The notion of segregation in its current application in British social policy confuses rather than illuminates social processes. While its historical roots lie in a discriminatory practice that was legally instilled in the US, current day usage implies the self-segregation of minority ethnic groups. This paper examines the historical legacy of segregation in the US and UK to argue a shift has occurred in the discourse surrounding the integration of ethnic minority groups, particularly British Muslims. Any attempt to advocate desegregation as a way to promote material equality has been replaced by its use to promote the removal of cultural difference. Contemporary British social policy has taken this further by advocating the necessity of social capital as a means to achieve community cohesion and shared values, further shifting emphasis away from material difference.
Interrogating Segregation, Integration and the Community Cohesion Agenda

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Abstract

The notion of segregation in its current application in British social policy confuses rather than illuminates social processes. While its historical roots lie in a discriminatory practice that was legally instilled in the US, current day usage implies the self-segregation of minority ethnic groups. This paper examines the historical legacy of segregation in the US and UK to argue a shift has occurred in the discourse surrounding the integration of ethnic minority groups, particularly British Muslims. Any attempt to advocate desegregation as a way to promote material equality has been replaced by its use to promote the removal of cultural difference. Contemporary British social policy has taken this further by advocating the necessity of social capital as a means to achieve community cohesion and shared values, further shifting emphasis away from material difference.

Key words
segregation, integration, assimilation, community cohesion

Introduction

A survey of the literature on racial and ethnic relations, coming out of public policy and academic institutions since the beginning of the twenty first century, might delude the discerning reader into thinking that issues of material inequality have been resolved and all that remains to examine is the thorny question of cultural difference. The persistence of differential outcomes in terms of employment, health, schooling across ethnic lines has become blurred by the increasing class differentiation of minority ethnic groups. Nonetheless, consistent evidence of poor housing (Harrison et al. 2005), poorer health outcomes (Nazroo 2003), lower occupational mobility (Heath and Cheung 2006) and higher levels of unemployment (Simpson et al. 2006) mark the experiences of minority groups, especially Muslims in British society. In place of a response that demonstrates these inequalities and attempts to offer new approaches to tackling entrenched, institutionalised practices of discrimination, an agenda has developed that is more concerned by cultural difference rather than material difference. This is not to argue that a ‘new’ or profound shift has taken place in the discourse surrounding minority groups, but rather the emphasis on cultural difference has become a way of submerging material inequalities.
The aim of this article is to examine the history of the ideas of segregation and integration in the US and UK and to argue that any vestiges of their service to counter inequality and injustice have been shorn in their contemporary British usage. Rather, they have become, alongside the discourse about the ‘death of multiculturalism,’ a convenient way of targeting and disciplining a particular group within British society, namely Muslims. This was well demonstrated by the then Prime Minister Tony Blair (2006), in a public lecture, when he categorically singled out Muslims as the group most in need of integration into shared British values. The re-packaging of segregation as ‘parallel lives’ and of integration as ‘community cohesion’ has enabled a shift away from the progressive elements of these discourses that were related to material inequalities and political exclusion. In the US the original premise of the segregation debate was based on the impact of spatial difference on material inequality, albeit in an assimilatory framework (Park 1926, Gordon 1964). In contrast, the contemporary debate in the UK, has served to reduce all social issues to the question of cultural differences and of conflicting value systems. Public commentators from the right (Lamont: 2002) and the left (Goodhart 2004) have joined in a chorus that combines to make anti-Muslim racism respectable (Kundnani 2007).

There is a significant post-war history of reciprocal influences between the USA and the UK on matters of social policy (King 1995). Most recently this has been illustrated through the adoption of welfare to work policies by the Labour administration, often explicitly modelled on US examples. Peck and Theodore have noted ‘a long history of US–UK transfer of policies, terminology, and administrative routines in the field of welfare-to-work, for all the institutional and political differences between the two systems’ (2001: 430). Not as well documented, but certainly at the same intensity, is the policy exchange around issues of immigration, racism and integration. Clapson (2006) has provided a detailed and nuanced analysis of the way in which American social scientists and philanthropic institutions played a crucial role in shaping British academic and policy discourse on race from the 1940s to the mid 1970s. Indeed, he states that: ‘the growing influence of American social science on the British urban sociology of race relations helped to provide a framework of analysis for early post-war studies of inter-ethnic relations in British cities’ (Clapson 2006: 253). This was not just at the level of exchange of ideas, but also in terms of financial support from US institutions such as the Ford Foundation. Perhaps the most pertinent example of this relationship was the way in which civil rights legislation in the US, which marked the beginning of equalities law in the 1960s, was paralleled by developments in the UK. Lou Kushnick (1998) in his outline of the development of the 1968 Race Relations Act in the UK, argues that experiences from the North American context were not fully taken into account and therefore similar mistakes were made on both sides of the Atlantic. Nonetheless, Kushnick’s critical appraisal indicates the extent of interchange between policy makers and academics on the issue of race and ethnic relations (Rodgers 1998). It should therefore not be surprising that the recent interest in the
concept of segregation should also involve a large amount of trans-Atlantic borrowing and interaction.

**Segregation US and UK**

In the now seminal text, *American Apartheid*, Massey and Denton (1993), make a plea to return segregation to the central place it once had in the literature on race in America. Noting how its use has fallen into abeyance, due primarily to its association with pathologising African American culture, Massey and Denton nonetheless argue that it is crucial to recognise the role that housing segregation plays in maintaining African American and more recently Mexican under-privilege. This view of segregation stems from the ecological hypothesis, established by Park (1926), that asserts the greater the degree of difference between spatial distributions of groups within an urban area, the greater the social distance from each other. This hypothesis was the focus of a great deal of research in the US in the 1950s and 1960s which attempted to relate residential segregation with economic inequality as well as cultural separateness (Duncan and Duncan 1955, Duncan and Lieberson 1959, Lieberson 1961, Taeuber and Taeuber 1964, Taeuber and Taeuber 1965). For example, Taeuber and Taeuber (1964) argued that socioeconomic advancement was directly related to residential dispersion for various immigrant groups and suggested it was the continued residential segregation of the African American population that impeded their ‘full and equal participation in the economy and the society at large’ (1964: 132). For Massey this period of research presents, in some senses, the golden period of segregation studies where it was relatively uncontested that segregation had a clear negative impact on African-American communities. However, this literature arose in an era when the “separate but equal” doctrine in the US was being questioned, but segregation was still legal. Indeed, despite the Civil Rights Acts passed in 1964, 1965 and 1968, opposition to desegregation was still prevalent across the north in the late 1970s. Advocating desegregation in the US at this time was therefore aligned to the progressive aspects of the Civil Rights movement. As such segregation as an analytical tool has a very different historical legacy in the US than in the UK.

Clapson (2006) clearly details the way in which Park and other Chicago School sociologists set the terms of the debate on immigration and race in Britain. It was therefore inevitable that the concept of segregation would be examined, but research in the UK consistently concluded that there was no comparison with the levels of segregation in the USA (Collins 1957, Deakin 1964, Jones 1967, Peach 1968). Subsequently, Peach (1966, 1978, 1986, 1996, 2006) has been most prolific in discussing levels of segregation in the UK. Over the forty-year period of writing on the matter he has consistently argued against the presence of American style areas of ethnic concentration, the so called ‘ghettos’. This is of course entirely to be expected when the different histories of urban development and immigration to the two countries are considered, but nonetheless has not barred the emergence of segregation as an analytical tool in the UK. In public policy discourse, especially on housing, the issue of segregation was
present as a specific facet of wider discourses on race from the 1960s onwards. In a useful review, Phillips notes ‘In the 1970s, there was widespread anxiety over the problems perceived to be associated with the growth of ghetto-like concentrations’ (2006: 27). The policy remedies were dispersal of black tenants, which echoed the bussing of Asian school children out of Southall in the 1960s, to prevent concentration of their numbers in schools. Policies of this sort were made illegal with the advent of the 1976 Race Relations Act. Following this the issue of segregation as a policy tool, even of housing policy, fell into abeyance. This time period quite neatly coincides with that identified by Massey and Denton (1993) for the decline in segregation studies in the US.

What is curious, therefore, is why segregation has again become so significant in the UK context, when it was almost absent from major policy statements on immigration and diversity before 2001 (Phillips, 2006). Most commentators note the first re-use of the term in Herman Ouseley’s report into Bradford in 2001, Community Pride not Prejudice, and its subsequent catapult into the media spotlight by various public commentators such as Trevor Philips. As a concept ‘segregation’ can maintain an analytical robustness in as far as a measurement of separateness between identified categories does not require an overtly political agenda to impute meaning and can enhance an agenda concerned with equality. If one considers the establishment of minority ethnic settlements within an historical framework, we see most contemporary areas of high concentration formed from migration to industrialised urban spaces. For example, in Britain, the 1966 Census showed that 56 per cent of immigrants resided in the six major conurbations, compared with 36 per cent of the total population (Castles and Kosack: 1985: 49) with more than a third of all immigrants residing in Greater London. In 2001, analysis had moved on to distinguish between immigrants and UK born ethnic minorities, but evidence from the Census showed nearly half of all Britain's ethnic minority residents lived in London (Simpson et al.,2006: p.41) with highest concentrations in the regions that migrant labour had originally moved to (London, West Midlands, East Midlands, North West, Yorkshire and Humber, and the South East). The nature of Black and South Asian migration post World War Two has been well documented elsewhere (Brah: 1996) but key is that migrants were restricted to working in mostly the least desired jobs and living in the least desired housing (Smith 1976, Henderson and Karn 1987). . The concentration of 55 per cent of Muslim households in the worst two deciles of multiple deprivation in England and Wales (Peach 2006) needs to be seen in this context.

Despite these kind of analyses the debate about segregation in the UK has emerged with a contentious set of academic evidence (Poulson and Johnston 2006) primarily concerned with inter-group interaction rather than inequality. In 2005, one of the main dimensions of segregation discussed by Trevor Phillips was the friendship patterns between different ethnic groups, where he argued interaction between minority ethnic Britons and Whites was getting worse. ³ Subsequently, studies on how to promote interaction has been the focus of research
commissioned by the then Commission for Racial Equality (SHM, 2007). In contrast, other quantitative work by Simpson (2004, 2007) has conceptualised segregation as a process and measured the migration patterns of both whites and non-whites while simultaneously taking account of the demographic trends of different ethnic groups. As such, he dispels the myth of segregation by showing that both whites and non-whites display trends of moving away from areas of high deprivation, towards white areas, and away from non-white areas. These trends are supported in qualitative work by Phillips (2006, Phillips et al. 2007) who has highlighted the desire of South Asians to reside in mixed areas and argued residential clustering has been the result of discriminative housing policy, fear of harassment and financial restrictions, as well as community and cultural ties. Even though this work has shown that ethnic segregation is a misconception of the processes that govern spatial concentrations of groups and has provided no evidence of self-segregation, the use and abuse of the term in policy circles still remains. A partial explanation for this may be found by returning to the way in which the many dimensions of segregation have been conceptualised and in particular the role of cultural difference in this array.

From the early US literature on segregation, one of the key aspects of social differentiation that arises from segregation is that of cultural difference or of different values. Though this may not be the most important in emphasis, it is certainly an aspect that is present. It is also evident in the re-emergence of the segregation debate in the US and best illustrated in Massey and Denton: ‘residential segregation has been instrumental in creating a structural niche within which a deleterious set of attitudes and behaviours – a culture of segregation – has arisen and flourished’ (1993:8). This kind of view, even when contextualised by a set of other parameters relating to discrimination and racism, enables the whole notion of segregation to be reduced to a description of cultural difference. This renders somewhat redundant Massey and Denton’s claim of avoiding pathologisation of African American communities in their revitalisation of the segregation concept. In Britain, civil disturbances of an often violent nature that involved Asian Muslim youth, the police and far right groups in 2001 led to the further rendering of ‘ethnic’ areas in exclusively negative terms. As has been noted by Phillips: the ‘areas in question…were seen as synonymous with high levels of social deprivation, poverty, drugs, and crime’ (2006: 28). In turn this creates ‘self-segregating British Muslim communities [who] are endangering the security, ordered stability, and national identity of (white) Britain (2006: 29). High levels of social deprivation may be present in other parts of the country, but what marks these areas as segregated is the creation of ghettos of alternate values.

The overly negative association of cultural difference with spatial concentration has been challenged in the literature. In the US, the role of ethnic enclaves in supporting businesses has been especially highlighted. Wilson and Portes (1980) and later work by Portes et.al (see Portes and Bach 1985, Portes and Manning 1986, Portes and Stepick 1985) has provided
evidence to support the ethnic enclave thesis, where immigrant minorities remained spatially concentrated, were less culturally assimilated but did better than minorities in the mainstream economy. Furthermore, he has argued the greater opportunity for self employment in ethnic enclaves showed there were alternative approaches to achieving occupational and social mobility and therefore successful integration of later generations. Peach has consistently argued for a more nuanced approach to segregation arguing that there are actually positive aspects to spatial clustering, particularly where this allows the development of institutions that enable minority participation (Peach 1996a). Anthropological approaches have also highlighted the affirmative associations that residents of enclaves have with an area, in terms of social associations, access to services and feelings of safety. In an impassioned defence of the positive aspects of the segregated black home space, Hooks argues: ‘Whatever the shape and direction of black liberation struggle.., domestic space has been a crucial site for organizing, for performing political solidarity’ (1990: 47). In the UK context, the pathologising of Asian and Black culture has a long history (Brah 1996) but again has been contested in terms of demonstrating how black culture is a site of solidarity and resistance (Gilroy 1992).

What is clear from the contemporary British discourse, as presented in the media and public policy debate on segregation, is that a shift has occurred in which cultural difference is viewed in solely negative terms. In light of the conclusive work of scholars such as Simpson (2004, 2007) and Phillips (2006) in exposing the ‘myths’ of increasing spatial segregation and self-segregating Muslims, the most recent policy report on the matter, Our Shared Future, tries to distance itself from the debate about segregation: ‘Excessive coverage about residential segregation for example serves to spread a view that the whole of England is spatially segregated. It overstates and oversimplifies the problem and leaves us “sleepwalking into simplicity”’ (Commission on Integration and Cohesion 2007: 3). Nonetheless, in its place it takes up the far more problematic notion of people living ‘parallel lives’. This, almost bare concept, forefronts the question of culture and is a way of ascribing non-British ways of life to minorities, particularly Muslims. The concept of parallel lives can dismiss the requirement for actual spatial segregation, as you can live next door to someone and not share the same value system or identity. At stake is what is acceptable difference (sexuality, disability) and what is not acceptable (Islam) and what the limits of tolerable difference should be. Often, the boundaries of what are considered acceptable values are set by the nation or a new national identity that needs to be forged (Cantle 2005). The parallel lives discourse relies on the establishment of a stable whiteness against which the destabilizing effects of the Muslim ‘other’ are negatively attached. By entering into this terrain, any of the potential arguments about equality attached to desegregation are subsumed by a necessity for cultural homogeneity or for reducing the gap between the white and the other. What had previously been interpreted as a problem of
Asians living in separate cultures has, since 9/11, been taken to be a problem of Muslims living by separate values (Kundnani 2007: 30).

It is necessary to be clear about how a racialised discourse on segregation implicates all visible minorities living in the UK, but in practice targets Muslims. Johnston et al (2007) when looking at educational performance in Bradford and Leicester have articulated that ‘Indian students in Leicester are more likely to attend highly segregated schools than are Pakistanis in Bradford’ (2007: 628). More significantly the research goes on to state that this high level of segregation for Indian heritage pupils does not affect their KS3 or GCSE performance. Therefore, the question arises as to why segregation is an issue of concern for those interested in material inequality, as this research demonstrates that Indian pupils perform well despite living in highly segregated areas. Indeed, Leicester has been sited as a model multicultural city with ‘pride in their community’ (Community Cohesion Review Team 2001: 15) and its policies recommended for adoption elsewhere. It seems that segregation is only negative when it comes to Muslim groups, it becomes a problem for Pakistanis in Bradford but not for Indians in Leicester. A recognition of this specific targeting comes from the unexpected quarter of Trevor Phillips:

The xenophobes should come clean…They are liberal Powellites; what really bothers them is race and culture. If today's immigrants were white people from the old Commonwealth, Goodhart and his friends would say that they pose no threat because they share Anglo-Saxon values. They may not even object to Anglophile Indians - as long as they aren't Muslims (Phillips 2004).

This specific targeting of a racialised group is not new within the British polity. Stuart Hall’s (1978) classic text ‘Policing the Crisis’ precisely describes the way in which mugging was used by the British press to create a moral panic about African-Caribbean young people in the 1970s. Just as “mugging”…[came] to be unambiguously assigned as a black crime located in and arising from the conditions of life in black urban areas’ (Hall 1978: 327) so ‘terrorism’ has become synonymous with Muslims (Kundnani 2007). These crimes have not only been situated with a specific group but also located within Black residential space. In both cases residential location has been a way of imagining the ‘attitudes, values, behavioural inclinations and social norms of the kinds of people who are assumed to live in particular ‘black’ or ‘white’…neighbourhoods’ (Smith 1993: 133). The recent shift though to self-segregation and parallel lives is one towards a discourse based on separate values rather than on any physical distance. As such the Muslim problem becomes much broader and therefore harder to contain and manage.

If one were to follow Sivanandan’s (1990) rationale for the British state targeting black youth in the 1970s, then it could be argued that this focus on Muslims is also a convenient cover for more widespread policies relating to the working class. In a similar, incisive and strident, critique of the racialised discourse on segregation, Debbie Phillips argues: ‘there is no evidence of disquiet over entrenched patterns of class segregation in the social and spatial
interactions of (White) British citizens, the epitome of which is the exclusive gated community’ (2006: 29). It could be argued that the focus on ethnic segregation is a way of diverting attention from this class segregation. Danny Dorling (2006) has been at the forefront of illustrating how both poor and wealthy households have become increasingly spatially segregated over the past 40 years. What is key in Dorling’s work is the fact that quantitative indicators in the fields of housing, health and income continue to show social polarisation and hence greater inequality:

As such poverty-social-exclusion has increased so too has wealth-social-exclusion risen. More individuals and families are able to command resources to enable them to exclude themselves from ordinary living patterns, customs and activities. More people have servants, use private teachers to school their children, can take many “exclusive” holidays and own two, or three or four houses while growing numbers cannot afford a mortgage on one home. (2006: 10)

Yet the parallel lives that are lived between White working class and white middle class people has almost no mention in public policy discourse on segregation. Increasingly universities such as the ones in which the authors of this article work, are populated by young people who find it relatively easy to settle into the cosmopolitan culture of ethnic difference, but who are fearful of the ‘townies’, ‘chavs’, and scornful of young single mothers claiming state benefits.11 Bev Skeggs has cogently argued that media representations of the white working class woman has become: ‘a handy figure for the government to deflect its cuts in welfare provision via the identification of a ‘social problem’’ (2005: 968). Indeed, the range of disciplinary measures on the white working class are pervasive and extensive; for example, Job Seekers Allowance and ASBOs (Anti-Social Behaviour Orders) curb civil liberties in much the same ways as the highly contested anti-terror legislation.

One of the central dichotomies in the report Our Shared Future by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion is presented by the relationship of the two named problem groups: Muslims and the White working class.12 The report recognises the need to address ‘the underperformance of White working class boys at school just as much as the disproportionate disadvantage faced by Muslim groups’ (2007: 98). They are presented as mutually exclusive categories, even though it is obvious that this is only at the level of how they are perceived as social problems. On the one hand, the white working class are seen as: ‘losers, no hopers, low life, scroungers (Mandelson: 1997) and on the other, Muslims are alien intruders with a sexist culture (Kundnani: 2007). These dichotomies find their resolution in the construction of these groups as the ultimate source of the problem of extremism (British National Party for the White working class and Jihadism for the Muslims), an issue high on the policy agenda of the newly formed Department of Communities and Local Government.13 It is at the point of equating the British National Party with Jihadism that the project of integration into a Shared Future becomes most clear. The transparent, normative mode of White middle class values which are ever present but not articulated become firmly established as that which is being segregated from and needs to be integrated into.
Assimilation and Integration

Assimilation is the policy solution to segregation in much of the early US literature, which argues that inter-group mixing, cultural assimilation and acquisition of occupational skills works to reduce occupational discrimination and aid economic and social mobility (Park 1926, Duncan and Duncan 1955, Taeuber and Taeuber 1964). Indeed, this literature subscribes to the theory of the race relations cycle, that contact moves through the stages of conflict and accommodation and results in eventual assimilation. While evidence was produced to show that desegregation resulted in improved socio-economic status and better chances of occupational mobility (Duncan and Lieberson 1959, Lieberson 1961), there was also a strong emphasis on cultural assimilation which reinforced the superiority of native White culture. Indeed for Duncan and Lieberson (1959), one of the consequences of segregation was social distance between groups, measured by the perception of the native White population towards immigrant groups. Clearly, while assimilation was aimed at eradicating inequalities and ‘dissipating subordinate status’ (Duncan and Lieberson 1959: 104), it aimed to do so on dominative normative terms.

To some extent this kind of assimilation was discredited due to a number of its assumptions. At the structural level, the conjecture that the host society was a homogenous static entity, into which minorities were inevitably going to adapt, was an obvious limitation in the analysis. Secondly, the perception of assimilation policy as a state-imposed normative program aimed at eradicating minority cultures, and therefore implying inferiority of the latter, discredited the concept in the Civil Rights Era. As Brubaker (2001) notes, however, there has been a return of assimilation in the US. Most notably, Alba and Nee (1997) have been at the forefront of arguing for its conceptual utility in understanding processes of incorporation. Whilst accepting its repudiation, for the reasons previously given, they argue for its utility to examine the social processes that occur spontaneously and often unintendedly in the course of interaction between majority and minority groups, looking specifically at the US. Expanding Milton Gordon’s canonical account of assimilation, they develop a theory that addresses the causal mechanisms of assimilation, incorporating the theory of the race-relations cycle, albeit recognising the limitations imposed by racism and discrimination. For example, they argue that ethnic stratification which places inferiority on ethnic minorities means that although individuals can improve their position in the opportunity structure, his/her ethnic identity ‘places a ceiling upon the extent to which they can rise’ (1997: 839). They suggest it is the occupational and geographic mobility of immigrants that are the most significant aids to their assimilation, and highlight that while assimilation works, it does so unevenly, a phenomenon referred to as segmented assimilation.

Segmented assimilation lends itself to the emerging quantitative data in the UK which indicates that Indians and Chinese groups are achieving second generation advantage in comparison with Pakistani, Bangladeshi and African Caribbean groups (Simpson et. al 2006,
Heath and Cheung 2006). Also some commentators on the 2001 civil disturbances in Britain’s northern towns indicated that this was an assimilation into British ‘yob culture’, rather than a result of self-segregation and Muslim values.\(^\text{14}\) Silberman et al. (2007) in a quantitative analysis of data in France, find three distinctions from the US segmented assimilation model which could apply equally well to the UK case. Firstly, the role of the colonial relationship between the French and North Africans determines the extent of incorporation; secondly the perception of cultural racism over colour racism, which is specific to North African Muslims; and thirdly ‘the place of geography is not quite the same’ and so indeed the ‘disadvantaged neighbourhoods surrounding French cities have, arguably, not been as abandoned by the state as have many of the inner-city areas in the US’ (2007: 24.). Despite these quite stark differences between the US and France, the authors do not call for an abandonment of the notion of segmented assimilation but argue for a recognition of the different causal mechanisms.

Brubaker (2001) makes the case for a more nuanced version of assimilation that can allow for understanding how immigrants change over generations. In its most positive aspect this new assimilation can account for change in terms of modes of heterogeneity rather than a singular homogeneity, and focuses on materialist aspects such as economic and educational assimilation, rather than on the cultural. However, despite this quite sophisticated attempt at asserting what could be called a benign assimilation there are a number of assumptions that render the concept problematic. Firstly, Gans (2007) questions the connection between social mobility and assimilation, preferring to see these as independent factors. This raises the question of why segregation/assimilation are of such concern to policy makers, a dilemma central to the argument of this article. Secondly, this benign assimilation still rests on the noted assumption that there are ‘core values’ to assimilate into.\(^\text{15}\) These are clear in the literature reviewed by Brubaker, where authors such as Alba (1995, 1997) assume a set of normative values that new immigrants need to have in order to assimilate. As a descriptive tool, there is clearly some merit in the segmented assimilation model especially when it refers to material differences between majorities and minorities, but as an analytic to describe the processes of immigrant incorporation into a society it is sorely lacking. This analytical deficit rests with the way in which assimilation relies upon the newcomer to engage in change rather than a structural account which foregrounds opportunity structures and institutional blockages.

Despite the surfacing of segregation in public discourse in the UK, assimilation has too much of a negative political history to follow suit. In its place the term integration has held sway. In governmental discourse, integration has long been the preferred language to tackle issues of perceived cultural difference. For instance in 1967, Roy Jenkins, the then home secretary argued: ‘[Integration] not as a flattening process of assimilation but at equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’; (1967: 216) and
then in 2002, Blunkett in the white paper, *Secure Borders, Safe Havens*: ‘But to ensure that we sustain the positive contribution of migration to our social well-being and economic prosperity, we need to manage it properly and build firmer foundations on which integration with diversity can be achieved’ (Blunkett 2002: 2). Nevertheless, Blunkett’s new integrationism (Kundnani 2007) shares many features of American style new assimilation. There are a clear set of normative values that are being constantly pronounced upon by government ministers, especially with regards to Muslims, which hark back to the US studies from the 1960s. The questions of speaking English, of specifically abandoning cultural practices and norms, and of loyalty to the nation are central aspects of the demands being made by the state on Muslims in particular and all minorities in general. The then Commission for Racial Equality’s (2005) definition of integration at first sight pays lip service to its own historical role of furthering social justice, by defining it in three parts—equality, participation, and interaction, but nonetheless underpins this by arguing it should also mean that everyone sign up to a set of core values which take precedent over ancestral and cultural values (2005: 1-2).

Indeed, as the discourse on integration has matured in the UK since 2001, it has become more and more focused on values and less on integration into the labour market or into educational parity. This has largely been through the adoption of the language of community cohesion as a corollary to integration. The policy document ‘*Our Shared Future*’ by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007) usefully represents this new position. This report is by far the most sophisticated of the policy statements that have emerged subsequent to the events of the 2001 civil disturbances and the rise in what is called ‘home grown’ terrorism. Indeed the report tries to distance itself from the reactive nature of the responses to these two briefs. Even though there is a problem with conflating the issues of local riots and transnational terrorism, the reports focus is on tackling what are perceived as national problems in a local way. While framing the problem in terms of ‘parallel lives’, the response to this is not to focus on a common culture but rather to emphasise a shared future. This subtle shift is quite important as it rightly asserts the possibility of citizenship in a context of different cultural practices and norms. In its best sense this implies: ‘An integrated and cohesive community is one where: There is a clearly defined and widely shared sense of the contribution of different individuals and different communities to a future vision for a neighbourhood, city, region or country’ (Commission on Integration and Cohesion 2007: 42). There is an attempt to recognise that difference outside of ethnicity exists and to emphasise the interconnections between gender, generation and geography. Nonetheless, the bulk of the report, and its recommendations, is concerned with ethnic/religious difference. Indeed, there is only one acknowledgement, in a report running to over 150 pages, that difference can be positive: ‘In our interim statement we highlighted the consultation from the Lesbian and Gay Christian Movement, which pointed out that “much human progress (in justice, arts, sciences, services etc) has emerged because people have thought and acted in ways which
did not conform to a single norm” (Commission on Integration and Cohesion 2007: 94). What is also relatively marginal in the report is the question of social inequality. As the response by the 1990 Trust (2007) to the report highlights: ‘The real issues of discrimination, structural barriers, poverty and foreign policy are the real barriers to a society in which all citizens share common values. Integration does not necessitate equality but equality will increase integration’. Indeed, the bulk of the recommendations concern different ways in which social contact and interaction across lines of religion and ethnicity can be increased. This is simply a reiteration of the communitarian agenda that lies behind much of the community cohesion discourse.

From Community Cohesion to Social Capital

In a Derridean sense the word segregation should always be written with integration next to it in brackets or crossed out, as each word implies the other and is always present when one or other of them is written. From a more empirical perspective, the same point is made by Bitterman and Franzen: ‘Generally speaking, segregation is viewed as the opposite of integration. Both terms describe the relationship between the collective whole that society represents and the component parts represented by the various population groups. But while integration suggests that which unites – ....– segregation is associated with that which separates ...’ (2007: 127). The authors also note how segregation is irrevocably viewed as negative. Michael Banton calls integration a ‘treacherous’ concept because it ‘assumes that the social processes of group interaction can be likened to the mathematical processes of making up a whole number’ (2002: 151). While this may be too literal an understanding of the term integration it does focus attention on the presupposed ‘whole’ against which groups are segregating and towards which they should be integrating. The nature and shape of this cohesive and well integrated society often remains un-named in the literature. In a review of European integration policies, Favell (2001) argues that it is the nation itself that provides the aspiration for what is being segregated from and needs to be integrated to. Indeed, this is the homogenous object that is behind the community cohesion agenda as articulated by numerous politicians since 2001 (see Kundnani 2007). As a relatively empty and flexible framework, the nation allows for a range of values to be asserted from democracy to tolerance. What is central to this discourse is a structuring of values into a hierarchy in which those that belong to ‘us’ are superior than those that belong to ‘them’. In academic debate the crudeness of what is essentially assimilationist notions of the homogenous nation have been contested, as we have shown earlier on. In policy circles the analytical framework of social capital has emerged and is viewed as apparently far more benign and rigorous. Rather than the nation as the unit which needs to be integrated into, the idea of creating a geographical area with high social capital, potentially allows for an avoidance of the pitfalls associated with an assimilation agenda that asserts majority over minority.
The spatial antinomy of the segregation debate sits well with a particular version of social capital, with its emphasis on face to face social contacts and generalised notions of trust. The notion of an ideal state comprised of high levels of general trust, reciprocity and a strong sense of belonging has been embraced by UK policy makers, who have used data measuring such ideals from government surveys since 2001, to report the state of the relationship between diversity, trust and community participation (Kitchen et al. 2006). Robert Putnam (1993, 2000) has advocated the benefits of social capital for social cohesion more generally and recently has applied this model to areas undergoing white desegregation, or becoming more ethnically mixed. The main argument put forward by Putnam is that ‘in the short to medium run…immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital’ (2007: 138). Indeed he finds that levels of trust and other indicators of social capital are lower in ethnically diverse areas not only between different ethnic groups but also within groups. Conceptually there is a contradiction between the discourses of segregation and social capital. Where the segregation debate finds areas of high minority ethnic concentration a problem, the social capital debate targets ethnically mixed areas. In empirical terms most areas of high ethnic minority concentration are in fact ethnically diverse neighbourhoods, therefore consistent in both debates is the production of Black neighbourhoods as pathologised (Smith 1993).

Like segregation, social capital has, in other contexts, been used in progressive ways. Although the basic idea that participation in groups can have positive consequences for individuals and communities has grounding in classic sociological texts, the concept of social capital has been claimed to be a property of individuals (Bourdieu 1986), families (Coleman 1988), neighbourhoods (Putnam 2000) and even nations (Helliwell 2003). It has become a contested term with some advocating benefits and seeing it as a solution to cohesion, (Putnam, 2007), while others (Bourdieu 1986, Portes 1998, 2001) regard it as an outcome of social and ethnic inequalities, showing how it works to exclude outsiders. In the British context, neighbourhood social capital has been seen as an integral part for achieving social cohesion with its emphasis on shared values. However, Cheong et. al. have eloquently demonstrated how ‘a focus on social capital assumes that everyone counts the same as everyone else without regard for the diversity of social context and economic inequalities’ (2007: 28). Furthermore, the concept goes back to an assimilationist framework that requires a reduction in cultural difference between groups for levels of trust to rise. It becomes inevitable then that good social capital requires homogeneity to create social cohesion and policy measures are targeted at reducing cultural difference and increasing interaction (with the same intention).

While the Commission on Integration and Cohesion assert that diversity of all kinds can present a challenge, as Putnam does, focus in the policy context remains on the challenges presented by racial and ethnic diversity to social capital and therefore cohesion. Our Shared
Future (2007) develops a more subtle account of change in areas where ethnic diversity has occurred, but works under the general premise that ethnicity is the most significant variable when looking at social capital in an area. Indeed, it is the too easy assumption that ethnicity is the main driving force behind reductions in social capital that provides an indication of why it has been taken up so readily by policy makers. Even in Putnam’s own findings, it is clear that contextual indicators play a far more significant role than ethnic diversity when it comes to having an impact on social capital.\(^{18}\) Therefore a decision is being made to focus on ethnicity in the theoretical model that underpins the quantitative research. Furthermore, ‘incidences of discrimination or inequality that define experience of ethnic minorities are left aside’ (Cheong, et. al. 2007: 34). Arguably, this could be seen as a response to policy makers concerns about ethnicity, as opposed to factors of material inequality. Conveniently, this form of capital that relies on the less privileged to form social relations in order to better their social and economic circumstances is of great appeal to ‘policy-makers seeking less costly, non-economic solutions to social problems’ (Portes 1998:3). The prevalence of economic inequality is often forgotten or dismissed in the social capital literature. However, Letki’s examination of the same hypothesis has shown that deprivation and disorder amplify the importance of cleavages, especially along racial lines (2005:11). She indicates that low socio-economic status of a neighbourhood has an indirect negative effect on social capital via diversity but the association of a low-status setting with racial heterogeneity leads to perceptions of diversity as the main causal factor. This point is further developed by Kundnani who argues that it is not clear from attitudinal surveys: ‘Whether this [distrust] is caused by the fact of diversity itself, or whether it is a particular way in which people think about the diversity of their community in societies marred by racism’ (2007: 35). In either case, Letki makes the salient point about policy solutions in this arena: ‘efforts to revive social cohesion through…inter-community relations are misplaced if they under-emphasise material deprivation, crime and low community socio-economic status’ (2005: 24).

It could be argued that it is precisely the lack of emphasis on inequalities that gives social capital its appeal to policy makers. Putnam (2007) offers a solution to the constructed problem of ethnic difference by drawing on the US assimilationist perspective, which is to reduce the social distance between individuals by reconstructing new social identities. This should be a two way process so individuals become comfortable with hyphenated identities. Though the examples offered from the US experience of intermarriage and religious conversion almost always imply change by the minorities.\(^{19}\) What is of course crucial about Putnam’s work is that it allows the responsibility for change to fall onto the shoulders of the minority ethnic groups themselves. Management of diversity and difference implies a rather benign process, but in the context of Islamaphobic Britain actually involves the creation of a disciplinary regime in which policy becomes increasingly targeted at Muslim groups (Kundnani, 2007). Social capital provides a sophisticated foil for the assertion of Muslims with incompatible practices: female genital mutilation, forced marriage and anti-gay discrimination.
being the most popular, which in turn disable the production of beneficial social capital. Under the palliative notion of ‘managing diversity’ what is rather exposed is a set of tools for disciplining and governing a potentially dangerous group (rioters and suicide bombers). Burnett (2004) usefully outlines the way in which the community cohesion agenda reworks the relationship between the citizen and the state, in which the role of the latter is solely concerned with discipline and control. ‘As the police ‘family’ increasingly extends to quasi-public and private bodies, and the concept of policing extends to the imposition of ‘active citizenship’, state-instigated racism becomes embedded in ‘community cohesion’ (2004: 14). This increasing role for policing activities becomes embedded in a discourse of self-discipline, where good communities are those that provide help in self-policing.

### Conclusion

In the long history of interactions between politicians, policy makers and activists from the USA and the UK, it has been argued that the traffic has too often been one way, with the UK responding to US led initiatives, often funded by that country’s more wealthy philanthropic institutions (Clapson 2006). Certainly in the revival of the debate about segregation and assimilation in the UK, policy makers have relied upon US notions of social capital and cohesion. However, the British academic and activist community has been fairly robust in its defence of the specificities of the British case, arguing against the conceptual framework of segregation (Simpson 2004, 2007, Phillips 2006); against the importation of the social capital method (Cheong et al. 2007); and against the new integrationism (Kundnani 2007). Indeed, in bringing together the literature for this paper, there is a stark absence of those who see much utility in a wholesale adoption of US analysis and policy in this arena. Nonetheless, with the creation of a Department of Communities and Local Government, the Labour administration has clearly indicated the policy weight behind the community cohesion agenda. It remains to be seen the extent to which this will be matched by as clear an agenda in the area of equalities with the launch of the unified Equality and Human Rights Commission.

The main point of the synthesis of US and UK literature that we have offered here is to indicate that the conceptual apparatus that has been used, ie of segregation and assimilation cannot be viewed as neutral academic tools that can be applied regardless of particular histories and contexts. Certainly progressive uses have been made of indices of spatial distance in the US context and the complex and multiple reasons why people live in any particular place has been subject to thorough and critical analysis. Our interest, however, has not been in attempting to explain patterns of population distribution, but rather to explain how segregation has come to be used in the current policy debate as a way of targeting a particular group within society. This has required a number of conceptual steps away from viewing segregation as a neutral analytical category to demonstrating its use as tool to target particular groups. Self-segregation, rather than representing choice of residence becomes
about a choice in values. These conceptual moves, which are also present in the adoption of
a social capital framework to enhance community cohesion, result in the initial targeting of
Muslims, but enable a much wider set of disciplines to encompass other ‘problem’ groups.

Footnotes

1. This is not to argue that cultural and material aspects are completely separate
domains, nor that one is actually more important than the other, but rather to note the
shift in emphasis in policy and academic discourse.

2. It was during this period that challenges to segregation in public schools arose when
five such cases, usually sited by reference to the first, Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, Kansas, came to the US supreme court for joint argument in 1952. Although
in 1954 the court ruled that there was no place for segregation in schools due to the
inequality and inferiority that this promoted, hostility from the Deep South and Virginia
meant that even by the end of 1956, in six southern states not a single Black child
attended school with Whites. Bussing opponents won a limited victory when the
Supreme Court ruled in 1974 that requiring the transfer of students from the inner city
to the suburbs was unconstitutional. Further, in 1978 the Bakke v. Board of Regents
of California ruling restricted the use of quotas to achieve racial balance in university
classrooms. Indeed the issue of school segregation remains a much debated area of
social policy in the US, with more recent evidence showing the process of
‘desegregation’ in the South is now being reversed. The Civil Rights Project have
argued that recent supreme court rulings are doing much to undermine the progress
made during the Civil Rights era with detrimental consequences for African American
and Latino populations (see http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/ and specifically

3. Analysis by the author of the yougov data used for the statistics in the speech
showed the change claimed in friendship patterns between 2004 and 2005 was not
statistically significant, in contrast to Phillips’ claims of the results being ‘beyond any
statistical fluctuation’.

4. Indeed Trevor Phillips in 2007 in a talk at Manchester University maintained his
argument about segregation despite the presence of those authors who had
conclusively refuted the basis of the segregation statistics that were being used as
the basis of his arguments.

5. In some senses this ties in closely with the death of multiculturalism debate, where
the valuing of multi-cultures by the state is problematic because it values cultural
difference, which in turn is the reason for rioting and suicide bombing.

6. The explanatory hint provided, but inadequately tested by Johnston et al. (2007) is
the different class positions of each group. This being ignored Pakistanis become
further racialised so that self-segregation is only an issue (as with multiculturalism)
when it concerns Muslims (Allen 2007)
7. Perhaps this positive view of Leicester should be expected as Ted Cantle was the former Director of Housing at the city council, Ted Cantle.

8. We use the term unexpected here, because Phillips himself has engaged in targeting Muslims for being anti-British: ‘Trevor Phillips’s declaration on the Jonathan Dimbleby television programme on 26 February 2006 that: “if Muslims advocate alternatives to the British parliamentary system, they should live somewhere else,” was typical of this attitude.’ (Allen 2007: 39)

9. Even in that context there was a transnational dimension as Jamaican criminal gangs were seen to be infiltrating the streets of London.

10. A similar argument is made by Peck in terms of the broader neo-liberalisation of social policy under which welfare reform falls.

11. In a report back by Professor Christine Griffin, on middle class university students’ drunk narratives, given at the Social Identities workshop on class, 7/3/7, there most visceral comments were always reserved for the White working class.

12. This focus on the White working class is not talked of in terms of segregation from the White middle class.

13. This dichotomy is presented in recent policy formulations on combating extremism, see


   The emphasis is on Muslim extremism, as funding for initiatives in this area is based on having more than 5% Muslims in a particular area.

14. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1408319.stm. Similar comments were made by commentators as seasoned as Tariq Modood in a paper given to a workshop on the British riots of 2001 at Salford University, May 14th 2002

15. Despite Brubaker’s (2001) own attempts at avoiding the necessity for this, benign assimilation with its process implications, rather than outcome approach, still requires a goal

16. This is from the Response to the Commission for Integration and Cohesion Consultation, by the 1990 Trust and is available from www.blink.org.uk/docs/CICC-response.pdf accessed 21/10/7

17. It could be argued that all the USA is currently going through a desegregation of white areas, finishing the incomplete business of the civil rights era in which black areas were desegregated. Indeed, the areas of high social capital that Putnam (2007) eulogises are precisely those places in the mid-west and rural south Dakota where diversity has been effaced (Hallberg and Lund, 2005) initially through the genocide of Native peoples and subsequently through spatial exclusion of African Americans.

18. If one looks at, Table 3. Predicting Trust in Neighbours from Individual and Contextual Variables, in Putnam (2007: 152) the standardised beta column shows that neighbourhood poverty and crime rates as well as individual factors such as age,
education and household income have more significance than the ethnic diversity variable.

19. Though there is no attempt to explain that racial intermarriage between black and white was illegal in the US until 1967 and was only taken off the statute books in the state of Alabama in 2000!
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