The Rise of Cybernetics? Government and Change in Lithuanian Cultural Policy

Egle Rindzeviciute

CRESC, The Open University

November 2005

The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) is gratefully acknowledged.
The Rise of Cybernetics? Government and Change in Lithuanian Cultural Policy

Egle Rindzeviciute
PhD student in Cultural Studies and Communications
Baltic & East European Graduate School
Södertörns högskola (University College)
egle.rindzeviciute@sh.se

Abstract

The paper focuses on the changing mechanisms of governance in Lithuanian state cultural policy. Exploring the period of (roughly) 1918–1970, which saw the birth of state cultural policy as we know it today, the paper engages in a discussion about the governmentalization of the state and the effects that the process has had on the formation of the cultural field. Looking at the change that occurred when the democratic regime was replaced with Soviet authoritarianism in 1940, I argue that the latter contributed with an increased organizational structuration of the field of culture in Lithuania. The paper presents preliminary findings as to how cybernetics, the science of control and information, influenced this process. Finally, the paper questions whether the effects of cybernetics as a paradigmatic mode of governance in the Soviet Union since the 1960s can be treated as symptoms of the governmentalization of the authoritarian regime.

Acknowledgements

The initial idea for the paper was born during the research visit at CRESC (October 2004 – January 2005), which was made possible thanks to a generous grant from the European Science Foundation, the NHIST program “Representations of the Past: National Histories in Europe”. The earlier versions of the paper were presented at the seminar, organized by the Communications Department at the University of Linköping (Sweden, April 2005) and at the CRESC Inaugural Conference “Culture and Social Change: Interdisciplinary Exchanges” that was held Hulme Hall, The University of Manchester (11–13 July 2005). I am most thankful to Tony Bennett and Francis Dodsworth for their very useful and insightful comments on the earlier drafts. And as always, I am deeply in debt to my PhD dissertation supervisors Irina Sandomirskaja, Martin Kylhammar and Lars-Christer Hydèn for their continuous guidance and ideas.

Introduction

In his speech at the beginning of the 1990s, Vytautas Landzbergis, the leader of Sąjūdis, the Lithuanian liberation movement, declared that there was nothing left after the Soviet era in Lithuania, but the ‘ruins of culture’. He meant that the soviet government did not create anything meaningful during the previous fifty years, but only succeeded in destroying what was done during the interwar period of independent Lithuania. Immediately, the statement was strongly opposed by those employed in the cultural sector. The employees of museums, libraries, culture houses (a soviet version of maisons de la culture) and so on argued that Mr. Landzbergis underestimated their efforts and work done in hard conditions and for low pay.¹ And indeed in 1990, a typical Lithuanian cultural worker was not digging in the ruins like an archaeologist unless it was really one’s profession. Rather, he or more often she was located in an office with books and shelves, had received higher education and was professionally
socialized into an elite strata. Nevertheless, ‘ruins of culture’ became an idiomatic expression often used to describe the post-soviet situation.

The otherwise forgotten speech was often mentioned as a typical of the political attitude of Sąjūdis in the interviews with arts managers and policy makers, which I carried out in the capital Vilnius in 2004 and 2005. The discussion about transition in Lithuanian state cultural policy in the 1990s focused around the question as to whether or not there were any ‘ruins of culture’: that is, on what had been destroyed - and to what extent - and what had been (re)created.

These are the questions this paper engages with. Understanding Lithuanian cultural policy in the 1990s requires an historically sensitive approach which encourages us to reassess the organizational heritage of the soviet era. The turn towards democracy with the declaration of independence from the USSR on 11 March 1990 did not happen in an empty field. Landzbergis, a musicologist by profession, spoke and worked not in ruins, but in a highly structured world of organizations and functions. Moreover, it can be argued that Lithuanian state cultural policy, the modern phenomenon as we now know it, came into being under soviet rule.

Hence, in order to understand the changes in the 1990s, we will ask how the sphere of culture and state policy towards it was constituted, both in terms of administration and discourse. The goal of this paper is to discuss how ideology was turned into technology and politics into management through the analysis of the development of cultural policy.

The case of Lithuania is an interesting example. A young nation-state created at the beginning of the twentieth century, but whose history of statehood stretches back to the Middle Ages, it faced turbulent changes during the last century. State cultural policy in Lithuania developed under several different political regimes: initially subject to the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century, then a small democratic nation-state in between the World wars, then a Communist state after Soviet occupation, followed by the restoration of independence and membership of the EU and NATO.

In relation to changing political regimes and forms of statehood, three formative periods of Lithuanian state cultural policy can be distinguished:

1) 1918–1939, a period of loose civic action, low governmental involvement in the cultural field, yet the formation and consolidation of Lithuanian nationalism.

2) 1940–1990, the period of Soviet governance, bureaucratization of the cultural field; cultural organizations consolidate, acquire political importance and social power.

3) 1990–2004, renegotiation of inherited structures: defamiliarization and innovation in cultural organizations; privatisation and fragmentation of the cultural sector.

My concerns in this paper are limited to the interwar period and sovietization in the 1950s–1970s. The prevailing interpretations of the transition in cultural policy in Lithuania in the 1990s depart from the ideological position pronounced by Landzbergis and focus on the restorative aspect, the reestablishment of the legacy of the interwar republic by recreating the organizations, their names and representations (as for example in Hiden and Salmon 1994; Vardys and Sedaitis 1997; Ashbourne 1999; Snyder 2003). I do not argue that to focus on the restoration is misleading, as it was a prominent part of the government policy. Yet this approach is one-sided. My focus on the early sovietization of Lithuanian cultural policies questions this established perspective by discussing the origins of the cultural organizations which achieved their national status in the 1990s. The questions of ‘ruins’ and ‘restoration’ can properly be understood only in the wider context of the development of soviet cultural policy in Lithuania.
In the official discourses, especially those promoted by the Council of Europe (In from the Margins 1997), the term ‘cultural policy’ has gained liberal connotations of governing-at-a-distance and is often juxtaposed to ‘cultural politics,’ which meant a more direct, interventionist approach of government to cultural processes or straightforward exploitation of cultural resources for political goals often as a part of so called ‘identity politics.’ The Foucauldian perspective of ‘governmentality’ allows us to analyze culture as a particular field of governance, which is constituted through certain techniques, forms of expertise, strategies and other regulatory practices (just like the “economy” in Foucault 1991:99). In this way, cultural policy as governance is seen as both political (fulfilling the rationales of a prevailing political regimes) and technological (influenced by available scientific achievements).

In line with Nicolas Rose, it can be argued that the government of culture is possible only through ‘discursive mechanisms that represent the domain to be governed as an intelligible field with specifiable limits and particular characteristics, and whose component parts are linked together in some more or less systematic manner by forces, attractions and coexistences’ (Rose 1999:33). Once a field becomes delineated it can be brought into the sphere of governance as an object and instrument. I argue that from the 1960s, it was the science of cybernetics, which played the major role in instrumentalizing culture and provided the ‘discursive mechanisms’ that Rose refers to here.

The organizational field of culture also depends on gathering knowledge and monitoring. Hence the culture field is brought into being via abstraction by ‘centres of calculation’ as defined by Bruno Latour (1987), which structure a spatial and technological production of knowledge. I argue that Latourian organizations and their networks created in the Soviet period provided a sphere for the production of the statistical knowledge needed for planning cultural policy.

It is not usual to use the perspective of governmentality in understanding the East European cultural transition. When talking about Eastern European societies, the development of state cultural policy is often discussed in the context of emerging cultural nationalisms. According to this view, shared culture comes to be a founding principle of state legitimacy (as in Gellner 1983). It is often argued that political elites expropriate ‘national culture’ through ideologies and, in doing so, invent the nation as an imagined community and (therefore) a subject of governance (see Anderson 1991). Consequently, the ideas of philosophers and other intellectuals come to be crystallized into social relations through the means of governmental policies of education, heritage, arts and language.

This approach often underestimates the influence that modern forms of organization (bureaucracies and administrative ideologies (a term from Urban 1982)) had on the emergence of state cultural policy as such. Hence the goal of this paper is to fill in the gap and to discuss how the development of forms of ‘rational’ organization influenced the formation of the cultural policy field.

There have been persuasive arguments made that modern cultural policy emerged as an attempt to shape the populations of modern nation states. It is interpreted as an instrument of making citizens, as public men or women, endowed with certain moral qualities and skills of cultural consumption (Bennett 1995; Prior 2001). In addition to that, I want to draw attention to the mechanisms through which ‘culture’ also emerged as a specific field of intervention to be managed by special techniques. In this way, ‘culture’ came to be both the instrument and object of governance.

Further, the governmentality perspective focuses on the technological aspect of the rule and ‘soft’ means of government, through making individuals responsible for their own conduct while also developing sophisticated methods of monitoring. In emphasizing these aspects, a
tendency to identify the rule-at-a-distance with liberal governance as political system occurs (as in Rose 1999). The case of Lithuanian cultural policy points to the need for a critical examination of this aspect of governmentality perspective.

The technology of governmentality, as well as its conceptual apparatus was strongly influenced by the developing information and communication sciences, which originated under the name of cybernetics. In turn, cybernetics developed both in the Soviet Union and Western countries. This science, initially limited to mathematics, but extended to linguistics and communication theories, contributed to both liberal democratic and authoritarian regimes.

The effect of cybernetics has been both wide-spread and fuzzy. There are strong similarities between cybernetics, which conceptualizes the world as the interaction of information flows, readable through code, consisting of adaptive and self-regulating complex systems and manageable through optimization of conditions and control of feedback, and the sociology of Talcott Parsons in his *The Social Systems* in 1951, while its direct influence on linguist Roman Jakobson (‘Linguistics and Communication Theory’ 1960) is an established fact (Gerovitch 2002). The relation between centre and periphery conceptualized by Latour is essentially based on the idea of feedback and control. ‘Information’, then the ‘knowledge’ society became an object of governmental policies and an object of study of governmentality scholars.

Soft methods, based not on force, but on feedback and adaptation of self-regulating systems (individuals, communities) came to be identified with the technologies of Western democratic regimes. However, according to historians of science (Vucinich 1984; Graham 1993; Gerovitch 2002), cybernetics had a great influence unparalleled by any other scientific theory in the Soviet Union. Moreover, it seems that the principle of action-at-a-distance was both discursively promoted and present in the organizational schemes of soviet media and the structure of cultural organizations. The concepts of cybernetics, which resemble the theoretical apparatus of governmental action-at-a-distance, pervaded cultural and political discourses by the 1970s. As a result, technology had a political meaning in the USSR as a result of the Cold War, and the USSR political discourses were highly technicized.

In this context, I now go on to look at:

a) the nature of the change of Lithuanian cultural policy when taken over by the Soviet regime

b) the extent to, and the respects in which cybernetics influenced the concepts and organizational practices of Soviet cultural policy

But first and foremost, this paper hopes to contribute material which would form the basis for further critical examination of the governmentality perspective, its scientific and political origins and applicability to non-Western countries.

**Governmental bodies for culture in the first republic of Lithuania, 1918–1939**

The section discusses the main features of the relation between cultural organizations and government in the interwar period. Unlike Thomas Lane (2002:18), who in his recent history of Lithuania (from the British perspective) praises the interwar government for having a ‘generous programme’ for supporting arts and culture, I argue that the most important cultural organizations and cultural initiatives were generated by private individuals and not by government. Quite the opposite, the state had often to be persuaded to support even her cultural representation abroad. Being mostly concerned with raising the level of literacy in the country, where about 30 per cent of the population was illiterate in 1923, government officials did not really bother with creating any programme for cultural action (and illiteracy dropped
to 5.9 per cent in 1941). Instead, the main responsibility was within society and this attitude was also often pronounced: ‘the role of the government in culture is completely insignificant compared with the role of society,’ its function is to encourage initiatives while ‘the great job should be done by society itself’.

Naturally, the history of Lithuanian cultural organizations does not start in 1918. The first public cultural institutions (museums, learned societies and reading clubs) in Lithuania emerged in the nineteenth century, but the governmental development of the cultural sector did not happen before the creation of the first republic in 1918. On the other hand, it was only authoritarian states which had a clearly defined and structured cultural policy on the governmental level in between the wars, as in Soviet Russia (with Narkompros, a governmental agency set up in 1917 for communist art policy), Mussolini’s Italy and Hitlers’ Germany. But also some initiatives occurred in the USA, such as the Federal Art Project, a part of Roosevelt’s New Deal policy in 1935, or private philanthropic organizations, which yet had far reaching geopolitical aspirations, like the Fulbright or Guggenheim foundations (see Ninkovich 1981). In France by contrast, despite lively leftist debate and action, which focused on the idea ‘culture for people’, cultural investment was regarded as a predominantly private affair and explicitly opposed to authoritarian regimes (Dubois 1999:119–120).

In a way like France in the 1920s and 1930s, though for different reasons, the Lithuanian government was not particularly active in assisting culture, either as a welfare or as an educational project. Yet there were several attempts to introduce the sphere of ‘culture’ or ‘art’ into the field of governmental policy. Being an adjunct to the departments of educational policy in the beginning, as the newly-created state prioritized education over culture, step by step culture made its way into the government’s organizational structure.

Consequently, it was learned societies, a form of association inherited from the nineteenth century, which became major agents behind organizing exhibitions, establishing museums and other cultural organizations. They were a very common organizational form for collective cultural activity. The primary function of learned societies was to unite interested individuals who wanted to develop their interests and also to engage in public action. They arranged discussion clubs, often public reading rooms, initiated studies and publications, organized exhibitions and other cultural events, established other organizations (often cultural or educational). They also acted as lobby groups when trying to promote one or another idea about cultural organization to the government. Being also gathering points for informal communication and entertainment (Mulevičiūtė 2001), the societies facilitated contacts between artists and politicians, businessmen and intellectuals, as their members were coming from different spheres. Moreover, the societies also represented different political or aesthetic ideologies such as conservative, liberal or the avant-garde and often engaged in debates in the press.

Among the most prominent were The Lithuanian Science Society (1907–39), The Society of Creators of Lithuanian Art (1907–15) and The Independent Artists Society (1930–1940). The Society of Creators, established by the artists representing different branches of the fine arts, concentrated its interests on museums, education and cultural diplomacy, while the state was supposed to take care of laws and be responsible for funding and the protection of monuments. The Society founded quite a few cultural organizations, but was not able to maintain them financially. Consequently, a closer cooperation with the government was sought. For example, among the participants in the opening of the exhibition Overview of Lithuanian Art (1 May 1920), organized by The Society of Creators, were the president, prime minister, other members of the government and high representatives of the Catholic church; the national anthem was played. Despite this, the exhibition made a loss. Although particularly heated rhetoric stating the importance of art for the young nation was used in relation to it, the government did not provide any help to acquire permanent facilities for future cultural projects (see Mulevičiūtė 2001:19, 24).
Summarizing, the cultural sphere in interwar Lithuania was not very rich in terms of organizations compared to Western countries. Schooling (only one art college existed in Kaunas) and gallery space were also fairly limited. Besides several smaller galleries, major exhibitions took place in M.K.Čiurlionis’s Gallery.\textsuperscript{11} Artistic life was organized around two seasonal exhibitions (Autumn and Spring), yet neither of these had permanent facilities.\textsuperscript{12}

However, following the international modernist trend to compete on the cultural stage set by the Great Exhibition of London in the Crystal Palace (1851), culture was used as a part of Lithuanian foreign policy, arguing her case for sovereignty. Already in 1900 at the International Exhibition in Paris, Lithuania participated separately from the Russian Empire. The prohibited Lithuanian press examples were exhibited alongside folk art. After 1918, Lithuania was represented at several World Fairs, participated in some international art exhibitions (such as the International Exhibition of decorative arts in Monza, 1925) and in Paris (The Museum of Applied Arts in 1927), five art exhibitions in Scandinavia (Sweden, Norway and Denmark in 1931).\textsuperscript{13} Lithuania established her sections in the Brussels Palais Mondials museum (Keršytė 2000). Finally, the country was represented in the World Fair in Paris (1937), where Lithuania shared a pavilion with Latvia and Estonia, and in the World Fair in New York (1939). Everywhere, even in the International Exhibition of Hygiene (Dresden 1930) and the World Fair in Paris in 1937 dedicated to ‘Art and Technology in the Modern World,’ Lithuania was represented by folk art artefacts and modern interpretations of folk art in the works of contemporary artists.\textsuperscript{14}

The choice of artefacts for display was motivated by a politically preferred conception of Lithuanian culture, statehood and historical continuity. These conceptions reflected the geopolitical situation of the country at that time.\textsuperscript{15} Because the Vilnius region was occupied by Poland, the culture associated with the Polish nobility was completely ignored: the culture of polonized noble estates, collections, architecture and other heritage of the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth period was not cared about.\textsuperscript{16} Instead, the model of folk culture designed in the nineteenth century and ‘national’ literature (mostly written by priests like Maironis and Antanas Baranauskas), music and painting (M.K. Čiurlionis) were highly promoted as the most important cultural products.\textsuperscript{17}

Besides fine art, the museum was another institution which had possible uses for governance. Quite a few public museums in the major cities were opened.\textsuperscript{18} The smaller museums of regional studies, often administratively linked to high schools, were rapidly spreading across the country. Though some museums were established under city municipalities, most of them were founded due to civic initiative.\textsuperscript{19}

In this context of a growing cultural organization sector and the scarce availability of resources, cultural actors demanded a specialized governmental body dedicated exclusively to culture. But the government was unwilling to create a separate cultural administration.\textsuperscript{20} Especially after the \textit{coup d’etat} in 1926, which established the so called ‘soft authoritarian regime’ of President Antanas Smetona, the question of controlling speech became more relevant for government. The concern climaxed in 1938, when The Agency for Public Work, which was dedicated to national culture and propaganda, was established, under the Prime Minister. The head of the organization was a priest, Izidorius Tamošaitis, an active member of the ruling nationalist party. The organization was primarily concerned with the mass media and censorship.\textsuperscript{21} Yet as Thomas Lane (2002:26) correctly notes, ‘a basic pluralism of social and civic organizations was permitted’ and the nature of the censorship was far from those in Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany. The principles of censorship were applied only to the ‘state sector’, especially schools while the private sector enjoyed a relative freedom of speech. For example, schools were prohibited to acquire certain journals or books, like pro-western \textit{Naujoji Romuva}. Nevertheless, the journals continued to be published and
publicly distributed. A more strict control was applied to certain political movements, such as the prohibited communist party.

Because government did not directly fund culture, it neither had many instruments to exert its control, nor as argued above the will to do so. This conditioned a substantial autonomy of the cultural field, even during the authoritarian 1930s. On the other hand, private sponsorship for culture was not developed in Lithuania. In 1926–1939 discussions about the idea of a Culture Fund (a funding body) and Culture Palace (a planning, policy body) took place in the press. The need for a public Culture Fund, like those in Latvia and Estonia (or Iceland), an alternative to governmental and private sponsorship, funded from an excise tax on alcohol, luxury goods and revenue from the penalties collected for public misbehavior, was actively voiced, but again no results were achieved. Instead, artists organized their own fund, which functioned as a welfare foundation, financed through memberships and tax from art sales, which helped the members in need. The idea of a Culture Palace, which would combine different functions (coordinating display, research, education and creation) and different arts and intellectual activities, was not implemented either.

And ironically, although the ideology of Lithuanian nationalism based ‘the state on culture’, the governments did not attempt to administer the underlying ‘culture’ in a planned, purposeful, rational way. Unlike Lithuanian language policy, cultural activities were not perceived as an instrument of governance and were rather destined to fulfil the function of representation on official occasions. With great ardour and in vain the artists called for change in the governmental attitude from that of individual commissions for a monument or an exhibition on a specific occasion to the development of infrastructure (Palace, Foundation or strengthening the policy making role of the Vytautas The Great Culture Museum).

Despite a lack of more consistent governmental involvement, the foundation for many of the future state-supported national organizations was laid in the interwar Republic: library network, art school, museums, artists union, opera and ballet, etc. The organizations established or planned were further developed under Soviet occupation and then revamped in the Second Republic. Despite fierce battles of political ideology, be they those of authoritarianism, communism or nationalism, the system of cultural organizations remained: a governmental department, museums, galleries, concert organizations, libraries and schools. Civic associations (draugija), which were widespread in the interwar republic, were seemingly maintained under Soviet rule as fake NGOs, often attached to various trade unions. However these organizations were closely controlled by the Party. Any independent artists groups and commercial galleries ceased to exist in the Soviet period.

Together with introduced control, I argue, the understanding of culture itself became organizational. That is, the field of culture came to be defined through and populated by organizations and came to be increasingly governed by the principles of rationality in distributing knowledge and cultural production.

Towards Systematized State Involvement: Official Cultural Organization in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (LSSR)

In the current scholarship, analysis of the Soviet state and culture is usually twofold. On the one hand, studies focus on the party ideology expressed in political principles, declarations, key documents and the press. This analysis is complemented with visual representations: social realism, architecture, films, sports, parades and other material cultures (see for example a recent revisionist anthology by Reid and Crowley 2000; or Kelly and Shepherd 1998). On the other hand, the strategies of resistance to the official authoritarian regime are analysed: the alternative cultural activities as expressed in youth culture, samizdat, and later on, ironic post-soviet art (for example Boym 2003).
These analyses do present a sophisticated picture of Soviet cultural discourse. But a crucial part is missing in this binary (official-unofficial) landscape of soviet culture. It is not clear precisely how the declared principles came to be embodied in material form as works of art, everyday culture and so on. This section analyses the missing intermediate sphere between these two poles: the sphere of policy, its organization, language and technology.

As with many revisionist studies of soviet society and culture, my analysis is focused on routinization and normalization, as opposed to the enforcement of brutal violence. The Soviets controlled culture not only by repression, but also by softer means. Moreover, culture was brought into existence as a clearly delineated, internally diversified and highly structured organizational field, which was understandable, manageable and dynamic.

How was culture as a field of governmental intervention constituted? I will look at the creation of organizational orders and discursive normalization, in a Foucauldian way, for the establishment of regimes of truth. Here policy as administration, organizational structure and managed activity dwells in between political decision and cultural product. Looking into how this sphere came into existence will not only contribute to a better understanding of Soviet culture and society, but also perhaps increase our understanding of the nature of modern cultural change, because today cultural change happens in organizations, through organizations and is often brought about by organizations.

In doing this, the section combines two solid traditions of research: Russian cultural studies and scholarship on management and administration in the Soviet Union. To my knowledge, the studies of Soviet bureaucracy, managerial ideologies and styles of organization have not been used for the analysis of cultural processes. Furthermore, how the changes in management influenced cultural production has not yet been explored. Obviously, because of the lack of space it is rather the task of my dissertation and not of this working paper to fill in this gap. Therefore the paper limits its ambition to mapping the constitution and governance of the soviet cultural sphere and questions in what sense we can say that this sphere was governmentalized by the soviets.

And finally, the post-colonial aspect of the study needs to be pointed out. Most Sovietologists were writing about the Russian Federation and Russians, where the soviet regime was the domestic regime. Probably because of linguistic reasons but also the particular interest generated by the Cold War, the studies of Soviet administrations are also limited to the organizations in Russia. Unfortunately, quite often the findings of such studies were with ease generalized towards other, non-Russian soviet republics. I focus on Lithuania, which enables me to ask how the soviet administration was introduced in a different context, which in some ways was more western, ‘civilized’ and modern than that of the aggressor.26

The short period of Lithuania’s independent statehood was discontinued on 15–17 of June, 1940 when the Soviet Army entered the territory of the three Baltic States.27 In the occupied republics, the cultural organizations were nationalized. The artists’ groups were replaced by official associations, the right to organize exhibitions or arrange performances was reserved to official organizations (Berend 1996:90). This greatly influenced the professionalization of the cultural field, as being an artist meant formally being an employee of the state, while rhetorically an artist was a servant to the people.

Ironically, though being fiercely against the ‘bourgeois’ idea of artistic autonomy, the Soviet regime systematically contributed to the construction of an autonomous field of culture. In a similar way to Foucault’s discussion of the shift from a family to population, one may argue that the Soviet regime treated an artist as an instrument and culture as an aggregate, a dynamic system which can be modelled and governed (Foucault 1991:99). Thus my argument is that culture for the Soviet regime was both an instrument for governing the population through
education and propaganda, but also came into being as a very complex object that required sophisticated methods of control.

First of all, unlike the government of interwar Lithuania, the Soviet regime had a clearly formulated and systematically enacted cultural policy. On the other hand, Lithuanian cultural elites had accumulated quite a rich experience of taking initiative and self-organizing in a relatively unregulated sphere of cultural institutions. Obviously, it was the latter that had to revise and adjust their habitual ways of behaviour.\textsuperscript{28}

Since the bolshevik revolution, the major concern of Soviet cultural policy was mass education and propaganda, which remained salient until the 1990s. Major means were introduced to decrease illiteracy and introduce ‘norms of civilized behavior’: for this purpose the People’s Commissariat of Enlightenment (\textit{Narkompros}, 1917–1929) was created.\textsuperscript{29} During the time of Narkompros and Lunachiarsky, the ideas of cultural enlightenment and the ideology of industrialization in some ways coincided with the modernist ideology of Russian constructivists. This artistic and intellectual trend was banned after the New Economic Policy (NEP, 1921–1928) failed in the late 1920s.

Both education and censorship were the main features of soviet cultural policy. From 1920 to 1953 cultural and propaganda affairs in Soviet Russia and its occupied republics were coordinated by \textit{Glavpolitprosvet} (Head Government for Political-Educational Work). \textit{Glavlit} (The Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs) was the major censorship body established in 1922. The emphasis on education was exemplified in ‘Kulturno-prosvetitel’naya rabota’ (Cultural-enlightenment work), promoted and coordinated by different organizations. However, it was restricted to the use of ‘cultural means’ by definition specifically located outside educational organizations (BSE 1975). In addition to Glavpolitprosvet, in 1945 the Committee for Culture-Enlightenment Work was created at the Council of Ministers, and functioned till 1953, when it was integrated with the ministry system. Thus until 1953 an array of different organizations took care of cultural matters on the top level.

In 1953, the year of Stalin’s death, the All-Union Ministry of Culture was established, together with the union-republican ministries. One of the arguments for introducing a new structure was a need for a greater efficiency in governing different spheres of culture. In this way, different Head Offices (\textit{Upravlenie}), responsible, for example, for cinemafication, fine arts, kulprosvet et cetera, were pooled together into an overarching organization of the ministry. It may be argued that the period of administratice rule started, which replaced one-man-made, often arbitrary and heavily militarized cultural policy of the post-war period.

The governmental system of the USSR was hierarchical and in principle was mirrored in the structure of union-republics’ governments. The main legislative bodies were the Supreme Soviet with the Politburo,\textsuperscript{31} headed by the chairman, and the Council of Ministers, headed by the premier, on the top. The application of the decisions was a responsibility of the executive organs, various committees; in principle the governments of the Union republics were treated as such organs.\textsuperscript{32} The cultural organizations were accountable to the supreme soviets, governments and their commissions for education, science and culture. But the main feature of the soviet management was strong leadership (Breslauer 1982; Shlapentokh 2001), thus the ultimate power of the decision belonged to the head of the state; in the ministry – the minister.

Financing of the cultural organizations and governmental bureaucracies came from the state funds allocated to current expenditure (the ‘consumption fund’, which meant that culture was not treated as an investment sphere). The funding for culture was under the subdivision of the ‘budget for education’, which included mass education, science, printing, libraries, broadcasting, arts and others.\textsuperscript{33} On the other hand, the central funding was distributed through Gosplan, the organization that approved the five-year plans. According to some former high-ranking soviet officials, this meant that even a party leader could not easily withdraw funding
from an unwanted activity. In this way, a centralized but also fragmented and rigid bureaucratic system of communist governance provided the lacunas of freedom of action.34

The hierarchy and structure of cultural administration reflected the administrative structure of the USSR. Together with the presence of trade unions and the five year plan, it resembled any other sphere of Soviet industry. The trade unions implemented welfare programs: they managed expenses on social insurance, sanatoriums, rest houses, preventive homes and so on. In addition, the unions were powerful censorship organs, entitled to decide on who is an artist or cultural worker and who is not.

However even in this context of centralization and control, I suggest interpreting the post-Stalinist era as a period of relative governmentalization of the Soviet state. Very soon the following First Secretary of the Party Nikita Khrushchev declared the dictatorship of Stalinism to be a great mistake if not a crime.35 The Thaw was the period of reform, when the concern with the welfare of the population was increased at the expense of the military economy (Shlapentokh 2001). The ideological function of art was revised; monumental and decorative art acquired new meanings of leisure and decorum, besides direct instruction. Ascetic cheap mass production and social housing were translated into the aesthetics of a soviet functionalism (Gerchuk 2000).

During several decades after the death of Stalin, management became science again.36 As Mark Beissinger (1988) demonstrated, the very discipline of administration had its ups and downs in the Soviet Union. The status of administration shifted from that of scientific practice propagated by the famous soviet Taylorist Aleksey Gastev in the 1920s to unnecessary and even evil ‘bureaucratization’ in Stalin’s period, which was followed by its rehabilitation in the 1960s–1970s. It is not by chance that the rehabilitation of administration coincided with the growth of cybernetics and the Soviet scientific revolution itself.

Cybernetics and the Cultural Sector

The development of soviet cybernetics, the science of control and communication, specifically the interaction between automatic control and people, and its political implications has been brilliantly analyzed by Russian historian of science Slava Gerovitch (2002). Gerovitch focuses on the development of the cybernetic approach in Moscow and its contacts with the West. He analyzes the ideological significance which cybernetics gradually accumulates, but as a historian of science, he does not really look into its implications in the cultural sphere. However he presents a strong argument that soviet scientific cybernetics, unlike its counterpart in the West, was explicitly ambitious to apply its methods for government of culture and society. My concern is to explore how and to which extent cybernetics as a powerful framework of soviet scientific and social thought since the 1960s (see Vucinich 1984:270–271) influenced soviet cultural policy making. Some of the core ideas of cybernetics closely relate to those underlying the theoretical framework of governmentality. How it emerged and what it implies are the main questions that the section hopes to raise.

As Khrushchev eased contacts with the West, the spread of the technologies of control of complex, feed-back based systems coincided on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The principles of cybernetics did influence management of soviet industries (see Conyngham 1973; Urban 1982; Beissinger 1988; Vucinich 1984; though did not contribute to their efficacy, argues Shlapentokh 2001). The books on communication and information, like those of Norbert Wiener and Robert Shannon, were translated into Russian.37 The information-systems approach in organizational studies was introduced in the Soviet Union.38 Sociology and econometrics became the main scientific paradigms for running the Soviet economy and society. The cybernetic approach influenced the official vocabulary for describing the field of
culture (which can be ‘closely observed,’ ‘measured,’ ‘inventorized’) and imposed the idea of planning based on modelling (emphasizing the abstract nature of systems which would enable rearrangement of the field).

The reason for the striking influence of cybernetics on culture is that the administration of the cultural sphere was organized in a similar way as in other fields of industry in the Soviet Union. It was in principle integrated in the general governance of different sectors: industrial, social and cultural sectors were governed in the same manner usually described as ‘command economic’.

The decisions were taken centrally and transferred to the local bureaus in the form of detailed instructions and ideological programs. Detailed accounting and reports were demanded in return. These instructions (which were something in between demand and request) firstly dealt with the content of artistic activities, but also prescribed in a detailed way how many and of which type of activities or products should be created. The limits of expenditure and the types of the buildings built were also centrally formulated and distributed, as well as the recommendations of reading lists et cetera.

Like any other form of production, cultural activities were organized around a five year planning cycle. The tasks were distributed in the ‘perspective five years plan’, divided into yearly and quarterly plans. The reputation and salaries of the cultural organization leaders depended on the fulfilment of these instructions. The funding was based on the principle of ‘achieved level’, which is also one of the main principles of cybernetic control, when a program departs from the actual functioning of the system as opposed to an expected one. The ‘achieved level’ was measured through ‘indicators of the state of culture,’ while qualitative analysis was not used. The statistical accounts of the indicators were published each five years.

It may be argued that the positivist approach of Taylorism, and then systems analysis, influenced the prevalence of the quantitative approach in Soviet cultural policy. The strongest emphasis was put on information as the main condition of the control of a given system (Urban 1982:56). This influenced the inventorization of cultural praxis into calculable and comparable forms. As a result, for the government culture emerged not as stock of pictures, artists, dances and songs, but as sequences of aggregated numbers, where the average of a republic was permanently compared against the average of the USSR.

Progress was the keyword, and was measured through the consumption and production of cultural goods. Numbers mattered most for judging success or value. As one party official stated, ‘the foundation of the success of every art collective is its repertoire’ (Diržinskaitė 1965:3), meaning the number of different works performed is perhaps even more important than the quality. The ‘repertoire approach’ thrived: statistics were collected about theatre, concert or library visitors; the number of books and music records, TV and radio consumption, subscription to the press (it was obligatory for everybody to subscribe to several journals and newspapers, even for school pupils). However, the tendency to treat culture as an aggregate was sometimes contested in the press. As Lithuanian historian Juozas Jurginis put it in the 1960s:

In socialist countries the status of the culture of one or another country is judged according to the percentage of people having secondary and higher education. In general, we are used to measuring culture in numbers and with pride make public statistics of schools, pupils, students, theatres, cinemas, clubs, libraries. The bigger the numbers, the greater is our pride. What do these numbers mean? First of all, they mean that, compared to the culture of the capitalist epoch, our socialist culture became mass, belonging to all-people. The riches of culture became accessible to everybody. ... We have quite a few buildings in the republic, which are called houses
of culture, though some of them contain more spider webs than culture. Measurement of culture in numbers has a limit. ... After the socialist revolution, culture was suddenly broadened, it was only a thin layer of education created, it [culture – E.R.] should go deeper and stronger (Jurginis 1965:11).

In this context, ‘deeper and stronger’ meant moving from folk culture to high elite culture, from a folk song to a symphony. The concern with quality and that it was not enough to calculate production and consumption in order to measure cultural development was continuously raised in further publications in the official journal of the Lithuanian Ministry of Culture Domains of Culture.

In the 1970s according to Slava Gerovitch, cybernetics was already transformed from a marginal, innovative science into a newspeak, an official discourse used by everyone and whose main function was to express loyalty to the governing party. Cybernetics was established as a major cross-disciplinary paradigm in science and started to function as a vehicle of the ideology of ‘Marxism-Leninism’, with numerous books on the application of cybernetics to culture and art being published. Philosophical writings on proving how cybernetics can be useful in the cultural sphere proliferated, in a similar way as typical writings on the significance of Marx and Lenin’s ideas for culture. The cybernetics’ ideas were still present in Russian cultural theory in the 1990s, as well as in the higher education of cultural managers and political technologists.

The essence of soviet cybernetics, often termed the system-cybernetic approach to culture, is the following. The approach emphasizes precision and rigorousness of the knowledge, which is best obtained from evidence-based, objective study of positivist facts and analyzed by using mathematical methods. Culture, from this point of view is understood as a complex system, which has its own subsystems (visual art, architecture etc.) and is a part of other larger systems (society, class, state etc.). In these interconnected systems the channels of information play the major role. The systems are hierarchically organized. They are not only complex, as defined above, but also dynamic. The dynamic is based on evolutionary change. Culture as a system is self-regulating through the process of feedback. The goal of the study of culture as a system is its government. To govern culture means to ensure optimal functioning of the system (its organizations, channels of communication et cetera), because it is assumed that the system is automatically self-controlled (Biryukov and Geller 1973:273–275). Drawing on Lotman, culture was viewed as a mechanism, whose goal was to produce and store information by translating the ‘world of facts’ into the ‘world of signs’, organized into ‘systems’ and composing ‘texts’ (Biryukov and Geller 1973:290).

Cybernetically orientated intellectuals defined culture as a system of signs, which could be known by the help of semiotics and governed by the help of mathematic modelling. On the one hand, the application of cybernetics to culture was of a technical, media oriented nature. For example, a programme can solve tasks on ‘harmony’ (Zaripov 1971), while A.I. Sinicky wrote an algorithm for creating ‘optimal’ exercises for the education of musicians (Sinicky 1968, 1971 cf Biryukov and Geller 1973). On the other hand, the cybernetic approach was supported by bureaucrats, who believed that once good rules for an organization are defined, good culture will be automatically produced as an outcome.

No wonder that cybernetic discourse, which rendered culture a manageable, logical unitary system, which can be known through evidence and governed as a sophisticated machine, prevailed in cultural policy texts. The approach was not only politically correct, but also could easily be integrated with the earlier Taylorist quantitative approach. Meanwhile, culture was governed as an economy and direct translations from one discourse to another were abundant:

for there is, in addition to the intensive aspect of cultural development (creation of cultural values) also the extensive aspect, i.e. the extension of culture and cultural
activities to the broad masses. This ‘extensive’ development of culture is of decisive significance for progress, since it is in these conditions that culture becomes a powerful instrument of human activity. At the same time, the ‘extensive’ development of culture lays the foundations for more rapid ‘intensive’, i.e. qualitative development (Zvorykin 1970: 11).

In this quotation, taken from the USSR report to UNESCO, cultural policy is conceptualized in economic terms, with intensive and extensive methods of development. The terms were primarily used in agriculture: intensive farming meant significant use of inputs in order to maximize productivity. This, often non-ecological mode of production was widespread in the 1960–80s. Extensive farming, in contrast, meant production from low cost land; thus in the intensive system the profit is generated by the high investments, while in the extensive system the profit is generated by the low cost of production. The principle of moving from ‘extensive to intensive’ echoes the call for ‘deeper and stronger’ cultural development quoted above (Jurginis 1965).

Both in the Soviet Union and Western countries the public function of culture and the growing body of cultural organizations resulted in an increasingly complex cultural field. In order to make policy, one had to have an overview. Comparable data had to be made in order to make the governance of the sphere possible. A new form of regulation came into being: cultural statistics.

In the 1970s, when according Gerovitch, cyberspeak became an ideological norm, the first step for making a cultural policy which ‘would fully meet the cultural requirements of the people’ was ‘to gather information about the cultural situation in the country’: the literacy rate, level of education, number of cultural organizations and their activities, availability of staff et cetera. The information was gathered by statistical centres, such as the Central Statistical Department attached to the USSR Council of Ministers, with a special subdivision for education, science and culture. Further, the information had to be reduced and analyzed, conclusions had to be drawn. For this, as the UNESCO report proudly claims, new sociological methods were employed (those methods were really new in 1970, because sociology became a legitimate science only in 1966 (Weinberg 1974).

A number of institutions developed these methods and did analyses. The most important of them was The Institute for Applied Social Studies of the USSR. Among others, The Novosibirsk Institute for the Economics and Organization of Industrial Production focused on the surveys of artistic preferences of the population, The Moscow Labour Research Bureau calculated expenditure on culture. In addition to that, each culture ministry had a ‘scientific-methodological department’, which was gathering statistical data, writing recommendations and issuing directives and orders. Modelling influenced the abundance of statistical estimates of the growth of number of artists, etc. The growth in numbers was the major indicator of progress, and prognosis was an important part of the process. Nonetheless, analysis of the data was rare, as the sociology discipline did not become fully legalized before the 1960s and the data was usually classified and accessible to top party officials only (on the function of sociology in the ‘closed ideology’ of party leaders, see Shlapentokh 2001).

On the other hand, the data was ideologically manipulated, as it had to be presented both domestically and to international peers. Cultural policy as an abstract set of means was supposed to be present in different countries, compared, aligned. In this process, UNESCO had a significant role. The USSR was a member of UNESCO since 1954. In the late 1960s and 1970s, UNESCO initiated a major project, reporting on cultural policies in different countries, from Tunisia to Soviet Ukraine. It can be assumed that this international
construction of cultural policy as a universal rational system, understandable, comparable and accountable despite its often local and/or nationalistic origins, also influenced the USSR.

The taxonomization and great inner diversity of the cultural field was still united under specific rationales and one overarching structure of government. It should be stressed that ‘organization’ itself was perceived as a value. The goal of developing organizations in the cultural field was to consolidate and strengthen their instrumental function. But also there was a strong belief that the field of culture itself needs organizational structures:

As a social phenomenon, contemporary art requires creating special societal institutions, organizations (unions), administrative-governmental apparatus (ministries, governments, etc) and an adequate preparation of professional specialized staff, which directly plans and practically organizes the functioning of art in society on different levels (Egorov 1973).

In Lithuania, the post-war soviet industrialist approach to culture clashed with the established civic nature of cultural organizations in the interwar. In turn, the cybernetic approach again did not originate locally in the LSSR, but was imported from the centre. However, this approach was welcomed by the dissidents who saw a possible way of evading communist ideology in digital technology. Precisely at this point very interesting questions have to be raised about the relation of centre-periphery and the nature of the colonialization of Lithuania by the soviets.

**The Sovietisation of Lithuanian Cultural Policy**

The Baltic States as a region had a special function in the economic system of the USSR: most of the high-end technologies and radioelectronic production was concentrated there. The beginning of the 1960s saw the opening of numerous technical institutes in Lithuania: faculties of Radioelectronics, Automatics and Engineered Economics were founded at the Antanas Sniečkus Polytechnic Institute in Kaunas. The branches were established in other towns, like Vilnius, Klaipėda etc. In addition, institutes in probability theory, galvanotechnics, biochemistry, quasiconductor physics, precision vibrotechnics, ultrasound; also the Laser Research Centre at Vilnius State University and others were created. In addition to that, the 1960s saw the legitimation of sociology in the USSR. The first institutions were created in Lithuania, which quickly started to learn from Western authors and especially their Polish neighbours, who preserved the discipline on a generally higher level despite its negative status under Stalinism (Weinberg 1974).

Nevertheless, the question of the extent to which the Baltics and Lithuania were a ‘production unit’ in the USSR, meant to operationalize and industrially implement the scientific discoveries made in Moscow and to what extent it could be called a knowledge-generating-centre remains to be answered. However, it would be misleading to think that the Lithuanian Soviet cultural policy was a mere fractal of the general USSR cultural policy. Rather, it both was and was not. The Baltic States were a special policy area for Moscow. It recognized that being culturally and geographically the West of the USSR (Zamascikov 1990), the Baltic States required a different approach compared with, for example, Far Eastern provinces. The special place of the region was also reinforced by the non-recognition policy towards the Soviet occupation of the USA, the UK and other Western countries (Loeber 1990:xvii).

This implied that methods were supposed to be more ‘civilized’, less could be done by a direct order and brutal force than in other republics. On the other hand, one may only speak of a very relative difference of Moscow policy towards the republics. Therefore one of the important questions to be addressed is the extent to which Moscow’s all-union directives cohered with locally taken decisions.
No doubt Moscow defined the policy, while locally the specific decisions on particular buildings, organizations and repertoires were taken. Of course, this labour division also varied from one sphere to another. For example, Moscow did not control the repertoires of Lithuanian theatres in advance but the film plans had to be confirmed centrally before shooting. Thus theatre productions were censored only after they were made, sometimes even after they were already performed publicly several times, while film and other mass media (television, radio, literature) were much more controlled.

This section is limited to a short and rather sketchy overview of how general soviet cultural policy was locally enacted in relation to reforming the organizations. My argument is that the Soviet regime contributed to the governmentalization of culture in Lithuania. However, it has to be pointed out that the cultural field itself and the techniques of intervention were efficiently subverted by Lithuanian nationalists in the late 1980s. In this way, the organizational basis developed during the interwar period was used by the soviets to govern Lithuania, and in turn, the system they developed helped the Lithuanian nationalists to argue even more efficiently their case for independence (as the ‘republican’ system of culture was transformed into ‘national’).

First of all, it was not just Soviet Russians who took the leading positions in Lithuania in 1940 and after 1944. Both Russians and Lithuanians shared positions in the newly created strong governmental bodies for culture. In 1946 the Agency for Art Affairs was established. This organization consisted of the following departments: planning and finance, accounting, economical-administrative, construction works, republican office for supply for theatres, Republican House of People’s Creation, personnel, theatre, music, school, fine art, repertoires, Composers’ Union, Artists’ Union.

In 1953 June 17, the Lithuanian union-republic ministry of Culture was created. The Ministry was made up by joining several agencies for separate cultural matters (valdybos, upravleniie): Agency for Art Affairs, Agency for Cinemafication, Agency for Culture-education and by adding staff training and administration departments: Agency for General Matters, Department for Planing-Finance, Major Construction Department, Staff-schools Department, Central Accounting. The regulations of the Ministry stated that it was under the authority of the LSSR Ministers Council and the USSR Ministry of culture. The Ministry commanded the work of cultural organizations in the territory of the republic. It ‘directly governed’ republican cultural organizations, ‘droves the activity’ of creative unions, carried out a ‘repertoir policy’ in concert organizations, making sure that only ‘full value’ works were produced. The actions of the Ministry were those of heading, supervision and control.

To understand what supervision and control meant, a portrait of the first Soviet Lithuanian minister of culture can be quite instructive for understanding early Soviet cultural policy in Lithuania. A writer, author of the novel Kalvio Ignoto teisybė (The truth of blacksmith Ignotas) for which he received Stalin’s prize, the highest literary award in 1951, Aleksandras Gudaitis-Guzevičius, was born into a working class family in Moscow in 1908 (he died in Vilnius, 1969). An experienced communist and member of the CP since 1927, he had quite a turbulent life during the interwar period. In 1929 he was a representative of the Lithuanian Comsomol Union (LKJS) at the Comsomol International in Moscow. In 1931–38 he was imprisoned for being a member of the prohibited Communist party and then in 1939 sent to provincial south-western Lithuania. After the Soviet occupation, Guzevičius was appointed as the Peoples’ Commissar for the Interior of the Lithuanian SSR. He personally accompanied Minister of Foreign Affairs Juozas Urbšys and Prime Minister Antanas Merkys with his family to the train which deported them to Siberia, though the official version presented to the society was that they are going to work at the Foreign Department at the People’s Commissariat (see Anušauskas 2005).
In 1944–45 he was appointed as the People’s Commissar for State Security (NKVD) and also granted the general major degree. In 1945–47 Guzevičius headed the Committee for Cultural-Educational Organizations. In 1947–50 he headed the literature publishing house. In 1953–1955 he was appointed as the minister of culture in the newly created ministry. His biographer writes:

He was often sent on business trips. The collective farms were being created in the republic, and Guzevičius, holding a big Browning in the pocket of his leather coat, used to climb the first lorry and go to read lectures about collectivization and to agitate peasants\(^58\) (Lisenkaitė 1980:192).

He was not only a passionate ‘lecturer’ with a gun in his hand, but also a prolific writer, the author of endless series of epic novels about the poor peasants and bourgeois kulaks, which were far from being professionally written, but closely followed stalinist dogma of social realism and class conflict.

Soviet cultural policy was made in the grim context of the collectivization of agriculture and first moves towards mass industrialization in the post-war years. Perhaps the very appointment of general major Guzevičius as minister of culture signified a lack of people, who would be able or willing to take up such a position. On the other hand, ‘supervision and control’ was mobilized to recover agriculture and develop industries, the major goals of the state. Subsequently, cultural policy was integrated into these major strategies (hence the lectures with a gun, mentioned above). For example, in one of his first orders On the work of cultural-educational organizations during the period of harvest and execution of preparation of agricultural products (17 July 1953), Guzevičius requires them:

\[
\text{to strengthen mass-political and cultural-educational work among collective farm, MTS and sovkhoz workers, to explain widely the decision of CPSU CC on the anti-party and anti-state actions of the people’s enemy Beriia... to mobilize the working people of the countryside to strengthen political alertness, to precisely execute the tasks of agriculture, posed by the party and the government.}^{59}
\]

Further, the order contains a list of seventeen means of how the main ideas should be enacted, which include lectures (with specified venues and occasions, like at the work place), seminars, cinemas, posters and other propaganda media and so on.

In the 1950s, agitation of the worker was the major task of cultural policy. In relation to this purpose cinema and the museum were the most important spheres. Cinemafication was the ‘extensive’ policy, aimed at the creation of a standardized and widespread network of cinemas. Closing the archives, purging library funds and revising museums was another major concern of the soviet powers. The archive of the Lithuanian Soviet Ministry of Culture contains an abundance of regulations and directives for existing and new museums, often translated from Russian ‘thematic plans’.\(^60\) Thus the primary concern of the Soviet regime was making disciplinary institutions function according to its needs and establishing its regime of truth in the information media, cinema, library and museum.

But it should not be overlooked that besides propaganda, in the 1950s, cultural policy often meant improving simple standards of everyday life of the citizens. A biographer of Juozas Banaitis, the next minister of culture,\(^61\) quotes his speech at the Xth congress of LCP in February 1958:

\[
\text{You know, how the culture of countryside is changing. The spectators sit in the hall without coats, it is warm, everybody is tastefully, nicely dressed. It is no more like it used to be before – all freezing, with coats, and smoke keeps coming from the entrance room. We are stepping forward already’ (Jakelaitis 1986: 133).}
\]
Nevertheless, a stronger concern with the welfare of people at the expense of military economy appeared only in Khrushchev’s Thaw (Shlapentokh 2001). Furthermore, from the local perspective, it can also be argued that post-war cultural policies were often policies of survival, characterized by an attempt to preserve the existing organizations. The following examples demonstrate how the cultural organizations which were to become significant in the 1990s ‘grew’ in terms of their size, complexity and significance during the Soviet period. In this process, renaming was an important strategy to signify the importance and function of the organization.

In the late 1940s and 1950s, previously existing organizations were reorganized, often merged, moved from the provisional capital in Kaunas to Vilnius: Vilnius University (1944), the Art Institute of the Soviet Republic of Lithuania (1951) and the Lithuanian State Conservatory (1945). M.K. Čiurlionis Art Gallery achieved the status of a Museum (1944), Vytautas Magnus Military Museum was stripped of the name of the duke and became the Military Museum (1940); the Vilnius State Theatre was established (1945). The Vilnius Picture Gallery was opened in Vilnius Cathedral, which after World War II was closed in 1949 and used as a storage house before it was given to the State Vilnius Art Museum in 1956. The churches were used for different purposes not only because of ideological reasons of desacralization, but also because of the lack of venues. For example, there was a suggestion to use a church as a film studio for the Republican Film Studio which was under the construction.

In the 1960s, many existing organizations were consolidated, their status was revised: the Republican Library was opened in a new building (1963), the State Vilnius Art Museum became the Lithuanian Art Museum, with a wide network of branch museums and galleries all over the Republic (1966); The Republican Opera and Ballet Theatre moved into a new building (1974).

It was also a time of establishing completely new organizations, which subsequently became important markers of the national consciousness. For example: Rumšiškės Open Air Museum, Lithuanian Skansen, representing regional farmsteads and folk culture (1966); the most important medieval castles were reconstructed or restored and opened as museums, such as the Insular Castle of Trakai, the seat of the Grand Duke of Lithuania in the fifteenth century (1962), the Castle Tower Museum in Vilnius (1960) and Kaunas Castle. The Lithuanian History and Ethnography Museum was established in 1960 and opened in 1968; Palanga Museum of Amber (1963) and the Art Exhibition Hall in Vilnius (1968) were opened.

It is also significant that not only historical buildings were used for the museums, like the Old Arsenal, castles, sixteenth to nineteenth century palaces, but also many new buildings were constructed, mostly in the 1960s–1970s. Thus cultural organizations are rarely based in Stalinistic architectural spaces, but more often in functionalist buildings. Several other major organizations were established later, such as the Kaunas Picture Gallery (1978), Museum of Revolution (1980, the National Gallery of Modern Art since 2001) and Mykolas Žilinskas Art Gallery (1989).

The list is far from being complete, but it gives an idea that the 1960s and the 1970s saw a relative boom in organizations. This could have been a belated effect of Khrushchev’s Thaw, but also could have been influenced by the institutionalized belief in the organization itself, created and managed according to cybernetic principles. Moreover, my argument is that the very concept of culture was organizationalized: soviet culture came to be perceived as a complex system, in which other systems – people, history and science interacted. The task of the state was to ensure equilibrium for these interactions, which was perhaps achieved in the Brezhnev’s stagnation. The problem was that it was not equilibrium that was needed, but an essential change which was demonstrated by the collapse of the regime in the 1991.
Towards a conclusion & future research

Summing up, this paper has argued that

1) civic cultural organizations emerged in the interwar republic of Lithuania
2) systematic governmental cultural policy and its organizational apparatus were established during the soviet era
3) the focus of soviet cultural policy moved from propaganda in the 1950s to the scientific control of culture in the 1970s

So, coming back to the beginning of the paper, did Lithuania inherit only the ruins of culture from the Soviet regime? Perhaps ruin was not the worst metaphor for Mr Landzbergis to choose, only with the qualification that it refers not to a crumbling medieval castle, as in Walter Benjamin (2003), but rather to a dysfunctional system which failed to maintain equilibrium.

Mostly due to imperfect technology in the Soviet Union, the impact of cybernetics on culture was predominantly conceptual. Culture was to be controlled through signals-programs and feedback. As an object of control, culture was thought about in terms of complex dynamic systems which continuously adjust to the environment (other systems) and are essentially dependent on information flows. Cultural policy was a technique of governance, the development of which influenced the constitution of a distinct organizational field of culture. In turn, the soviet regime employed the concepts of cybernetics both to organize its cultural discourses and to control the organizations. Thus, though cybernetics ceased its dominant role as a scientific paradigm and technique of governance in the late 1980s, it can be seen as a connecting part between the principles of neo-liberal governance introduced in the 1990s and the negated and feared Soviet past.

Though the discursive effects of liberal governance can be implied by soviet cyberspeak, yet it often was just another ‘open ideology’ both for the masses and intellectuals. However the organizations created according to the principles of this open system were real. In turn, during the late 1980s-early 1990s these organizations were not ruins, but functioning vehicles for the ‘singing revolution’. Further, the organizational system persisted, it was transformed from ‘soviet’ into ‘national’ and its logic infused the principles of the new Lithuanian cultural policy in the 1990s. ‘Culture-as-organization’ was subverted and used further, this time for the post-soviet neo-liberal governance that had been gradually taking shape.
Appendix 1.
The major state and non-state bodies for culture in the Soviet Union and Lithuania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>The Republic of Lithuania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917-1929</td>
<td>Narkompros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-53</td>
<td>Glavpolitprosvet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Glavlit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>The Writers’ Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>The Organization for National Culture and Propaganda under the Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944-53</td>
<td>Glavpolitprosvet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-53</td>
<td>Councils of Culture-Education at the Council of Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>The Agency for Arts’ Affairs at the LSSR People’s Commissariat Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>The Union Ministry of Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>The Union-Republic Ministry of Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-80s</td>
<td>Informal underground movement of <em>samizdat</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations

BSE Great Soviet Encyclopaedia (Bolshaya Sovetskaya Enciklopediya)
CP Communist Party
CPSU Communist Party of Soviet Union
Glavlit Major Censorship body (The Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs)
Glavpolitprosvet Head Office for Political-Educational Work
LCP (CC) Lithuanian Communist Party (Central Committee)
LKJS Lithuanian Comsomol Union
LSSR Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic
MTS Machine Tractor Stations
Narkompros People’s Commissariat for Enlightenment
NKVD People’s Commissariat for State Security
NOT Institute for Scientific Organization of Labour
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Archives

LLMA (Lietuvos literatūros ir meno archyvas) Lithuanian Archives for Literature and Art

End Notes

1 Interview with former minister of culture Darius Kuolys, Vilnius September 2004.
2 Within this context, ‘democratic cultural policy ‘ understood as ‘government-at-a-distance ‘ was formulated as a desired goal for the post-soviet Lithuanian elites, embodying decentralization, delegation and responsibilization.
3 Though Mitchell Dean warns against such identification (Dean 1999)
7 See the formation of L’Association des Écrivains et Artistes Révolutionnaires (1932) and later transformed into l’Association des Maisons de la Culture et des Cercles Culturels in 1935 (Dubois 1999:114).
8 Especially active in the media were avant-guarde artists groups such as Ars (Art), or the writers group Keturi vėjai (Four winds) but also the intellectual club Naujoji Romuva (New Romuva).
9 The Society for Science founded a public library and historical museum in Vilnius (1907 and 1908) and was active both in politics and (particularly philological) scholarship. The organization was an important force behind the establishment of independence: 18 of 20 signatories of the Independence Act on 18 February 1918 were members of the Society for Science.
10 In 1930, The Independent Artists Society was established as an alternative to the more conservative Society of Creators. The Independent Society closely cooperated with Naujoji Romuva (New Romuva, 1931-1940), a
In 1919 Lithuania moved its capital to Kaunas, while the city of Vilnius (Vilna, Wiłno) and its region was occupied, changing hands until finally being joined to Poland in 1922. Consequently, most important organizations did function and formed a basis for many of the collections of the future museums.

In the debates in the press (for example, *Naujoji Romuva*, late 1920s-1930s) changes and tensions developed along the axis of traditionalist and modernist styles, generations and individuals, no policy dimension was discussed. Even though there was a case of conflict between several newly established museums, it was mostly avant-garde artists and writers conflicting with older traditionalists.

And not without difficulties, because official foreign policy was not particularly directed towards Scandinavia.


After the establishment of a sovereign nation-state in 1918, the temporary government of Lithuania, which mostly consisted of scholars and artists, members of The Lithuanian Science Society since 1907, formed the Art Department under the provisional government, headed by national-romanticist painter Antanas Žmuidzinavičius. In 1919 Lithuania moved its capital to Kaunas, while the city of Vilnius (Vilna, Wilno) and its region was occupied, changing hands until finally being joined to Poland in 1922. Consequently, most important organizations were moved to the provisional capital. And those remaining in Vilnius were still active, though their activity was considerably controlled and often limited by the Polish government (for example, Seselskytė 1998). But the organizations for culture run by the Polish nobility or representative of other ethnic groups, like Jews or Karaites did function and formed a basis for many of the collections of the future museums.

Some historians argue that the anti-Polish sentiments were partially a result of the Russification policy in the nineteenth century. After their studies in St. Petersburg, many Lithuanian nationalists came back with formed opinions about the evil influence of the Poles. See for example a case of Maironis, the Catholic priest and canonized national poet, in Alvydas Nikžentaitis, ‘Jogailos įvaizdis lietuvių visuomenėje.’ *Lietuvių atgimimo istorijos studijos (Nacionalizmas ir emocijos (Lietuva ir Lenkija XIX-XX a.))*, Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos instituto leidykla, 2001: 61.

Typically for romantic nationalism, history was written selectively and seen as materialised in the folklore. As mentioned above, crosses and woven plaets were the objects which symbolized the spirit of the nation and dominated the displays in the international exhibitions (Jankevičiūtė 2003). Monuments were erected to Lithuanian medieval dukes as the symbols of sovereignty (see Vilnius 2001). Memorial sites were constructed for unknown soldiers and liberation fighters (see Staliūnas 2001). The state was concerned with establishing public sites of experience and memory, thus encouraged the creation of rituals of memorialization, collection of folklore and preserving heritage (though no heritage preservation legislation was passed, see Mačiulis 2003).

The directors of museums, for example Galaunė, called these organizations a ‘treasury of the Lithuanian soul’ and the ‘honour of the nation’ and saw them as instruments for building the nation (see also Keršytė 2000). Yet this instrumental – or missionary – role of culture and the museum was not systematically used by the government. One could argue that already at this early stage in the construction of the nation the political role of culture was defined and promoted by cultural operators themselves, but not by politicians.

This was clearly not because governmental involvement in culture was unthinkable at that time. Already in 1922 there were ideas circulating in the press about bringing civil organizations closer to state authority. Four years later the efforts resulted in the establishment of the Arts Department at the Ministry of Education in 1926, together with...
the Council of Artists as a counselling body. Indeed both organizations functioned for a very short time, as after the coup d’etat by the Tautininkai Party (Nationalists) in 17 December 1926, the Arts Department and the Council were abolished and cultural matters were transferred back to the Department of General Matters of the Ministry of Education. In relation to that change, The Society of Lithuanian Art was recreated and became the major actor in supporting cultural life and representing Lithuania abroad for the remaining few years of independence. In 1926-28 it ran a public cultural centre, with a small library and exhibition space (Mulevičiūtė 2001:49). It must be noted that the Society was also financially supported by the state, yet it maintained its non-governmental profile. In 1931, the Department of General Matters, which took care of art affairs in the Ministry of Education, was abolished. After a while, in 1934, the Department for Cultural Matters was created, in the context of the approaching opening of the Vytautas Magnus Museum. This was the major event, as the museum was presenting the history of the Lithuanian nation. The opening perhaps enabled the cultural operators to argue their case more strongly with the government.


23 In 1935, a specialized Commission for Art, chaired by art historian Paulius Galaunė, director of Įkurionis Gallery (from 1936 Vytautas Magnus Culture Museum), was created, but very soon dispersed after the establishment of The Lithuanian Artists Union. The union membership was based on professional qualifications, not on affiliation to certain social circles or subscribing to certain views as was in the case of the societies. Current arts affairs were supposed to be managed by this organization. Meanwhile the Council of the Vytautas Magnus Museum was supposed to take care of museums and heritage preservation (Jankevičiūtė 2003: 22). The organizational bodies in the culture sphere were not directly dependent on the government structures, but were closely related.

24 However, the celebration of Vytautas the Great anniversary in 1930 is a great example of a political campaign, in which different cultural, political and economical activities were combined and strategically used: a choice to establish the Vytautas the Great Museum won against the proposal to build many monuments in province, the construction of a bridge over the river Nemunas in Kaunas was emphasised along fairs and festivities that involved all the country. See Giedrius Vilūnas, ‘Vyauto Didžiojo kultas tarpukario’, Lietuvoje Lietuvių atgimimo studijos 17 (Lietuva ir Lenkija XIX-XX a.) (Vilnius: Lietuvos istorijos instituto leidykla, 2001).

25 On the other hand, the debates about the need for popularisation of culture appeared in the second half of the 1930s. For example, in 1935 Antanas Juška, the director of the Department of General Matters (for art and culture) in the Ministry of Education stated: ‘Some propose that the state should organise obligatory attendance of theatre, concerts and exhibitions… Not everybody wants to study, but the state obliges everybody to attend at least primary school. If art is also a good thing, why it also shouldn’t be obligatory? Art is very expensive, and it is necessary to organise its wide access, in order that more people could use its benefits. Firstly some compulsion should be exerted, then maybe society would strain itself after cultural process’ (cf Mulevičiūtė 1996:43-44; translation mine – E.R.).

26 It is a good question, in which way the USSR was a colonizing power in the Baltics. Even the economic relation between the province and the centre represented a reverse colonialism, as Sergei Zamascikov argues: Moscow exported unskilled work to the Baltic States while imported the commodities (Zamascikov 1990:92).

27 In the beginning of July, with the help of an arranged election, the minority communist parties of occupied Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania ‘won’ 92.8, 97.19 and 99.19 percent respectively of votes in ‘spontaneous’ elections. The provisional People’s Governments were formed which immediately declared the country as integral parts of the Soviet Union. Vladimir Dekanozov (Lithuania), Andrei Vishinsky (Latvia) and Leningrad communist party leader Andrei Zhdanov (Estonia), the high Soviet officials who were among closest to Stalin, were appointed as the supreme emissaries of Socialist Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Together with the regime, both the principles and organizations of Soviet cultural policy were introduced to Lithuania.

28 A good example is the case of the Jewish Ghetto Museum in Vilnius. The museum was established astonishingly quickly after the end of World War II on 12 of May, 1945, by a group of enthusiasts who gathered the objects preserved in the Jewish ghetto and the prison. The ghetto library was used for the storage of collections and was planned to serve as a temporary premise for exhibitions about life in the Jewish ghetto and holocaust. An official letter was sent to Moscow, asking for a permission to register the museum, accompanied with a proposal of an opening exhibition devoted to Sholom Aleikhem, an acknowledged Jewish classic writer in the Soviet Union. Yet this attempt to please the Soviet government with an inaugural exhibition did not work and it was ordered to close down the museum immediately. The objects were distributed to appropriate institutions (The State Revolution Museum, The Agency for Art Affairs and The Book Palace) (Alpernië 1999:28-29). This example illustrates, how fake was the promotion of grass root activities and self-organization in soviet ideology.
The Rise of Cybernetics? Government and Change in Lithuanian Cultural Policy


30 Cinemafication (kinofikacija) was one of the most important policies after the war. It concerned the technological development of the ‘material basis’ needed for cinema, which meant both the network of stationary and mobile cinema theatres, film studios, standardisation of technology et cetera. Just like electrification was a basis for industrialization, cinemafication was the means to install a permanent network for the distribution of propaganda.

31 The institution of Politburo was established in 1919 and consisted of 5 members, from 1930 had 10 members. In 1952 was renamed into Presidium and extended to 36 members, but after the death of Stalin returned to 10 members. It functioned under the name of Presidium until 1966, and was again renamed as Politburo.

32 It is argued that the power for passing laws and decision-making belonged to Politburo and secretariat. While the function of the Supreme Soviet was to approve the decisions made by Politburo in its ‘very short, efficient sessions where the decisions were taken very quickly’ (Bauža 2001).

33 Though the state was the main sponsor the funds for culture come from different budgets, as all-Union, republics, local (regional, municipal, district and village). Also trade unions had their own funds. Often the source of financing depended not on the location, but on the size of the establishment (Zvorykin 1970: 19). Some organizations have their own budgets are supposed to be self-supportive, as publishing houses, cinemas, orchestras, theatres.

34 For example, under the Lithuanian culture minister Lionginas Šepetys in the 1960s, a new Opera House building in Vilnius was constructed with the cost of about 18 million roubles, while at that time was prohibited to build spectator halls the cost of which would exceed about 2 million roubles. After such a negligence of the rules, the minister received critical lectures and papeikimas, a letter saying that he had misbehaved, from Moscow and that was it (Author’s Interview with Lionginas Šepetys, Vilnius April 2005).

35 In his famous speech On Terrorism, made in a closed Party meeting during the XXth Party Congress in 1956, external and brutal control, identified with Stalin’s style of government was dismissed. Instead soft technologies of power, identified with the authority of Lenin had to be introduced: ‘Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation, and patient co-operation with people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint, and the correctness of his position – was doomed to removal from the leading collective and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation’ (Khrushchev 1979:23-24).Which is followed by the argument, how patient and instructive Lenin was.

36 In 1978, the Academy of National Economy was established in Moscow, the first institution to train professional leaders since the time of NOTs research institutes (which studied ‘scientific organization of labour ‘ in 1920s). On famous Russian Taylorist Gastev, see Beissinger (1988).

37 Wiener was translated pretty soon after he was published in America, but his books were kept in special library funds with strictly limited access before cybernetics became legitimate: Norbert Viner, Kibernetika i obshchestvo in 1958 and Robert Shannon, Imitacionnoe modelirovanie sistem – isskustvo i nauka (Moskva: Mir, 1978). There were no Lithuanian translations because scientific literature was published only in Russian.

38 In addition to that, argues Vucinich, theoretical attempts were made to connect art and science. In 1963, The Commission on the Interrelations of Literature, Art and Science was established in Leningrad to explore ‘the inner dynamics of scientific and aesthetic modes of inquiry’ (Vucinich 1984:350). Yet Vucinich focuses on the complementary relation between art and science, where art was supposed to humanize and intuitivize science, while the impact of new the new science to art and culture is not discussed.

39 Nevertheless, further research is needed to find out if the influence was more of intellectual nature (a fashionable interdisciplinary cyberspeak, which gradually took over many functions of Orwellian newspeak, as Gerovitch argues), or was there any substantial cooperation between the institutes of the research on cybernetics and those institutions of culture, which were involved in policy making.

40 For example, in one of the first Gosplans after the WWII, a detailed part concerning culture is present. The tables of numbers indicating the organizations to be established and production to be made in the soviet republics represent following sectors: film, cinemafication, theatre and music organizations, radio and television broadcasting, culture-educational organizations, book publishing, book sale, media industry (film, paper, record, advertising), print (from art books to school notebooks), professional education and labour and salary. Gosplan SSSR. 1956-60. Projekt. Lithuanian Archives for Literature and Art (further LLMA), F. 342, A.1, B.243.

41 For example, Prikaz Ministra kultury SSSR N. 9 (4 January 1954) ‘O Gosudarstvennom plane razvitiia orsaslei kultury SSSR na 1954 god ‘. LLMA, F. 342, A.1, B.136. The plan is made for the entire USSR, with the tables of distribution of the tasks for the soviet republics. The fulfillment of the plan is measured in per cent. The accounts are published also locally as summaries of the ‘indicators’, which are compared with the average of entire USSR and other republics. See for example, Kultūros šakų ekonominių rodiklių. 1955-58. LLMA, F. 342, A.1, B.264.
42 Translation from Lithuanian is mine – E.R.


44 A kind of soviet version of political correctness, which often meant nothing in terms of content as depicted in Yawning Heights, the famous satire about the soviet academia by Alexander Žinoviev (2000), originally published in 1976.

45 Among most prominent thinkers were aesthetic philosopher Moise S. Kagan, S. Ch. Rapoport and Yurii M. Lotman who formed the so called Tartu School. Lotman’s extensive volumes Trudy po znakovim sistemam (Works on the systems of signs) were published in the 1960s and early 1970s (appeared in 1965, 1967, 1969 and 1971).

46 However, cybernetics as an alternative worldview was mostly welcomed by dissidents in the 1960s. Further, the cybernetic movement was closely related to emerging discipline of semiotics and structural linguistics. The contacts between the two disciplines will be explored in my dissertation.


48 As for example, The School of Cultural Policy in Moscow headed by Piotr Shchedrovitsky, philosopher who was one of the leading figures of the Moscow methodologist circle in the 1960s.

49 The fascination with the growth per se was often ridiculous, as in Zvorykin (1970), who proudly announced that by the year 2000, the number of artists in USSR will be increased by 600 percent.

50 Translation from Russian mine – E.R.

51 The Sociological Research Laboratory was opened at the Vilnius University in 1965, at the Kaunas Polytechnic Institute in 1966. The Department of Philosophy, Sociology and Law was created at the Lithuanian Academy of Science and became an institute in 1977. For more see online resource www.cee-socialscience.net.

52 It does not seem that Lithuania was rich with inventions. According to the soviet author, the first scientific discovery (in the sphere of hot electrons) made in Lithuania belongs to J. Požėla, in 1977. Later, Požėla became a member of the USSR Science Academy, the section for Informatics, Counting Technology and Automatics (Griškevičius 1985:154).

53 Negotiating the balance in designing the research inquiry is still a political question. For example, in the discussions of postsoviet historians politics is exceptionally identified with the state, governmental organizations. This assumption enables Lithuanian historian Česlovas Bauža to claim that there was no politics in Lithuania in 1940-1988. According to him, ‘politics’ was in Moscow, where the decisions were taken. While in LSSR was mere ‘administration’, or execution of the Moscow decisions (see the discussion in Bauža 2001).

54 Collaborating was the most extensive form of working under the Soviet regime. Collaboration was expressed through negotiation of small local freedoms and loyalty to the overarching CPSU. As Lithuanian historian Tininis argues, Lithuanian collaborators were against independent Lithuanian state and for the Soviet Union. Yet by unofficial means they sought that Lithuania would have a cultural and partially economic autonomy, as they argued for using two languages (Lithuanian and Russian), for autonomous management of agriculture and partially industries, supported national education system and local ‘kadry’ (Tininis 2001).

55 LLMA, F. 289, A.1, B.2, L.5.

56 See LTSR Ministrų Tarybos 1953 birželio 17 nutarimas Nr. 433 Del Kultūros ministerijos struktūros ir etatų. LLMA. The decision was followed by the separate decisions on the regulations for former autonomous agencies, and then the departments of the ministry. On 18 July the regulations of the Agency for Arts Affairs within the Ministry approved, 21 July – regulations for the Agency for Cultural-Educational Organizations, and so on. The same summer, many regulations for republican and district agencies of cinemafications, radio and other organizations were passed.

57 To compare: the Ministry of Culture in France was established in 1959, The National Endowment for Arts in the USA – in 1965, the Swedish National Council for Culture in 1974, while the Arts Council of Great Britain was founded in 1946, and the Ministry of Culture in Poland was established in 1947, as a successor to the Ministry of Propaganda and Information (1945).

58 Translation from Lithuanian is mine, unless stated differently.
LLMA, Lietuvos kultūros ministro Įsakymas Nr. 43 Dėl kultūros-švietimo (staigų darbo derliaus nuemimo ir žemės produktų paruošų vykdymo laikotarpiu. F. 342, A. 1, B.4, P. 2.

Some of the plans were prepared both by the LSSR History and Law Institute, headed by a hard-core communist Žiugžda and by soviet Russian experts. A typical feature of the thematic plan is to define both historical content and the material organization of the exhibition. For example, the order About the work of republican regional museums (23 July 1952) is 11 pages long and resembles a detailed history conspectus from the Neolithic epoch to the collectivization of the 1950s. Another example is one of the earliest thematic plans of such kind which deals with Kaunas Military-Historical Museum (former Vytautas the Great Museum). The document provides a detailed list of the means of display, which have to be used in the museum: 1) picture, 2) diagram, 3) dummy (e.g. a silage tower, a combine harvester), 4) model (e.g. turbins, ‘Pergale’ factory), 5) moulage (a vegetable, a horse), 6) samples of mineral excavations and wood, 7) samples of raw materials and production, made in LSSR. See Tematicheskii plan, Otdel sovetskogo perioda. Edited: Kemov, E.S. (24 January 1952), LLMA. F.342, A.1, B.107, P.49.

Because of bad health, Guzevicius left the position in 1955 (Lisenkaitė 1980). He was replaced by Juozas Smilgevičius, who only shortly was a minister and curiously is not represented in the LSSR encyclopedia (1980). According to the private source, perhaps there was not much to present as Smilgevičius was an ordinary party member, who worked in the executive committee of Vilnius (Interview with Šepetys, April 2005). On the other hand, it is not impossible that Smilgevičius became persona non grata.

See LLMA, F. 342, A.1, B.128, P.114.
References


