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The Built Environment and the Formation of Liberal Elites in England and Germany around 1900

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The Built Environment and the Formation of Liberal Elites in England and Germany around 1900

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Abstract

This paper offers a comparative investigation into the formation of liberal subjectivities in Britain and Germany at the outset of the twentieth century. It argues that the notion of ‘Bürgerlichkeit’, which galvanised cultural debates and practices in Germany at the time, had less to do with issues of class in the traditional sense, but can be read as a political project in analogy with British liberalism. Beyond this general similarity, however, national differences are also explored, particularly where they relate to the relative importance of domestic and public spaces in shaping the ‘character’ of a new civic self in both societies.

Keywords

**Liberal governmentality in Germany and Britian; history of bourgeois culture;
disciplining the senses; domestic space.**

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The study of material culture has infused the historiography of Western liberalism with a new direction. Liberalism is no longer taken to be just a political philosophy, or a party political movement, or even a network of voluntary associations forming a democratic political substructure. Instead, it is the centrepiece of a theory of governmentality, which focuses on the emergence of a 'neutral' state.¹ Informed by approaches as diverse as historical anthropology, the sociology of material culture, and actor-network theory, this literature focuses on the process by which modern states create infrastructures and technologies that enable the indirect or liberal exercise of power.

Such a perspective necessitates a re-thinking of 'national patterns'. Much of the older historiography has posited a sharp contrast between British and German liberalism. Political historians diagnosed a 'failure' of German liberalism, classifying early twentieth-century Germany as an anti-liberal nation, which diverged from the ideal type of liberal modernity defined by England.² In this view, the marginalisation of liberal parties in the German parliament was indicative of a weakness of the German bourgeoisie.³ For the Wilhelmine period, Wehler talked of the "Entbürgerlichung" of German society, and Hans Mommsen diagnosed a "dissolution of the German Bürgertum after 1890".⁴ Intellectual historians observed an analogous difference between both countries in terms of the evolution of liberalism as a political doctrine. Authoritarianism and neo-feudal attitudes, they suggest, marginalised liberal elements in German political thought, and undermined the project of bourgeois rule.⁵

Recent research has cast some doubt upon such national stereotyping. Instead, the continued strength of German liberalism in local and regional politics during a period of its supposed decline, the hegemony of liberal thought in Germany's modern legal system, and the decisive role of the 'expert' in managing Germany's profound social transformation in the later nineteenth century have all come to the fore.⁶ As Blackbourn and Eley's seminal study showed, while they may not have been 'liberal' in every classic sense, German *Bürger* effected a 'silent revolution', in which key liberal aims, such as the rule of law, were achieved.⁷ Building on these findings, younger historians have recently argued that the effects of liberal political activity in Wilhelmine Germany were mostly felt outside the realm of official *Reichstag* politics, in what Repp has recently dubbed an "anti-political space".⁸ This is not to suggest that liberalism's ascendancy was non-political, but that it was focused on activities outside the realm of 'official politics'. Jenkins suggested as much, when she included a chapter on urban planner Fritz Schumacher in her study of municipal liberalism in Wilhelmine Hamburg.⁹ She accepts the view that 'bourgeois government' German-style diverged significantly from an ideal-typical (Anglo-American) view of liberalism, yet insists that the achievements of German liberalism be judged in their own right. In terms of the transformation of material culture, Repp has argued, not (only) Weimar Germany, but imperial Germany should be thought of as Europe's 'laboratory of modernity'.¹⁰

The perspective of governmentality opens up possibilities for pushing this revisionism one decisive step further. Around 1900, under the heading of *Bürgerlichkeit*, a political discourse and praxis emerged in Germany that is best understood as a project of liberal governance in the Foucauldian sense. Its key objective was the education of a new liberal citizenry. In 1912, Friedrich Naumann, a leading left liberal thinker of the time, and MP for the Progressive People's Party, published his influential essay 'The Industrial State'. He argued that the German economy had become industrial, but politically and culturally, the country was still ruled by largely aristocratic agrarian elites, and shaped by their reactionary value system.¹¹ The task for the future was to create an 'industrial state', that is, a political order which would truly reflect the interests and values of those who defined Germany economically and

socially. What Naumann called the industrial state, his close associate, the architect and cultural reformer Hermann Muthesius referred to as a *bürgerlich* society:

An alarming mania prevails for glossing over real conditions, to over-refine until something is considered 'distinguished', to force one's self into a pseudo-aristocracy. We seem to be ashamed of the very thing which should make us proud, our *Bürgertum*. We want to be aristocrats at the very moment when the *Bürgertum* has become the basis of our economic, social and political life, when it has reached such a height that it is able to determine the culture of our time.¹²

German attempts to promote a new social order drew much inspiration from English precedents. Naumann and his associates learnt from the political strategies and the social orientation of English 'new liberalism'. Naumann not only relied on the political programme developed by British liberal thinker such as Leonard T. Hobhouse, but also borrowed Lloyd George's polemical vocabulary from the debates about the 1909 'People's Budget'.¹³ Similarly, for Muthesius and the other reformers organised in the German *Werkbund*,¹⁴ the English example in turn demonstrated how the built environment could help foster a new type, liberal governmentality. Both in a practical and a symbolic sense, cities became liberal 'actants', environments that moulded the liberal citizens of a new era.¹⁵ Material interventions, ranging from pipes and drains, via slum clearance, to the creation of boulevards and public parks, all contributed to the conditioning of liberal subjects. This process has been explored in an exemplary fashion in Patrick Joyce's recent study of Manchester as a paradigmatic liberal city.¹⁶

Yet public space was not the starting point for the creation of new liberal subjects. It was, rather, the second stage in a process that translated new subjectivities into a public political idiom. Domestic space offered the site where such subjectivities were first defined. Yet the role of domesticity in the evolution of liberal governmentality is more ambiguous and controversial than that of the city at large. Broadly speaking, two rival interpretative paradigms have emerged. The first regards domestic and public space as actants in a single project of liberal governmentality, which served to discipline the senses in directly comparable ways. Nikolas Rose's suggestions that liberal citizens were governed not through the imposition of "duties, but by throwing a web of visibilities [...] over personal conduct" can be applied to the bourgeois home just as much as to the liberal city at large.¹⁷ Chris Otter has teased out this connection more explicitly. He argued that, where the pre-modern city (as well as the modern slum) was dominated by the senses of proximity, such as smell, in the modern, liberal city, "the respectable mastered their passions in public spaces conducive to the exercise of clear, controlled perception: wide streets, squares and parks. In their homes, separate bathrooms and bedrooms precluded promiscuity and indecency".¹⁸

A different explanatory model has been developed by feminist scholars, for whom domestic space in the nineteenth century constituted the antithesis of the liberal public sphere. For Michelle Perrot, the exclusion of women from the project of liberal governmentality relied on the strict separation of the domestic from the political realm. "The nineteenth century was the golden age of private life, a time when the vocabulary and reality of private life took shape. [...] In the long run, the [French] Revolution sharpened the distinction between the public and private spheres, emphasised family values, and led to differentiation of sexual roles by setting up a contrast between political men and domestic women."¹⁹ Valverde goes one step further in arguing that such exclusion were the enabling condition which made the very project of liberal governmentality thinkable in the first place. Since the Enlightenment, liberal governmentality was confined to those who had matured to a state of adulthood defined chiefly in terms of the repression of the sensual and instinctive. "Internally [which in this case also means: in the domestic realm], the paradigmatic liberal subject continues to govern his passions through non-liberal means, even as both he and his authorities seek to maximize self-rule and other liberal rationalities".²⁰ As children, the liberal subjects of the new era had "the

capacity and the very desire for self-government grafted onto their primitive little souls by the strenuous efforts of [...] educated adults. [...] Liberal governance [...] is constituted by a binary opposition between nature and freedom, passion and reason, that continually reproduces despotism within rational autonomous self-rule.”²¹ This opposition maps onto the “geographical distinction [...] between the private household and the public realm”.²²

This pattern can be observed both in England and Germany, yet operated in slightly different ways. For Valverde, the German notion of liberal self-rule was (and is) based on a conception of ‘intellectual maturity’, which we can trace in philosophical discourse from Kant to Habermas. Rationality became the principal weapon by which the passions and instincts likely to inhibit liberal self-rule were repressed. Domestic space served as a training ground for such rational repressions. This analysis reiterates observations first made by Norbert Elias, who saw the repression of the instinctual by reason as the key to the “civilizing process”.²³ The analogous English project emerges in no less a negative light, yet here ‘reasonableness’, rather than ‘rationality’, was the focal point. “In Anglo-Saxon culture, the moral/cultural content of reasonableness has been held in higher regard than purely intellectual skills.”²⁴ English liberal thinkers from Mill onwards distinguished between mere knowledge and the desire for improvement, where only the latter could lead to real civilizational advances.²⁵ For Valverde, this notion is just as ‘despotic’ as the rule of reason over its others. Yet the British emphasis on reasonableness and the will to self-improvement implied a relatively greater reliance on the prescriptive transmission of ‘moral content’ and the formation of ‘character’ through instilling useful ‘habits’, as opposed to the simple privileging of rational faculties over other modes of (sensual) perception.

What we are dealing with, then, are two distinct models for explaining the role of bourgeois domesticity in the establishment and smooth running of liberal governmentality. On the one hand, the Rose-Otter model suggests that the bourgeois home operated as a microcosm of the liberal city, in much the same way as the liberal city acted as a microcosm of ‘the liberal state’.²⁶ On the other hand, the Valverde model suggests that the bourgeois home trained its inhabitants in despotic self-government which, by a paradoxical twist, was at once the opposite but also the necessary precondition for liberal self-rule in the public domain. These models also have somewhat different implications for an Anglo-German comparison. The Rose-Otter model is universal. It de-emphasizes national peculiarities, except in so far as nations can be identified with different stages of the unfolding of modern liberalism. In so far as nineteenth-century Britain took a lead in developing new forms of liberal governmentality, we should expect a greater degree of liberal openness in the British bourgeois home of this period, vis-à-vis its less advanced German equivalent. The Valverde model, by contrast, is less development-oriented. Here, a pattern of national difference arises instead from two related yet subtly different modes of ‘despotism’: the dogmatic rule of reason over the self in the German case, the conditioning of the subject to ‘reasonableness’ through ‘habit’ in the British case. It is time to test these models against some historical evidence.

It is clear that, throughout the long nineteenth century, public and private, political and domestic were seen as mutually constitutive dimension of the project of liberal governance. Numerous sources suggest that, in Germany in particular, the supposed failure of bourgeois domesticity to reject older, feudal models of sociability was widely identified as a chief impediment to liberalism’s further advances in the public sphere. The bourgeois home thus became the object of countless reform initiatives designed to foster a more authentically bourgeois way of life. Even the German term for bourgeois, *bürgerlich*, was shaped by this linkage: it could refer to a broadly liberal conception of citizenship (the German citizen is the “Staatsbürger”), but also to a new type of house-proud domesticity. To appreciate the special significance of this nexus, it is necessary briefly to consider the etymology of the term.

Bürgerlichkeit is one of the most notoriously misunderstood concepts of German history. The Marxist use of the term *Bürgertum*, signifying a coherent economic class in the sense of bourgeoisie,²⁷ was very far from the minds of those late nineteenth-century reformers who so frequently invoked the concept to summarize their own political ambitions. This use of *bürgerlich* designated a characteristic disposition and attitude, which combined the qualities of ‘civil’, ‘civic’ and ‘domestic’. This signification can be traced back to the Enlightenment, when writers like Gotthold Ephraim Lessing mapped out a specific *bürgerlich* morality.²⁸ As the antonym to official, stately, courtly as well as aristocratic, *bürgerlich* designated things private, domestic, natural or unaffected. Famously, Chodowiecki’s cartoons contrasted the falsity of aristocratic attitudes with the authenticity of the inward gaze that underpinned *bürgerlich* moral conduct.²⁹ This newly discovered realm of domestic virtue did not signify a retreat from the political. Rather, it was transformed into the very basis for the German Bürgers’ claim to political competence. Burchell’s observation that “eighteenth-century political thought [was] preoccupied with finding a way of rescuing man from [...] a split between civic and civil models of subjectivity” is particularly apposite in the German case.³⁰ For in a more structural way, too, the eighteenth-century was the period in which the notion of *Bürgerlichkeit* became the basis of liberal citizenship. The enlightened absolutist regimes of eighteenth-century Germany kick-started the transformation of direct political rule into indirect or ‘liberal’ government when they filled the ranks of their expanding bureaucratic administration with educated experts.³¹ This German *Bürgertum* defined itself through education and state service; by contrast, independent commercial and industrial activity only gave rise to something resembling a class consciousness towards the very end of the nineteenth century.³²

From its inception, then, to be *bürgerlich* encompassed the dual meaning of political participation through expertise, and a new form of subjectivity cultivated at home. This is why, even around 1900, German liberal reformers saw the home as the launchpad for a *bürgerlich* consciousness equipped to challenge a political order dominated by aristocratic elites and landowning interests. Aesthetic and practical strategies worked in tandem to achieve this end. Stylistically, the aim was emancipation from historicism, an idiom associated with the aristocratic and courtly architecture of previous ages. This agenda was powerfully articulated by reformers such as Fritz Schumacher, co-founder of the German *Werkbund* in 1907, and from 1910 Supreme Building Director of Hamburg, Germany’s second city.³³ Schumacher’s polemical rejection of historicist forms continues to influence modern architectural criticism to this date.³⁴ The aesthetic quest for *bürgerlich* forms was supplemented by a search for new payouts which would facilitate and foster new codes of behaviour in the bourgeois home. Cleanliness was a central category in this project. Particular attention was paid to bathrooms, purpose-built, spacious and well-lit rooms that were fitted with the latest in modern plumbing to encourage new habits such as daily bathing. Here, Muthesius and others looked to England as a direct inspiration. Significant parts of Muthesius’ multi-volume opus, *The English House*, were devoted specifically to hygiene and the functional lay-out of bathrooms:

Thus, a high, and, in the best sense of the word, artistic style of bathroom is achieved. Refraining from adding any ornaments [...], a space of true modernity is created. It is so authentic, and will stand the test of time, because it has been developed in a strictly logical manner [...]. Such a modern bathroom is like a scientific instrument, through which intelligent technology celebrates its triumph, and where externally applied ‘art’ would only distract. The form that has been developed from functional requirements, is in itself so intellectually sophisticated and meaningful, that it gives rise to an aesthetic pleasure that differs on no count from the enjoyment of art.³⁵

Thus far, then, the evidence bears out what we have called the Rose-Otter-model: the home functioned as a microcosm of the liberal city, spaciousness, light and sanitary reform working together to discipline, order and cleanse the world of the senses. Britain, more advanced in terms of liberal governmentality, took the lead. German reformers, eager to ‘catch up’, copied this model, and in the process, conceptualised it more explicitly. Muthesius’ work was hailed in the English press as the first attempt by a foreigner to come to a real appreciation of the English spirit – and simultaneously regarded with bewilderment for having turned an ‘implied’ practice into an issue of philosophical investigation. Under the heading ‘A German view of modern English architecture’, *The Architect and Contract Reporter* reviewed Muthesius’ first publication on the topic, and described the peculiarity of his approach in the following terms:

The text reveals in almost every line the pains which the author must have taken to arrive at the truth, and we have only to compare it with essays in which French architects have endeavoured to describe our modern architecture in order to perceive the difference not only between individuals but between two races. The German, being more of a philosopher, endeavours to get at the root of things and to explain why they assume one form rather than many others.³⁶

Yet there were also characteristic differences. As we have seen, Valverde suggests that, unlike its German equivalent, the British project of liberal citizenship was based on an almost instinctive inculcation of ‘habits’ to promote ‘reasonableness’ and the will to self-improvement. This theory in born out by the research of Stefan Collini into the centrality of ‘character’ to Victorian political discourse.³⁷ Collini’s analysis of political writings and educational tracts from the second half of the nineteenth century suggests that liberal subjectivity was increasingly defined in terms of a “Manichaen view of the self”, in which the aim was a “settled disposition” that controlled the “impulses [...] identified with the lower self”.³⁸ The emphasis on character became an omnipresent trope in political debate, extolling, on the one hand, the necessity of testing the strength of character in adverse circumstances, while, on the other hand, attempting to remove an excess of “temptations which the individuals in question will be unable to resist, and thereby warping the habits that will ineluctably govern their actions in future”.³⁹

Collini’s analysis also points out an interesting difference between the English and the German approach to character-formation. Some British liberal thinkers, notably Mill in *On Liberty*, “urged a [...] Humboldtian ideal of self-cultivation and the expansion of experience; an ideal, in short, of Bildung”.⁴⁰ Yet this was not a position characteristic of wider liberal discourse and practice in England. More typically – and due at least in part due to the greater role of evangelical Christianity in England – Victorians equated character with self-discipline, which could be built up through the almost mechanical repetition of character-forming ‘habits’. As Collini puts it, “the feature of *On Liberty* to which contemporary critics took strongest exception was its perceived glorification of individual caprice and selfish indulgence at the expense of the stern demands of duty which were [...] the true school of character.”⁴¹ Hence, duty, candour and manliness became the defining features of the new liberal self of the Victorian and Edwardian eras, with their well-known training ground in the public school system. Collini concludes his analysis with a report on a cricket match between Eton and Harrow:

Cricket is a game which reflects the character – a game of correct habits, of patient and well-considered practice – the very last game in the world in which any youth without the power of concentrativeness [...] is ever likely to excel. To any lover of education the game of Harrow was a treat, and that of Eton a disappointment. In Harrow we see care and discipline, and patient labour; in Eton wild erratic performance, no sign of training or mental effort.⁴²

Herein lies what is possibly the most noticeable different to subject-formation in German liberalism. For the domestic spaces advocated by German reformers like Muthesius were marked by precisely that dichotomy of duty and freedom, restraint and self-exploration which Mill had advocated, but which was so quickly marginalised in English culture at large. A close analysis of one particular type of room can illustrate this point.

The spiritual heart of the German bourgeois home, and also the part of it that was accessible to a wider circle of friends and political allies, was the music chamber. It was the stage for what became a defining ritual of the German *Bürgertum* – and one that was defined in deliberate contradistinctions with other national cultures. As Muthesius put it:

In a country where music is as important as in Germany, indeed, where music is, in a sense, THE national art, the music chamber assumes a very special significance in the house... It is true that the piano or grand piano is part of the standard furniture of the house in many countries, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. Yet abroad, music is nowhere near as highly developed as in the German house...⁴³


The German ritual of *Hausmusik*, the performance of chamber music by amateurs in the bourgeois home, first reached widespread popularity in the early nineteenth century, an era often referred to as *Biedermeier*. As Paul Mebes explained in his influential book, *Biedermeier and Bürgerlichkeit* were almost synonymous.⁴⁴ House music, like *Biedermeier* as a whole, has been viewed in predominantly critical terms by historians of high culture. In this, they have largely followed the lead of a now rather outdated view first propagated by political historians. Compared with its ‘progressive’ eighteenth-century antecedents, the *Biedermeier* years between the Vienna settlement of 1815 and the 1848 Revolutions were dubbed conservative, culturally banal and politically tame; in short, an age dominated by a German bourgeoisie which had resigned itself to the repressive policies of the Metternich era, placing its own narrow self-interest as a class above the causes of political improvement and social reform.⁴⁵ Historians of *Biedermeier* music echo those views. Thus, in a detailed survey of the history house music in this era, Nicolai Petrat finds evidence of the decline of artistic innovation and risk-taking. A statistical analysis reveals that, amongst all pieces that were composed for the piano in this era – the *Hausmusik* instrument *per excellence* –, the relatively complex and aesthetically challenging genre of the sonata declined from 33% in 1818, via 6% in 1848 to just 3% in 1833.⁴⁶ It was replaced by simpler and more ‘harmless’ musical forms, such as the potpourri (1818: 2,5%, 1843: 27,5%). Professionals at the time lamented this trend. In 1818, Friedrich August Kanne, writing in the *Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung*, contrasted a golden age where “Mozart’s and Haydn’s sonatas were appreciated and performed by an emotionally sophisticated musical public”, when tunes performed on the piano at home “elevated and spirit by virtue of their inner substance, dignity, splendour, sentimental *gravitas* and loveliness”, with a present in which the piano in the home “is considered by all classes as a piece of furniture even more essential than the washing basket, sewing table or a key cupboard”, leading to a veritable “musciomania” with little inward meaning.⁴⁷ In 1819, another critic wrote in the same journal: “The more devoid of content, the more superficial, the more lacking in serious meaning, the more welcome and pleasant [music is held to be]; the more unnoticed musical notes drift past the ear, the more diverting and delectable they are considered”.⁴⁸ Instead of developing music in new directions, Petrat argues, *Biedermeier* practitioners cultivated a regressive combination of “introspection, the continuity of the classical idiom, a sense of national musical heritage, a pedagogical impulse and the seamless integration of musical performance into the fabric of daily bourgeois life”.⁴⁹

In characterisations such as these, we see the old notion of *Biedermeier* as a reactionary epoch at work. In reality, *Biedermeier* culture, and the role of music within in, was much more dynamic. In so far as it can be read as a commentary on the German bourgeoisie’s stance vis-

à-vis the modernisation process, this was marked not so much by wilful ignorance, or outright rejection, as heightened awareness and ideological ambiguity. The well-rounded ‘self’, that was so confidently celebrated in the neo-classical literature and art of the decades around 1800, was quickly deconstructed after 1815, and the very notion of a fixed and stable ‘identity’ dissolved in multiple and contradictory Romantic fictionalisations. In the post-war years, scholars such as Hans Pyritz, concerned with the overthrow of the ‘myth’ of German high classicism, first drew attention to this process, when they coined phrases such as the “anti-classical turn”.⁵⁰ What applied to the idiosyncratic and at times proto-deconstructivist late Goethe is also evident in the music of Schubert and Wagner. Increasingly precarious balancing acts between harmony and dissonance, unity and multiplicity, wholeness and fragmentation, formed the basis on which the ritual of house music evolved during the *Biedermeier* years. This explains not only the survival of *Hausmusik*, but its increasing prominence in the discourse of bourgeois identity in the later nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries – culminating in Adorno’s famous apotheosis of music against the dictates of ‘mass culture’.⁵¹

In this process, the spaces in which house music was performed grew more elaborate in their design. They played a vital role in maintaining that unstable equilibrium between cultivating and controlling the ‘affective drives’ unleashed by the performance and intense contemplation of music. The first striking physical characteristic of later nineteenth-century music chambers is the near-absence of décor or narrative details. Nothing here detracted, or entertained – the ‘enjoyment’ of culture was a matter of extreme earnestness. Muthesius’s own designs proved prototypes that were widely adapted. Chairs were carefully arranged, and even fixed to the floor to prevent later re-ordering by the users.⁵² On the one hand, this arrangement optimised musical acoustics. On the other hand, it channelled the way the music was perceived, and discussed. There was no large, single dining table; people had to sit in more intimate groups, where conversation about the musical performance could be focused and intense – the antidote to the social chatter in the foyer and on the grand staircase of the opera house. And these were not the only ways in which Muthesius imposed his regime of strict sensory control. Rugs, especially ornamental, oriental rugs, were seen as another distraction. As clients had an unfortunate tendency to add them to carefully designed rooms, Muthesius suggested that all music chambers be fitted with parquet floors so elaborate in appearance and costly in production that even laymen would not dare to cover them up with textiles.⁵³ The music chamber in Muthesius’ own home (Illustration 1) was fitted with the perfect floor: pure geometrical patterns, executed in different woods. The same principle applied to walls. Wallpaper or textile wall hangings were deemed distracting. White walls fostered concentration. To stifle any temptation to decorate such walls retrospectively, Muthesius recommended the creation of a simple pattern of thin dark wooden rails, thus creating a visual rhythm of white squares in black frames. Last but not least, cushions and upholstery were to be kept to a minimum, plain wooden surfaces were preferable. Again, the functional argument – perfect acoustics – provided the launch-pad for an aesthetic minimalism that transformed a sensuous experience – the enjoyment of music – into an exercise in disciplining the senses.

Figure 1



Yet, for all this emphasis on discipline, we have to bear in mind that the essential purpose of the music chamber was to stage the very emotions and sensual pleasures that were then so carefully channelled and controlled. The traditional setting of the opera was quite different in this regard. While characters in an opera might act out extreme affectations on the stage, the relationship between them and the audience was distant. Indeed, as the bourgeois critics remarked, the opera-going public regarded music as a secondary affair: it provided an ornamental backdrop for a social game in which visitors conspicuously paraded their wealth and status in front of one another – one only needs to recall the fact that many of the more expensive boxes in opera houses would face away from the stage, towards the audience.⁵⁴ By contrast, the music chamber involved the audience in the performance in a highly emotive way. The strict regime of visual discipline which surrounded the performance was not just about controlling the senses: it was also to sharpen the individual's receptiveness to the emotional experience of the music itself.

A master-narrative of affect-control cannot capture this particular aspect of bourgeois sensibility. 'Rationalisation' and 'disenchantment', related categories frequently proposed by theorists of modernity, are equally unhelpful.⁵⁵ For the agenda of nineteenth-century German *bürgerlich* reformers was not to repress the affective realm associated with the experience of music. Instead, they developed a curious fascination with sentiments that transgressed notions of order and the rational self. In so far as the music chamber was designed to control emotions, it did so less by outright repression of rationality's opposite, but by a tendency to create an Idealist superstructure for emotions and affects. History provided an important means for accomplishing this goal.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, a tendency had developed in German bourgeois villas to decorate room in the style of a particular epoch. The *Villa Oskar Huldchinsky* in

Berlin, for example, named after its wealthy patron, contained several so-called ‘period rooms’, including a rococo salon and a Renaissance study. Contrary to what modernist critics of the *beaux-arts* suggested, such period rooms were not randomly eclectic, but often constructed with a very specific overall effect in mind. All component parts had to be ‘authentic’, and were often assembled with professional advice so as to create a perfect *ensemble*. The technique was similar to the effort that went in to the construction of ‘period rooms’ in the museums of the time, many of which are preserved till today in the Metropolitan Museum in New York. In Berlin, members of the *haute bourgeoisie* frequently consulted Wilhelm von Bode, Director of the Berlin Museums, on the collections that furnished their private rooms.⁵⁶ Bode soon moved beyond the idea of the period room, recommending the creation of what he called ‘Stimmungsräume’, atmospheric rooms. This was another important step in the process by which cultural norms were internalised. In Bode’s atmospheric rooms, a few select historical pieces would provide the appropriate framing for a single work of art. Instead of drowning the spectator in a wealth of historical detail, the purpose of the surroundings was to focus attention on what Bode called the ‘artistic masterpiece’. This was typically displayed in the centre of the room or, if the masterpiece was a painting, in the middle of the main wall.⁵⁷ Atmospheric rooms no longer illustrated a didactic historical narrative. They created an appropriate setting for what Benjamin famously dubbed the “auratic work of art” of modern bourgeois culture.⁵⁸ Gaehtgens commented on Bode’s room: “Thus the painting of Preacher Anselm and his wife [the centrepiece in a Bode *Stimmungsraum* called the *Rembrandtsaal*] is presented as a profane alter piece, and the room is transformed into a ritual space for the worship of art”.⁵⁹ Such rooms were often transferred in their entirety from the bourgeois home to the museum: the *bürgerlich* gaze onto culture was neatly transferable from the private to the public realm. For example, in 1904, the rich Berlin textile trader James Simon donated part of his private collection for the opening of the Kaiser-Friedrich-Museum, on the condition that one of the original rooms of his house would be displayed in its entirety as the *Kabinett Simon*.⁶⁰ He thus set a precedent for the private room ‘going public’. The privacy of these bourgeois rooms, in other words, was a fiction; private space was redefined as a place in which new public modes of perception and understanding were practised.

An analogous trend transformed the appearance of music chambers. In 1904, Eduard Simon (cousin of James) commissioned architect Alfred Messel to build him a grand villa in Berlin/Victoriastraße, which included a music chamber with historical rococo artefacts and decorations. Only two years later, in 1906, the progressive art patron and social reformer Karl Ernst Osthaus commissioned *Jugendstil* artist Henry van de Velde to design the interior of his grand home *Hohenhof* near the city of Hagen. *Hohenhof* contained a so-called *Hodler-Raum* (after the fresco painter Hodler), a reformist version of what Gaehtgens called a ritual space for the worship of art. Also in 1906, Muthesius created the music chamber as the centrepiece of his own model house. What differentiated the two types, historicist and reformist, was the more Spartan character of van de Velde’s and Muthesius’ spaces. With the reduction of ornamental details, the idea of the historical cultural artefact as a ‘trophy’ disappeared; the idea of the space for the worship of culture triumphed.

It is harder for the historian to reconstruct to what extent the day-to-day use of such spaces – clearly designed with certain purposes in mind – conformed to these intentions. Yet here, too, material evidence provides interesting clues. Perhaps the most emblematic depictions of how house music was performed and perceived around 1900 is a series of paintings and woodcuts by French artist Félix Vallotton, which quickly reached widespread popularity in many European countries. Vallotton was a post-impressionist artist, loosely affiliated with a group who called themselves the “Nabis”.⁶¹ The name had been suggested by a linguist who was a friend of these artists, and derived from the Hebrew *Nabiim* for prophets or those who have seen the light. The Nabis, in other words, saw their role as those who possessed a secret insight, which they tried to articulate in their art. For Vallotton, this was an insight into the psyche of contemporary bourgeois society. As he himself put it:

“I am like a spectator, a passer-by who travels the highway of life and interests himself in the battle of the human insect. I observe the diverse manifestations of social change. I am philosophically incapable of hating. I do not curse. I record.”⁶²

Figure 2



Sasha Newman explained the subject matter of this painting thus:

The Symphony portrays Misia [Natanson] at the piano and, sequestered at some distance, five absorbed listeners (who surely include Vuillard, standing, and Alfred Cortot, with glasses). The shape of the piano, the patterns of the background, and the title itself suggest a musical, but one wonders why Vallotton chose the word ‘symphony’. Was he slyly commenting upon Misia’s charisma, setting her off in pure white as a spiritual orchestrator of both her music and her admirers? They are indeed held spellbound, almost disembodied, in the blackness that emanates like sound from her piano. Surely no other Symbolist painter managed to capture so completely the mesmerizing powers of a performer and her music. But such a reading, if just, intimates that music exerted a mysterious, seductive power not unlike that held by women over men, a theme that had been brewing in Vallotton’s painted and graphic work since the middle of the decade.⁶³

The intertwining of musical and gender dynamics is particularly revealing here. Misia, the mysterious performer at the centre of Vallotton’s woodcut, was an icon of fin-de-siècle femininity. A member of the *haute bourgeoisie* of Paris, married to the publisher Thadée Natanson, then the businessman Alfred Edwards, and then to the Spanish painter José Maria Sert, she befriended and sponsored countless leading artists of her age, including Toulouse Lautrec, Renoir, Mallarmé and Debussy, and the Nabis. Vallotton she addressed in her letters as “Mon cher Vallo” – he in turn admired, desired, feared and despised her at the same time.⁶⁴ Misia’s sexuality, which she herself turned into the object of something like a cult in her autobiography,⁶⁵ was simultaneously threatening and tempting. As such, it functioned as the perfect analogue to the power of music in bourgeois culture.

Conjuring up the threats to the liberal subject was, in a sense, also a strategy for making those threats manageable. It seems, however, that it was not a strategy generally acceptable to English liberals, who, as Collini suggested, relied more on prescriptive methods for

disciplining the self. That is not to say that the German reform effort had no English equivalents. In fact, for all their nationalism, German liberal reformers themselves frequently pointed to their English inspirations. What is noticeable, however, is the extent to which these were models derived from a counter-culture which operated at a considerable ideological distance from the official liberal regime. Paradoxically, English domesticity seemed to be characterised by the very absence of the virtues of discipline, concentration and duty extolled on the played fields of Harrow. Take, for example, the case of domestic music chambers. As Muthesius himself pointed out, many English drawing rooms contained grand pianos, yet musical taste was underdeveloped “even amongst the most educated of people”, and private musical performances resembled “orgies of musical dilettantism”.⁶⁶ This lack of discipline was associated with “the London Arts and Crafts community, which is suffering from an obsessive rusticity”. Lack of sensory discipline was evident in the attempt to “give the sophisticated mechanism of the piano a shell which resembles the gate of a barn”.⁶⁷ The same critique could be applied to the Arts and Crafts interior *in toto*. Baillie Scott was one of the architects most frequently referred to in Muthesius’s multi-volume praise of the English House. Yet the same architect’s design for a music chamber also makes the difference very apparent (illustration 3).⁶⁸

Figure 3



While generous in scale, the intricate patchwork of shapes and colours was highly diverting and self-consciously ‘rustic’ in the Ruskinian sense. Little here was appropriate for instilling a sense of sensory discipline into the liberal subject.

Similar differences become apparent when we consider the positioning of the bourgeois home in the city. German reformers looked to English Arts and Crafts architects like Lutyens or Baillie Scott for inspiration in designing new liberal interior spaces. Yet they were highly critical of the withdrawal for bourgeois urbanism which the Arts and Crafts movement signalled. While Muthesius’ houses employed Arts and Crafts-inspired vernacular motifs, these were used in a ‘narrative’, not a literal, manner. These houses could (and should) be ‘read’ as statements pertaining to the formation of a new, liberal state. While suffused with a sense of locality and nature – many of these houses engaged with the open landscape on the garden side⁶⁹ -- the new German bourgeois homes could also be viewed with great ease from the street, many even from several sides. Hedges were kept very low indeed – no more than a foot or two – and Muthesius’ characteristic white fences, which he used as Mackintosh-style geometrical ornaments, offered little more than a symbolic suggestion of private space. These houses ‘spoke’, they projected private values onto the public sphere. For all their dislike of representation, they were proud flagships of the ideology of a new age. By contrast, Baillie Scott’s houses were typically crouched behind large trees, totally hidden from public view, with their grounds protected by that archetypal English signpost ‘No trespassing’. Muthesius himself described the experience of ‘not seeing the English house’ during his travels in

Britain. It is easily replicated today, further enhanced by the presence of high-tech burglar alarms and guard dogs which threaten the life of the researcher.

This was not just a difference of taste. In the English Arts and Crafts movement, ‘privacy’ signalled a retreat from society and public culture, not a resource to be mobilised for the regeneration of an alienated public culture.⁷⁰ After an era of intense reform activity within the city during the Victorian age, in the 1900s, English Arts and Crafts reformers increasingly re-directed their attention to green field sites. Town planning focused on the idea of the garden city.⁷¹ It is true that, inspired by such examples, Muthesius collaborated with Richard Riemerschmid in the creation of the first German garden-city, Hellerau, near Dresden. Yet he quickly became disillusioned when Hellerau developed into a centre of ‘alternative culture’, where a small group of self-styled avant-garde artists celebrated a value system that set itself up in opposition to the liberal-bourgeois order. Tessenow’s 1911 Hellerau *Festpielhaus*, crowned by a huge Yin Yan emblem, was the visual manifestation of this shift, turning Hellerau became into a focal point of the life reform movement and a center of Dalcroze’s expressionist dance.⁷² As Muthesius dissociated himself from the project, and focused his attentions on bourgeois suburbs instead. For him, the vernacular inherent in the Arts and Crafts ideology could only be invoked with great caution. *Haus Freudenberg*, the second house of Muthesius’ *Rehwiese* ensemble, provides an instructive example. It was modelled on Edward Prior’s *The Barn* of 1896. Prior’s building, constructed of untreated natural stone, was far more archaic than Muthesius’.⁷³ Muthesius’ house was self-consciously modern and functional. The use of timber framing, the ultimate rustic material, provided the only obvious reference to the Arts and Crafts tradition. Yet structurally, this was not a timber-framed house at all. What creates the impression of timber framing is the gable alone, where timber was externally applied and displayed like an inscription or motto. This was no isolated incidence. Take the example of Munich, another German city that was transformed by bourgeois ‘experts’ in the decades around 1900. Following the lead of Viennese urban planner Camillo Sitte, its liberal urban planners vehemently resisted the suggestion of Riemerschmid to plan Munich’s expansion as a ring of garden-cities. So suspicious were they of ‘naturalism’ that they even banned the creation of new urban parks. Their ideology was one that embraced bourgeois urbanism, reasserting liberal, Protestant and secular values over Catholic, Bavarian agrarianism and its conservative politics.⁷⁴

In conclusion, then, it seems that the German case offers a better example of the use of the bourgeois home as a training ground for liberal subjectivities that informed, and fed into, the project of liberal governance of the city, in the way implied by what we have dubbed the Rose-Otter model. This was made possible by the fact that the German notion of *Bildung*, central to the identity of the *Bürgertum*, offered a blueprint for the careful channelling of the non-rational aspects of domesticity, in a way that allowed liberal characters to be formed without relying on the outright repression of the sensual and affective implied by the Valverde model. The fact that, as Collini has shown, such a *via media* was rejected by most British liberal reformers precluded a similarly smooth integration of British domesticity into the project of liberal governance. Here, it seems, the principal sites for disciplining the ‘character’ of liberal subjects were public schools and sportsgrounds. The home, by contrast, came to be seen as liberal governmentality’s other, a sphere for retreating from public identities, which followed a very different hierarchy of values.

¹ A useful overview is Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, eds, *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Chicago, 1991).

² This view is commonly known as the *Sonderweg* theory, that is, the theory of a special German path into a technological modernity, in which political culture failed to ‘keep up’. This view of a German

exceptionalism and ‘misdevelopment’, was initiated by Karl Dietrich Bracher, but is today most prominently associated with Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Das deutsche Kaiserreich, 1871-1918* (Göttingen, 1973).

³ Cf. Jürgen Kocka, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Hans Mommsen and Rainer Lepsius’ respective contributions in Jürgen Kocka, ed., *Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1987).

⁴ Wehler, *Kaiserreich*, and idem, ‘The German Double Revolution and the Sonderweg, 1848-79’ in Reinhard Rürup, ed., *The Problem of Revolution in Germany, 1789-1989* (Oxford 2000).

⁵ Leonard Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition* (Chicago, 1973). A seminal study on the cultural politics of feudalization is Ute Frevert, *Ehrenmänner: Das Duell in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (München, 1991), translated as *Men of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel* (Cambridge, MA, 1995).

⁶ See Volker Berghahn, ‘The German Empire, 1871-1914: Reflections in the Direction of Recent Research’ and Margaret L. Anderson, ‘Reply to Volker Berghahn’, *Central European History*, 35/ 1 (2002), pp. 75-82 and 83-90; James Retallack, ‘Ideas into Politics: Meanings of Stasis in Wilhelmine Germany’, in Geoff Eley and idem, eds, *Wilhelmism and its Legacies: German Modernities, Imperialism and the Meanings of Reform, 1890-1930* (New York and Oxford, 2003), pp. 235-52. Much recent research concentrates on the role of the locality as a site for progressive reform. See for example Jennifer Jenkins, *Provincial Modernity: Local Culture and Liberal Politics in Fin-de-Siècle Hamburg* (Ithaca, 2003); Jan Palmowski, *Urban Liberalism in Imperial Germany. Frankfurt am Main, 1866-1914*, (Oxford, 1999), as well as idem, ‘The Politics of the Un-Political German: Liberalism in German local government, 1860-1880’, *Historical Journal*, 42 (1999), 675-704.

⁷ David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in nineteenth-century Germany* (Oxford, 1984).

⁸ Kevin Repp, *Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity: Anti-Politics and the Search for Alternatives, 1890-1914* (Cambridge/ Mass, 2000).

⁹ Jenkins, *Provincial Modernity*.

¹⁰ Kevin Repp, *Berlin Moderns: Art, Politics, and Commercial Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Berlin* (forthcoming) appropriates the classical Weimar label ‘laboratory of modernity’ for Germany’s Wilhelmine years.

¹¹ Friedrich Naumann, ‘Der Industriestaat’, 1912, in idem., *Werke*, 6 vols (Cologne and Opladen, 1964), III, *Politische Schriften*, pp. 42-70. Compare Rüdiger vom Bruch, ed., *Friedrich Naumann in seiner Zeit* (Berlin, 2000); and Peter Theiner, *Sozialer Liberalismus und deutsche Weltpolitik: Friedrich Naumann im Wilhelminischen Deutschland, 1860-1919* (Baden-Baden, 1983).

¹² Hermann Muthesius, *Der Kunstwart*, 17, 1904, p. 469, quoted M. Jefferies, *Politics and Culture in Wilhelmine Germany: The Case of Industrial Architecture*, Oxford and Washington, 1995, pp. 50-1. On Muthesius’ life, compare Julius Posener’s many writings, such as ‘Hermann Muthesius’, entry in *Architect’s Yearbook* 10, 1962, pp. 45-61; idem., *Anfänge des Funktionalismus: Von Arts and Crafts zum Deutschen Werkbund* (Berlin, Frankfurt a.M., Vienna, 1964); idem., *From Schinckel to Bauhaus: Five Lectures on the Growth of Modern German Architecture*, Architectural Association Papers, 5 (London, 1972). John V. Maciuika, *Before the Bauhaus. Architecture, Politics, and the German State, 1890–1920* (Cambridge, 2005), portrays Muthesius as a Prussian modernizer, and a precursor of the Bauhaus.

¹³ Both the political philosophy of new liberalism and its political implementation in measures such as the ‘People Budget’ of 1909 were important precedents for Naumann’s political writings and activities. See Stefan-Georg Schnorr, *Liberalismus zwischen 19. und 20. Jahrhundert : Reformulierung liberaler politischer Theorie in Deutschland und England am Beispiel von Friedrich Naumann und Leonard T. Hobhouse* (Baden-Baden, 1990); and Michael Freedon, *The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform*, Oxford, 1978.

¹⁴ The best English-language introduction remains J. Campbell, *The German Werkbund: The Politics of Reform in the Applied Arts* (Princeton, 1978), especially pp. 3-81 on the pre-1914 era. Compare also idem, *Joy of Work, German Work* (Princeton and Oxford, 1989); Posener, *Anfänge des Funktionalismus*; S. Muthesius, *Das englische Vorbild: Eine Studie zu den deutschen*

Reformbewegungen in Architektur, Wohnbau und Kunstgewerbe im späten 19. Jahrhundert (Munich, 1974); Mark Jarzombek, 'The Kunstgewerbe, the Werkbund and the Aesthetics of Culture in the Wilhelmine Period', *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, 53, 1, March 1994, pp. 7-19. F. J. Schwartz, *The Werkbund: Design Theory and Mass Culture before the First World War* (New Haven and London, 1996), discusses the *Werkbund* as part of a general critique of industrialisation and consumerism.

¹⁵ Bruno Latour, *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society*, Milton Keynes, 1987, who introduced the neologism 'actant' as a neutral way to refer to actors irrespective of intentions, both in the human and material world.

¹⁶ Patrick Joyce, *The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City* (London and New York, 2003).

¹⁷ Nikolas Rose, *Powers of Freedom*, Cambridge, 1999, p. 73.

¹⁸ Chris Otter, 'Making Liberalism Durable: Vision and Civility in the Late Victorian City', *Social History*, 27:1, January 2002: 1-15, quote p. 3.

¹⁹ Michelle Perrot, 'Introduction' in Philippe Aries und Georges Duby, eds, *A History of Private Life*, vol 4, *From the Fires of Revolution to the Great War* (Cambridge/ Massachusetts, 1990), pp. 2 and 9.

²⁰ Mariana Valverde, 'Despotism and Ethical Liberal Governance', *Economy and Society*, 25/3 (August 1996), pp. 357-72, quote p. 357.

²¹ Valverde, p. 326.

²² Valverde, pp. 369-70.

²³ Norbert Elias, *The Civilising Process*, p. 240

²⁴ Valverde, p. 363.

²⁵ John Stuart Mill, 'On Liberty', in: idem., *Three Essays*, Oxford, 1859, new edn 1975, pp. 88-89.

²⁶ This conception of the liberal state was propagated by James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, New Haven and London, 1998.

²⁷ Jürgen Habermas, *The Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, translated by Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge/ Mass., 1989). In keeping with the original German term in the subtitle – *Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* – the book assumes a connection between the meanings of civic/civil/ domestic and 'bourgeois'.

²⁸ Gotthold Ephraim Lessing termed a new literary genre 'bürgerliches Trauerspiel', which designated a morlising, sentimental play in a domestic setting. Although the word contained a social dimension, aristocrats – the target of much enlightened 'conversion rhetoric', were encouraged to behave in 'bürgerlich' ways; this paradox is explored in Michael Stürmer, 'Bürgerliche Fürsten', in Wolfgang Hardtwig und Harm-Hinrich Brandt, eds, *Deutschlands Weg in die Moderne: Politik, Gesellschaft und Kultur im 19. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1993), pp. 215-22. On the same problem in a French revolutionary context, see T.C.W. Blanning, *The French Revolution: Class War or Culture Clash* (Basingstoke and New York, 1998).

²⁹ C.G. Boerner, *Daniel Nikolaus Chodowiecki (1726-1801) und seine Zeit* (Düsseldorf and London, 2001); Renate Krüger, *Das Zeitalter der Empfindsamkeit. Kunst und Kultur des späten 18. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland* (Vienna and Munich, 1972); and Lothar Pikulik, *Leistungsethik contra Gefühlsethik. Über das Verhältnis von Bürgerlichkeit und Empfindsamkeit in Deutschland* (Göttingen, 1984), especially pp. 7-15 and 306-24.

³⁰ Graham Burchell, 'Peculiar Interests' in *The Foucault Effect*. Burchell is here commenting on J. G. A. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce and History*, especially p. 69.

³¹ Walter Demel, *Vom aufgeklärten Reformstaat zum bürokratischen Staatsabsolutismus* (Munich, 1993); Bettina Wahrig and Werner Sohn, eds, *Zwischen Aufklärung, Policy und Verwaltung. Zur Genese des Medizinalwesens 1750–1850* (Wiesbaden, 2003); Eckhardt Hellmuth, 'Enlightenment and Government' in Martin Fitzpatrick, Peter Jones, Christa Knellwolf, Iain McCalman, eds, *The Enlightenment World* (Oxford, 2006), pp 442-456.

³² The division of the German bourgeoisie into a distinct Bildungsbürgertum and a Wirtschaftsbürgertum was a later development.

³³ Hartmut Frank, ed., *Fritz Schumacher: Reformkultur und Moderne* (Stuttgart, 1994). See also Jenkins, *Provincial Modernity*; Hermann Hipp, 'Fritz Schumachers Hamburg: Die reformierte Großstadt', in Lampugnani and Schneider, eds, *Moderne Architektur*, pp. 151-83; and the conference proceedings *Zur Aktualität der Ideen von Fritz Schumacher: Akten des Fritz-Schumacher-Colloquium 1990* (Hamburg, 1992).

³⁴ Polemics against the place of historicist or beaux arts architecture in Hamburg can be found in: Volkwin Marg and Gudrun Fleher, *Architektur in Hamburg seit 1900*, new edn (Hamburg 1968), esp p. 21; Hermann Hipp, *Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg: Geschichte, Kultur und Stadtbaukunst an Elbe und Alster* (Cologne, 1989), esp. p. 213; Ralf Lange, *Architekturführer Hamburg* (Stuttgart, 1995), esp. p. 55; Volker Plagemann, *Kunstgeschichte der Stadt Hamburg* (Hamburg, 1995), esp. pp 256 and 259.

³⁵ Hermann Muthesius, *Das englische Haus*, vol. iii, *Der Innenraum des englischen Hauses* (Berlin, 1905), p. 238.

³⁶ *The Architect and Contract Reporter*, Vol. LXV, No. 1673, 11 January 1901, pp. 27-28 and 18 January 1901, pp. 42-43 published a two-part review of Hermann Muthesius, Königl. Regierungsbaumeister, zugeteilt der Kaiserl. Botschaft in London, *Die englische Baukunst der Gegenwart: Beispiele neuer Englischer Profanbauten* (Leipzig und Berlin, 1900). Quote from Part One, p. 27.

³⁷ Stefan Collini, 'The Idea of Character in Victorian Political Thought', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, fifth series, 35 (1985), pp. 29-50.

³⁸ Collini, p. 34.

³⁹ Collini, p. 36.

⁴⁰ Collini, p. 38.

⁴¹ Collini, p. 38.

⁴² Quoted in J.A. Mangan, *Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School: The Emergence and Consolidation of an Educational Ideology* (Cambridge, 1981), p. 187. See also Bruce Haley, *The Healthy Body and Victorian Culture* (Cambridge/ Mass., 1978).

⁴³ Hermann Muthesius, 'Das Musikzimmer', in: *Almanach*, ed. by Velhagen und Klasings Monatshefte, Berlin/Bielefeld/Leipzig/Wien, 1. Jg., o.J. [1908], pp. 222-237, quotation p. 222.

⁴⁴ Paul Mebes, *Um 1800: Architektur und Handwerk im letzten Jahrhundert ihrer traditionellen Entwicklung*, 2 vols (Munich, 1908).

⁴⁵ The last two decades have seen a systematic revision process of the so-called 'Restoration' years, emphasising the continued reform momentum in various spheres of political and social life. Key publications include Michael Broers, *Europe After Napoleon: Revolution, Reaction and Romanticism, 1814-1848* (Manchester, 1996); Christopher M. Clark, 'Germany 1815-1848: Restoration or Pre-March?' in J. Breuilly and M. Fulbrook, eds, *German History Since 1800* (London 1997), pp. 38-60, and idem., 'The Napoleonic Moment in Prussian Church Policy', in David Laven and Lucy Riall, eds, *The Napoleonic Legacy* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 217-236, which argues that reform continued after 1815 in the sphere of confessional policy. Demel, *Vom aufgeklärten Reformstaat*, posits an essential continuity of reform between the Enlightenment and the so-called Restoration. Paul Schroeder attacks the restoration myth in international relations in *The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848* (Oxford, 1994).

⁴⁶ Nicolai Petrat, *Hausmusik des Biedermeier im Blickpunkt der zeitgenössischen Fachpresse: 1815-1848* (Hamburg 1986 = Hamburger Beiträge zur Musikwissenschaft vol 31), p. 64.

⁴⁷ Petrat, *Hausmusik des Biedermeier*, pp. 82-83.

⁴⁸ Petrat, *Hausmusik des Biedermeier*, p. 92.

⁴⁹ Petrat, *Hausmusik des Biedermeier*, p. 266.

⁵⁰ The political impulse behind such a re-evaluation was deeply ambiguous, and has led to much historiographical controversy since. It combined elements of the extreme left, exemplified by Benjamin's celebration of the post-classical Goethe (cf. Walter Benjamin, 'Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften', *Neue deutsche Beiträge* 2, 1925, H. 1, pp. 83-138, and H. 2, pp. 134-68) and those sometimes associated with an anti-rationalist right. The latter was initiated by Hans Opel and his notion of an "existentialist Germanistik", inspired by Heidegger: Hans Opel, *Die Literaturwissenschaft in der Gegenwart. Methodologie und Wissenschaftslehre* (Stuttgart, 1939); Karl Viëtor, 'Goethes Altersgedichte', *Euphorion* 33, 1932, pp. 105-52; and Hans Pyritz, 'Nachlaßfragment Humanität und Leidenschaft. Goethes gegenklassische Wandlung 1814/1815,' in: idem, *Goethe-Studien*, edited by Ilse Pyritz (Cologne and Graz, 1962), pp. 34-51. The opponents of the anti-classical turn, however, were also frequently associated with the political right, of a different type, propagating as they did a normative notion of classicism as a 'healthy' basis for German national identity. Cf. Wolfgang Schadewaldt, *Goethe und das Erlebnis des antiken Geistes* (Freiburg i.Br. 1932) and idem., 'Goethes Begriff der Realität', *Goethe, Neue Folge des Jahrbuchs der Goethe-Gesellschaft*, 18, 1956.

⁵¹ Theodor W. Adorno, *Essays on Music*, selected, with introduction, commentary, and notes by Richard Leppert; translations by Susan H. Gillespie (Berkeley and London, 2002). See also Robert W. Witkin, *Adorno on Music* (London, 1998).

⁵² Muthesius, 'Das Musikzimmer', p. 233

⁵³ Muthesius, 'Das Musikzimmer', p. 231.

⁵⁴ Muthesius and opera

⁵⁵ The idea of modernity as disenchantment originated with Max Weber, 'Science as a Vocation', in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, ed., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York, 1946), pp. 129-156. See also Ronald M. Glassman and Vatro Muvar, eds, *Max Weber's Political Sociology: A Pessimistic Vision of a Rationalized World* (Connecticut, 1984); Stephen Kalberg, 'Max Weber's Types of Rationality', *American Journal of Sociology* 85:5 (1980), pp. 1145-79; Lawrence A. Scaff, *Fleeing the Iron Cage: Culture, Politics, and Modernity in the Thought of Max Weber* (Berkeley, 1989). More recent articulation of this idea as Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA, 1983); Remi Braque, *The Wisdom of the World: The Human Experience*, trans. Teresa Lavender Fagaan (Chicago, 2003); Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion*, trans. Oscar Burge (New Jersey, 1997); and Roy Porter, *Flesh in the Age of Reason: The Modern Foundations of Body and Soul* (New York, 2004).

⁵⁶ Olaf Matthes, 'Bode – Tschudi – Lichtwark. Zur privaten Sammeltätigkeit in Berlin und Hamburg um 1900', in Ulrich Luckhardt and Uwe M. Schneede, eds, *Private Schätze. Über das Sammeln von Kunst in Hamburg bis 1933* (Hamburg, 2001), pp. 15-21; Thomas W. Gaehtgens, *Die Berliner Museumsinsel im Deutschen Kaiserreich: Zur Kulturpolitik der Museen in der wilhelminischen Epoche* (Munich, 1992); Manfred Ohlsen, *Wilhelm von Bode: Zwischen Kaisermacht und Kunsttempel* (Berlin, 1995).

⁵⁷ Interestingly, for Bode, the creation of such spaces was also a way of sorting and ordering his perceptions of the wider world in a more practical sense, as much of his collecting endeavour was the result of his extensive travels throughout Europe and Russia, which he undertook on a yearly basis. Wilhelm von Bode, *Mein Leben*, edited by Thomas W. Gaehtgens and Barbara Paul (Berlin, 1997).

⁵⁸ Walter Benjamin, *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit : drei Studien zur Kunstsoziologie* (Frankfurt am Main, 1963).

⁵⁹ Gaehtgens, *Berliner Museumsinsel*, p. 45, illustration p. 47.

⁶⁰ Matthes, 'Bode – Tschudi – Lichtwark'.

⁶¹ The Nabis included Bonnard, Denis, Ibels, Ranson, Vuillard, Roussel, Verkade Lacombe, Rippl-Rónai and Maillol.

⁶² “Je suis qu’un spectateur, un passant qui se promène sur la grand’route de la vie s’intéressé aux batailles des insectes humaniens. J’observe les manifestations diverse du mouvement social, en philosophe incapable de haïr. Je ne mandais pas, je constate.” Quoted from Sasha Newman, *Félix Vallotton: A Retrospective*, Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven 1991. French original quote on p. 268, the English translation on pp. 11-12.

⁶³ Newman, *Vallotton*, p. 74

⁶⁴ Rèches-Thory and Perucchi-Petri, *Die Nabis*, p. 281.

⁶⁵ Misia Sert, *Pariser Erinnerungen*, translated by Hedwig Andertann (Frankfurt a.M., 1999).

⁶⁶ Hermann Muthesius, *Das englische Haus*, vol. iii, *Der Innenraum des englischen Hauses* (1905), p. 201.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

⁶⁸ Illustration from: Adriana Boidi Sassone et al., *Möbel vom 18. Jahrhundert bis Art Déco* (Cologne, 2000), p. 621.

⁶⁹ The most famous example is an ensemble of two (originally planned were three) houses on the *Rehwiese* in Berlin, which were part of a landscaped ensemble that used a formal garden as a transitional space between the adjacent houses and the landscaped valley on which they bordered. These two houses – one of which Muthesius’ own home – served as advertisements for his work and can thus be regarded as the purest embodiment of Muthesius’ views of the intersection of the land and the city.

⁷⁰ The withdrawal from the public which English Arts and Crafts houses embody is only surpassed by the paranoia that produced American gated communities, in which many US Arts and Crafts houses are located. The work of Bruce Price at Tuxedo Park, for example, is totally cut off from public view, and cannot even be viewed by appointment.

⁷¹ The most useful survey of the garden city movement in Europe and America is Stephen V. Ward, *The Garden City: Past, Present and Future* (London, 1992).

⁷² Marco DeMichelis, *Heinrich Tessenow (1876 – 1950): Das architektonische Gesamtwerk* (Stuttgart, 1991); Dalcroze’s role in Hellerau was first publicised in Otto Blensdorf, *Die Hellerauer Schulfeste und die "Bildungsanstalt Jaques-Dalcroze"* (Elberfeld, 1913). On Dalcroze’s ideas on rhythmic education and life reform, see J. Timothy Caldwell, *Expressive Singing: Dalcroze’s Eurhythmics for Voice* (Englewood Cliffs, NY, 1995) and Michael Kugler, *Die Methode Jaques-Dalcroze und das Orff-Schulwerk "Elementare Musikübung"* (Frankfurt am Main, 2000). Dalcroze publicized his own method in Emile Jaques-Dalcroze, *Rhythmus, Musik und Erziehung*, reprint of the 1921 Basel edn (Seelze, 1994).

⁷³ Peter Davey, *Arts and Crafts Architecture* (London, 1995), pp. 71-74.

⁷⁴ Leif Jerram, *Germany's Other Modernity: Munich and the Building of Metropolis, 1895-1930* (Manchester, 2007). On Sitte, compare G. Collins and C. Crasemann-Collins, *Camillo Sitte and the Birth of Modern City Planning* (London, 1965).