reorientation of education policy from access to quality), or alternatively by frankly parasitical interests (Indonesia's crony capitalists).

Up to this point Grindle's insight is consistent, as she recognizes, with the rent-seeking literature's pessimistic view that policy capture is inevitable, as it is economically rational for interested parties to capture it. The rent-seeking literature deals with the problem by calling for a reduction in state activity in order to diminish the potential for rents (Krueger, 1974; Tullock, 1967 and 2005). However, Grindle reports that it has been possible for determined leaders like Carlos Salinas in Mexico to deal with the problem in a different way, by introducing a new policy which dislodges a preceding policy and which meets the needs of society rather than of hostile interests, initially at least. The Latin American leaders capitalized on the widespread perception of economic crisis, used patronage power to place supporters in key appointments, sidelined hostile party leaders and trade unions; in short, they pulled all the levers that their formal positions granted them in order to break stalemates and face down rent seekers.

Grindle's analysis implies a policy version of the Second Law of Thermodynamics where policies are inevitably subject to entropy. Every policy, she effectively suggests, comes with a sell-by date (Hofman *et al.*'s 'expiration date'). We are meant to resign ourselves to the expectation that the same heroic forces that are currently defending cash transfers and health policy in Brazil – the political actors who established the policy, and also the new interest groups that the policy itself has created (families benefiting from the *Bolsa Escola* programme, health service users) – will degenerate into reactionary obstacles to a new and more appropriate policy.

Further, we can draw from Grindle's analysis the inference that when the sell-by date arrives, the best way to bring about the termination of an exhausted policy is by superseding it with a new one that is supported by new ideas and new supporters; by trumping the old policy rather than by a frontal assault on it, the latter a drastic option that few leaders will undertake (DeLeon, 1978; Frantz, 2002; Sato, 2002). Thus terminating a policy becomes, paradoxically enough, an issue for the beginning and not the end of the policy cycle, since advocating a new policy will generate more reforming energy than opposing an old one.

However, the experience of microfinance suggests that there are ways of bucking Grindle's law of entropy, for a time at least. The same interest groups digging their heels in to resist any diminution of their privileges are, from a different point of view, sources of feedback that policymakers can use to maintain or rescue the congruence of their policies. Institutions, after all, do sometimes renew themselves: the counter-reformation in the Catholic Church is one celebrated historical example. And for policymakers just as for prelates, the incentive is that adaptation based on feedback preserves congruence with the changing policy environment, without which the old policy risks being swept away by a new and more congruent one.

Where does this leave us? Durability turns out to be more important, and more interesting, than we thought it was in Chapter 1. We saw that a policy needs to have a (preferably broad) coalition behind it to survive for any length of time. However, we also saw that durability turns out to be a two-edged sword: policies have the same

propensity to go bad as to stay good. To prevent policy decay, at the very outset policymakers need to minimize the influence of potential coalition members whose interests are hostile to policy objectives. Following that, policymakers need to ensure that policy coalitions become feedback mechanisms that facilitate adaptation, rather than ossifying into entrenched associations of rent-seekers.

Figure 1 presents the policy trajectories that we have discussed in this section.

Figure 1   Policy duration: A typical implementation trajectory

Policy coalition assembles

↓

Implementation

↙   ↓   ↘

consolidation   adaptation   ossification

(Shankland & Cornwall)   *(Hulme & Moore)*   ↙   ↓   ↘

termination   supersession   stagnation

(DeLeon, 1978 etc.)   *(Grindle)*

DESIGN MATTERS: LESSONS ON POLICY CONTENT

Policy and the Political Environment

Our cases have told us relatively little about the nuts and bolts of policy at the micro-level. The detailed discussion of microfinance models in Hulme and Moore's chapter, where design has mattered critically to financial sustainability, viability and women's empowerment, and likewise the brief but significant discussion of customs reform in Hofman *et al.*'s chapter, throw into relief the decision of our other contributors to concentrate on the non-professional, elements of policy success. Perhaps their absence is inevitable in a collection that spans the gamut of development policy, militating against the professional scrutiny that a focus on a single policy area might have allowed. However, we think there are still some useful lessons about the way that policy design at the macro-level interacts with the political environment, including about the way that the political economy of policy is itself amenable to design.

Where Should Policy 'Autonomy' be 'Embedded'?

The first lesson is a refinement of what Peter Evans (1995) has called 'embedded autonomy'. Policy design in the tradition that stems from Weber is assumed to require some insulation from political and social influences for the technocrats who design it. Hofman *et al.* argue that insulation along these lines contributed to Indonesia's economic success up to 1997. In the especially complex area of macroeconomics, that insulation is symbolized by the traditional *purdah*, or retreat from day-to-day politics, which the UK Finance minister and his officials are permitted in the run-up to the annual Budget. At the other extreme are those quick and dirty responses to some immediate political need that tend to be stigmatized as 'policy on the hoof'.

However, in another instance of good policy going bad, the same insulation that facilitated Indonesia's success laid it open to failure, Hofman *et al.* tell us, as the crony capitalists captured economic policy unconstrained by any civil society checks and balances. But that does not mean that we should feel nostalgic for the early phase of Soeharto's authoritarian regime. For, admittedly with the wisdom of hindsight, Hofman *et al.* castigate Soeharto for having 'bad policies in good times': for having failed to establish sound institutions, including the institutions of democracy, at a time when

windfall oil revenues would have made this relatively easy to do. Moreover, in neighbouring, more-or-less democratic Malaysia[1] and under the roughly contemporaneous Mahathir, the technocrats enjoyed the same insulation from politics. That also goes for their counterparts elsewhere in the region, as Hofman *et al.* note. Those countries are indeed examples of 'embedded autonomy', where technocrats have real autonomy that is qualified by being embedded in a dense network of social ties and which is, among other things, a source of intelligence – or of what we have called 'social learning'. Arguably therefore, our cases show that not just any old form of 'embedded autonomy' will do. 'Social ties', yes; but which ones? After all, macroeconomic policy in Indonesia *did* become embedded after a fashion, but in a small sector of crony capitalists, while its insulation from other groups and political processes fatally weakened policy adaptability.

Thus the 'what' of policy cannot be separated from the 'who whom?' questions of political economy. We have to distinguish between groups which support pro-poor policy and groups that oppose it, in very much the way that Mitlin distinguishes in Chapter 6 between the private companies and politicians that distorted pro-poor housing policy and the residents' groups that tried to keep it on track. In a similar way, because industrial policy in Latin America was not designed to enforce slow phasing out of industrial protection, and there were no countervailing groups to point to that omission, it was possible for industrial interests to lobby for protection to increase beyond reason. That in turn contributed to the replacement of the import substitution policy by neo-liberal policy, as Grindle outlines in her chapter.

Designing Participation

Grasping the importance of distinguishing between groups that support and oppose policy objectives prepares us to learn from the history of Brazil's National Health System, perhaps the most significant of all the experiences which our cases record. The institutionalization of support has contributed to its consolidation, as Shankland and Cornwall explain. Enshrined in the Constitution and the Basic Health Law, the Health Councils with their entrenched representation from organized civil society and the regular cycle of Health Conferences at municipal, state and federal levels have been

crucial. It may be that policymakers underestimate the extent to which the 'who whom' issues of the distribution of power can be designed in the same way as the 'what' issues of policy content. We will expand on this point when we discuss the importance of institutions later on.

Policy Design and Policy Learning

Design issues are also important in ensuring adaptive capacity in policy. While most of our contributors do not use the language of policy learning in their chapters, the substance of learning is present in most of them. The channels for learning are multiple, and many are not directly related to policy design: the freedom of a critical press, the scope for political debate, the existence of independent research bodies and a host of other attributes of a healthy public sphere are all critical for policy learning (see below). But learning can also be designed for. Brazil's health councils and conferences, and Nampula's district planning processes (Jackson), are as much sources of learning as ways of embedding policy and making it legitimate.

Ideas and Coalitions

Whether a nascent policy appeals to an audience that is broad enough to lift it off the ground is a matter of ideas as well as interests (John, 1998). This was clear in Marcus Melo's discussion of Senator Eduardo Suplicy's efforts to gain political support for a basic income grant policy in Brazil. We have seen already that in most of our cases there was a broad and loose coalition of policy champions which shepherded the policies through the necessary parliamentary and other processes. In Brazil it was the fertile suggestion of an economist called José Márcio Camargo that income grants to poor families should be conditional on children going to school which attracted the broad political support that gave the policy the necessary traction.

A further element of design that receives somewhat less attention is clear in Hofman *et al.*'s chapter. This relates to that aspect of design that enhances synergies among different policy instruments (for instance, between sectoral policies and macroeconomic policies), thus increasing the overall human development effects not just of each instrument but of the policy package as a whole. This theme appears as central to the

story of Indonesian economic success, and while Hofman *et al.* do not necessarily say so explicitly, the suggestion is that the ability to design with such synergy in mind was itself helped by the existence of a strong, protected and professionally competent team of technocrats.

The Political Economy Must Support Policy Design

In this section we hope to have shown how policy design has interacted with political economy in our cases. Certainly we are obliged to repeat that our emphasis on political economic and institutional dimensions of success ought not to obscure the brass tacks of planning and design which matter greatly to development success; the Weberian insistence on political insulation for the technocratic planners is correct. However, even the best design in the world will only succeed if the surrounding political economy provides, or is designed to provide, a coalition that will support the policy and that will give feedback that will allow the policy to respond to changing circumstances, and hence to endure.

POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF SUCCESS

That 'political economy' which we have just highlighted in relation to policy design can be an all-encompassing concept. Indeed in chapter 1 we use it to cover everything from leadership to state-society and power relationships. Underlying this broad use of the term, though, are four simple ideas. First, policies cannot be analyzed separately from their social, political and economic contexts. Second, heroic leaders, entrepreneurs and brokers, so often the darlings of policy analysis, must be understood in terms of the networks of which they are a part, and in turn the institutions and social structures within which those networks are embedded. Third, the forms, functions and effects of policies are as much determined by wider socio-economic relationships as they are by the internal dynamics of the policy design process. And finally, for our particular purposes in this collection, 'success' is a question of political economy: not only in its determination, but also in the power relationships that ultimately decide what counts as success in a society.

State-Society Relations and Policy Cycles

The cases have reinforced our initial editorial conviction that policy was far from synonymous with state policy, and that successful public policy depends on much more than state action. They depict interaction between the state and a wide range of organized non-state actors which includes social movements, unions, NGOs and business lobbies, and which takes different forms at different stages of the policy cycle. Here we focus on two ways in which state-society interactions contribute to success.

First, they have stimulated a vigorous public debate that has made certain policies imaginable and politically viable. Social movements have been key. The Brazilian cases are clear on this. The progressive democratization of Brazilian society – itself largely a product of social movement pressure (Dagnino *et al.*, 2006) – also made possible new and increasingly inventive forms of mobilization. One of these was the civic movement to impeach President Collor which gave rise to a 'countrywide mobilization' (Melo's phrase) to distribute food to poor people in which NGOs played an important role. 'The Action in Defense of Citizenship for the Fight against Hunger' spawned thousands of local committees across the country. Public awareness of hunger intensified, influencing discussions in Parliament. Melo is convinced that these antecedents were critical in creating an environment in which a basic income transfer programme could become politically attractive. Shankland and Cornwall suggest something similar about Brazil's *movimento sanitarista* (the movement for public health) which brought activists and professionals together and paved the way for a publicly funded, rights-based health system.

This process of policy development is very different from the basically 'top-down' one that Hofman *et al.* and Grindle outline, but not wholly different from the one outlined by Hulme and Moore. The similarity between Bangladesh and Brazil is that income transfers, microfinance and public health provision all alike arose from an initial burst of what Hulme and Moore, quoting Uphoff – who in turn got the idea from Hirschman, (1984) – call 'social energy': the creative popular ferment which accompanied democratization in Brazil and independence in Bangladesh. The difference, however, is that Brazil's activists channeled their energy into the state, whereas Bangladesh's

channeled it into the voluntary sector: Brazil's activists were as optimistic about government as Bangladesh's were pessimistic.

Such social movement processes not only give more visibility to issues that later become policies. They also create expanding networks of relationships and shared commitments that help sustain the policies that are grounded in those commitments. Moreover, through their subsequent involvement with the policies, the networks develop further links with government reformists (cf. Fox, 1996), and with other activists and professionals outside the core bureaucracy. Shankland and Cornwall argue that this is precisely what occurred in Brazil's health councils, and analyze the process in terms of Peter Haas's concept of 'epistemic communities' – in their case communities that run from council members through to professionals and administrators.

These epistemic communities play various roles. First, they provide a vision of what a fully fledged policy would look like. The case of microfinance (Hulme and Moore) is obvious here, but this also applies to participatory planning in Mozambique (Jackson). Following that, they help to maintain the policy, they provide feedback that can be used for policy adaptations, and they guard against the possibility that policy will be captured or watered down by others. Mitlin's arguments about the susceptibility of housing programmes to capture by business or political interests reflect her concern that such network-based communities are weak in the field of housing policy, leading to her closing call for policies that foster more empowerment.

Networks and the Legitimacy of Non-State Actors
Mitlin's discussion is also helpful because it makes clear that there is always a range of network-based communities that surround policy. Their relative power determines the direction of policy. Hofman *et al.* say the same thing in so many words when they point to the multiple ways in which non-state (or better, non-Soeharto) institutions were weakened, preventing other networks from developing and steering policy away from the increasingly dominant (and closed) networks of the crony capitalists. As so often in this collection, the question 'successful for whom?' is crucial. We suggest that it is the

groups which are able to mobilize networks and influence policy development which will benefit from that policy.

It would seem to follow that the Brazil model of social engagement (development by the people) offers more than the Bangladesh model of social altruism (development for the people, 'of non-poor, for poor', as James Copestake is quoted as saying by Hulme and Moore). The nature of the evidence in this collection means that we can only flag this up as an interesting possibility on which further research would be worthwhile. However, if we can develop that suggestion, then 'development success' becomes a war of attrition which requires the sustained empowerment of pro-poor actors. That empowerment in turn requires alliances which, however riven by latent tensions (Mitlin), are strong to the extent that that they are grounded in prior networks of solidarity and forms of social energy that bind like-minded actors together (Fox, 1996; Hirschman, 1984). Critically, and again as Mitlin suggests, for such alliances to 'win', they must involve both civil society and state. Civil society actors need to enroll state reformists in their efforts to elicit and sustain particular policies, and reformists need to reach out to civil society actors.

Thus the state is never the sole actor in any of our cases. That is not a new insight: scholars have recognized it at least since Heclo and Wildavsky (1974) and, more recently, Rhodes' influential writing on networks proceeds from it (1997). But in our cases the state is not always even the leading actor. This is humbling for both elected and appointed state officials in one way. But in another way, it creates the possibility of harnessing the social energy which social movements seem to find easier to tap into than public bodies: the civic mobilization which led up to the substantial commitments to African aid at the G8 Summit of 2005 at Gleneagles in Scotland is a dramatic recent example.

'Dethroning' the state would appear to raise the criticism of legitimacy so often leveled at social movements: by what right do you presume to place yourselves on an equal footing with a legitimate government, especially a democratically elected one? We cannot hope to answer that criticism fully in this chapter. However, we are perhaps

entitled to point to Shankland and Cornwall's account of the participatory structures of Brazil's National Health System as adding to rather than supplanting the conventional legitimacy of the state. Certainly those structures may over time degenerate into a glorified rent seekers' club where an obsession with universal access to health services prevents the service improvements that a market-based system may be better at providing: that would be Grindle's fear. But for the moment they appear on balance to be enhancing the health care available to citizens rather than damaging it.

Varieties of Policy and the Question of Distribution

In the introductory chapter, we suggested that policies that aim to redistribute resources are less likely to be successful, largely because they encounter more resistance. At one level, this may seem an unhelpful observation, as almost all policies have redistributive effects over time. However, our cases appear to endorse the argument that policies that are explicitly redistributive – be this because they transfer the resources of one group to another, because they target significant public spending to particular groups or because they appear to take resources away from a particular interest group – are very prone to problems.

This is partly due to the institutional complexities that derive from problems of scale. Any policy that attempts redistribution on a significant scale needs to involve large institutions. Mitlin argues, for instance, that mass housing policy needs the involvement of the state for both resource and legal reasons. In the case of microfinance, any effort to scale up (to step up from a project to a policy, so to speak) has likewise required NGOs to seek funds from new sources. In Indonesia, many of the sectoral and macroeconomic policies had to be resourced by external loans. In all three cases, going to scale drew new players into the institutional network through which policy was delivered, and those players brought with them an additional set of interests, potential conflicts and conditions which complicated policy dynamics.

Merilee Grindle's chapter addresses another related sense in which policy type influences the probability of success. Arguing particularly from the experience of education reform, she suggests that policies of expansion are more likely to succeed than are policies

aimed at changing the way a service is provided. This is because expansionary policies (e.g. those aimed at increasing education provision), while benefiting some more than others, do at least bring some benefit to many different groups. Policies that aim to change the mechanisms through which services are delivered and controlled are quite distinct. They offer far less by way of immediate tangible benefits, and generally concentrate heavy costs in a few particular groups (who, furthermore, are often the same groups who benefited from earlier policies of expansion). They generate far more resistance.

Leaders and Leadership

Grindle shows that the possibility of overcoming resistance depends greatly on leadership skills, both the ability to negotiate and the ability to force through change in the face of resistance. Likewise, it may be that in conditions of increasing institutional complexity such as those we outlined above, forceful leadership becomes even more important as a way of cutting the Gordian knot of institutions. Certainly leaders appear as important actors in the policy narrative in all our cases, and also as part of the explanation of success in Grindle and Hulme and Moore's chapters. Given that policy is a public matter, leaders are the public faces which those coalitions must have if their ideas are to be implemented as policies.

We have already listed ways in which Grindle's leaders used the levers of power. We need only list, additionally, a couple of the ways in which Muhammad Yunus shaped the development of microfinance in Bangladesh: through inventing it, primarily, but also later on through using his elite position to negotiate its unique statutory position, and later still through reinventing it in the form of 'Grameen II'. Leadership thus emerges as integral to policy success, consistent with other accounts such as Tendler's (1997). Yet it remains hard to theorize and work with, as Melo points out in Chapter 2.

Perhaps it is helpful if we break the identification of leadership with a single leader and think of it as a task, not a person. Individual power is not the exclusive property of leaders who are formally designated as such. Leadership may be 'distributed' (Barry, 1991; Brown and Hosking, 1986), shared relatively equally among several members of a

coalition. That seems to have been the case with 'the coalition', as Jackson calls it, which drove participatory planning in Nampula (Chapter 8). Alternatively, leadership may be sequential, with different individuals having more or less power at different stages of policy development, rather in the way that the conch shell in William Golding's *Lord of the Flies* passes from hand to hand to indicate which boy can speak in a meeting. Melo's fine-grained account of Brazil's income transfer policy illustrates this.[2] It was Senator Eduardo Suplicy who put the original idea on the policy table, (he modestly attributes the idea itself to a colleague: see Chapter 2, Note 12), whereupon the economist Camargo refined it in a way that made it attractive to the municipalities (the Mayor of Campinas, Magalhães Teixeira, ran with the ball for a while), and then to the federal government, initially under Cardoso and latterly under Lula.

There are also different categories of leader. One set, exemplified by Suplicy and Yunus, includes those leaders who both help elaborate the initial policy idea and then assiduously promote it. In Burns' (1978) well-known terms, they are 'transformational' leaders, exercising power that derives from their determination and intrinsic skills as policy innovators (see also Rogaly, 1996). They are not necessarily elected or deeply embedded in broader socio-political structures that give them power and legitimacy.

A second category does derive its power from the political base. These are the classic political leaders who populate Grindle's chapter. They resolve conflicts, build policy consensus, and force through policy adaptations which break down the political equilibria that block change. However, it is not a foregone conclusion that they will do any of those things. Melo suggests that their willingness or otherwise depends on their calculation of the political benefits. In Burns' terms, these are the 'transactional' leaders. (Of course some very gifted individuals can be both transactional and transformational leaders: Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh is an example.)

A third category of leaders are the technocrats. They appear as important players in macroeconomic policy in Indonesia, and in industrial and – even more – education policy in Latin America. Theirs is what French and Raven (1959) have called 'expert power'.[3] They may also have their own networks, particularly professional ones – epistemic

communities inside and outside their countries which are also a power base of sorts. Technocratic leaders operate behind the scenes. While this gives them room for manoeuvre, it means that they cannot play a role in resolving political conflicts around policy change, and so they need the classic political leaders to do that job for them, and to insulate them from political pressures.

Our cases suggest that leadership is particularly important at three policy stages:

- the inception stage, where an individual or individuals get(s) the idea on to the policy agenda (for instance, Suplicy with income transfers in Brazil)
- the implementation stage where an individual or individuals overcome(s) the opposition of supporters of the old dispensation (Grindle's Latin American leaders)
- an individual or individuals ensure(s) that the policy adapts to changing circumstances, using the coalition as a feedback mechanism (Muhammad Yunus with microfinance in Bangladesh)

Leaders and Followers

All this is some way from the railway bookstall picture of the leader as the autonomous, lonely individual taking tough decisions and dragging his followers in his or her wake. Leaders of the kinds we depict may articulate their followers' aspirations better than they can, and they may even persuade their followers that they see their interests more clearly than they do themselves. But their political identity is inseparable from that of the coalitions whose figureheads they are. Indeed their power evaporates when they become detached from their power bases and identify themselves with other elite figures outside their coalitions. That was the fate of Bishop Abel Muzorewa in the run-up to Zimbabwean independence, of Mikhail Gorbachev in the dying days of the Soviet Union and of Margaret Thatcher after eleven years as the United Kingdom's prime minister. We can contrast that fate with the way that Nelson Mandela in South Africa resisted the apartheid government's attempt to drive a wedge between him and his party, the African National Congress, just before his release from prison in 1990.

This is close to the view of leadership which Melo derives from Fiorina and Shepsle (1989) in Chapter 2. It is clear that Grindle's leaders are not of this type, but it is not clear that the policies they have forced through have been successful. In this collection at least – and once again we stress the limitations of our seven cases – it is the leaders of the kind we have depicted whose coalitions' policies have succeeded.

Perhaps the need for leaders to stay close to followers mitigates the striking fact that all the 'leaders' that we have named in this section are still within the charmed circle of the policy elite: they are 'of non-poor, for poor', in Copestake's words which we quoted earlier. There is nothing in our cases to suggest that individual poor people have directly influenced 'pro-poor' policy (Hulme and Moore have an interesting discussion of 'men's leadership and [poor] women's agency' which bears on this). Lacking all of French and Raven's bases of social power, their route to influence is through collective action, as Mitlin emphasizes in her chapter conclusion, and as Shankland and Cornwall illustrate in their discussion of Brazil's institutionalized health councils and conferences.

IMPLEMENTATION

Given that our definition of success has been a time-based one – we wanted to see policies that have endured and, preferably, survived a change of government – the implementation phase is part and parcel of development success. The chapters suggest several lessons about it.

Complex Policies and Empowering the Powerless

The first lesson concerns policy complexity. Generally, the simpler a policy's implementation process, the greater the chance of success. Macroeconomic policies of the kind that Hofman *et al.* address are easier to implement and sustain than social development policies because the path from design to implementation is short and involves fewer actors.[4] A short path means less resistance, slippage or reworking of the policy. This in fact was one of the arguments used to justify setting up Latin America's social funds. They were designed to minimize the steps from central government to final recipient in order to speed up implementation and limit the diversion of funds (van Domelen, 2006).

However, for most social sector policies, implementation is a complex process involving multiple actors, intermediaries and interests. Our cases suggest a useful lesson here, one that relates to 'empowerment'. Diana Mitlin argues forcefully in her chapter that a range of actors try to twist policy implementation to their own advantage. Since some of them naturally have more power than others, the extent to which a policy actually addresses human development needs comes to depend on the extent to which the implementation process empowers those who lack power, since they are the very ones at whom pro-poor policy is directed (in Mitlin's case, those who lack secure shelter). Shankland and Cornwall's chapter pulls in the same direction. Brazil's health councils enhanced health system users' ability to insist that access to services should be based on citizenship, not the market.

These observations, which echo those made by Guggenheim (2006) among others, highlight the fact that policy success means keeping implementation processes 'on track', oriented towards human development goals rather than clientelist ones. For this to occur, the progressive empowerment of the groups which are committed to ensuring these human development goals is of signal importance to forestall policy capture and distortion.

Policy Success and the Institutions of Democracy
We included institutions under the heading of implementation in our Chapter 1 framework, so it is convenient to review here what our cases have told us about them. At this stage we do not need to labour their basic importance, which most of our contributors recognize, notably Hofman *et al.* and Grindle. However, our contributors are divided about the special case of the institutions of democracy so we will spend some time discussing them in this section. It may be an advantage of a cross-national case collection like ours that there is an opportunity to reflect on divisions that may be taken-for-granted assumptions at national level.

Our first group of contributors associates democracy with success. The association is strongest in the two Brazil chapters, which argue that the electoral popularity of income transfers and the institutionalization of civic engagement in the health sector there have

done a great deal to keep the income transfer policy and the National Health System on track. But it is also present in the Indonesia chapter. Earlier on we noted Hofman *et al.*'s reading that although prosperity was possible in Indonesia up to 1997 with weak institutions which included Soeharto's 'guided democracy', the Crisis of 1997 was the point at which the institutional and democratic chickens came home to roost.

However, other contributors barely raise even E. M. Forster's celebrated 'two cheers for democracy'. All that Hulme and Moore's social entrepreneurs seem to need from the Bangladesh government is for it to keep out of microfinance's way. They note that the growth of NGOs there, including microfinance NGOs, was a reaction to the early failure of government to respond to the problems that accompanied Bangladesh's independence in 1971. So negative is the view of government that the Grameen Bank, they report, refuses to employ anyone who has been tainted by working in the public sector. Likewise, Mitlin's heart is with 'community democracy' rather than the party political variety, which she sees as indelibly clientelistic; while Grindle, for her part, makes no distinction between democratic and authoritarian leaders.[5]

Outside the sometimes wishful thinking of international development agencies, it is the skeptical view of democracy of the latter contributors that is probably the mainstream academic one, as Melo highlights at the start of his chapter. Mushtaq Khan (2005), for example, has used the incontestable fact that rich countries are generally more democratic than poor ones to argue that the electoral competition that stems from democratization in developing countries is very likely to increase the power of patron-client factions, since they are usually better organized to assert their preferences than the atomized majority of poor voters. He exempts from his rule only the high middle-income countries where he sees democracy approximating to the version prevailing in rich countries.

Yet Khan remains explicitly a democrat, as is Grindle among our contributors despite her admiration for some authoritarian leaders' political skills, and even Mitlin and Hulme and Moore's criticisms of democratic politics are contingent rather than fundamental ones. Therefore the challenge is to make democracy work for development, and to see

whether the social entrepreneurialism of Chapters 2, 5 and 7 can be replicated in, or transferred to, other countries (from Brazil), and equally to the public sector[6] (from the NGO sector, where microfinance has been most vibrant).

Constraints on Replicating Brazil's State-Led Success

In canvassing that possibility we must be aware of four specific constraints that our cases suggest, in addition to the general one that 'context matters' with which most of us are now familiar.

1. Both our positive examples of civic engagement come from a single country, Brazil. Relevant to Khan's critique, one of Brazil's characteristics is that it is a lower middle-income economy, whereas Bangladesh, despite encouraging recent growth, remains low income. (However, so too does Mozambique, whose success with embedding democratic participation in a disadvantaged region Jackson has recorded.)

2. Even if the decision of social activists to go down the NGO path in Bangladesh and the government path in Brazil was fortuitous, rather than based on a clear-eyed calculation about the potential for a state-led approach to succeed in the two countries (and we have already noted the view that the growth of Bangladeshi NGOs reflected government failure following independence), there may be some 'path dependence' by now (Mahoney, 2003), restricting Bangladesh's freedom to switch to the government path.

3. A replication of the 'social energy' that accompanied democratization in Brazil in the late 1980s will probably be necessary, as that was crucial at the inception of the income transfer policy and the National Health System. We need hardly stress what a tall order that is, although we should note that there are those who believe that some inducement or 'catalyization' is possible: see for example Uphoff (2000).

4. Great care will be needed to design an institutional structure of participation that will empower the intended beneficiaries of the policy, and prevent the political patrons and rent-seekers from capturing it. This is also a stringent constraint, but at least our Brazilian cases offer encouraging precedents.

It is beyond the scope of our enquiry to say if those formidable constraints can be overcome in any particular country. However, it seems reasonable to state that if in Bangladesh (or elsewhere) a new generation of social entrepreneurs were to arise, share Khan and Grindle's democratic instincts and decide to apply the same energy to the public sector that a previous generation applied to the voluntary sector in Bangladesh, then the success of state-led social development in Brazil may offer a model that it can adapt.

POLICY TRANSFER: ENTREPRENEURS AND INCENTIVES

Voluntary and Coercive Transfer: Donors as Bit Players

In discussing policy transfer in Chapter 1, we suggested that it was unlikely that policies imposed through 'coercive transfer' (Marsh and Dolowitz, 2000) would succeed. It may be significant, therefore, that none of the successful policies in this collection seems to have been foisted on the policymakers. Indonesia's macroeconomic policy under Soeharto and economic liberalization in Latin America were broadly 'orthodox', but according to Hofman *et al.* and Grindle they were still developed locally. In Indonesia the 'technocrats' were more influenced, it seems, by their university teachers in the United States than by the IMF or the World Bank, whose views also counted for less in Latin America than political leaders' own deep conviction that change was necessary, as Grindle goes out of her way to emphasize.

Where policies are transferred voluntarily rather than imposed, then political salesmanship will be at a premium: the saying that 'a good product sells itself' does not apply to policies. Here again there is a role for the domestic 'transformational' leader. Eduardo Suplicy, Raul Prebisch and Muhammad Yunus in Chapters 2, 3 and 5 respectively are examples. They promoted as well as designed the policies with which they are associated.

It is striking how modest is the role that the IMF, World Bank and other donor agencies play in our cases, either for good or for ill, considering their ubiquity in the development literature.[7] This may be because when these agencies promote a policy, their financial power means that they inevitably do so as coercers rather than salesmen. But it may also be – and this is a hypothesis – that large bureaucracies are less good at innovating or persuading than think tanks, research institutes, NGOs and public intellectuals. If there is something to the hypothesis, then apart from the cold water it pours on the late-90s ambition of the World Bank to turn itself into a 'knowledge bank', it has important implications for knowledge generation to support policy development. Multi-nodal systems of policy innovation which bridge research and policy may be more fertile than bureaucratic monoliths (Stone, 2000; 2002).

Varieties of Transfer

Even in our cases of policies that have been adopted voluntarily rather than through coercion, there is still considerable variation in the nature of the transfer. Grindle's account of the transfer of policy ideas in industrial development and education across Latin American governments is closest to the transfer process that Marsh and Dolowitz envisage. Here the transfer is from one national polity and technocracy to another, with other actors, in particular multilateral ones, oiling the wheels.

But we also have two forms of transfer that are outside Marsh and Dolowitz's model. The first is what is probably the paradigmatic case of modern international development policy transfer, that of microfinance. Its interesting feature is that it has largely bypassed governments, the conventional agents of public policy. The process of transfer has been from its inception and expansion in the Grameen Bank to its adoption by other Bangladeshi NGOs, and then subsequently by international policy circuits, including the World Bank, at which point it entered the pantheon of development orthodoxy. This, however, is a logical consequence of the view of development policy which we espoused in Chapter 1, in terms of policy beneficiaries rather than providers, a view that brings the NGOs which have taken the lead on microfinance within the scope of mainstream development policy.

The second form of transfer was hinted at in the last paragraph when we talked about the expansion of the Grameen Bank and the replication of its activities by other Bangladeshi NGOs. That phase of the development of policy is well discussed under the heading of 'scaling up' in the NGO literature (see for example Uvin, 1995), but something like it also occurs in the public sector. Thus Melo describes the within-country transfer of Brazil's income transfer policy, initially across municipalities and subsequently up to federal government, and Jackson describes the difficulties encountered in Mozambique's attempts to scale up Nampula's participatory planning model.

Policy Refraction: Incentives and Congruence

In Chapter 1 we talked about 'policy refraction', where policies are adapted to local conditions rather than adopted wholesale. Our cases have provided two insights into this process. The first concerns incentives. When policymakers are free to adopt or not adopt, incentives matter as much in transferring policies as they do in transferring footballers.[8] Melo's argument in Chapter 2 is that the income transfer policy benefited from a 'bandwagon' effect, with first one municipality after another and then the federal government scrambling on board because of the electoral return which they expected this popular policy to give them. Similarly, the opportunities to make money and win votes were incentives for private companies and politicians to attach themselves to housing policies in Mitlin's chapter. Arguably it is because such incentives are missing in Mozambique that the Nampula participatory planning experiment has not transferred successfully to other provinces or to the national level.

The problem here is that the incentive may be so much baggage weighing the policy down. With income transfer in Brazil, making payments conditional on school attendance added a transaction cost, as someone presumably has to monitor attendance, adjudicate on appeals from feckless parents and so on. More problematically, we have seen already how bringing private companies and politicians on board skewed housing provision away from support to community self-help activities. These compromises may have been what made the policies viable, but they came at a cost.

That said, one way or another policies have to be brought in line with the broader incentives and values that structure policy making. The tremendous transfer and diffusion of microfinance, for instance, has occurred partly because its emphasis on individual repayment and individual entrepreneurship[9] chimed with the broadly neo-liberal discourse that dominates international financial institutions, ministries of finance and social responsibility foundations. The emphasis on women was helpful too (though it would appear secondary). The transfer of import-substituting industrialization policy in Latin America was also aided by its congruence with nationalist ideologies of state-led development that underlay both military and populist governments of the period. Finally, and perhaps most interestingly among our cases, the argument for basic income guarantee transfers tied to education resonated with the structure of political incentives in Brazil's consolidating representative democracy. It offered a policy with potential vote-winning dividends, and thus became an object of partisan competition as each party tried to leapfrog the others by adopting the policy to reach out to a larger part of the electorate.

The consumers of particular policies are thus at different levels, and so it is not only the impact on beneficiaries that will determine whether they are transferred. The more a policy resonates with other policy stakeholders, particularly powerbrokers, the likelier its transfer into new domains will be. In this sense, once again, design matters. The policies that travel are not only those whose design increases the likelihood of human development effects but also whose design makes the policy attractive to its different audiences. The design challenge, here again, is to structure the policy process to empower groups committed to ensuring that the policy stays faithful to its original objectives. Shankland and Cornwall's account of the development of Brazil's National Health System shows that this can be done, even in the face of considerable pressures.

CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONALIZED SOCIAL ENERGY

The framework developed in chapter 1 was more comprehensive than parsimonious. It gave our contributors a good deal of room to manoeuvre, but as an explanatory tool it was unwieldy. In the light of our cases and our analysis of them in this chapter, can we identify a shorter list of factors that has greater explanatory power? Based on our

cases, the items on that list will all concern the politics of policy, about which our cases have told us more than we expected, and less than we expected about its managerial and professional aspects. In part that emphasis must reflect our contributors' (and their editors') personal preoccupations. We would not want readers to go away with the idea that the professional content or the management of policy don't matter. That is, for one thing, because in individual cases they have mattered a good deal (the content of customs reform in Indonesia, the Grameen Bank's human resource system in Bangladesh). But it is equally because in the actual development practice of governments like Malaysia's and of development agencies (to take an example from outside this collection), we observe the ever-increasing use of the techniques of strategic management – in performance indicators, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, logical frameworks and so on. However, it is the political issues that our contributors have given us a mandate to highlight, and we do so now.

Taken as a whole, the cases suggest three main explanatory factors: power, leadership and institutional design. We discuss them now in turn.

Power: Organizations and Coalitions

The balance of power is central to all seven cases. It creates environments more or less propitious to different policies, and determines which groups and which ideas will prevail. The power of different actors ebbs and flows over the lifetime of a policy. Power over policy has many sources, but two seem to matter a good deal: organization and coalitions. Actors gain power as they become organized: unity as strength, not only in the teachers' and other unions where that motto was coined, but also in squatters' associations, business lobbies and users' committees. Getting organized increases policy leverage.

The ability to develop policy coalitions (which our contributors have variously labeled alliances, epistemic communities, social movements or networks) is also important (cf. Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Our contributors make clear again and again how such

coalitions serve as sources of power in policy arguments. In policy tussles, it is effectively coalitions that do the tussling.

Leadership

Second, one cannot read these cases without being impressed by the frequency with which leadership emerges. Policy success is not impersonal, and cannot be understood without referring to named individuals. However, as well as the heroic and lonely figures of popular legend (though they exist), our cases depict two other styles of leadership, which we called 'distributed' and 'sequential'. We also noted three different types of leadership, transformational, transactional and technocratic, variously important at different policy stages. All these styles and types are rooted in the coalitions that they personify; they do not float freely above them.

Institutional Design

Third, while our cases have told us little about the professional content of policy design, they have given us an insight into its institutional architecture. We have seen the importance of conducting pro-poor policy in a way that empowers those who are committed to it (and, by the same token, that relegates those who are opposed). Once more we highlight Brazil's health councils and conferences as the paradigm case of empowerment through institutional design.

Likewise, the policy needs to be designed to provide incentives to individuals and groups whose participation is crucial to realizing a policy, as we saw happening in Brazil when income transfers were linked to school attendance; an example which illustrates that the incentives need not take the form of crude personal inducements.

'Institutionalized Social Energy': An Account of the Stages of Policy Success

In the light of our cases and our analysis of them, it is possible to identify a schematic account of the stages of policy success which incorporates the above three explanatory factors and which seems to map quite well on to the cases (Table 2). We suggest 'institutionalized social energy' as a label for this account, as long as it is recognized that it is a shorthand for a process whose stages, in terms of Table 2, are these:

social energy → idea → coalition → leader → institutionalization → feedback

Table 2: **'Institutionalized social energy': An account of the stages of policy success**

POLICY STAGE	EXAMPLE	THREAT TO SUCCESS
An upsurge of *'social energy'* ...	Democratization in Brazil (Chapter 2)	Policy lacks popular roots or is imposed (structural adjustment policies)
Generates a policy *idea* ...	Microfinance in Bangladesh (Chapter 5)	Sterile oppositionism (Chapter 6)
or highlights an existing idea ...	Income transfers borrowed from the Basic Income European Network (Chapter 2)	
around which a *coalition* assembles ...	'the coalition' in Nampula, Mozambique (Chapter 8)	Sabotage or competing coalitions (Chapter 6)
which throws up a *leader* who gets the idea on the policy agenda ...	Suplicy in Brazil, Salinas and other Latin American leaders (Chapters 2 and 4)	Leadership is weak (succession of presidents in Venezuela, Chapter 4)
and overcomes opposition from supporters of the old dispensation.	Deliberate weakening of teachers' unions in Latin America (Chapter 4)	Opposition to economic reform is too strong (Kiragu and Mukandala, 2004)
The coalition is *institutionalized*, empowering beneficiaries and deflecting patrons and rent seekers ...	Health councils and conferences in Brazil (Chapter 7)	Patrons or rent seekers capture the policy (partial capture of housing policy, Chapter 6)
and consolidated through *feedback* to adapt the policy to changing circumstances.	Innovation in microfinance products in Bangladesh (Chapter 5)	Policy entropy (macroeconomic policy in Indonesia, Chapter 3; universal access education policy in Latin America, Chapter 4)

There are three items listed under 'threats to success' which are not self-explanatory. First, our reference to 'sterile oppositionism' is influenced by Mitlin's account of how the urban housing movement in Mexico shifted from negative resistance to evictions and land tax charges towards active demands. The slogan that encapsulated the shift was '*Protesta con propuesta*': protest with proposal. Sterile oppositionism would mean not going beyond resistance: 'protesta sin (without) propuesta', as it were.

Second, while we would love to be able to say pithily that policy success comes from inside while policy failure comes from outside, that would exclude the case of income transfers in Brazil, which had a European origin. However, we have noted that it was adopted voluntarily, just like all our successful policies and in contrast to structural adjustment policies (our chosen example of a 'threat' at Stage One), which notoriously failed partly because they were not 'owned' (McCourt, 2003). Thus the American historian Barbara Tuchman's (1984: 411) rhetorical question - 'What nation has ever been built from outside?' – retains its force.

Third, since all the policies discussed here were actually implemented, we have had to go outside our collection for an example of failure to overcome opposition to a policy. Our example (from a distressingly large set of possibilities) is the economic reform failure and the election defeat of President Soglo of Benin in the mid-1990s, at the hands of an informal alliance of trade unions and opposition parties (Kiragu and Mukandala, 2004).

We would draw the attention of conservative-minded readers, who may feel they have had little to show for our enquiry up to now, that despite the 'pro-poor' definition of development which the authors of this volume have espoused, our 'institutionalized social energy' account turns out to be ideologically neutral, with equal application to policies of any political complexion – including 'anti-poor' ones.

The distance we have traveled to arrive at this account becomes clear when we compare it with a standard model of the public policy process such as that of Jenkins (1978), with its stages of initiation, information, consideration, decision, implementation,

evaluation and termination.[10]   In a nutshell, where Jenkins' model is rational, ours is political (which is not to say that 'political policy' is necessarily irrational). However, we hope that our account is not idiosyncratic. In its stress on the social origins of policy ideas and coalitions, it shares much with those accounts that emphasize the sociology of knowledge and politics of ideas in policy processes (for example, Bebbington *et al.*, 2006); and in its stress on the multifarious membership of policy coalitions, in which the state is not necessarily the leading member, it aligns itself with Houtzager's (2003) polity approach. This is apart from those writers we have referenced from whom we have drawn inspiration – and not least from the contributors to this volume.

Further Research

Research is hydra-headed: we resolve research problems only to see others sprout in their place. The limitations of our research strategy are a specific reason for that happening here. If the results of our enquiry have vindicated our decision to look at development policy through the lens of success, then first and foremost we call for further analyses of success. There are frequently cited examples of 'success' about which we know surprisingly little. Economic growth in Malaysia and Mauritius are two which have been invoked in this collection (there are of course many more examples). We saw in Chapter 1 that it is not clear how much the former owes to a World Bank structural adjustment loan in the early 1980s and how much to the earlier indigenous decision to launch an all-island Free Trade Zone. Nor is it clear how we should compare the latter with an account like Hofman *et al.*'s in this volume of growth in neighbouring Indonesia. Such analyses may wish to use the criteria for success (durability etc.) and at least the standard of evidence that we have established here, but they will take our enquiry to a deeper level if they are based on fresh primary research rather than looking sideways at their authors' previous research as our contributors have done (and as we intended that they would).

Paraphrasing Mahatma Gandhi's famous remark, our contributors tend to agree that democratic development 'would be a good idea': they remain democrats at heart even where it is authoritarian success that they discuss (Hofman *et al.* and Grindle). There is even the hope in Jackson's chapter that policy success will strengthen democratic

legitimacy. While there may be no statistical correlation between democracy and growth, as Mushtaq Khan has pointed out, we can still seek examples beyond the possibly exceptional case of Brazil where democracy has gone hand in hand with development success, bucking the patronage and rent-seeking trend about which authors like Khan and Anne Krueger are so pessimistic. Providing an answer to this second research question of ours will throw light on the very large but very important issue of the relative viability of state-led and NGO-led (not to mention private sector-led) development.

A third research question which our emphasis on development policy in the long run has created – somewhat to our editorial surprise – concerns the trajectory of implementation. Are policies doomed to atrophy, as Grindle implies they must, or are they able to renew themselves, as Hulme and Moore imply that they can? Again, we need examples to supplement Hulme and Moore's account of microfinance in Bangladesh. In this context it will be interesting to see if empowering those who support the objectives of pro-poor reform and using their feedback to adapt policy to changing circumstances is as important as our cases suggest. There may well be other factors that we have overlooked, possibly those factors of professional content or policy management about which we have had so little to say.

The fourth and final question concerns the origin of policy ideas. The creative ferment from which they emerge takes place beneath the policy analysis radar. For example, it took a good number of years for microfinance in Bangladesh to come to the attention of scholars, by which time the gestation was long over. In the social capital tradition, we know quite a lot about the social movements from which policy emerges, and at the other end of the policy process we know quite a lot about policies once they are in the public arena. But between those two extremes we know little. It would be very useful to have more accounts that are as close to the data as Melo's and Jackson's are here.

Suggestions for Policymakers

We come now to the practical implications of our findings, even though the suggestions we will make come with a health warning because of the nature of our research

strategy. Our expanded view of the policy community means that we will address social activists as well as the government and development agency officials to whom recommendations in volumes like this are usually confined.

State officials, both elected and appointed, should develop antennae that will enable them to scan for winners on which to base their policies in the ever-bubbling pot of social ideas and inventions: outside agencies may be more fertile sources than government ministries and departments. Officials will increase the likelihood of their policies materializing and sticking by making common cause with groups outside government who share their commitments, and by giving them a formal institutional role. Such groups can be a sounding board for the appropriateness of policies, allowing 'running repairs' that will keep the policies on course. It is wise to give as few hostages to fortune in the form of concessions to hostile groups as possible.

Social activists should think whether counterparts' success in influencing government policy in Brazil, Mozambique and (for housing policy) Chile, the Philippines and South Africa is a precedent for moving from opposition to constructive engagement – from 'protesta' to 'propuesta' – and uniting in a policy coalition with like-minded state officials. The frustrations of working with the state will be substantial, but so will the potential rewards. Activists should channel at least some of their 'social energy' if at all possible into state structures, and avoid the vicious circle where dissatisfaction with state corruption and inefficiency leads to setting up parallel structures which further erode state capacity, and so round again. They should stay engaged through implementation, firstly by lobbying to be included in a formal institutional structure that will help ensure that the policy is not hijacked by patrons and freeloaders, and then by giving feedback that will contribute to the policy staying on track rather than atrophying.

Development agencies should consolidate the view to which many of them already subscribe that successful policy comes from inside, and in normal conditions cannot be induced by an outside agency – however bitter a pill that may be for some agencies to swallow. Since they are committed to supporting 'what works', they should use their

purchasing power to commission studies that will help them understand long-run policy success and 'pick winners'.

For all three alike, it is important to identify the policy leader who at the policy inception stage will be the battering ram that gets a policy on to the statute book. And lastly, the *leaders* themselves should recognize that their role is to personify the policy, and stay close to the people who put them where they are. They should have Mandela and not Muzorewa as their role model.

Celebrating Success

In his eulogy for the Irish poet William Butler Yeats, W. H. Auden (1966: 143) said that it was part of a poet's job to 'teach the free man how to praise'.[11] Sober-sided policy analysts as well as ecstatic poets do well to remember that giving credit where credit is due is part of our job. The seven cases in this collection, despite their scrupulous authors' many and proper qualifications, provide serious evidence of policy success on a large scale which has been sustained for a decade or longer, often against the odds, evidence that takes the form of impact on human development and social and political life. Even professional students of development are not immune from the prevailing image of the Third World as a place of famine, fire and flood, and it is salutary to remind ourselves occasionally of what has been achieved in development policy, and to learn and draw inspiration from the reminder. That is the simple thought with which we began this enquiry, and with which we now bring it to a close.

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NOTES

[1] Malaysia during the period in question has been variously labeled a 'quasi-democracy' (Zakaria, 1989), 'semi-democracy' (Case, 1995) and – perhaps most expressively – a 'repressive-responsive regime' (Crouch, 1996)

[2] Although Melo also warns against the quasi-psychological discussion of leadership in which we are about to indulge.

[3] It may be useful to list the items of French and Raven's classic taxonomy of individual power. As well as expert power, they are legitimate power, reward power, coercive power and 'referent power' (an individual's ability to generate respect or affection).

[4] The problem may also be compounded by a lack of widely accepted models of social reform (see Chapter 2 on this point).

[5] Jackson's chapter is in a third category, as an example of 'reverse causation', where it is his chosen policy that strengthens democracy rather than vice-versa.

[6] It is worth noting that Hulme and Moore are as critical of Bangladesh's private banks as they are of the government.

[7] Hofman *et al.*'s chapter, with its account of aid amounting to over 30% of government spending in 1967, might seem an exception. But even here, Hofman *et al.* say that donor influence on economic policy in that period came partly in the oblique form of Ford Foundation scholarships that allowed the 'technocrats' to study in the US; and of course the IMF's role in the 1997 Crisis remains controversial.

[8] We are grateful to Anne-Marie Goetz for suggesting this point (though not the football analogy) at the first of the seminars on which this collection is based.

[9] Notwithstanding the emphasis on group solidarity and group-based guarantees, microfinance schemes produce individual entrepreneurs, not group-based enterprise, and far less social movements.

[10] More recent accounts have challenged systems models like Jenkins', but mostly because they are seen as mechanistic and over-simple, rather than because they are apolitical: see Hill (2005).

[11] As with the reference to Paul Simon at the start of this volume, Auden's poem was readily available in full on the Internet at the time of writing.