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Abstract

This paper attempts to map out the emergence and operationalization of the concept ‘cultural diversity’ in British television policy since the 1970s. Following the governmentality approach of Dean (1999), the paper charts the emergence of ‘cultural diversity’ through an analysis of policy documents, audience statistics and academic studies that address the presence or absence of cultural diversity and its related or prior concepts and logics. The paper examines how statistical measures of cultural diversity were generated and mobilized by policy actors, and what consequences this had for policy and governance in British television. Several conceptions of cultural diversity have featured in debates, policies and practices across this period. From the 1970s to the 1990s, essentialized concepts of multiculturalism and cultural diversity connected primarily to race politics coincided with mainly quantitative studies of the representation of these categories in the content and workforce of British television. This connected to a policy rationale of offering greater representation to marginalized groups and viewpoints. However, since the late 1990s a more ‘flowing’ concept of cultural diversity is present in policy debates: cultural diversity as a mode of being, a way of thinking, something discoverable through a qualitative sense and thus coinciding with qualitative studies. This connects to a particular ‘social capital’ policy rationale, identifying practices associated with fostering cultural diversity as a means to increase the social capital of individuals, towards the ends of democratic renewal, social cohesion and economic productivity.

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Introduction

Cultural diversity remains a live issue in British television and governance. In 2001 the then Director General of the BBC, Greg Dyke, labelled the corporation ‘hideously white’, but the difficulties broadcasters have with understanding and realising ‘cultural diversity’ in programming and production remain. This summer, for instance, the BBC appointed a new Editorial Manager for Cultural Diversity in a renewed effort to recruit employees from more diverse backgrounds (Hundal, 2006). This paper attempts to tell the story about the introduction of various ‘cultural diversity’ initiatives from the late 1970s, and then their perceived failure by the late 1990s and 2000s. This story overlaps with another, about the role and ‘fortune’ of quantitative research and statistics, which move from potential hero in the effort to introduce ‘cultural diversity’, to apparent villain as those in the industry began to consider the ‘measurement’ of cultural diversity as not just impossible, but also counterproductive and damaging.

Policy debates about ‘cultural diversity’ on television or in television production have featured several conceptualization of difference and diversity. An examination of policies, practices and debates around television over time suggests the manner in which television tells the national story, indeed the very idea of a national story, has been complicated. In the 1970s and 1980s television policy debates centred upon the issue of including diverse and marginalized voices in ‘the’ national conversation, moving towards the objective of a multicultural representation of an apparently multicultural society. Since the late 1990s the question has been redefined. Policy discussions have focused on how to have plural overlapping conversations within and across the differing political, social, cultural and economic spaces within which people living in Britain are located and locate themselves. We can speak now of a new concept, which policy is both responding to and helping to create or operationalize. Somehow, over the course of the past decade or two, a particular notion of multiculturalism as the recognising and managing different – essentialized – identities and voices has been replaced by a concept of ‘cultural diversity’ as a mode of thinking about identity.

This paper charts the emergence of ‘cultural diversity’ through an analysis of policy documents, audience statistics and academic studies that address the presence or absence of cultural diversity and its related or prior concepts and logics. After setting out the paper’s analytical framework in part 1, the bulk of the paper contains a chronological examination of the emergence of, and consequences of the emergence of, measures of ‘cultural diversity’ for practices of governance. That is, once statistics on ‘cultural diversity’ were generated, what new and distinctive ways the statistics were mobilized by policy actors? For instance, since the 1970s various agencies have gathered statistical data on the representation of minorities on screen and on the employment of minorities in television. These statistics have then been used to warrant new employment practices and new regulations governing the content – representation – of minorities on screen.

Part 2 examines debates in the 1970s from which stemmed the creation of Channel 4. Part 3 examines the treatment of ‘cultural diversity’ in television policy under the Conservative governments of Thatcher and Major, and Part 4 addresses the period of Labour government since 1997. In Part 5 I explore the relative successes and failures of the policies based on the operationalization of forms of ‘cultural diversity’, and the turn towards more qualitative understandings and assessments of the concept.
This paper has two main findings or conclusions. First, and broadly speaking, two senses of the concept cultural diversity have been understood and used in the debates and policies examined. From the 1970s to 1990s, essentialized concepts of cultural diversity connected to race politics and multiculturalism coincided with mainly quantitative studies of the representation of these categories in the content and workforce of British television. Many policy documents called for recognition of cultural diversity, for ‘more’ cultural diversity, as though the concept cultural diversity referred to an observable, measurable phenomenon. Napoli (1999), for instance, analyses US media policy in terms of the amount of source diversity (ownership, workforce), content diversity (representation of ideas, demographics), and exposure diversity (what content the audience actually receives). However, since the late 1990s a more ‘flowing’ concept of cultural diversity is present in policy debates: cultural diversity as a mode of being, a way of thinking, something discoverable through a qualitative sense and thus coinciding with qualitative studies.

Second, the paper argues that these different concepts are attached to different policy rationales. The essentialized concept of cultural diversity was employed to do different ‘work’ to that expected of the ‘flowing’ concept. The work these concepts have ostensibly done is related to the bodies of knowledge from which they have emerged and the policy goals these knowledges have been used to further. The essentialized concept of cultural diversity has often been used within a multicultural framework or policy orientation, where the policy goal – the work to be done – was to offer representation and voice to marginalized groups and viewpoints. Such a framework or orientation often assumes a positive or normative commitment to a ‘marketplace of ideas’ analogy postulating equal access of ideas or people to a public sphere or ideas-marketplace (Napoli, 1999; van Cuilenburg, in Brants et al. (eds.), 1998). The ‘flowing’ concept of cultural diversity has been used, in contrast, within a social capital framework, where the policy goal has been to increase the social capital of individuals in Britain as a means to ends such as democratic renewal, social cohesion, and economic productivity.

Part 1: Analytical framework: Knowledges and statistics in politics

All policy paradigms need a knowledge foundation made up of concepts and a way of measuring those concepts. Take two paradigms of economic policy for instance. The paradigm ‘Keynesianism’ sets about to create economic growth through managing demand in a national economy. This utilizes concepts such as ‘national economy’, ‘national level of employment’, ‘aggregate demand’ and so forth, and ways of measuring these concepts – indicators of how these aspects of the national economy are performing. Similarly, the paradigm ‘monetarism’ sets about to create economic growth through the reduction and stabilisation of inflation as a means to provide stable conditions for free market activity. This utilizes concepts such as ‘inflation’, ‘money supply’, and ‘economic rationality’, and measures of these concepts. Or take two paradigms of contemporary political philosophy. The neoconservatism of the current US administration advances concepts such as ‘national greatness’ and ‘weakness’ and measures of these concepts, e.g. comparative levels of defence spending. The rather vague policy paradigm of the current Labour government in Britain, meanwhile, derives certain concepts from sociological analyses such as ‘risk’, ‘inclusion’, and ‘connectivity’, and again attempts to construct indicators, targets, and ultimately measure progress in terms of these concepts.

The seminal deployment of policy paradigms in political science is Peter Hall’s (1993) social learning model of policy change. He distinguishes three levels of policy change. A first-order change involves tinkering with policy instruments, a second-order change involves changing policy instruments, and a third-order change involves entirely new goals. This third order change can be called a paradigm shift. However, Hall’s analysis gives little attention to the knowledge foundation these levels of a paradigm are based upon, and the politicisation of
knowledges entailed in political contests over which paradigm should ‘reign’ at any moment. For instance, in his analysis of the paradigm shift in British economic policy from Keynesianism to monetarism in the 1970s Hall links the discrediting of Keynesian policy in the 1960s to the apparent failure of that paradigm on its own terms, principally the failure to deliver full employment. What Hall’s account misses is the targeted assault by monetarist economists, journalists and politicians on specific levels of the Keynesian paradigm. These actors sought to discredit Keynesian concepts but often by discrediting the measures and indicators of those concepts. Treasury models and figures were a consistent target, depicted as inaccurate. In this way, actors did not have to openly dispute the goals of the Keynesian policy paradigm (managed growth and high employment), only the knowledge (models and statistics) required for the realisation of these goals. By ‘proving’ one set of goals could not be realized with any reliability, this opened a space for a new set of goals (O’Loughlin, 2005). It is no small irony that the monetarist paradigm was itself discredited in the 1980s by the failure to accurately measure the key concept for monetarism, the money supply.

An appropriate framework to analyse this relationship between knowledge and policy is governmentality. Governmentality brings the different levels of knowledges mentioned above onto our analytical horizon. In his re-thinking of power, Foucault advanced an understanding of the “art of governing” as an activity more similar to running a family than, for instance, moving society towards a grand vision (Foucault, 1978, in Burchell et al. (eds.), 1991; see also Lemke, 2001). In his essay “Politics and Reason” Foucault suggests governmentality works as a pastoral power, akin to the Christian notion of shepherd and flock: pastorship is both totalising, as all the sheep must be ruled continuously and permanently, and individualising, as the shepherd must have knowledge of each sheep and its character (Foucault, 1979, in Kritzman (ed.), 1988). Government requires knowledge of its (diverse) public – public behaviour, habits, conditions, and viewpoints. But one cannot find or see these aspects of citizens’ lives in an unmediated manner. The exercise of power entails organising and directing perception or ‘the gaze’, producing a truth (Foucault, 1977, p187); thus power and knowledge are inseparable. In order to do anything, government must construct knowledge. For instance, ‘race’ is a category or object of analysis constructed socially through a ‘labour of division’, requiring the work of social scientists and the designers of censuses (Hetherington and Munro, 1997; see Murji, in Braham and James (eds.), 2002, pp172-180). Bureaucratic ordering requires categories such as ‘race’ (or ‘cultural diversity’), and the category becomes the basis of further consideration of questions about ‘race’. Yet the construction of that category did not just happen. The construction occurred within certain projects guided by certain rationales.

Hence, government may attempt to discover and order social reality through or in terms of specific concepts. Dean (1999), for instance, examines how concepts of ‘risk’ have been used in this way. He asks four basic questions: What knowledges make risk thinkable? He highlights statistics, sociology, epidemiology, and accounting and insurance knowledges. What techniques discover risk? For each knowledge he notes the techniques, e.g. use of probability in insurance, interviews in sociology, and so forth. What technologies govern risk? Here Dean analyses practices such as risk screening, case management, and certain insurance practices. Finally, he asks what political rationalities deploy ‘risk”? Here, he locates ‘risk’ within welfare state and neoliberal rationalities.

We might consider ‘cultural diversity’ as one concept through which the governance of populations is conducted. What knowledges make cultural diversity thinkable? As Ang (1991) argues, television companies commission audience surveys and in the process construct, somewhat simplistically, ‘the audience’. What techniques discover cultural diversity? Audience surveys will most likely use quantitative techniques rather than in-depth interviews with smaller numbers of audience members. What technologies govern cultural diversity? This paper intends to chart the various policies television companies use to govern cultural diversity within their organisations, for instance policies regarding recruitment or programme
commissioning. Finally, what political rationales deploy the concept ‘cultural diversity’? Is it significant that particular conceptualisations of cultural diversity have emerged and been used under a centre-left government? What were the broader policy orientations or paradigms this government has pursued within which television governance can be located?

Part 2: Challenging the mainstream in the 1970s: The creation of Channel 4

By the 1970s television policy in the UK was subject to debates surrounding television’s relation to, and role within, what was perceived to be an increasingly ‘diverse’ society. Criticism of mainstream television and its two major broadcasters, the BBC and ITV, came partly from the free-market right (Altram et al., 1962; Caine, 1968), but most forcefully from the left. For instance, in 1974 Labour’s NEC Home Policy Committee produced a discussion paper *The People and The Media*. The document, drafted by Nicholas Garnham and Caroline Heller, called for diverse content and production in the media. They placed this within a general argument for industrial democracy within broadcasting, to ward off ‘the twin dangers of government and commercial control’ (cited in Freedman, 2003, p90). Drawing on particular knowledges in the form of academic theorists such as Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall, the objective or rationale of the document was to use television and other media to nurture creativity and allow a proliferation of voices. The policy technology would include the centralisation of all advertising revenue and replacement of the licence fee with an Exchequer grant, and dispersal of programme-making units across the UK. The arguments were based less on numbers (statistical reports) and more by a theory-driven narrative. Two quotes indicate the relation in the document between Marxism and an aspirant narrative of social change. In the document Garnham and Heller write:

[The BBC and ITV exist within a] system in which two powerful institutions responsible not to the public but to the real, though hidden, pressures of the power elite, big business and the cultural establishment, manipulate the public in the interest of that power elite and socialize the individual broadcaster so that he collaborates in this process unconsciously.

(cited in Freedman, 2003, p86)

While Garnham wrote to *The Guardian* dismissing proposals more moderate than his through a narrative of revolution:

It is like building a small village in which to eke out a living at the mercy of the feudal barons, rather than laying siege to their fortresses.

(cited in Freedman, 2003, p87)

None of the reforms proposed in *The People and The Media* reached Labour’s 1974 manifesto. However, a few years later a problematisation of ‘the mainstream’ was again evident in the findings of the Annan Committee, which produced the 1977 report *The Future of Broadcasting* that recommended the establishment of what became Channel 4. The report noted a diversifying society in which the BBC-ITV ‘duopoly’ exercised a ‘straightjacket’ in television, creating tensions between producers, and between producers and government (Goodwin, 1998, p19). The report rejected the notion of a national ‘consensus’, suggesting that events in the 1970s had demonstrated the lack of any political or social consensus in Britain, so that positively and normatively there was no sense in trying to use the channel to represent a consensus or homogenous national conversation. Importantly then, the Committee’s rationale for the creation of Channel 4 was the need for a diversity of programmes, not diversity within programmes. That is, the Committee rejected the conceptualisation of balance within television programmes, i.e. pluralist shows featuring
many voices, in favour of balance across the television schedule. Those with a particular viewpoint were to be allocated whole programmes to those to construct a thesis.

The creation and mandate of Channel 4, then, can be seen as a reaction against prevailing conceptions of cultural diversity, in particular the notion of pluralist programmes that would give a voice to marginalized minorities within an ostensible mainstream. By now a number of studies of British media suggested immigrants and ethnic minorities were portrayed through negative stereotypes and linked to crime and social problems (Butterworth, 1967; Hartmann et al., 1974; Critcher et al., 1977; Troy, 1981). In fact, in rejecting the notion of a national consensus, the Committee and subsequent creators of Channel 4 did not favour using the channel to give more and fairer representation to ‘minorities’ as such. They did not want the channel to act as a broker between minority groups. Furthermore, if the channel was created as a platform for the underdog, this would pose political problems. Instead, the creators settled on the more politically-neutral goal of offering television to ‘tastes not catered for’, and this could include programmes for the rich (programmes on yachting were discussed) as well as poor (Docherty et al., 1988).

Following the 1980 Broadcasting Act, British television gained a fourth channel. Channel 4 was formally created by an Act of Parliament in 1982 and began transmissions on 2 November 1982. In examining the birth of a television station as the translation of certain concepts (‘cultural diversity’ and ‘balance’) into practice, we must take note of the specifics of the particular situation (Bennett, 2001). In this case, the political context and the role of certain individuals partly determined the creation of Channel 4. The manner in which the channel was created suggests how a broadly ‘progressive’ project and rationale was redefined due to political expediency and the task of getting a channel started. Indeed the channel’s mandate was largely to provide a public service – to meet tastes not catered for – which may not have resonated with the neoliberal Conservative government of the time. Moreover, that a Conservative government supported the creation of this channel was due in large measure to the role of the Home Secretary, Willie Whitelaw, in facing down opposition from Conservative colleagues (O’Malley, 1994, p7; Docherty et al., 1988). In this way, the policy to create Channel 4 fell within the reigning public service paradigm, but new instruments and technologies to achieve public service goals would be used.

The technology to realize the goals of broadcasting many theses and programmes to appeal to ‘tastes not already catered for’ lay primarily in the mode of production of Channel 4’s programming. Quite simply, Channel 4 would not make programmes, only fund, broadcast and distribute them. Channel 4 would be akin to a publisher. Programme titles would display the production company name. This relatively independent role was bolstered by a funding arrangement whereby Channel 4 would broadcast advertisments in a joint deal with ITV, freeing Channel 4 of the need to negotiate with advertizers itself. These technologies, therefore, offered a potential route not simply to diversity in programming but to diversity of programming.

As a postscript to the story of Channel 4’s creation as an example of the translation of certain concepts of cultural diversity into practice, the question must be asked: were these concepts translated into practice as envisaged? A decade on, the programme schedule actually contained a higher percentage of independently-produced programmes than was envisaged. However, this led to the consolidation of an independent production sector staffed by television professionals, not necessarily resulting in a wider range of voices and ideas in programmes. Indeed, by the 1990s the BBC and ITV also relied heavily on independent producers, such that it made economic sense for those producers to generate mainstream programming (Goodwin, 1998). This has implications for our understanding of policy developments. As Hay (2004) has argued, the success of a political concept or policy objective may depend on the manner in which it is institutionalized. The institutionalisation of
the idea that diverse programmes would follow the increase of independent producers produced unintended consequences counter to the original intention.

Part 3: The Thatcher and Major governments: Diversity through deregulation?

Within the policy orientation of the Conservative governments of 1979-97, characterized broadly as a free economy and small strong state (Gamble, 1994; Green 1987), the question of the governance of diversity in television was re-interpreted. But if we understand the term ‘paradigm shift’ to refer to the re-orientation of policy goals as well as policy instruments (Hall, 1993), then there was no paradigm shift. The Thatcher and Major governments held to the goal of public service broadcasting and attendant efforts to increase cultural diversity. However, there was a change in the instrument deployed to achieve these goals. Alongside a growing set of techniques within television companies (training, recruitment, etc) the government used policies of deregulation as a means (in name, at least) to the ends of cultural diversity. But this process was complicated by the competing objectives of rival government departments. The goals of the free-market Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) contradicted the goals of the culturally-protectionist National Heritage Department (Henry, 1994). This contradiction was exemplified through two documents: the 1988 White Paper Broadcasting in the 1990s, and the BBC report of 1992, Extending Choice.

In Broadcasting in the 1990s, new rationales were used to deploy the concept diversity. The White Paper proposed a statutory requirement that 25 percent of programmes on the BBC and ITV come from independent producers. In the creation of Channel 4, as we saw earlier, independent production was rationalized as a means to increase the diversity of people and ideas reaching the screen. In the 1988 White Paper other rationales are stated:

…independent producers constitute an important source of originality and talent which must be exploited, and have brought new pressures for efficiency and flexibility in production procedures.

(Home Office, 1988, p41)

Within the broader policy orientation of the Conservative government, then, television policy would be informed by the concepts and logics of efficiency and flexibility. This was in line with the approach of the DTI. These proposals were a means to changing the BBC more generally: ‘the Corporation’s acceptance of the Government’s independent production targets [was] a further stimulus for change at the BBC’ (Home Office, 1988, p10).

The concept of ‘diversity’ was challenged altogether a few years later in the BBC report of 1992, Extending Choice. The context of the report is important: the Conservative government had just released a Green Paper questioning virtually all aspects of the BBC, and promised a White Paper in 1994. Seeking perhaps to pacify the government, the BBC’s response contained a strategy to represent ‘national culture’. This complemented the policy rationale of the National Heritage Department, ‘national heritage’, which was influential in the formation of a new education policy, the national curriculum. There was another rationale to the BBC’s re-orientation towards matters of culture and diversity: by claiming to address a national culture per se, the BBC could avoid criticisms that its programming was too high- or low-brow. All British-made non-factual shows were to be brought under the heading ‘Expressing British Culture and Entertainment’ (Goodwin, 1998).

Hence, throughout the 1979-97 period of Conservative government, elite debates occurred about the apparent trade-offs between a neoliberal economic logic and cultural protection (Brown and Leapman, 1994). Yet, meanwhile, as Campion’s (2005) survey of the employment experiences of television staff in the UK suggests, television companies were
introducing policies to ‘deal with’ the ‘problem’ of minorities. She recounts her own experience:

When I joined the BBC at the beginning of the 1980s, there was a great sense of change in the air. Sexism and racism were already being challenged in programmes and in the workforce. The arrival of Channel 4 in 1982 with its explicit remit to focus on under-represented voices helped to put diversity on the broadcasting agenda with a new political dynamism.

Real breakthroughs seemed to be happening everywhere. Lenny Henry established himself as a talented Black entertainer in his own show; *The Chinese Detective* featured David Yip in the lead role of a major drama series and turned him into a household name. Women were presenting news and current affairs reports, and starring in their own cop shows. The BBC Community Programmes Unit was bringing many ordinary voices to the fore in a direct and unselfconscious way. The first magazine programme for disabled people crept into the schedules. Many local radio stations launched their first programmes for Black and Asian listeners. On national television Meera Syal was doing pioneering work as an actress…

(Campion, 2005, p4)

Whatever the contours of elite policy debate, the practices of British television regarding cultural diversity had been altered in the early 1980s. Alongside the creation of Channel 4, in 1980 John Birt had set up a London Minorities Unit at LWT so that television production at LWT might reflect changing social/ethnic relations (Phillips, in Sreberny, 1999). Though developments were uneven across the sector, by the early 1990s Cottle (1993) was identifying multicultural-oriented news production practices in regional television, suggesting some attention to, and diffusion of, cultural diversity practices. Finally, an additional pressure for new practices regarding cultural diversity may have come from the Greater London Council (GLC) and other metropolitan local authorities in the early 1980s. As Mercer (1994) describes, the GLC provided a governmental, institutional platform for a mix of groups from the traditional Left and movements centred upon race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality. This enabled those groups to shape decision-making and distribute resources. This development led to a counterproductive competition between groups for resources as groups sought ‘to establish who was more authentically opposed to whom’ rather than constructing a coherent contestation of the emergent conservative political hegemony of the time (Mercer, 1994, p262). However, it is significant that the GLC did launch a new approach to arts funding. By conceptualizing arts and film both as ‘cultural industries’ and as means to educational objectives, the GLC was able to rationalize more systematic funding of black cultural initiatives such as workshops and film festivals. These initiatives, notably the *Third Eye* black and Third World film exhibition in 1983, brought together black producers who went on to work in both independent and public sector television production (Mercer, 1994). Hence, whatever the eventual political failures of the GLC, these initiatives added impetus to anti-racist cultural production in this period.

**Part 4: Under New Labour, a challenge to pluralist policies emerges**

In this section we see that two overarching rationales for cultural diversity policy in British television – global competitiveness, and strengthening a multicultural Britain – defined policy debates by the late 1990s. However, these rationales were undermined by conceptual confusion and contestation surrounding ‘multiculturalism’, and by a perceived failure of cultural diversity policies to satisfy the expectations of minority audiences and television workers.
While in opposition in the mid-1990s, the Labour Party leadership had accepted the diagnoses of many Conservatives that deregulation was a means to media diversity and cultural diversity. Underpinned by a particular reading of globalisation that privileged an asserted imperative to ‘respond’ and ‘be competitive’ in the globalising world, Labour’s rationale for deregulation was that diversity would boost Britain’s economic performance. In December 1995 the Labour shadow heritage secretary Jack Cunningham criticized the Conservative government for not deregulating enough:

We will not go with the government’s system, I can pretty much guarantee that. My own preference is for complete deregulation . . . Cross-media ownership is a good thing. The whole point is to ensure the creation of bigger companies that can compete abroad.

(cited in Freedman, 2003, p165)

This logic permeated cultural diversity studies in this period. The National Film and Television School (NFTS) produced a report, *Pitch Black* (2001), on ‘the commercial value of black producers working in British television’. The report argued that positive discrimination to boost the number of black staff in leadership roles would give television production companies wider access to talent and creativity and thus a better market reach. Trevor Phillips, then presenter of LWT’s *London Tonight* and later head of the Commission for Racial Equality, argued that if ‘the British TV industry wants to be a global player’ then it would have to include more minority producers. ‘It’s about survival’, he argued (in Sreberny, 1999, p8).

Yet Labour television policy was not only guided by political economy. Certainly by the time Labour came to office in 1997, multiculturalism was a second knowledge from which policy debates drew. Just as globalisation offered a technologized narrative about Britain’s place in the world as a ‘knowledge economy’ with London as a ‘global hub’, so multiculturalism offered a complementary narrative about Britain’s place in the world as a tolerant, pluralistic society with London as the definitive multicultural city. Further, multiculturalism was a key concept in high profile debates about the changing nature of Britishness, in relation to immigration and European integration. The McPherson Report (1999) and consequent Race Relations (Amendment) Act of 2000 aligned with the multicultural zeitgeist, each targeting institutionalized racism.

Two policy initiatives demonstrate the attempt to translate and institutionalize the twin rationales of global economic performance and multiculturalism in television policy. In October 2000 the Cultural Diversity Network (CDN) was launched as a forum for discussion about how British television should address and represent British society: ‘To change the face of television so that it truly resonates with the audience’ (www.cdnetwork.org.uk/programmes.html). The CDN held to the essentialized concept of cultural diversity, promoting policies largely to increase the amount of diversity of staffing and representation in television programming. The CDN website lists its achievements since 2000:

- Most Broadcasters now have targets for employment of ethically diverse staff
- There are formal portrayal monitoring systems in place within several of the major television companies
- Drama output has become increasingly diverse, both in casting and production
- News presentation and production has become increasingly diverse, and more sensitive to the needs of diverse communities
Yet it is as a forum that the CDN has offered perhaps its most interesting contribution to the operationalization of ‘cultural diversity’ in television policy. Though the CDN has largely espoused multicultural policy recommendation, at a CDN conference in 2002 Lord Ousely, former chair of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), called for more ‘multi-cultural knowledge and experience’ at the top level of television (cited in Wells, 2001, p10). This is a subtle shift to invoking a certain *mode of thinking*, which Ousely is labelling multicultural at this point (but isn’t necessarily so).

If the CDN attempted to further the institutionalisation of a multicultural conception of cultural diversity, a second policy initiative did likewise plus integrate that rationale with the global economic performance rationale. The BBC English Regions Diversity Strategy of 2001-2002, entitled *New Audiences Start Here*, ‘sets out a diversity action plan which focuses on better reflecting England’s diverse communities in our programmes and in our workforce’ (Soros and Jones, 2001, p2). The document’s lexicon indicates the influence of multicultural knowledge and the essentialized concept of cultural diversity (‘reflecting ’communities’). This rationale is combined with the *business case*. The report argues diversity ‘will enhance perceptions about our service, raise our value to licence fee payers and improve our profile as an employer’ (Soros and Jones, 2001, p8), and cites a *Business Impact* report:

> Workforce diversity can help bridge gaps between the workplace and the marketplace, opening up new markets. Companies that mirror their marketplace can enhance their image, and send a positive signal to stakeholders and potential investors.

(cited in Soros and Jones, 2001, p5)

In addition, *New Audiences Start Here* proposes diversity as a means towards higher audience ratings, higher staff morale, and compliance both with a 2000 European Anti-Discrimination Directive and with the then-recent speeches of the BBC Director General. The report lists various policy technologies proposed to further these rationales. Technologies include revised policies for content monitoring, specialist programming, recruitment, training, mentoring, outreach initiatives, opening up the BBC premises, and for responding positively to complaints. Where the report is unclear is in its specification of techniques for discovering cultural diversity in its programming, staffing, or audience perceptions. The report proposes a ‘monthly diversity audit of the Regional 1830 news bulletin’ and monitoring of staff, but offers no methodology or details of how these reports will be conducted or what forms of data will be produced (Soros and Jones, 2001, p9). Similarly, the report proposes sharing ‘market research material … to provide staff with information that will help them better understand the diversity of our audiences’ (Soros and Jones, 2001, p13), but does not specify the nature of this ‘material’, who will collect it, and how.

The *New Audiences Start Here* report appears typical of many initiatives within broadcasting organisations. But as we noted earlier, in the case of the introduction of independent production with Channel 4, it is in the institutionalisation of policies that unintended consequences occur and the translation of concepts into practice can (or, more correctly, will) be distorted. In her interview-based study of television workers, Campion (2005) documents how many aspects of these initiatives had failed to realize their original objectives by the late 1990s and early 2000s (see also Sreberny, 1999). The use of statistics to monitor the diversity of workforces, for instance, was held by many working in television to be often counter-productive. Contrived promotional literature showing diverse faces was felt by some to mask the lack of change ‘in the jobs that matter: the ones where the creative and editorial power lies’ (Campion, 2005, p15). Statistics were seen as malleable, monitoring was always announced in advance, it caused resentment, it led to minority actors being treated as ticks for
boxes and to minority actors having to compete for that token ‘minority’ role, statistics merged together minorities into one category, only counted large minorities (Black and Asian, not Chinese or Greek), or counted the wrong identification (‘Where are the boxes for Muslims? Do you mean Indians, Asians, Africans, Brown People, Black People? No, I mean Islam’ (documentary maker cited in Campion, 2005, p20, italics in original)). Overall, the study suggested the construction and deployment of statistics since the 1970s had not altered the culture of television in Britain, and had in some ways proved counter-productive. What statistics and initiatives based around statistics missed, Campion argues, was how cultural diversity can be considered a way of thinking about identifications and relations. This aligns somewhat with Ousely’s call for ‘multicultural knowledge and experience’.

Alongside perceived policy failure, it was evident that ‘multiculturalism’ was a contested concept that could not simply be translated into policy. McLennan (2001) wrote of four types of multiculturalism – conservative, liberal, corporate, and critical – and these were just the four most dominant. If multiculturalism meant the representation and inclusion of cultures as traditions, surely homage to static traditions to not fit dynamic New Labour Britain? If multiculturalism meant the celebration of difference, could cultures not be celebrated episodically and from a distance? (Horsti, no date)

Part 5: Beyond numbers: different forms of cultural diversity

The perceived failure of cultural diversity policies and the conceptual problems surrounding multiculturalism led to a search for new knowledges upon which new policies could be based. As Sreberny had argued in 1999 (p16), ‘There is a profound sense in contemporary social theory that the category ‘ethnicity’ has exploded’, and this explosion of identifications was borne out by her study of minority audiences. In a policy report for the Council of Europe, Bennett (2001) hinted at a relation between empirical changes in global society and changes in forms of diversity. Regarding the former, he pointed to:

…what are now increasingly recognized as the complex and varying ways in which trajectories of peoples, cultures, and histories cut across, undermine, and provide alternatives to the territorial logic of national cultures.

(Bennett, 2001, p28)

These changes had given rise to forms of diversity that ‘challenge[d] the basic grammar of national cultures’ (Bennett, 2001, p28). The diverse range of experiences and identities in any territorial space may include sub-national minorities, autochthonous minorities, diasporic minorities, and indigenous minorities, he argued. Varying forms of diversity co-existing within a polity offered a problem demanding different responses at the level of governance and policy.

Two reports, one governmental, one academic, indicate how this re-thinking was proceeding. A Home Office booklet, Training in Racism Awareness and Cultural Diversity (2002), argued that public sector managers must accept that their cultural diversity commitments entailed changing the whole culture of their organisations, not just supplementary policies:

Similar to other concepts in Human Resources, such as empowerment, diversity can gain acceptance without understanding, and in doing so the real power of the concept can easily pass people by. Fully embracing diversity is also about accepting change and that the organisation will become a different place to where it is now.

(Home Office, 2002, p4)
Campion’s (2005) recent report on cultural diversity in British television includes a series of recommendations that follow from Bennett’s diagnosis of the varying forms of diversity and the Home Office’s argument for wholesale cultural change. Her solution to how policymakers, television workers and the rest of us address varying forms of diversity is to diffuse or inculcate what she labels ‘cultural intelligence’ (CQ). She suggests culturally-intelligent programmes:

- are inclusive in their portrayal of different groups, particularly those who are currently marginalized in society;
- seek to represent different groups of people to each other accurately and authentically;
- enable people to speak for themselves wherever possible
- find universal human truths in surprising places and are not afraid to look in culturally specific areas of British life that are outside of the mainstream;
- seek out hidden connections, reveal shared histories;
- help us to understand ourselves and each other, our place in this country and in relation to other people around the world;
- encourage informed debate on controversial issues by ensuring all viewpoints are thoughtfully represented;
- recognize the subliminal messages programmes transmit are as important as the explicit ones.

(Campion, 2005, p94)

The objective that CQ programming might help further, Campion argues, is ‘that of public service broadcasting … how do we get to know each other better?’ (Campion, 2005, p104, italics in original). She lists various policy technologies for realising CQ programming, in the fields of commissioning, production, scheduling, promotion, and programme reviews. Her proposed technique for discovering cultural diversity and CQ is in-depth qualitative research by those working in television into the cultures their programmes are about (p106), such that programmers have ‘a qualitative sense of diversity’ (anonymous quote, cited in Campion, 2005, p122).

If global competitiveness and a multicultural society were the dominant rationales for cultural diversity policy in the late 1990s, by the early 2000s social inclusion was another important rationale for the Labour government. Campion’s study mentions two rationales: building social capital and facilitating a National Conversation. It is interesting that Campion’s proposed ‘qualitative turn’ is founded on the notion of connection. Invoking the term ‘social capital’ allows these studies to chime with a broad social capital literature, some of which has informed the thinking behind Labour’s policies since 1997. In addition, the global competitiveness or ‘business case’ for cultural diversity fits well with this development of what Campion calls CQ. As Yudice (2003) has argued, in many periods and in many ways, culture has been conceptualized as a resource to be used for social, political or economic ends. Today, perhaps, it is the case that a government may use television governance and policy to foster (not just represent) cultural diversity as a means to build connections between citizens/audience members in such a way as will increase their social capital; a measurable increase in social capital would, in theory, enhance economic productivity.
Yet different conceptions of connection, measured in different ways, have different policy consequences. We have seen Campion’s qualitative ‘sense’ of cultural diversity and social connections, and from this Campion urged specific policy recommendations. We may contrast this with a recent BBC/Work Foundation report, Watching Alone: Social Capital and Public Service Broadcasting (2004). Written by former Goldman Sachs economist Martin Brooks, the report argues that social capital is a positive externality (unintended consequence) arising from the activity of watching television. As we watch together, we have something in common – we can talk about the programme we both watched, or the programme may help us understand other people in our society. The proliferation of television channels and concomitant audience fragmentation, Brooks suggests, threatens to reduce social capital in the UK. Given that he is talking about the increase or decrease an ‘amount’ of social capital, Brooks proposes that the question of how policy can ‘nourish social capital is ultimately empirical’ (Brooks, 2004, p9, p8). Yet he concedes ‘social capital … can be difficult to make precise and practicable’ and is hard to fit into causal accounts that might legitimate policy actions (Brooks, 2004, p18). He cites studies that demonstrate correlations between operationalized concepts of ‘social capital’ and various phenomena such as economic growth and social trust. Nevertheless, it is not clear Brooks provides any way forward for policymakers hoping to justify investing effort and money in cultural diversity initiatives as a means to inculcate ‘social capital’.

What are the implications of these developments in the knowledges and policies associated with cultural diversity for the role of the statistical surveys so dominant in the 1970s and 1980s? Our analysis suggests a narrative whereby, since the late 1990s, statistical reports became associated with policy failure and a sense of disappointment and anger among minority audience and workers in television (Sreberny, 1999; Campion, 2005). Of course, qualitative and quantitative data do not have to be held as mutually exclusive or competing phenomena (Elliott, 2005). For instance, quantitative studies may find general trends and correlations, and qualitative studies of samples of the large survey can be used to identify the mechanisms by which these correlations may be arising. For instance, Sreberny (1999) calls for the establishment of coordinated longitudinal research and a database of audience and workforce data. And one could argue that audience surveys, content analysis of television programming, and statistical studies of the demographics of television workers could be used to identify issues and concerns which could then be investigated by more qualitative studies. But it is clear that (awareness of) the growing complexity of identities and identifications means that statistical measures of the ethnic composition of audiences or television workforces appear to have become an insufficient basis for policy.

Conclusions

1. The move from essentialized to ‘flowing’ concepts of cultural diversity. From the 1970s to 1990s, essentialized concepts of cultural diversity connected to race politics and a particular notion of multiculturalism coincided with mainly quantitative studies of the representation of these categories in the content and workforce of British television. Since the late 1990s a more ‘flowing’ concept of cultural diversity is present in policy debates: cultural diversity as a mode of being, a way of thinking, something discoverable through a qualitative sense and thus coinciding with qualitative studies.

2. Different concepts are attached to different policy rationales. The essentialized concept of cultural diversity was attached to the policy goal of offering representation and voice to marginalized groups and viewpoints. This goal often assumes a positive or normative commitment to a ‘marketplace of ideas’ analogy posting equal access of ideas or people to a public sphere or ideas-marketplace. The ‘flowing’ concept of cultural diversity has been used, in contrast, within a social capital framework, where the policy goal has been to increase the
social capital of individuals in Britain as a means to ends such as democratic renewal, social cohesion, and economic productivity.

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1 This paper does not present actual analysis of particular statistical reports, but makes general statements about reports analysed, including the 1992-2003 reports ‘Television: The Public’s View’, undertaken by the Independent Television Commission (obtained from the UK Data Archive, www.data-archive.ac.uk).

2 In this paper I shall refer to ‘rationales’ rather than rationalities. Dean (1999, p211) defines political rationalities as ‘[a]ny form of calculation about political activity, i.e. about any activity which has as its objective the influence, appropriation, redistribution, allocation or maintenance of powers of the government of the state or other organizations. Political rationality is a species of governmental rationality in so far as it entails thinking about directing the conduct of others or ourselves. To the extent that its objective is to influence the way governmental organizations exercise their powers, its concerns are quite distinct.’ I will not use the term ‘rationality’ because of the wider connotations and competing understandings of the term in the social sciences; it may not always be obvious that ‘rationality’ implies ‘governmental rationality’ as Dean defines the term. I use the term ‘rationale’ to suggest a more limited set of policy principles towards particular objectives.

3 Campion’s report is complemented by Vertovec’s (no date) study of a radio station in Berlin. He explores how the SFB4 Radio Multikulti station attempts to normalize difference by offering programming that represents a range of cultures and languages over any given day. The station’s slogan, “We speak with an accent”, is intended to appeal to all those in Germany who speak with a foreign accent, thus normalising their differences. In addition, the editors make a conscious effort to build contacts in the various ethno-linguistic communities of Berlin to which they broadcast, connecting – as Campion suggests – in a way that gives the programmers a qualitative sense of diversity.

4 There are also normative issues surrounding the policy of ‘investment’ in ‘cultural diversity’ initiatives, for example: it devalues the aesthetic aspect of cultural diversity (Yudice, 2003); it creates an illusion that there is a problem to be solved (Karppinen, 2005); and should we measure and impose quotas on media content given that it’s supposed to be free speech (first amendment objection) (van Cuilenberg, 1998)?
References:


The operationalization of the concept ‘cultural diversity’ in British television policy and governance


