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***E pluribus Duo: Contrasts in US and British Segregation Patterns:*¹**

Abstract

Recent attempts have been made to argue that Britain is sleepwalking into American-style ghettoisation. The paper argues that such claims misunderstand both the US and British situations. In particular they fail to recognise the unique intensity of the African-American ghetto. Nothing like the concentration of the African American population exists in Britain and attempts to label Indian, Pakistani or Caribbean areas as ghettos misrepresents the British minority position and underestimates the African American situation.

The ghetto is a phenomenon, almost unique in western urban societies, to the African American population. Although Black segregation levels are now decreasing, the ghetto remains. British ethnic segregation is generally moderate and decreasing and seems to be following the American assimilation, rather than the African American ghetto model. However, ghettos do exist in Northern Ireland albeit with different causation processes from those in the US. Ironically, the truly ghettoised groups in the US and UK are their oldest minorities, the African Americans and the Northern Irish Catholics. Space, however, does not allow me to cover this latter important topic.

The paper compares segregation levels for minority populations in the US and UK. It finds that the decreasing levels of segregation, over time, for foreign immigrants groups and their descendants, predicted by the assimilation model of the melting pot, has been an accurate predictor for the formation of the American nation. The exception has been the African Americans. The extreme rejection of Blacks has been the means by which newer arrivals have been able to 'become' White. Black segregation levels remain high, although slow signs of decrease have appeared since 1980. The paper argues that the failure to distinguish between the ghetto and the ethnic enclave has allowed a misinterpretation of the Black present, a falsification of

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its predicted future and the misrepresentation of the history of the European ethnics' past.

INTRODUCTION

The British literature and the press (Johnston et al 2002; Phillips, 2005; Poulsen, 2005) has, in recent years, been alive with allegations that Britain is sleepwalking into American style segregation and literature. The assertion stems from a profound misunderstanding of the difference between the ghetto and the ethnic enclave. The sharpest explanation of this point was made by Thomas Philpott (1978) using Chicago 1930s data. He demonstrated that there was a fundamental difference between the European ethnic enclaves and the Black ghetto. These differences are clear from table 1.

The first column of Table 1 gives the population of major ethnic groups. The second gives the number of each group living in their so-called 'ghettos'. The third gives the total population of those 'ghettos'. The fourth shows the proportion of each group 'ghettoised'. The fifth column shows the proportion the named group's population formed of the total of the so-called ghetto.

Table 1 'Ghettoisation' of Ethnic Groups, Chicago, 1930

Group	Group's City Population	Group's 'Ghetto' Population	Total 'Ghetto' Population	Percentage of group 'Ghettoized'	Group's percentage 'Ghetto' Population
Irish	169,568	4,993	14,595	2.9	34.2
German	377,975	53,821	169,649	14.2	31.7
Swedish	140,013	21,581	88,749	15.3	24.3
Russian	169,736	63,416	149,208	37.4	42.5
Czech	122,089	53,301	169,550	43.7	31.4
Italian	181,161	90,407	195,736	49.7	46.2
Polish	401,306	248,024	457,146	61.0	54.3
African American	233,903	216,846	266,051	92.7	81.5

Source: Philpott, 1978, 141

For all the European minorities, apart from the Poles, only a minority of their populations lived in their supposed 'ghettos': 3 per cent of the Irish, 14 per cent of the Germans, 15 per cent of Swedes, just under 50 per cent of Italians and 61 per cent of Poles. However, almost all of the Black population, 93 per cent, lived in the Black ghetto. Secondly, European ethnic groups rarely formed a majority of their supposed ghettos. Just over a third of the Irish 'ghetto' was Irish, 32 per cent of the German 'ghetto' was German, a quarter of the Swedish 'ghetto' 31 per cent of the Czech

'ghetto', 46 per cent of the Italian 'ghetto' was Italian and just over half of the Polish 'ghetto' was Polish. However, for the Black population 82 per cent of the Black ghetto was Black. The European enclaves in other words were dually dilute. Less than half of their respective groups lived in their supposed ethnic areas and generally less than half of the population of their supposed ghettos was composed of the named group. The Black ghetto, on the other hand, was dually concentrated. Nearly all Blacks lived in it. Nearly everyone in it was Black. The European enclaves were voluntary, the Black ghettos were enforced. The European enclaves were positive (Ward, 1982) the Black ghettos were negative. The European enclaves were springboards or decompression chambers, the Black ghettos were prisons.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SEGREGATION

Spatial segregation is important because the level of segregation between groups in a city has been an effective index of social trust. High segregation means low social trust. Low segregation means high interaction (Duncan and Lieberson, 1959). In his Johan Skytte Prize Lecture, Robert Putnam (2007) suggested that ethnic diversity tends to reduce social solidarity and social capital. His evidence from the US suggests that in ethnically diverse neighbourhood's residents of all races tend to 'hunker down' and that trust (even of one's own race) is lower, altruism and community cooperation rarer, friends fewer. If we apply this analysis to the US and the UK, the lowest trust seems to exist between the African American and White populations in the US and between Northern Irish Catholics and Protestants in the UK.

Segregation and Assimilation

The dominant story of American segregation has been one of immigrants settling in dense city-centre ethnic enclaves and gradually dispersing outwards. There has been the gradual inclusion and assimilation of European, Latino and Asian populations albeit with considerable discrimination and competition between those already accepted and those (the Chinese, Japanese, Irish, Italians, Poles and others) considered temporarily beyond the pale: *E pluribus unum*.


However, although this is the dominant story, there are two other narratives. The dominant other story has been one of continued and enforced segregation of the African American population. The minor story has been one of continued voluntary concentrations of some minority groups (Li, 2008).

The true story of Black segregation, as late as 1958, was obscured by attempts to 'normalise' the African American population as if it were just another foreign immigrant group. This implicitly views the struggle for African-American assimilation, as on a par with the European immigrant struggles. The true story, however, is one of African American exceptionalism. It was, indeed, this Black exceptionalism which allowed the success of the assimilation of nearly all other groups, into the White American core, no matter how racially or culturally different they appeared at first. So what happened, in Nathan Glazer's (1999) words was that **'the sharpest divides are between African Americans and all others, regardless of race'** (see also Alba, 2005). Putt more bluntly, the history of African American experience is not '*E pluribus unum*' it is *E pluribus duo*. In Britain, on the other hand, the sharpest distinction has been between the Whites and the rest

The Macro picture: Black/White Ethnic and Racial Competition

The starting point for this brief history of Black American competition with White immigrants is Walter Willcox's (1931) map of the distribution of the African American and the foreign White population USA in 1920, at the end of the era of mass European migration to the USA. The map shows two macro regions with an intervening shatter belt. Over 10 per cent of the population of the Southern (the states marked black) from Texas to Maryland) are black (the upper figure in each state) and less than 10 per cent foreign-born white. The block of 'northern' states marked grey, from California to Maine, manifest the inverse combination- all over 10 per cent foreign white and less than 10 per cent Black. Between them runs a belt of states from New Mexico to West Virginia in which neither foreign whites nor African Americans formed 10 per cent of the population.

(Figure 2: map of USA in 1920 Black 10 per cent and foreign White 10 per cent).




Work by the economist Brinley Thomas (1954) demonstrated how the US economy up to the time of the Civil War had responded to prior changes in the rates of European immigration. During the Civil War, he argued that the American economy matured. By the end of the Civil War, European immigration was controlled by prior changes in the US economic cycle (Thomas, 1964, 94). Thomas argued that argued that White European immigration avoided the areas of competition with the native Black population, but at the same time white immigration blocked opportunities for

African American movement from the South to the North, resulting in this inverse geographical pattern: whites avoided the states with Black dominance; blacks were unable to penetrate, in substantial numbers, areas of foreign White dominance.

Evidence of this blocking over space is replicated in an inverse pattern of blocking over time. When white immigration dipped, Black northward movement increased. When white immigration increased, Black movement dropped (Figure 2),

**Figure 2: United States: Decennial rates in increase of foreign born
And internal migration of Black Population to the North**



Source: Thomas, 1954, table 37, 131.

Although the inverse relationship between White immigration and Black northward movement can be tracked back to the 1870s, the dramatic migration breakthrough for southern Blacks can be seen in the right hand section of Figure 3. It came in the First World War. World War I decoupled the relationship between economic boom and white immigration. The War both caused the American economy to boom, and simultaneously blocked the flow of the foreign white workers on which economic expansion had hitherto depended. Lacking foreign whites, industry drew in African Americans from the South.

Thus both the map and the diagram tell the same story. The inverse relationship over space, seen in the map of the US in 1920 at the end of the great period of European immigration, is manifested over time in the inverse relationship between the rates of growth of the foreign born in the US and the growth of the Black population the North).

However, there is an additional element to the story. From the start of World War I to the end of World War II, for the 31 years from 1914 to 1945, African Americans became the newest immigrant group in Northern US cities. Until the arrival of the Puerto Ricans in the post 1945 period, African Americans were effectively the most recent wave of immigrants. The newest wave was expected to be the most segregated. Thus Black segregation could be normalised into the expected model. Black segregation was normalised as an expected phenomenon. However, it was also naturalised as a temporary phenomenon.


The standard understanding of segregation was developed by Park and Burgess and the Chicago School of Sociology. In simple terms, it was a brick in the pond model. The newest immigrant groups settled in dense clusters in the inner city displacing or replacing the group which had preceded them. They, in turn, displaced/replaced their predecessors and so on in an outward rippling effect. As they moved outwards, the minorities mixed more with the wider society and became more assimilated.

Park, regrettably made no distinction between the ghettos and the other immigrant colonies: they are all seen as specific examples of the same generic type, not distinct species. As Robert Park (1926) put it:

‘The Chinatowns, the Little Sicilies, and the other so-called “ghettos” with which students of urban life are familiar are special types of a more general species of natural area which the conditions and tendencies of city life inevitably produce’ (Park, 1926, 9). ‘the keener, the more energetic and the more ambitious very soon emerge from their ghettos and immigrant colonies and move into an area of second immigrant settlement, or perhaps into a cosmopolitan area in which the members of several immigrant and racial groups live side by side’ (Park, 1926, 9).

Later members of the Chicago School charted this outward movement over time in graphic form (figure 4).

Figure 4: Diagrammatic representation of the outward movement of minority centre of gravity in Chicago of selected ethnic/national groups over time 1880-1940.



Source: Adapted from Ford (1950)

Transects showing the zonal distribution of Minority Groups in the city of Chicago, 1890-1940

Source: adapted from Johnston, 1971, 248, after Ford 1950

The social assimilatory process was thus locked into this geographical spatial pattern. Thus the newest immigrant group was simultaneously the most inner city concentrated, the most segregated, least English speaking and the least assimilated with the he poorest jobs and the lowest degree of out-marriage (figure 5). The assimilation model therefore seemed to posit an inevitable shift over time from a highly segregated, unassimilated inner city location to a suburban fully assimilated residential pattern with low degrees of segregation from the charter population: ghetto-enclave-suburb.

Figure 5: Expected relationship between residential segregation and social assimilation







Figure 6: Expected relationship between residential segregation and social assimilation: applied to Polish ethnic group



We can amalgamate these different processes of figures 5 and 6 to produce a synthetic model of the expected relationship between location, segregation and assimilation in three generational stages (Figure 7)

Figure 7: theoretical and applied three-stage model of ethnic segregation and assimilation



However, this three stage sequential model was transformed into an inevitable transition model: Ghetto- Village – Suburb. In this conception, the ethnic village became a kind of low-fat version of the ghetto.

Figure 7 not only represented the *current* locations of three different generations at one moment in time. Figure 5 also represented the *history* of the most suburbanised groups. Most importantly Figure 5 was believed to represent the *future* of the most as segregated group, the then African American population. The suburbanised Irish, it was imagined, three generations ago, were where the African American population were now. In three generations' time, the Black population would be where the Irish were now. Such was the confidence in this model, that Philip Hauser, Director of the Chicago School of Sociology published in 1958, the following prediction in *Confluence* (a journal edited by Henry Kissinger):


The Negro migrant to the city will, without question, follow the same pattern of mobility blazed by the successive waves of immigrants who settled our central cities. Just as the immigrant underwent a process of 'Americanization' the in-migrant Negro is undergoing a process of 'urbanization'. The Negro is already rising and will continue to rise on the social-economic scale as measured by education, occupation, income and the amenities of urban existence. Furthermore, the Negro, in time, will diffuse through the metropolitan area and occupy outlying suburban as well as central city areas (Hauser, 1958, 65).

The exceptionalism of the Black Ghetto

The trouble with this projection was that the ghetto was not a part of the 'normal' process. It was a thing in itself. It was not the first part of a threefold sequence. Black ghettoisation revealed the misunderstanding of European enclaves. European ethnics were never truly ghettoised, so never went through a true ghetto stage. Worse still, the Black ghetto's dissolution was not inevitable. Indeed it has still not dissolved. The Black population of the US accounts for 12 per cent of the American population. If they were evenly distributed across the population, they would form 12 per cent of the population of any area.

Figure 7 shows the percentage of the Black and White populations of the USA in 2000, living in tracts with given percentages of African Americans: 38 per cent of the African American population of the United States lived in tracts where they formed between two thirds and 100 per cent of the tract population and where less than 1 per cent of the white population lived. 81 per cent of the White population lived in tracts where less than 10 per cent of the population was Black and where only 15 per cent of African Americans lived.

Figure 8



Source: Author's calculation from US Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1) 100-Percent Data, tract level; *American Factfinder*

http://factfinder.census.gov/home/en/epss/p_ct_geo_in_geo_2.html

INDEXES OF SEGREGATION

To tell this story efficiently, the Index of Dissimilarity (ID) is used as the main tool. ID measures the degree of likeness or dissimilarity of the residential patterns to two groups in a city. It is calibrated from 0 (no segregation or perfect similarity) to 100 (total segregation or complete dissimilarity). ID values have a direct verbal, meaning: the percentage of either of the two groups being compared, which would have to change their area of residence in order to replicate the distribution of the other. The underlying theoretical assumption is that the more residentially similar the two groups are, the more assimilated they are (Park, 1926; Duncan and Lieberman 1959; Lieberman, 1963; Taeuber and Taeuber., 1965; Peach, 1975; Massey and Denton, 1993). Many other measures of segregation are available, both singly and in combination, (Duncan and Duncan, 1955; Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965, 197-245) but ID has particular value for this overview of being a measure with a cumulative, tested literature extending over fifty years.

From the middle to late 19th and early 20th centuries, Lieberman records just two cases of the Black population in Northern cities being less segregated from the native White population than some of the Eastern and Southern Europeans. In Boston in 1880, the 'Coloured' population was segregated from native Whites by an index of 50.6 while Italians had an index of 73.8, Poles 61.5 and Russians 53.8 (Lieberman, 1963, 79 table 19). The Coloured/ Native White ID had remained the same since 1850 (Lieberman, 1963, 78, table 18). In Columbus in 1910, Native born Whites were less segregated from African Americans (31.6) than Native born Whites were from Foreign born Whites (39.1) (Lieberman, 1963, 122, table 38). However, after the Great Northward

Migration of the World War I years, African Americans became the newest immigrant group and universally the most segregated.


The short half-century: 1910s to 1950s African Americans as the ‘Newest’ Immigrant group

We thus arrive at a situation from the 1910s until the 1950s, when the African American population was the newest immigrant group in the United States. World War I had cut off European immigration. Anti-immigration legislation in the early 1920s had prevented its renewal. The stock market crash of 1929 and the Depression of the 1930s had further reduced foreign immigration. World War II had prevented European migration yet again, but stimulated further internal migration of African Americans from the South to the North.

The Black position as the newest immigrant group, made it appear ‘natural’ for African Americans to be the most segregated group. After all, the newest group was expected to be the most segregated. The Poles and Italians had taken from 1880 to 1950 to experience a substantial decrease in their IDs. By 1958, we have seen, from Hauser’s prediction above, there appeared to be complete faith that when the next immigrant wave arrived in America, the African Americans would move up and out of the ghettos

The false hope of Hauser’s prediction is evident in Figure 8

Figure 8: Comparison of Decreasing Polish segregation in Chicago 1930-1990 compared with continuing high levels of Black segregation



Two years after Hauser's 1958 paper, the US 1960 census, shattered the faith in the universal applicability of the model to the Black. Even thirty five years later, in 1993, the Black segregation remained so unchanged that Massey and Denton could publish their book entitled *American Apartheid*, revealing that the African American population was not only still ghettoised, but was now hypersegregated. The inevitability of the Chicago assimilatory model, so well exemplified by European groups, was stopped in its tracks. Moreover, it had failed despite Hauser's correct statement that the Black population was '*already rising and will continue to rise on the social-economic scale as measured by education, occupation, income and the amenities of urban existence.*' The problem was that such progress did not translate into decreasing segregation.

The critical paper which demonstrated the failure of the Chicago model to explain high levels of Black and its failure to decrease over time, was published by Karl and Alma Taeuber in 1964. Their paper dealt with the Chicago's Black population in the 1960 census. The Taeubers demonstrated that the Puerto Ricans, who had been arriving in the US since the late 1940s, and were the newest immigrant group, were less segregated from Whites than native African Americans. Puerto Rican segregation from Whites was 67 compared the Black/White ID of 83 (Taeuber and Taeuber, 1964, 131 in Peach. 1975). Not only were the Puerto Ricans less segregated than the Black population, but this was despite the Black population being superior to them on every socio-economic measure. The Taeubers showed that the very high level of Black segregation could not be explained by the relative poverty of the Black population. Employing an indirect standardisation technique, they showed that if the Black population had been distributed across the city according to income, their expected segregation from the White population in 1960 would have been 10 instead of the observed level of 83. In other words, far from Black poverty being the driver of Black segregation, income differentials between Black and White 'explained' only 12 per cent of the high level of Black segregation.

Kantrowitz (1973a) reinforced the conclusion that race was the driver of the unexpected contrast between the African Americans and Puerto Ricans, by demonstrating that Black Puerto Ricans in New York were more segregated from White than brown ('other race') Puerto Ricans, who in turn were more segregated from Whites than White Puerto Ricans. African phenotype and race emerged as the driver of African American segregation. Puerto Ricans formed the brown foothills to the Black mountain of Harlem (Kantrowitz, 1973b).

Data for New York City (Peach, 1999) shows the continuing power of Blackness on segregation. There was a chromatic scale. Table 2 shows that Non-Hispanic Whites' (ie European White) segregation from Non Hispanic Black (ie African Americans) was 82. This is higher even than the segregation of All Whites from All Blacks (76). Whites were segregated only moderately from Hispanic Whites (47) but more from Other Race (Brown) Hispanics (67) and most highly from Black Hispanics (75). Hispanic Whites had low segregation from Other Race Hispanics (32) but higher segregation from Hispanic Blacks (45). Massey and Bitterman (1985) demonstrated that with Puerto Rican entry to White tracts in New York in 1980, there was a 90 per

cent chance of White loss. However, for Mexicans entering White tracts in Los Angeles in the same period there was a 50 per cent chance of White gain. The sharpest divide lies between between the long established Blacks and Whites, not between the recent Hispanics and Whites.

Table 2: Tract level Indexes of Dissimilarity (ID) and Segregation (IS) for New York PMSA 1990

	White	Black	Total Hispanic	Puerto Rican	(Anglo Whites) Non Hispanic White	Non Hispanic Black	Hispanic White	Hispanic Black	Hispanic Other Race	English	German	Irish	Italian	Polish	N
White	0														4,832,376
Black	76	0													2,254,576
Total Hispanic	58	53	0												1,842,127
Puerto Rican	64	52	22	0											898,088
Non Hispanic White	8	81	66	71	0										4,112,614
Anglo Whites															
Non Hispanic Black															
African Americans	77	5	57	56	82	0									2,014,863
Hispanic White	47	59	20	34	55	62	0								719,762
Hispanic Black	75	41	31	37	81	45	45	0							239,713
Hispanic Other Race															
Brown Hispanics	67	55	14	21	74	59	32	32	0						859,957
English	36	83	72	76	34	83	63	83	79	0					254,587
German	24	82	68	73	21	83	58	82	76	25	0				549,791
Irish	26	83	68	73	23	83	57	82	76	34	21	0			756,557
Italian	31	84	70	74	28	84	60	84	78	47	36	31	0		1,126,601
Polish	25	83	69	73	22	84	59	83	77	40	31	38	44	0	367,459
ID	28	51	41	49	35	53	35	51	50	49	41	42	46	42	
IS	64	69	52	54	67	70	38	53	56	50	44	47	53	43	
															8,546,848

Note: The N column includes double counting eg White, Non-Hispanic White etc

Source: Peach (1999)

Note: colours are used to highlight important high or low IDs

ID = Index of dissimilarity between pairs of ethnicities (where row and columns intersect) except in the penultimate row where it represents the difference between the named group in the column heading and the total population, including itself.

IS = in last row represents the Index of Segregation between the named group and the total population, excluding itself. Where a group forms a large part of the total population, its ID is bound to be low.

Moreover, Massey and Denton(1993, table 4.1 p 87) showed that irrespective of whether Blacks were rich, middle income or poor, their average degree of segregation from Whites of the same income category in the 1970-1980 period was high and similar for each income category. The average segregation of poor Blacks from poor Whites in 18 Northern Metropolitan areas was 85.8; that between middle income Blacks and Whites was 80.7 and that between rich Blacks and rich Whites was 83.2 (Table 3). Recall that the ID's range is from 0 to 100.

Table 3 : Average segregation of poor, middle income and rich Blacks from poor, middle income and rich Whites in 18 Northern Metropolitan areas, 1970-1980

<i>Northern Metropolitan area</i>	Income category		
	under \$2,500	\$25,000- \$27,000	\$50,000+
Boston	85.1	83.9	89.1
Buffalo	85.2	80.0	90.0
Chicago	91.1	85.8	86.3
Cincinnati	81.7	70.9	74.2
Cleveland	91.6	87.1	86.4
Columbus	80.3	74.6	83.4
Detroit	88.6	85.0	86.4
Gary-Hammond-E Chicago	90.6	89.5	90.9
Indianapolis	80.8	76.6	80.0
Kansas City	86.1	79.3	84.2
Los Angeles-Long Beach	85.4	79.8	78.9
Milwaukee	91.3	87.9	86.3
New York	86.2	81.2	78.6
Newark	85.8	79.0	77.5
Philadelphia	84.9	78.6	81.9
Pittsburgh	82.1	80.6	87.9
St Louis	87.3	78.4	83.2
San Francisco-Oakland	79.9	73.7	72.1
<i>Average</i>	81.3	76.4	78.8

Source: Based on Massey and Denton, 1993, Table 4.1

In 1965, the Taeubers (1965) followed their 1964 paper with their landmark book *Negroes in Cities*. The book used block data, with a finer mesh (average population size of 100 households) than the more usual tracts (usually 3,000 to 6,000 persons; Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965, 223, 226). Block data produce a higher ID than tracts. The results for the 207 cities for which block data were available in the 1960 census were dramatic. ‘The index values ranged form 60.4 to 98.1... Half the cities have values above 87.8 and a fourth above 91.7 (Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965: 34). The Black population was almost completely segregated.

Black Segregation as Different in Kind: not a slowed down Black version of the general assimilation model, but a totally different trajectory

What we are seeing here, therefore, is not a slowed down Black version of the general assimilation model, but a totally different trajectory for the African American population. Segregation levels were high and continuing high. The Black population was on a pluralistic rather than the assimilatory path. Newer immigrant groups, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Mexicans, Chinese, Indians, and Koreans proceeded to leapfrog the Black population into lower segregation (Table 4) and higher intermarriage.

Table 4:
Residential Segregation Indices of Dissimilarity for African Americans, Latinos and Asians: All metropolitan areas (weighted Average): 1980, 1990, and 2000 (tract level, using Non-Hispanic Whites as the reference group)

Year	African Americans	Latino or Hispanic	Asian and Pacific islanders
1980	72.7	50.2	40.5
1990	67.8	50.0	41.2
2000	64.0	50.9	41.1

Source: Iceland and Weinberg with Steinmetz (2002. Tables 5.1, 41.1 And 6.1 respectively

Note: I have not been able to disaggregate the Latino or the Asian populations into their constituent parts

The old assimilation model had held out the hope of time/space substitution. According to the old model, Blacks as he most recent immigrants to the city, were assured that in three generations they would be where the Irish, Poles and other Whites had already reached. The suburbanised Irish could believe that three

generations ago they had been where the Black population now found itself. Both beliefs were wrong: the Irish had never been ghettoised; the Blacks could not escape the ghetto.

Six Important contributions to the Geographical Debate on Segregation

After the Taeubers' work, but perhaps without direct consciousness of it, there appeared a set of landmark works disentangling the ghetto from the enclave. Four contributions stand out: those of Philpott (1978) Ley (1973) Ward (1982) Harvey (1973) Massey and Denton (1993) and Ellen

David Ward's (1982) approached the issue from the opposite end to Philpott. While Philpott argued that the Black ghetto was negative and unique, Ward emphasised that enclaves were generally good, but perhaps slipped into the error of assuming that they had been ghettos. His emphasis was on the positive attributes of the European ethnic enclave. He argued that the enclave was not the site of ghettoised anomie and social pathologies, but a decompression chamber; not limbo, so to speak but the antechamber to acceptance and assimilation. Because there was such emphasis on the advantages of the European enclave, one has, perhaps, to infer the disadvantages of the Black ghetto from the silences on the matter.

David Ley's Ghetto

David Ley's (1974) classic account of the ghetto, *The Black Inner City as Frontier Outpost*, was a trap-door book. By this I mean that he first draws a picture of the ghetto from the popular press and media representations, as a Black, armed insurrectionary camp, destabilising the core of American cities. He then pulls the trap-door lever and drops the reader into the reality of the street. He switches from the stereotyped outside view to the inner participant observational experience. He shows the ghetto as fractured and individuated: the site of zero-sum games in which advantage is gained almost only at the expense of another's loss, a prison, not a springboard. Ley's is a personal and humane reading of suffering.

David Harvey's Ghetto

David Harvey's (1973) account of the ghetto in *Social Justice and the City* has a totally different approach. It marks Harvey's conversion from quantitative geography to Marxism on his road to Damascus. Harvey sees the ghetto not as a problem for capitalist society but as a solution to capitalist problems. The filibustering introduction to the chapter, explains the fundamental difference between the capitalist concept of 'profit' and the Marxist concept of 'surplus value'. Profit is the difference between the cost to the capitalist producer and the price to the buyer. The capitalist buys the raw material, and buys the labour applied to produce a finished product; the amount of the sale price of the product above the production cost, is the capitalist's profit. Profit belongs to the capitalist. On the other hand, Marxist 'Surplus value' belongs to the workers. 'Surplus value' is the addition in value, produced by the application of labour to the raw material. The Marxists' historic role for labour, therefore, is to force the redistribution of the surplus value, stolen from the working

class by capitalists. The capitalists' defence strategy, however, is to prevent working class solidarity. Harvey argues that capitalists use poor Blacks to divide the working class by threatening White workers with cheaper Black competition. Capitalists divert the White workers to fight Black workers, rather than the capitalists. Concentrating the Black population in the ghetto makes the Black population more visible and threatening. According to Harvey, the ghetto is the product of the segregation of the rich from the poor. The Blacks, as the poorest group are the most concentrated.

Although the Harvey analysis has important insights in to the way in which 'race' is racialised, his economic explanation of the ghetto does not work. Income difference, as the Taeubers (1964) showed, 'explains' very little of Blacks' residential segregation. Blacks are not segregated because they are poor. If they were, Latinos would be more segregated than Blacks.

2008, was the 40th anniversary of the Lyndon Johnson's Fair Housing Act, which sought to deconstruct the enforced ghetto. Several imaginative schemes have been introduced, including the US department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD's) attempt to disperse ghetto inhabitants by lottery (Goering. 1993). Seven years after Massey and Denton's American Apartheid appeared, Ingrid Gould Ellen's (2000) Sharing America's Neighborhoods was published, with an optimistic tone.

Since 1968 there has a slow but continuous decrease in the degree of Black/White segregation. Iceland et al's (2002 and Iceland 2004) analysis of changes in the weighted average ID for all Metropolitan Areas in the United States, shows a decrease of ID from 72.7 in 1980 to 67.8 in 1990 to 64.0 in 2000. The decrease has been continuous from the censuses of 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000.

Table 6: Residential Segregation Indexes for Hispanics or Latinos: 1980, 1990, and 2000 (tract level, using Non-Hispanic Whites as the reference group)

Index, year, and percent	All metropolitan areas (weighted Average)	Weighted average	Minimum	Median	Maximum
Index of Dissimilarity					
1980	50.2	51.1	16.0	52.5	69.0
1990	50.0	50.8	19.3	49.9	74.4
2000	50.9	51.7	17.5	51.3	75.4

Source: Iceland and Weinberg with Steinmetz (2002. Table 6.1)

Ellen's Optimism

Ellen's findings, as of the 2000 census, show modest overall progress towards more racial mixing (just as segregation measures have shown some degree of

decline over the last 20 years). She enumerates 25.5% of all tracts as totally integrated in 1980 and 36% by 2000. A good deal of this integration, it is essential to note, is with *non-Black* minorities. She also reports that only 47% of tracts remained stable, with 10% or less change in racial proportions. Roughly half of all tracts that were integrated in 1990 lost Whites; nearly 51% lost White residents while only 2.4% gained Whites. (Goering, 2005 Peer Review of "Racial and Ethnic Residential Segregation in the United States: 1980-2000" http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/peer_review.html)

Yet despite the progress exemplified by the decrease in IDs from 1970 to 2000 and Ellen's evidence of increased mixing of African Americans with the rest of the population, Black segregation remains higher than that of their main comparator group, the Latinos and even higher than that of newer immigrant groups such as the Chinese.

The Latino population has grown explosively since the 1960s and by 2000 had overtaken the African American population as the largest minority in the US, Yet between 1980 and 2000 their weighted average ID for all Metropolitan areas had increased from only 50.2 to 50.9. Recall that during this period, the Black ID for the same set of cities had fallen from 72.7 to 67.8 in 1990 to 64.0, but remained 13 points higher than that of the Latinos and 23 points higher than for Asian (table 7).

Table 7: Residential Segregation Indices of Dissimilarity for African Americans, Latinos and Asians: All metropolitan areas (weighted Average): 1980, 1990, and 2000 (tract level, using Non-Hispanic Whites as the reference group)

Year	African Americans	Latino or Hispanic	Asian and Pacific islanders
1980	72.7	50.2	40.5
1990	67.8	50.0	41.2
2000	64.0	50.9	41.1

Source: Iceland and Weinberg with Steinmetz (2002. Tables 5.1, 41.1 And 6.1 respectively)

Regrettably, Iceland et al's (2002) analysis aggregates all Hispanic ethnicities into a single group, despite the fact that there are major differences between them. Mexicans for example are strongly concentrated in Texas, California and

the States between, Cubans are concentrated in Florida and Puerto Ricans in the North East and Illinois. There are also important socio-economic and phenotypical differences between them.

Nevertheless, despite the aggregation of Hispanics into a single category it seems unlikely that Iceland et al (2002) broad conclusion is not true and that the Hispanic population, despite being more recent, less English speaking and less socio-economically advantaged than the Black population (but see Li. 2010) is significantly less segregated than African Americans. Despite the rapid growth of the Latino population (from 9.6 millions in 1970 to 35.3 millions in 2000 and 44.3 millions in 2006) the highest levels of Latino segregation are 10 points lower than those for African Americans.

The Chinese, in fact, seem to be the only example of an ethnic group in the US which has been able to break away from ghettoisation. In the Chinese case, it has been achieved not by the dissolution of the concentrations of Chinatowns (indeed Min Zhou, 1992, has shown how New York's Chinatown has grown and diversified engulfing most of Little Italy and beyond) but through traditional assimilatory dispersal (such as the Chinese movement into the Sunset and Richmond suburbs of San Francisco) and the creation of new ethnoburbs by newly arrived Chinese in the suburbs (Li., 1998; Ley. 1995, Mitchell, 1997)

If we take the whole universe of tracts for the USA in 2000, categorised by the percentages of the Black and White populations living in tracts with given percentages of the Black population (see Figure 7 above) it is evident that there is a considerable skew.

While 82 per cent of the White population is living in tracts which are between 0 and 10 per cent Black, 36 per cent of the Black population are living in tracts which are between two-thirds and 100 per cent Black. Thus decreases in Black segregation are coming about more through white areas becoming more mixed rather than black areas becoming less Black

The Black experience had another unexpected effect. It concealed the fact that not all pluralistic paths of integration are involuntary. Amish colonies such as that in Lancaster County in Pennsylvania show that voluntary separation is a viable route for social organisation in the US. However, such groups are seen as historical survivors and rural rather than urban, so they become oddities rather than mainstream adaptations. Nevertheless, voluntary and highly concentrated ethno-religious enclaves, such as the ultra-orthodox Satmar Hasidic Jews of Williamsburg or the Lubavitch Hasidic Jews of Crown Heights or even the highly secular Russian Jews of Brighton Beach (all three areas are in Brooklyn) demonstrate the viability of highly segregated and encapsulated communities. Looking beyond the USA to Canada (where, unlike the USA, there is a religion question on the census), relatively high levels of Jewish residential segregation are evident (Darroch and Marston, 1972; Peach, 2005b). In the 1991 census, for example the Jewish IDs in Montreal, Toronto and Winnipeg were respectively were 82.75 and 72.0 (Peach, 2005). Work by Alba, Logan and Crowder (1997) has even suggested a re-constitution of Italian neighbourhoods in the New York


suburbs. These points about the viability of voluntary pluralistic concentrations become important in relation to the contrast between US and UK segregation patterns.

UK SEGREGATION

British segregation differs significantly from that of the US. Britain is a smaller country in population terms. The US has 300 million people, the UK a fifth of that number. Large-scale Non-European migration to the UK is largely the product of only the post 1945 period. Whereas the African American and Latino populations together already accounted in 2000 for a quarter of the US population, and including the Asian population, nearly 30 per cent of the US population, Britain's combined Black and Minority populations in 2001 constituted only 8 per cent (Table 8).

Britain has far less statistical data on its BME ('Black and minority Ethnic Population' the official shorthand) than is the case in the US. Britain has collected ethnic data on the census only since 1991. However, imperfect as the estimates are, it is clear that the population has grown dramatically since 1951. Britain's Black and Minority Ethnic populations (their official designation) have grown from less than 100,000 in 1951 to 4.5 million in 2001. Estimates for the Main groups' growth are given in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Estimated growth of the Caribbean, African, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Chinese populations 1951-2001.



Source: Author from censuses 1951-2001.

The Black Caribbean population grew from less than 30,000 in 1951 to 566,000 in 2001, but has remained fairly stable at the half million mark since the 1970s. Caribbean migration was largely working class, but unlike the later South Asian movements it was relatively gender balanced at an early stage and women came as workers. Caribbean movement closely followed the demand for labour in Britain and came to an effective halt after the economic crisis of the 1973 Yom Kippur War

The Indian population, on the other hand, increased from just over 30,000 in 1951 to just over a million by 2001. The composition of the population was more complex from that of the Caribbean. The movement was largely from prosperous peasant areas in the Punjab and Gujerat, but contained also a highly significant professional elite population, particularly of medical practitioners and academics. In the late 1960s and early 1970s Indian numbers were swollen by the forced migration of East African Asians from Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi. The East Africans were largely middle class, professional and entrepreneurs. Unlike the peasant migration, which arrived directly from the sub continent, they came a families and with no myth of return (Anwar, 1979). East African Asians and their children account for roughly a third of the Indian population. Although the Indian population contained significant number peasants (albeit from the rich irrigated Punjab region) the overall Indian socio-economic profile in Britain was high. Their settlement was concentrated in the more prosperous South East and East and West Midlands of the country (London, Birmingham and Leicester). Religiously, just under half of the Indian population was Hindu, A third was Sikh and 13 per cent Muslim.

The Pakistani population came roughly contemporaneously with the Indian population, but was much slower in bringing wives and families to join the men who pioneered the movement (Ballard, 1990, 223). Their numbers have increased from about 10,000 in 1951 to three quarters of a million in 2001. About half are now British born. (Ballard, 1990:2200) estimates that about two-thirds of majority of Pakistanis come from the Potohar plateau in the north west of the country and the great majority within this number from Mirpur or Azad Kashmir. A significant part of the Pakistani population was composed of peasants from the Mirpur region of Northern Pakistan who had been displaced by the construction of the Mangla dam on the river Jhelum. Many of the men were employed as unskilled shift (often night shift) workers in the textile manufacturing industries of West Yorkshire (Leeds/Bradford) and Lancashire (the Greater Manchester Area) and in the metal working industries of the West Midlands (Birmingham) area. The delay in bringing wives and families to join the men was affected by misgivings about exposing them to British morality (Ballard, 1990). This attitude is still reflected in the exceptionally low participation rate of Pakistani (and also Bangladeshi) women in the formal labour force (about half that of the population as a whole). Nearly all of the Pakistani population was Muslim.

Bangladeshi immigration was late, compared with that from Indian and Pakistan and peaked in the 1980s. Much of the Bangladeshi migration came from the

rather isolated District of Sylhet and settled directly in council housing in Tower Hamlet, the most deprived London Borough in the East end of the city. As with the other South Asian groups, the original nodes of settlement remain the main centres today. The Bangladeshis have the poorest socio-economic profile of the main immigrant groups. Nearly all of the Bangladeshi population in Britain was Muslim.

Since the 1990s there has been new refugee migration from Bosnia in former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan Somalia, Morocco and Nigeria. There has also been a surge of immigration from Eastern Europe (notably an estimated 500,000 Poles) as new countries have joined the European Union, so that Britain's new minorities are becoming more diverse (Vertovec, 2007)

ARE BRITISH CITIES AS GHETTOIZED AS THOSE IN THE US?

Ethnic IDs in Britain

Although large scale non-European minorities are the product of the last half century, the 19th and 20th century immigration of the Southern Irish and East European Jews set two distinctive patterns of integration. The Irish have followed (despite the struggles of the IRA) an assimilative trajectory, so that their spatial distributions, socio-economic profiles and marriage patterns are very close to those of the White British population as a whole. The Jewish integration has been more plural, showing a higher socio-economic pattern than the population as a whole, a high degree of concentration in London particularly in north London (Graham, 2005).

First of all segregation levels of most British visible minority groups are not high. Secondly, it is decreasing. Thirdly, it appears that the Black groups, the Caribbean and Africans are following the American melting pot (or Irish) model while the South Asians may be following a pluralistic or Jewish trajectory. Fourthly none of these British ethnic groups seem to be following the African American ghetto model, although there are disputes over this point. Johnston, Forrest and Poulsen (2002:597, 600) listed Leicester, Bradford and Oldham as having ghettos and Poulsen (2005: tables 17 and 18) argued that If Leicester's Indian concentration had been ranked at its equivalent level for Black segregation in the US, it would have been 'right up there with Chicago and Bradford's Pakistanis with Miami.'

Low and Decreasing Segregation

The most robust figures we have for measuring ethnic segregation come from the censuses of 1991 and 2001, the only censuses to have included a question of ethnicity. Table 8 shows that the average IDs apart from the Bangladeshis, are low or moderate and that all have decreased between 1991 and 2001. This decrease was despite the rapid rate of growth of the Black and Minority (BME)

populations. The unweighted average Caribbean ID was a low 36. The Indian average ID in 2001 was 40, the Pakistani ID was 51 and the Bangladeshi was a high 61. The Caribbean average had decreased from 43 in 1991 to 37 in 2001; the Indian average from 42 to 40; the Pakistanis from 56 to 51 and the Bangladeshis had decreased from a very high 69 to 61.

Table 8: Comparison of 2001/1991 Indices of Dissimilarity, ward level, for the Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations in the main centres of settlement in England

	Caribbean		Indian		Pakistani		B'deshi	
	2001	1991	2001	1991	2001	1991	2001	1991
Birmingham	35	40	42	48	55	62	61	67
Blackburn	*	*	56	53	53	52	*	*
Bradford	32	39	42	49	51	54	60	69
Kirklees	53	62	52	55	46	49	*	*
Leeds	53	63	42	42	55	61	61	79
Leicester	20	29	44	42	46	47	61	73
London	39	43	44	46	46	48	61	62
Manchester	38	49	35	39	48	52	53	63
Oldham	24	38	42	49	66	72	66	73
Oxford	33	32	27	25	32	46	*	*
Pendle	50	48	39	36	53	56	*	*
Sandwell	27	36	31	41	49	55	58	65
Sheffield	37	47	37	33	60	69	64	70
Wolverhampton	27	29	28	33	55	64	*	*
unweighted average	36	43	40	42	51	56	61	69

Source: author's calculation from Census of England and Wales 2001, ward data Table S104.

*= insufficient numbers <1,000

The Caribbean population, for which we have a longer record of change in London (where over 60 per cent of their number live) shows a continuous decrease at all scales from 1961 to 2001 (table 9). The highest percentage that the Caribbean population formed of any Output Area (average size 300 people) the equivalent of a US block statistic was 38 per cent.

Table 9 Comparison of Caribbean-born IDs in Greater London at Borough, Ward and Enumeration District/Output Area level, 1961 – 2001.

Year	Ward Level ID	Source
1961	56	Lee (1973)
1971	49	Woods (1976)
1981	46	1981 census: author
1991	41	1991 census: author
2001	39	2001 census: author

Average wards size c 12, 000

Recall that the highest percentage for African Americans at tract level in Chicago or was 100 per cent and that 2000 ID for African Americans in New York (81) and Chicago (80) are twice as high as for Caribbeans in London. The New York (Table 10) and Chicago Black IDs have remained high since at least the 1930s.

Table 10: New York City, 1940 - 2000 Indices of Dissimilarity of African Americans and Whites

Year	Index of Dissimilarity	Scale	Source
1940	86.8	Block	Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965, 39
1950	87.3	Block	Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965, 39
1960	79.3	Block	Taeuber and Taeuber, 1965, 39
1970	81.0	Tract	Massey and Denton, 1993, 64
1980	82.0	Tract	Massey and Denton, 1993, 64
1990	82.2	Tract	Denton, 1994, 58
2000	81.0	Tract	Iceland et al 2002 PMSA

The London data show not only decreasing degrees of segregation of the Caribbean population nationally, but a hollowing out of the inner city concentrations and outward movement from the centre (Peach, 1996, 2005, 187)

It is perhaps surprising that there have been claims that British cities Bradford and Leicester are ghettoised and more segregated than Chicago or Miami (Poulsen, 2005; {Phillips, 2005). Table 11 gives the figures for the percentage for the concentration of minorities in the British cities as compared with the African American population in Chicago and Miami.

Table 11: Comparison of the degree of concentration of Minorities in Leicester (ward data) and Bradford with African American Concentrations in Chicago and Miami (tracts)

	Leicester			Bradford		Chicago PMSA	Miami PMSA
	Indian	All Minorities	Pakistani	All Minorities	Black	Black	
100	0	0	0	0	3	0	
90	0	0	0	0	50	13	
80	0	17	0	0	7	28	
70	12	11	0	30	6	12	
subtotal 70+	12	28	0	30	66	44	
					4		
60	9	30	17	12	4	16	
50	29	0	32	0	2	5	
40	18	12	0	15	4	6	
30	4	0	16	16	6	7	
20	4	14	10	11	5	7	
10	16	13	19	9	8	6	
0	7	3	6	8		9	
Per cent	100	100	100	100	100	100	
N	72,033	101,184	67,994	101,617	1,559,886	457,214	

Source: Source: Author's calculation of US 2000 census Short form tract data SF1. Peach, 2009

British data from Census of England and Wales S 104, ward level.

PMSA=Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area.

It can be seen that only 12 per cent of Leicester's Indian population lived in their supposed Ghetto where they formed between 70 and 80 per cent of the ward population. There were no wards where they formed over 90 per cent of the population. If one summed all minorities together, 28 per cent were living in wards where they formed over 70 per cent. Chicago, which was claimed to have the equivalent ranking of segregation as Leicester, had two thirds of its Black population in tracts where they formed 70-100 per cent of the population; 3 per cent of Chicago's Black population were living in tracts which were 100 per cent black. 50 per cent were living in tracts which were 90-99 per cent black. . Bradford, whose Pakistani population was ranked at the same level as Miami's African American population, had no ward in which Pakistanis formed as much

as 70 per cent of the ward population. Miami, on the other hand had 44 percent of its of its black population at this level.


The highest percentage formed by the aggregated minority population, found in any of the 8,800 wards in England and Wales in the 2001 census, was 88.1 per cent. In Britain, one had to aggregate all minorities together to produce such a proportion. There were only nine wards with a concentration in the 80s. These concentrations, it should be emphasized, refer to an aggregation of all minority groups, not to a single minority as is the case for the classic ghetto.

Although these British concentrations are high, they are dwarfed in relation to the intensity and extent of the levels of African Americans segregation. We find that for Chicago alone, there were 43 tracts in which the black population accounted for 100 per cent of the population, a further 24 where they formed 99 per cent and 309 altogether where they formed over 90 per cent of the population. Not only is this the case, but the figures refer to a single ethnic group not a collation of minorities aggregated to make a worst case scenario.

US and UK Inter-ethnic marriage patterns

The contrasts between the British Caribbean population and the African American population are even greater when inter-ethnic marriage and other unions are considered (see also Model and Fisher, 2001 and 2002.).

Figure 9. 1992-2002 unions outside own group (%), Great Britain,



Source: Labour Force Survey, 1991: Quarterly Labour Force Survey (Spring) 1992-2002

Notes:

- (a) Applies to married and cohabiting men and women
- (b) 'Mixed' and 'Other' ethnicities excluded from analysis

Source: Coleman, 2004

In the period 1997-2001, over one third of Caribbean men had a white partner. The figures for Indian men were much lower, 7.9 per cent, for the Pakistanis lower still at 6.8 per cent and for the Bangladeshis almost invisible 1.7 per cent. The high rate of Caribbean exogamous partnerships is strikingly different from the low rates of the South Asians. This reflects what I have termed as the Irish trajectory and the Jewish trajectory. South Asian marriages are still, to a large extent unions between two families rather than simply between two partners. Arranged marriages (and marriage rather than cohabitation, or any informal unions are of immense importance). Marriage is not simply within the bounds of co-nationals, but within the same caste, within the same regional origin and in the case of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations within the same family, with a preference for first cousins (Ballard, 1990; Shaw, 2001).

Black/White unions in Britain are striking difference from the American patterns. Unfortunately US data refer to marriages rather than to unions. However, in 2000 only 6.3 per cent of married Blacks were married to a white partners and only 2.3 per cent of Black women had a White husband (Table xx)

Table 12: Black Endogamy and Exogamy Rates USA 2000

Race and origin of spouse	2000 (000s)	Percent endogamy	Percent exogamy
White total	50,331		
White Male Total	49,012		
White Females	49,185		
White Males/Black Females	95		0.2
White Females /Black Males	268		0.5
Black Total	4,352		
Black Males	4,257	93.7	6.3
Black Females	4,084	97.7	2.3
Black Male/White female	268		
Black Female/White male	95		
Black/Black	3,989		

Source: Estimate based on *Statistical Abstract of the USA 2001*. Table 50, p 4

Thus, to summarise, the Black Caribbean population, the nearest British comparators to the African American population were following an assimilation (albeit a segmented assimilation to the white working class) melting pot model of low and decreasing segregation and high inter-ethnic marriage and cohabitation pattern with the white population. This is not to say that there were no problems. There had been huge urban conflagration and disturbances between Black youths and the police in the 1980s and educational qualifications of Black boys are low. Caribbean women have a more white collar socio-economic profile than the men. However, they have a high proportion of single


parent households with dependent children and a high proportion of social housing.

The South Asian groups are more socio-economically differentiated, with Indians doing having a white collar socio-economic profile. Pakistanis have a more depressed socio-economic profile and the Bangladeshis even more so.

Once one changes the criterion from ethnicity to religion, sharper distinctions appear. Hindus have the highest socio-economic profile followed by Sikhs with Muslims at the bottom. There are many contributory reasons for this, but the main one is Purdah, the protection of women fro contact with unrelated men. Only 30 per cent of Muslim women of working age are in the formal labour market. This is half the percentage for the rest of the population and other religions. The lack of women in the formal labour market, translates into much lower household incomes than for other groups and poorer housing conditions. One third of Muslim households in England and Wales are located in the worst decile of Housing areas with a further 22 per cent in the next worst decile. Figure x shows that this is a significantly worse situation than for any other religiously demarcated group.

Figure 9

Sources



Source: Peach, 1996b

Conclusions


The conclusions to be drawn from these observations are that there is a contrast between the American and British views of segregation. The American view is


that ethnic and racial segregation is a transitory phenomenon. Where segregation persists, strenuous efforts have been made to eliminate it. Although the African American population remains highly segregated, change is taking place and the degree is decreasing.

The British view of ethnic enclaves until 9/11 has been much more permissive. Policies of Multiculturalism, initiated by Roy Jenkins as Home Secretary in 1966, saw the process as one of enrichment of British life rather than a flattening of the new cultures. It was an encouragement and respect for diversity. Since 9/11 the political discourse has switched from multiculturalism to ‘social cohesion’. South Asian concentrations have been labeled as ghettos and new elastic criteria have been proposed to convert ethnic enclaves into ghettos (Peach 2009; 2010). Even the successful outcome of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland has not resulted in a dismantling of the true ghettos. Instead their existence has been given institutional recognition and the ghetto edges have been landscaped with architectural decorum.

If we compare the 2001 ward concentration of Britain’s aggregated minorities with the 2000 tract concentrations of the African American, we see the important contrasts between the two countries.

The conclusion is that in the UK not all segregation is seen as bad, though the coincidence of high ethnic concentrations in areas of multiple deprivation is seen as an evil (Figure 9).





What one could conclude from these two diagrams and from the literature is that in the US White areas are becoming more mixed, but Black areas are remaining very Black. 80 per cent of the White population lives in tracts which house 15 per cent of the Black population while 37 per cent of the Black population lives in tracts where hardly any white live.

In Britain 6 per cent of all Minorities live in areas which contain very few Whites, but in 2001 even the most concentrated wards had at least 10 per cent white populations: none were 100 per cent minority. While over 80 over cent of Whites in England and Wales lived in wads where the minority population formed less than 10 per cent of the population, these wards also contained nearly 40 per cent of the minority population. The evidence in Britain is that the spreading out is greater than the tendency to pile up.

The UK exception is in Northern Ireland where, the Peace process has led to a formalisation of the separation of the Catholic and non Catholic working class populations, although mixing of middle class areas continues to expand

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